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a journal of East & West studies

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Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01–734–0592)

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America and Europe: The Logic of Interdependence

Raymond Aron

TWENTY-FIVE years have elapsed since the Hague Conference, presided over by Winston Churchill, gave rise to the Council of Europe. I am one of those who took part in that Conference and therefore older, though not necessarily wiser, by twenty-five years. In other circumstances, the comparison between yesterday's hopes and today's realities would move us to meditate on the irony of history, on the inevitable failure which is a penalty of success, on the unforeseen success which is a compensation for failure. Those who guided the foreign policy of the United States after World War II, who sought and participated in the economic reconstructure of Western Europe, must now feel some sense of fulfilment. But they also envisaged, or at least some of them envisaged, a federal grouping of those nations which were to share a common destiny; and they are disappointed. Observers are virtually unanimous on the provisional outcome of the enterprise—an extraordinary economic success, but a political community which has failed to emerge.

I would like to suggest that many of us who grumble about the Atlantic Alliance, the old unswerving fighters for European unification, rightly convinced that there is still much to be done, are also inclined to see the world through the same old spectacles. But I frequently question myself about the feelings of the generations after my own, those who are now forty years old or twenty. Do they share the same anxieties and hopes? What does the Atlantic Alliance mean to them?

In my view the Alliance has created a framework of internal security within which Europeans have been able to rebuild their ruins; they have learned to live together and have achieved some measure of prosperity. Whether young Europeans are aware of this political and economic success or not, they bear witness to it in their everyday lives: they cross frontiers without a thought and Europe is their mother country, at least in the sense that it is the place where they spend their vacations. As far as the United States is concerned, it is different; they do not know it so well; to them it appears as a rival as well as a protector: rival in the economic sense and protector in the military. I do not think that the two enterprises—European unification and Atlantic cooperation —have ever been free of difficulties and misunderstandings on both sides. President Kennedy, in the era of his Grand Design, invoked the image of two pillars which must support the bridge connecting the two sides of the Atlantic. Yet he remained faithful to the doctrine of non-proliferation. The United States reserved for itself nuclear arms, the

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ultimate resort, while promoting the increased participation of Europe in the use of conventional weapons. Such a division of defence responsibilities may seem rational in Washington, but it carries a double disadvantage. On the one hand, politically, it imposes on the United States permanent responsibility for European security; on the other hand, psychologically, it weakens the European will to take responsibility for its own defence.

Today a dominant feature of the transatlantic debate is concerned with the disproportion between economic prosperity in Western Europe and its political and military impotence. Thus the Six, and now the Nine, represents a strong force in world economy, a giant in world trade, while remaining a dwarf in inter-state relations. Is Europe able to discuss on equal terms, tariff rights or special drawing rights so long as she believes herself threatened by the blackmail implicit in the withdrawal of American troops?

Some young Europeans ask why we should fear the withdrawal of American troops. Why imagine, of all possible eventualities, the most improbable, the onrush of Soviet tanks westwards? We must, I believe, counter their objections, or rather, clear up the misunderstandings. If we believe in a US military presence in Europe, it is not because we attribute aggressive intentions in the classical military sense to the Kremlin leaders, it is not that we prefer confrontation to *détente* and the Cold War to coexistence (assuming for the moment, that these terms do have a precise meaning). It is simply that the Soviet Union today is one of the two greatest military powers in the world. And this great power is governed by methods fundamentally different from those in the West. Can it be taken for granted that the USSR would not be tempted to extend her influence, or even her rule, if she were not confronted by resistance, if there were no comparable countervailing power? This simple reason, based on historical experience, explains our attachment to the Atlantic Alliance.

APART from the technical, military or diplomatic controversy, we must not lost sight of the paradox present in the existing historical situation. Warsaw and Budapest form part of historical Europe; they are as much a part of European culture as London, Paris, or Rome, but in spite of geographic proximity and of its past, Eastern Europe does not belong to the same economic or political grouping as Western Europe. The Atlantic community does not exist today in the full sense of the term, but our political-economic group incorporates the US and Western Europe almost up to the same line of demarcation traced on German territory at the Yalta Conference during the last war and, in spite of *détente*, it does not include Budapest, Prague and Warsaw. We should not forget the temporary contradiction between geographic proximity and political alignment: we should not forget that political alignment cuts across the cultural ties and spiritual affinities between the

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two sections of Europe. An element of confrontation will persist in the era of *détente* so long as certain freedoms and rights inherent in our civilization have not been restored in places which are so near and yet so far from us.

Is this Euro-American grouping to which we belong threatening to break apart? Is President Nixon's diplomacy—rapprochement with former enemies and coolness towards his allies (as some of his critics point out)—threatening the feeling of common destiny, and so rendering any further cooperation difficult to achieve? Since the world economy is divided into two world markets to use Marxist terminology, political allies must inevitably be economic rivals. Or again, to use another terminology, there are now no longer any true economic conflicts except between allies or quasi-allies. Is it necessary to add that economic solidarity also exists only among allies? German prosperity is necessary for the prosperity of France, and both France and Germany require American prosperity. In practical details, however, there is competition and the opposition of rival interests. When I was young we jokingly spoke of a tradesman who was losing on each individual commodity sold, but who was nevertheless able to make a profit on the whole business. So today one could say, almost seriously, that the Atlantic community demonstrates the apparent contradiction of successful cooperation at the macroscopic level which hides, on various occasions, differences of interest. Are these contradictions likely to compromise the overall solidarity? Are we returning to massive devaluations, or to the transfer of unemployment from one country to another through undervalued currency? I think not. We are at present in an unprecedented situation. For the first time, a currency which has in a way exercised the function of an international currency, has ceased to inspire confidence. American foreign investments in the preceding period have been paid for not by a surplus in the balance of payments but by a deficit, that is, from the credits of foreign central banks. The monetary crisis puts a question mark on everything: rates of exchange, the role of gold, the GATT rules, tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers.

I adhere to the theory which American economists have called "scrambled eggs." The European and American economies are so strongly intermeshed that it is difficult to conceive the terms and consequences of dissociation. On the other hand, so long as the dollar continues to play the role it does, the responsible authorities in Washington must bear in mind both the privileges and obligations of an international currency. A devaluation of the dollar by 15 per cent in 1960 would probably have prevented at least some of the difficulties which we are now facing. It is difficult not to fear that, having invested pride and prestige in refusing to devalue the rate of exchange of the dollar against gold or against other currencies, the American leaders will not now embrace another extreme theory and begin to believe in floating rates of exchange to re-establish a correct level between international currencies and to

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solve the problem of their own balance of payments. Given the pattern of American exports, the so-called perverse effects of devaluation may continue for some time.

There are also other reasons for anxiety. From official statements, it is possible to conclude that the objective will not only be a trade balance, but a surplus necessary for overseas investments. Why this objective? Income from foreign investments has allowed Britain to accept a trade deficit for a long time. If the United States is concerned about the cost of its foreign policy, and in particular the cost of stationing American troops in Europe, then I think it would be better, once and for all, to have a frank and straightforward dialogue about it. For it seems right to me that Europeans who want a continued American troop presence should pay the price in terms of currency. I think it is deplorable and potentially destructive for the maintenance of transatlantic friendship and cooperation to mix up, or to give the impression of mixing up, protectionism and trade, the stationing of troops and the reimbursement of the Value Added Tax.

Many people are asking the question: while economic and trade matters are tending to separate Americans and Europeans, is not President Nixon, in a rather Machiavellian tradition, looking for simultaneous cooperation with Brezhnev and Mao Tse-tung, over the heads of his allies? Nixon's achievements in foreign affairs have been an exercise in realistic diplomacy and the effective use of power. He has managed to withdraw the United States from Vietnam on conditions very close to those he set out when he took office. He has had the strength to end the quarantine of China. He has, in fact, brought American diplomacy into line with the traditions of European statesmanship. The time of crusades is over and so is the period of non-recognition of regimes regarded as illegitimate. Europeans who often preached wise restraint blame him for applying it. Yet perhaps I may be excused for raising a question which is usually left unspoken. According to Montesquieu, even in wisdom there can be excess. One should not see an adversary as a devil, but one should not see him as a friend either. Perhaps one can consider the opponent of today as a friend of tomorrow, but one should not take him as a friend before he becomes one.

Nixon's visit to Peking, the devaluation of the dollar and the end of the Vietnam war, complete a period of history which began in 1947 with the Truman declaration and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. At the present moment of history it is necessary to pay closer attention in European and American relations to common values and objectives, to analyse economic problems in the light of the present political realities, and by concentrating on essentials to overcome the daily controversies which are the life, the glory and the weakness of democracies.

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America and Europe: The Logic of Unilateralism

George Ball *

PARTICULARLY during the past two years, relations between Europe and America have been marred by increased disdain and resentment. Since there is an inevitable interaction between what is said and done on each side of the Atlantic, there is a danger that we may, by indifference or carelessness or simply pique and frustration, create a climate in which these trends could be encouraged and intensified.

If that should occur it would be both tragic and unnecessary. Since the War, in Europe and America, we have been through intense and rewarding years together which have forged habits and systems of cooperation. Until the past three or four years, most of us took these for granted and believed that the design for effective co-operation we had worked out would provide an enduring mechanism through which we could improve the effectiveness of our common efforts and expand our common interests.

But today I am not so sure. The fundamental assumptions that have supported our post-war cooperation are now in doubt because of several complex developments. For more than two decades, Europe has been able to concentrate largely on its own internal affairs because it could rely for security primarily on the United States nuclear umbrella and the precarious balance of terror resulting from the nuclear stand-off between Moscow and Washington. At the same time, with the progressive shedding of its colonial possessions it has relieved itself of most world responsibilities. The prime achievement made possible by this luxury of concentration has been the conception and development of the European Economic Community—and particularly the creation, within the framework of the Community, of a great mass market. The direct and indirect benefits that have flowed from the European Economic Market have been the most important single factor in launching and sustaining an unprecedented era of economic growth. As a result Europe has developed a new sense of resilience—and an increasing conviction that, except in matters of security, it is now able to stand on its own feet. In fact, even security concerns have lost much of their urgency in the course of *détente* between East and West.

One might have hoped that, by this time, Europe's new sense of well-being and self-confidence would encourage it to move towards the

* This is based on a speech made by the Hon. George Ball at the Europe-America Conference held in Amsterdam on 28 March 1973. The proceedings of the conference will appear as a book entitled *The New Atlantic Challenge*, edited by Richard Mayne, and published by Charles Knight & Co. Ltd.

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assumption of a world role more nearly commensurate with its resources —or, in other words, with the role that the individual countries of Europe played in pre-war days. But I see little evidence of such intention; instead it seems to me that Europeans are, if anything, becoming even more preoccupied with their own affairs and even less concerned about the problems of the rest of the world. Although I know that the idea may be painful, I feel compelled to point out that Europeans are beginning to exhibit much the same kind of isolationism that America knew in the period between the two World Wars, with the result that—even conceding a unity that is more metaphorical than real—Europe exerts little more than a regional influence.

At the same time, in the realm of North Atlantic relations, Europeans certainly do not look towards the United States with anything approaching the same recognition of common interests that prevailed some years ago. Even the most vocally anti-American of my European friends still hope that America will continue to maintain its troop deployments on European soil, but there is, I feel, a growing resentment of America.

YET if Europe may be eyeing the United States with a jaundiced eye, the American attitude towards Europe is also deteriorating. For this a number of factors are to blame. Most important is the long, painful, frustrating and profitless ordeal in Vietnam—an experience that has done incalculable harm not merely to America's prestige but to its internal coherence, its belief in its own national mission, and, as an end result, the spaciousness of its foreign policy. Those effects have intensified the unfortunate coincidence of two other developments which, each in its own way, have tended to undermine self-confidence, put America on the defensive and generate an anxious and surly mood.

The first is the dislocation in our national life created by the belated efforts of the United States to rectify an old injustice. The British essayist Gilbert Chesterton once remarked that " progress is the maker of problems," and, in the case of America's treatment of its black citizens, that has certainly proved true. Together with the distressing state of our cities and the new focus on the dangers of our environment —problems which Europe is only beginning to experience—there is today much fashionable talk of what I believe to be a false dichotomy—whether America can any longer afford to devote vast resources to the maintenance of a world role or must concentrate on the unfinished business on its home front.

The second disturbing development has been the succession of financial crises triggered by America's persistent inability to move toward equilibrium in its balance of external accounts. Because the United States' internal market spreads over the length and breadth of a continent, foreign trade has not, in modern times, played as significant a role in our national life as in the case of smaller nations. As a result, the concept of a balance of payments on international account has

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never had much reality for the American people. For a country that emerged from the second world war with huge financial reserves and a disturbingly large annual surplus in its accounts with the rest of the world, the idea that the United States would ever show persistent deficits in its balance of payments—and recently even deficits in its merchandise trading account—has been hard to accept or explain. Americans have always thought of such deficits—if they have thought of them at all—as a chronic disease of weak nations. They find it difficult to reconcile a burgeoning internal economy with a deepening concern over our ability to balance our international books. Apparent contradictions of this kind—the paradox of visible strength and inexplicable weakness—defy public understanding since they lie outside normal logic and experience. The result—as history has frequently shown—is an almost inevitable tendency toward frustration and suspicion that inspires the search for a scapegoat—a reaction stemming from the assumption that, because these problems seem to have no rational base they could have arisen only through the malignity—or at least unfairness—of third persons, which, in this context, means America's principal trading partners.

Unhealthy as may be the effect of these suspicions on international politics, they would have made only a minimal impact on trans-atlantic relations had Western Europeans achieved anything like the progress toward full economic integration and political unity that was optimistically predicted in the days of innocence before the famous thunderbolt was hurled from Mount Elysee just ten years ago. Until then a structure had seemed to be taking shape through which Western Europe could organize its power and then equip itself to play a major and constructive part in world politics. That structure, as it appeared to many Americans in the early years of the Kennedy Administration, foreshadowed a Europe moving toward political unity and thus, ultimately, achieving the ability to speak with a single voice and act as a single political force. Because of our common heritage of ideas and institutions and our common attitude toward the pre-eminence of the individual and his rights to life and liberty, Americans took it for granted —quite properly—that a united Europe and a resolute America could work shoulder to shoulder in the pursuit of their common objective of a peaceful and secure world.

ALTHOUGH I know that it is now fashionable in some European quarters to regard the concept of an Atlantic partnership with considerable cynicism—as though it were merely a rhetorical device through which America hoped to influence, if not dominate European policy—I am sure that this was never in the minds of any American government with which I was associated. On the other hand, we were sadly aware of the fact that the United States had no monopoly of wisdom and we felt confident that a strong independent Europe would not only collaborate effectively in common enterprises but might also help deter us from unwise moves. At the end of the day

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we foresaw the prospect that, with the common strength of such a partnership, the West could work towards a gradual reduction of tensions and the improvement of relations with the East from a solid position. It seemed to many at the time, and it still seems to me, that this was a fundamentally sound conception which no one has been able to replace. Unfortunately, though Europe has made notable progress in building a mass market that has benefited not only Europeans but America as well, progress toward political unity has been lamentably slow and meagre.

Were the United States today in a buoyant and optimistic mood, it might accept this disappointing lack of progress without losing a sanguine view of the future. But given current attitudes of uneasiness and disenchantment, what Europe does or fails to do is viewed with a more than usually critical eye. It is not surprising, therefore, that concern is being expressed at high levels of government about whether the European trading bloc is basically antipathetic to United States' interests. Because our commercial policy is now largely in the hands of the technicians, it is no longer regarded as bad form to argue that America may have made a major error in encouraging the creation of the Community during the 1960s, nor even to suggest that the United States should develop policies which weaken rather than strengthen the fabric of European unity.

Comment of this kind is often attributed to the recrudescence of America's traditional isolationism, but such a diagnosis is, I think, far from the mark. In my view, what we are witnessing is not isolationism in anything like its classical form but the creeping emergence of an American variant of Gaullism. One can see this manifested in the procedural aspects of our political life—in the subordination of the legislative branch to an assertive executive, in the increasing use of theatre, spectacle, summitry and surprise in our international affairs and in the efforts to bend the deliberations of international organizations to serve a special national purpose. But procedure is only the surface evidence of a significant shift in the direction of American foreign policy —a shift away from an alliance policy toward the kind of unilateralism so brilliantly practised by General de Gaulle, but this time supported by the weight and resources of a super power.

The direct discussions that President Nixon conducted during the past year with the leaders of China and the Soviet Union were expressions of this and there is other evidence that America's emerging new diplomacy puts a high premium on the flexibility to manoeuvre without need to consult alliance partners. One may regard such flexibility as essential if America seriously sets out to play the role of balancing power among those key world power centres which President Nixon named in his now famous *Time* magazine interview—the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Western Europe and Japan.

Obviously, if such a concept should dominate American policy, the implications would be greatly disturbing for Europe because the logic

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of unilateralism prefers fragmentation to unity as that would make the balancing role far easier to play. However, I am not suggesting that unilateralism—the new American gaullism—has been fully incorporated in United States policy today, merely that there are strong pressures in that direction. Whether or not these pressures will prevail will depend in large part on Europe's reactions, for such views would gather little response in America if Europe had gone further towards achieving the vision of political unity, however idealistic it may seem. In the absence of such unity, America finds it difficult to try to conduct business with the Community. In most matters it must still deal with nine separate governments and even in commercial matters, where the Community purports to act as a collectivity, decisions are delayed and diluted since they emerge only after complex internal negotiations. The result of all this is that the American government finds it far easier to go it alone with only minimum prior consultation, or none at all, while an increasing number of Americans both in and out of government express their disenchantment by dismissing the Community as little more than an instrument for the commercial advantage of a group of self-centred European nations that connive to create policies aimed at the longer range economic and commercial interests of the United States. Distorted though this picture may be, there is just enough vocal anti-Americanism in Europe to give it a measure of credibility.

On the political front, we should be aware of the fact that if American mistrust of Europe continues to increase, the government will almost certainly be forced to withdraw American troop deployments from Western Europe and that this could well start a chain reaction leading to a diminished NATO contribution on the part of other Western powers.

MANY political philosophers have maintained that in order for a group of nations to achieve unity, there must be a unifying state. This state might, in theory, be a member of a group such as Prussia with the *Zollverein* or, alternatively, it might be a common enemy compelling unity by posing a common threat. In any event the role of unifying state is important and one might contend that a certain amount of anti-Americanism would be healthy if it unites Europe in facing pressures and competition from America. But no matter how strident anti-American sentiments may become, it would be a delusion to believe that the United States will play the constructive role of common enemy, for though it may annoy, the United States will never terrify. On the contrary, since resentment of America is being generated far more from pique than fear, the alienation of the United States from Europe or of Europe from the United States would be far more likely to cause Europe to fragment rather than unify.

In this context one may regard West Germany as a special case. To the extent that it were to feel less anchored to the West, its diplomatic adventures with the East could create further strains in the European

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structure, perhaps leaving Britain and France to re-establish a pale imitation of the *Entente Cordiale*. Even more dangerous are the probable effects of Western disarray in encouraging the Soviet Union to try to extend its influence; for if the West ceases its efforts to achieve unity and the individual nation-states respond to American unilateralism with a unilateralism of their own, a succession of European governments may be tempted to make their own bilateral arrangements with Moscow from what would necessarily be a position of relative weakness. If, as a result of the interaction of policies being followed on both sides of the Atlantic, America's presence and influence were largely withdrawn from Europe at the same time that European nation-states resumed their ancient rivalries, the Soviet Union would automatically emerge as the politically dominant power over the whole European land mass simply by what Raymond Aron has called the "logic of number."

Mankind's capacity for wishful thinking is almost limitless and today there is a rapidly spreading belief that the Cold War has ended and a permanent *détente* has settled like a comforting blanket over the whole of Europe. I hope that it is true but consider it an insufficiently solid hypothesis to support a major policy. One can observe that the Soviet Union has altered its tactics, but whether it has abandoned its strategic objectives is still a matter of conjecture. Thus in the decade of the seventies the Soviet threat appears not so much the possible use of naked power as a possible extension of its political influence, reinforced by power.

This, it seems to me, is the danger that exists for Europe and America in the weakening of transatlantic understanding, particularly if that should lead to policies of unilateralism on both sides of the ocean. Yet there are disturbing signs that such understanding may now suffer severe erosion not merely in respect of political relations but even more vividly in our economic, financial and commercial dealings.

IN today's complex world, where economics and politics are tightly interlaced, the direction chosen by a great nation necessarily cuts across the entire spectrum of policy. Therefore, the American trend towards unilateralism and the equal and opposite reactions of Europe could greatly complicate the problems of rebuilding and modernising our common principles and institutions for guiding financial, monetary and even political policy. To be sure, in the atmosphere of crisis and confusion that surrounds world monetary policy America has—perhaps briefly—moved away from the negative posture of unilateralism that characterized its attitude last year and now seems to be pursuing a more affirmative policy. Yet the problems themselves are far from solved and the possibility of a final breakdown and a return to the dog-eat-dog, jungle conditions of the 1930s can still not be ruled out —particularly if the politicians remain disengaged and solutions are left in the hands of the technicians.

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However, it is in commercial rather than monetary policy that the greatest dangers lurk, for on neither side of the Atlantic is the level of statesmanship very high. Protectionism is increasing in America as a by-product of the anger and frustration that I have mentioned, and at a time when relations are strained between legislative and executive branches of the American government there is considerable danger that pressure groups may trigger irresponsible actions while Europeans on their part seem more querulous than understanding. There is, of course, political talk in Washington that calls 1973 the "year of Europe" so far as American policy is concerned, but I would regard that with scepticism. The Congressional hurdles to be surmounted in America are very high and the process of equipping the President with adequate negotiating powers is not only time-consuming but by no means certain in outcome. At the same time it requires a large quantum of optimism to assume that, within the next few months, the Community will have been able to solve the formidable problems of assimilating three new members while at the same time evolving a negotiating posture that reflects more than a tradesman's haggle.

Meanwhile, the broad directions of American policy remain undetermined. To what extent will America re-embrace the policy of alliances which has been primarily grounded on Atlantic relations—or to what extent will we be tempted by unilateralism—the new American gaullism? The issue is a complex one affected by many different influences, of which one of the most important is the power struggle now taking place between Congress and the President. Yet much will depend upon what happens in Europe. Will you continue down your present narrowly-focused course, paying scant attention to events that occur outside your immediate neighbourhood and rejecting responsibility for events taking place further afield? In the latter case, America's own introspectiveness is likely to increase.

A year ago I was asked at an international meeting whether America would continue to stay interested in Europe, and I replied that that depended on whether Europe continued to do anything interesting. Certainly the enlargement of the European Community has revived our optimism, for it seems to offer the opportunity for Europe to regain something of the hope and idealism that led to the creation of the Community more than two decades ago. Yet a structural change of this kind is not enough unless it reveals its meaning in a new attitude, a broader comprehension and a firmer will. The list of problems that can be effectively solved only through common action by Europe and the US is a long and increasingly important one, but will both sides have the will to try to find common solutions or will each become so absorbed in the search for the narrow, short-range advantage that the durable solutions are lost to us forever?

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The Soviet Union and Western Europe

Leopold Labedz *

IF the proverbial visitor from Mars were to try to understand the present Soviet policy towards Europe, he would be puzzled by both the Soviet explanations of it and the Western attitudes to it. He would immediately notice a number of strange juxtapositions and incongruencies. The first would be the coincidence of Soviet *détente* policy and the simultaneous Soviet strategic build-up which resulted in the acknowledgment of Soviet nuclear parity with the USA. The Martian visitor would notice that the Soviet naval and air-force expansion programmes were vigorously pursued at the time when the USA was reducing its global commitments, and that while the Soviet Union was extending them, it was assiduously following a policy of what it called "constructive dialogue" with the Americans. What was it that Soviet policy was trying to achieve for which it was prepared to disregard the bombing of Hanoi, to suspend the ransom-tax on Jewish emigrants, to abstain from criticism of President Nixon, and to perform many other unnatural acts—from Brezhnev's speech in Tiflis (which helped the Administration defeat the Mansfield amendment) to the discretion of the Soviet press on the Watergate affair. This unusual self-restraint, whatever its interpretation by the "American imperialists," would indeed be difficult for our visitor to understand.

Looking for its motives he would no doubt discover that the speech made by Mr Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU declared that:

> The revolutionary slogans which we proclaim to the people are not empty words. Even when whole decades pass between the sowing and the harvest . . . the Soviet Communist Party will continue to pursue a policy in international affairs which will lead to the furtherance of the world-wide anti-imperialist struggle.

The Martian would find that the interpretation of "peaceful coexistence with the capitalist countries" is no different under Brezhnev than under his predecessors. "It 'cancels' only one type of struggle-war as a means of settling international issues."[1] The only innovation codified in theory is that intra-bloc affairs are to be settled on the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine. In his research the Martian would come across the resolution adopted at the meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU on 27 April which noted Brezhnev's "great personal contribution" to Soviet foreign policy.

* This article is based on a paper presented at the colloquium of West European and US Research Institutes held in France in May 1973. It will appear in book form together with the other papers presented. © by Stanford Research Institute.

[1] *Leninism Today* (Moscow, 1970), p. 133.

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From his more objective stance, he might be a little less euphoric than Western commentators about the significance of the April 1973 reshuffle in the Politburo. Many of them found it positively heartening and declared that the new members would strengthen *détente*. Peregrine Worsthorne wrote in the *Sunday Telegraph* (29 April) that this is the assumption which "rightly or wrongly" was made in Western Europe. According to Nicholas Carroll in the *Sunday Times* (29 April), that faithful representative of Stalin and Khrushchev at the time of the Berlin and Cuba crises, Andrei Gromyko, is "widely admired in Western foreign ministries as a skilled and determined negotiator blessed with a dour sense of humour." Jonathan Steele commented on the inclusion of Marshall Grechko, whose tanks rolled to Berlin in 1953 and to Czechoslovakia in 1968, in an article in *The Guardian* (28 April) headed "Brezhnev sacks peace critics from Politburo." According to Dev Murarka in *The Observer* (29 April) the promotion of Yuri Andropov, the head of the political police, who is busily stamping out Soviet intellectual dissent, "denotes that the KGB has been sufficiently tamed as well as rehabilitated to be given this accolade." Indeed he may deserve it.

Our Martian visitor would have already noticed that contrary to original Western expectations, *détente* did not produce an internal relaxation in the countries of the Soviet bloc but, in striking contrast to the arguments rationalizing the new *Ostpolitik*, resulted in the general tightening of political and cultural controls in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. There was a conscious effort over the whole area to counter prophylactically the risks involved in *détente* by a more rigid internal policy. If our visitor from Mars were to ask an American official for an explanation of these coincidences, he would hear that "the era of confrontation is over," that, as President Nixon said in his Report to Congress on 1 June 1972, we have entered a period of negotiations through which we would be "forming habits of cooperation and strengthening institutional ties in areas of peaceful enterprise," so as to "create on both sides a steadily growing vested interest in the maintenance of good relations" between the USA and the USSR.

If he were to ask about Western Europe, our Martian would find the situation "curiouser and curiouser." He would register diametrically opposite opinions about its political condition and prospects. Peregrine Worsthorne declared that:

> Today Western Europe is being courted on all sides, by the Soviet Union, by China and not only by the United States. The European Community is a court card which all the super-powers would like in their hand, and are prepared to pay a high price for. After the last war Western Europe was desperate for American protection. Today it still wants that protection, but not nearly so desperately, and not without being conscious that far from having to beg for it, it can probably go on getting it on any terms it wants.[2]

[2] Peregrine Worsthorne, *Sunday Telegraph*, 29 April 1973.

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This is hardly a conclusion which will recommend itself to the Americans. On the other side of the Atlantic the political implications of the recovery of Europe are exaggerated for precisely the opposite reason. George Kennan wrote that "as the strength, self-confidence and unity of the West European community grow, the importance of the American involvement naturally declines." [3] The political diagnosis of Walter Laqueur is more likely to be nearer the mark: "The present state of West-East relations . . . tends to aggravate the paralysis of will now obtaining in Europe." But, although the risks in this situation are obviously more direct for Europe than for the USA, it should be clear to any observer—even one from Mars—that Western Europe is disinclined to face the implications for itself of the coincidence between the Soviet policy of *détente* and the "Nixon Doctrine." The simple truth is that in the last decade a decline in the political will in the West has occurred—in the United States and in Europe. Squabbles over defence costs are merely a reflection of this. The policy of *détente* provides an outlet for Western wishful thinking which is never far from the surface.

It is unfashionable to mention risks, much less to insist that unless they are faced they may sooner or later turn into positive dangers. Yet it is necessary to stress that the reasons which have impelled the Soviet Union to seek *détente*—China, consolidation of the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe, the need to import Western technology—do not exclude the possibility that the Soviet Union may also be pursuing more long-term goals, and if political developments present it with more opportunities in Europe, it is more than likely that it would seize them in order to shift the balance of power in the Soviet Union's favour. So far, it has always done just that. It is embarrassing to make such elementary points, but in the present Western political context they do need repeating. *Détente* is by definition a transitional period and the question of what follows it is of cardinal importance. The Martian visitor would certainly ask it, even if so few analysts and press commentators are inclined to do so.

The assumption that the Soviet Union is now a status quo power is questionable. In any case it would seem a prudent policy to avoid leading it into temptation. Virtue, in morals and politics, may consist of a chronic lack of opportunity. But such opportunity may arise. If *détente* leads to American withdrawal from Western Europe, if Western Europe is unable to fill the gap resulting from contraction of American power, thus leaving each West European country to deal with the Soviet Union on a bilateral basis, the road will be open to the "Finlandization" of the whole area. Even at present one could give our Martian visitor names of several likely candidates for the role of Kekkonen in various West European countries.

[3] George F. Kennan, "After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1972.

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Moreover, this comparison is unfair. What the Finns are doing is dictated by circumstances largely beyond their control, whereas Europeans would be in this situation on a more voluntary basis. It is a melancholy thought that during the Khrushchev period many East Europeans hoped to eventually reach the status of Finland. They have not achieved it. And now the prospect is no longer excluded that it is the West European nations which may eventually find themselves in this position (without having Finnish *sisu* to cope with it). Anti-Americanism parading as pro-Europeanism, squabbles over agricultural prices with small regard for wider political considerations, concealed and unconcealed neutralist tendencies—all these may lead to West European non-alignment rather than to West European unity. The French policy of being in and out of NATO at one and the same time, the " Scandinavian " attitude of Norway, Denmark and Iceland, German illusions about *Ostpolitik*, the internal malaise of Italy and Great Britain —all these West European political and economic weaknesses provide opportunity targets for Soviet policy and Soviet leaders are only too well aware of this. " Exploiting the contradictions among the imperialists " is an old Leninist tradition. The Soviet and East European press constantly harp on the differences over trade and monetary policies which are occurring between the United States, the EEC and Japan.

THERE may be room for argument on the long-term evolution of Soviet political perceptions of the changing world, but there cannot be any doubt that on the more immediate level of strategy and tactics they retain certain ingrained characteristics which include subordination of strategic decisions to political considerations, the pursuit of political goals by stages, concentration on the erosion of the political will of the adversary, " salami tactics," etc. These characteristics all derive from the historicist nature of Soviet ideology and, however misplaced the Soviet historical interpretation may be, it confers on Soviet policy advantages of long-term consistency and cohesion vis-à-vis the " pragmatism " of the Western adversaries who so frequently confuse shortsightedness with pragmatism.

Whether this historicist cohesion can be maintained in the face of historical developments which daily contradict the hallowed dogmas of Soviet ideology is indeed another question. But Soviet theoreticians perform incredible dialectical acrobatics in order to rationalize them. In international relations they try to square the circle by arguing that the Soviet Union is for *détente* and for " peaceful coexistence " with the American imperialists and their West European capitalist allies and that it is promoting a principled " anti-imperialist " policy, unlike its Chinese rivals who have betrayed their earlier revolutionary posture:

> Recently the bourgeois press has been making a great hue and cry about the invented question of the direction of change in the contemporary world, whether it be bi-polar (USA-USSR), triangular (USA-USSR-China), or multi-polar. . . . It has become fashionable

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> at present to talk about a pentagonal world (USA, USSR, China, Western Europe and Japan). . . . This futile approach leads to an obvious misrepresentation of the real picture of the world with its two social poles—socialism and capitalism. The essence of the "bi-polar" or "multi-polar" conceptions is that they derive the development of international relations not from the class basis of the participating countries, but from narrow nationalist interests. . . . The Chinese version of the "two super-powers" (USA-USSR), allegedly trying to divide the world into their spheres of influence, fits appropriately into this scheme. Both "bi-polar" and "multi-polar" conceptions are directed against the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. . . . The principle of peaceful coexistence is first and foremost concerned with the creation of favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism, with the strengthening of international unity and cohesion of the socialist commonwealth, with aid to developing countries, with support for all contemporary progressive movements, with the assertion of those principles of international relations which would exclude war as an instrument for solving conflict and which would guarantee non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the development of trade and other economic relations between them on the basis of mutual interests and a firm rebuttal of the aggressive forces of imperialism.[4]

This doctrinal farrago can be easily dismissed as a ritual obeisance to obsolete doctrinal pieties, "signifying nothing," yet it does reflect the present Soviet perception of the world and a rationalization of its own foreign policy role in it. As such, it is still relevant to the observation made by Henry Kissinger 16 years ago:

> To our leaders, policy is a series of discrete problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system has had many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur.[5]

A lot of water has passed under the Potomac, Seine and Thames bridges since these words were written, and even more since President Roosevelt told Ambassador Bullitt that in his opinion Stalin wanted nothing but security and "that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world of security and peace."[6] Now that hopes for *détente* resemble those earlier expectations of post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union, it may be necessary for our imaginary Martian to question not only to learn about the role of Marxist historicism in the conditioning of Soviet political strategy and tactics, but also about

[4] W. Kortunow, "Peaceful coexistence and the ideological struggle," *Voprosy Istorii*, KPSS, 1, 1972.
[5] Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1957), p. 434.
[6] Quoted by John Lukacs, *The Great Powers and Eastern Europe* (New York, 1953), p. 799.

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the lessons, if any, drawn by the West and the Soviet Union from post-war history. Without such a backward glance no innocent Martian could hope to understand the present risks for Europe.

THE first thing which he will observe is that in all the comment on the ill-fated proposal for a new Atlantic Charter, nobody has questioned what happened to the old one which proclaimed "the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live." It is true that Western Europe is not occupied by the Soviet Army as was Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, but it is also true that, in the thirty years that have passed, the question on the historical agenda has moved, as a result in the shift in the balance of power, from a question of the danger to the future freedom of Eastern Europe, to one of the risks to the future freedom of Western Europe (not through Soviet occupation but through "Finlandization").

The second thing which our Martian will observe is that this shift has occurred in spite of long-lasting United States' superiority in military technology.

The third thing he would notice is that when the Soviet Union was relatively weak, Stalin took a hard line in foreign policy (tempered by caution) and when it had achieved strategic parity and was relatively strong, Brezhnev engaged in a policy of *détente* in the West. Is the difference to be explained by changes in the internal character of the Soviet Union? This was the predominant argument of Western commentators during the Khrushchev period when "de-stalinization" provided a semblance of persuasiveness to the idea of a "change of heart" in the Soviet Union, as if foreign policy was just a matter of heart. Under Brezhnev, there was no "de-stalinization" but rather a steady return to a "hard" internal policy, a line confirmed at the April 1973 Central Committee Plenum which made it clear that in light of the dangers of "ideological subversion" being increased by *détente*, there would be extra vigilance and no relaxation of Party controls in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[7] The same Plenum enhanced the status of Soviet foreign policy which has moved nearer the centre of Soviet concern at the very time when the United States and the countries of Western Europe have shifted their focus to domestic preoccupations. The Plenum also declared that "the task of holding an all-European Conference on Security and Cooperation has moved to the forefront in European politics" (*Pravda*, 29 April).

If it is still correct that "to the Soviet leaders policy is an aspect of a continuing political process" and not "a series of discrete problems," and I believe it is, then our Martian guest would be entitled to question the political rationale of Soviet policies and the factors which in their

[7] *Pravda*, 29 April 1973. Cf. Leopold Labedz, "Shadows over Helsinki," *Encounter*, June 1973.

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architects' perception make these discrete juxtapositions into a cohesive line in "a continuing political process." In order to answer the question, he must notice another point which explains the current shift of direction in Soviet policy towards Europe: the failure of the Khrushchevian strategic perspective about the underdeveloped countries and about the economic race with the West.

In the middle fifties, the Soviet leadership decided to direct a political offensive towards the Third World, the territory which seemed to hold revolutionary promise and to be prepared to accept the Soviet model of industrialization. The state-inspired rate of economic growth was seen as inexorably carrying the Soviet Union towards its cherished goal of "catching up and overtaking" the most advanced capitalist country, the United States of America, in that supreme Marxist criterion of historical progress—labour productivity—as well as in the volume of production and in technological competition.

The frustrations and reversals in the underdeveloped countries mitigated the high hopes connected with the strategy directed at "imperialism's soft underbelly." The conflict with China blocked it, at least in Asia.

THE economic perspective of the Khrushchev era failed no less obviously. The rate of growth of the Soviet national income has been falling since 1958 and as Abram Bergson argues,[8] this was due to the most sensitive element for Marxists: the decline in the rate of increase in productivity. During the same time, Japan, Germany and Italy achieved higher rates of growth and the United States a sufficiently high GNP increase to make all the Soviet boasts of the fifties and early sixties look extremely unreal. Technological competition was even less promising as the Soviet Union has actually fallen behind in the development of those new industries which are decisive for what it terms "a scientific—technological revolution."[9] The lost race to the moon acquired in this respect a symbolic significance. The promise that the Soviet Union would overtake the capitalist countries in 1970 in per capita consumption of milk and butter has been forgotten. Even disregarding the problems concerning the quality and variety of distribution and service facilities, Soviet per capita consumption is only about one-third that of the USA and about half that of England. *Radio Erevan,* the imaginary repository of Soviet unofficial jokes, summed it up in a reply to a listener's question about the possibility of the building of socialism in the USA: "Yes, it is possible comrade, but where are we going to buy our grain then?"

[8] *Problems of Communism*, March–April 1973, pp. 2–4.

[9] In his *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development*, 1945–1965, Antony Sutton argues that "the kind of central planning that guides the Soviet Union has virtually no capability for self-generated indigenous innovation."

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THE collapse of the perspective of the Khrushchev era, in respect of both political and economic strategy towards the external world, induced the Soviet leaders to revise it. The new perspective was, of course, not a result of one grand decision, but emerged through recognition of new difficulties and a search for new opportunities. It marked a shift of focus towards Europe where the possibilities of political gains now seemed greater than before, better than in Asia with its Chinese deadlock, and better than in the under-developed nations of other continents where 15 years of Soviet military and economic aid did not bring any commensurate gains.[10]

The logical concomitant of the revised strategy was a modified policy towards the United States, which aimed at the neutralization of its new policy towards China, of its involvement in Europe, and, if possible, at getting American credits and technological know-how. *Détente* was a logical instrument of this new perspective. A more militant strategy would produce the opposite effect, bring the opponents closer, make them more alert and narrow down the area where "contradictions" between them can be exploited.[11] The results of the new strategy have so far been quite positive from the Soviet point of view as the *Pravda* editorial of 29 April, summing up the results of the Central Committee Plenum on foreign policy, made clear by using terminology somewhat inappropriate to the *détente*: "The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries have broken the front of the 'cold war'." The achievement of the Moscow-Bonn agreement was greeted in the Soviet press with an unprecedented outburst of satisfaction. The international recognition of the DDR and the conferment of legitimacy on the Soviet position in Eastern Europe were the cherished goals of Soviet policy for decades. And now, as the London communist *Morning Star* (30 April) reported it, the "security conference is top priority for the Soviet Union."

In contrast with some of his earthly hosts, the visitor from Mars would undoubtedly have acquired by now sufficient knowledge to recognize why this should be so. He would have noticed that Western countries are participating in the Conference reluctantly, that China is very critical of it,[12] and that the Soviet Union can take a cohesive stand in all three conferences (Helsinki, MBFR, SALT II), while for Western countries they represent an occasion to expose their "contradictions."

[10] Cf. Leopold Labedz, "The Soviet Union in Asia," Adelphi Papers, No. 91.

[11] The most recent discussion on the subject can be found in the previous issue of *Survey* devoted to the international scene in the seventies and current Soviet foreign policy.

[12] The Polish *Polityka* (7 April) reported: "We Chinese, said the head of the Chinese legation in Paris, General Huang Chen, are against the Helsinki Conference. The Soviet Union wants to push out the Americans from Europe so as to be able to exert greater pressure on China. . . . Premier Chou En-lai and the head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chi Peng-fei, made every effort to persuade the foreign ministers who visited Peking in 1972–73, M. Schummann from France, W. Scheel from West Germany, A. Douglas-Home from Great Britain, and de Medici from Italy, that their government should take a more reserved stand at the Conference."

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EVEN without taking these factors into account, the history of negotiations with the Russians, from Teheran to SALT I, does not inspire confidence in Western preseverance. With few exceptions, like the Austrian Treaty, they usually resulted in political gains for them, and this time they are not in a position of relative weakness. American shortcomings in negotiating with communist powers are a matter of record which, unfortunately, is neither well-known nor widely understood. The late Professor Philip Mosely described them in his essay on "Negotiating with the Russians" and the new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Fred Charles Iklé, analysed them perceptively in a memorandum presented in 1970 to Senator Henry M. Jackson's Sub-committee on National Security and International Operations. What Iklé calls a "semantic infiltration" and what I call "creeping Newspeak" is on the increase at this time of *détente* and will serve Soviet purposes in negotiations.

Security in Europe is gradually redefined as anything that conforms to Soviet imperial goals. *Détente* is a matter of "peaceful coexistence" in which the attacks on "imperialism" are to be permitted as "ideological struggle," while criticism of Soviet actions is to be banished as "a return to the spirit of the cold war." "Cultural exchange" is to be determined by the extension of Soviet censorship at home and abroad and "scientific cooperation" is to be made a vehicle for the acquisition of technological expertise by the Soviet Union.

When it comes to the political side of the negotiations, the Soviet Union knows better than Western countries that accepting a label may already prejudge the outcome of subsequent diplomatic encounters. The West agreed to the title of "Security Conference" in spite of the fact that it was perfectly clear that security could not be the subject of it. But the name remained, contributing to confusion and illusions. The Soviet Union on its part refused in Vienna to recognise the designation —MBFR, and rejected it as "Atlantic terminology" (*Magyarorszag*, 18 February) because it did not like the idea of "balanced" reduction of forces as a starting point of negotiations. In this way the Vienna talks, the convening of which was interpreted as implying a Soviet concession to the Western powers for agreeing to come to Helsinki and take part in the Soviet-initiated Security Conference, were neatly converted again to a contentious issue. The Soviet negotiators resist semantic obstacles and are thus free to play their favourite game in which each subsequent compromise is slightly more favourable to themselves than the previous one. In this diplomatic "salami tactics," Soviet representatives have had long experience and it is not entirely surprising that the procedural compromise reached in Vienna is "substantially along the lines of a Soviet bloc proposal" (*The Times*, 28 April). The West agreed to the Soviet demand that Hungary should not be a full participant but limited to observer status. This was described officially as a "compromise," but as the *International Herald Tribune* (5–6 May) reported, it amounted

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" to acceptance of the Soviet side's position, with the West getting nothing in return."

THE substance of the general issue has, of course, been known since the original Rapacki proposal. The Warsaw Pact forces have more than 2 to 1 superiority over NATO in conventional forces. A symmetric reduction would only increase this superiority. A simple arithmetic calculation can show that if the process is carried far enough, NATO forces would be reduced to zero, while the Warsaw Pact would retain over half of its forces. The Soviet Union is, of course, well aware that this is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the idea of negotiations, but it was never inhibited in bringing forward unacceptable proposals. Sometimes they help to stall the negotiations; at other times—to get a more favourable " compromise "; at still other times, simply to sabotage the negotiations without incurring the odium for breaking them. The rejection of the idea of " balanced " reduction of forces can serve any of these three possibilities.

Even " balanced " reductions may be too risky for the West, yet symmetrical reductions do not even take into account the fact that American troops would withdraw beyond the Atlantic while the Soviet ones only beyond the River Bug. Soviet negotiators can afford to wait. They have long been reading in the Western press that negotiations about troop reductions are necessary because American troops will be reduced anyhow. What incentive it gives them to strive for a quick compromise is difficult to imagine, unless they were to be convinced that the prospect may be reversed.

The preliminary talks at Helsinki have hardly been affected by the developments in Vienna despite the fact that the Russians so quickly retracted their implied *quid pro quo*. Logically it should have hardened the Western diplomatic stand at Helsinki particularly on the sensitive, and politically the most important, issue there: the question of the " free movement of information, ideas, and people." But in fact the stand of Western powers began to weaken here too. Already in the D'Avignon Committee which was preparing the platform of the Nine for Helsinki, the French opposed as " provocative " the formulae which would deal explicitly with the " free flow of ideas " and which would implicitly proscribe " the Brezhnev doctrine." In Helsinki the Rumanians got no diplomatic support for their efforts to proclaim an international condemnation of military interventions " whatever the form, whatever the pretext." On " the free flow of ideas and people " the Western powers made a " tactical " retreat from their original position and at the end of the third round of the preliminary talks they abandoned the original formulation and insisted only on the insertion of " an open formulation " on that subject on the CESC agenda.

The situation is thus not too promising for Europe: in Helsinki the Europeans are not sufficiently concerned about their freedom; in Vienna

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(and outside) they are not sufficiently concerned about their security; it is absent at the Security Conference and so are the Europeans at SALT II.

WHAT answer could be given to our visitor from Mars if he were to ask about the implications of SALT II for the security of Western Europe? Fears about a "nuclear Yalta" are obviously misplaced, there is still no doubt about the American commitment to European security, but the confirming credibility of the American nuclear deterrent has already come into question.

There is no agreement among the experts about the significance of SALT I. Some considered its results as having increased the security of both the USSR and the United States through the establishment of stability at parity level.[13] Others criticised the United States negotiators for going from strategic superiority to strategic inferiority by abandoning the 1969 US positions at the beginning of the SALT talks. Dr. William R. Van Cleave in his testimony before the Jackson Committee argued that "there was nothing that one could call a coherent national strategy to guide the (American) SALT decisions," that "the terms of agreements themselves are almost the antithesis of stability" and that "future Soviet historians could regard this (result) as the golden age of Soviet negotiation."

Whatever the case in terms of pure military strategy, Dr. Van Cleave is undoubtedly right in saying that "most people in the world do not think like US system analysts." It is the political effect of the perceived strategic situation that matters and it is in this sense that a shift in the military balance affects the overall balance of power. The question of the credibility of the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe was always, and remains, a question of the credibility of the American nuclear deterrent. There is little doubt that this credibility is being slowly undermined.

Strategic analysts tend to think in terms of consequences of strategic changes in the nuclear balance for the possible conduct of war. The analysts see the logic of the game and assume that the nuclear adversaries, like chess players, would follow it without necessarily testing it on the imaginary nuclear chess board. But the political consequences follow not only from the actual assessment (which may be right or wrong) of the strategic balance by sophisticated analysts, but from the general perception of the situation by politicians and the unsophisticated public, and this is affected by many factors. There is a striking parallel between lack of the political component in post-war Western nuclear strategy and its lack in Western strategy during World War II. In the negotiations with the Russians they themselves did not make

[13] Cf. Wolfgang Panofsky, "from SALT I to SALT II" in *Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1973. Also: William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Assessing the Moscow SALT Agreements" in *Orbis*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, Summer 1972.

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then and do not now make this mistake. In their approach they always take *politique d'abord*. The Soviet official textbook for diplomats, *The History of Diplomacy*, begins with a quotation from Engels recommending that strategy must be subordinated to politics.

MacNamarra, his whizz-kids and their descendants never understood this in their technocratic approach to the problem of the strategic balance. The Western " game theory " specialists think the problem is that the Russians have to acquire technical sophistication on nuclear strategy, while the real problem is that it is they who need to become more politically-minded.

The relevance of this to the question of European security is rather obvious. The present troubles between the USA and Europe can only be successfully tackled through political understanding. The major Western mistakes in the post-war period which resulted in the shift of the balance of power against the West were political mistakes and not mistakes of nuclear strategy. Indeed, it is even arguable that changes in nuclear strategy reflected them without the strategists realising it. It is certainly ironical that the doctrine of flexible response, so fully presented by Henry Kissinger in his book on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, did not prevent a situation in which it may be argued that a limited war in Europe not being a credible proposition (and it was not a great success in Vietnam) the US may eventually face a stark dilemma of either returning to the doctrine of massive retaliation or of sacrificing Europe in a " Nuclear Yalta." However, this is not the necessary logic of development. The credibility of a deterrent is a question of political psychology and not just of the anticipated moves on an imaginary nuclear chess board. It is often argued now that the new military technology based on lasers—small nuclear weapons—and the " smart " bombs may fill in the gap caused by the Soviet preponderance in conventional arms and the prospect of limitation or withdrawal of American troops from Europe. It is argued that, in terms of the extent of destruction, " mini-nukes " do not differ from more conventional arms. This is an argument, however, which, by obliterating the sharp distinction between " nuclear " and " conventional " arms, undermines the very basis of deterrence which is rooted in the general feeling of qualitative difference between the two. The flexible response may be a necessary element of deterrence and " mini-nukes " may be a necessary part of it when conventional troops can no longer be expected to play this role in the West. But it will only be " credible " if the distinction is preserved rather than obliterated in order to facilitate the " selling " of " mini-nukes " to the public. As long as it is preserved, the fear of escalation will continue to provide the psychological underpinning for the deterrent role of nuclear weapons. It would indeed be paradoxical if, in the search for their actual " military effectiveness," their deterrent effect was to be lost in the evolution of military strategy from massive retaliation to " mini-nukes."

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The Russians, who never put much store on the distinction between limited and an all-out nuclear war, are better served politically by their relatively crude strategy. They can escape this type of dilemma by concentrating on the goal of gradual erosion of the political will of the adversary. If successful in Europe, it will lead to its "Finlandization," i.e. to a situation in which West European countries may become subordinated to the dictates of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, extremely sensitive in their internal political responses to its demands, and in which no politician can play a major role in national politics unless he enjoys the confidence of Moscow. This is not an unrealistic goal for the Soviet Union; it cannot be fought by nuclear means. Nuclear strategy can only play a role in it by preserving the central strategic balance. In this perspective nuclear weapons play a symbolic political role today and are not just an instrument designed to play a military role tomorrow. It is the general policy, conceived in its overall political sense, that is of paramount importance in approaching the current problems of Western Europe in its relations with the USA and the USSR. But although the present situation in this respect is understandably causing anxieties, the future is still open.

IF our Martian visitor, not being quite able to understand why Europe should be so politically vulnerable in spite of its economic recovery, were to ask how this situation came about in terms of overall political development, he would look closely at the post-war political history of Western Europe. This can be divided into three periods: in the first, Great Britain sabotaged the idea of European unity; in the second, this was done by France; in the third—the present one—the consequences of the previous two periods are becoming apparent, but not learned.

In the post-war history of the United States there is success in its policy of containment in Europe (due to the Marshall Plan and NATO), but not in Asia. The Vietnam War and internal weaknesses in the United States created a mood of withdrawal which impelled American foreign policy to lower its profile and use the Chinese gambit. However, Western Europe remains an area of primordial importance for the USA and so rather obvious contradictions of American policy in Europe must be faced and resolved. They are interrelated.

One contradiction is that a policy asking the Europeans to realize that they must unite and become more involved in their own defence is unlikely to succeed if at the same time it implies no need to worry because "the era of confrontration has ended." Any long-term risks for Europe are then likely to be treated by the Europeans as non-existent. Accommodation with the USSR can be achieved through negotiations in a spirit of *détente* without need for additional political exertions and military expenditure.

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The other contradiction is between American non-proliferation policy and the goal of an independent, though allied, unified Western Europe. A nuclear status for Western Europe is not politically feasible in the near future and, if promoted too forcefully now, it may bring more harm than good. But in the long run, if one accepts the idea of European unification, however distant, one must also accept the idea of an eventual West European responsibility for its own defence which, with the trend away from conscription, must be nuclear in one form or another. It is difficult to imagine it at the moment but some special Anglo-French-American cooperation in this field seems a necessary prerequisite. Yet as long as France retains its post-Gaullist, anti-Atlantic outlook fearing *les Anglo-Saxons* more than the prospect of Finlandization this will obviously remain an unrealistic proposition.[14] It is sad to recollect that it was de Gaulle who first proposed the idea of the atomic *directoire* and it was the Nassau agreement which finally put an end to this prospect. The present European and American tendency towards unilateralism, about which George Ball spoke and warned against at the Amsterdam Conference, is a legacy of lost opportunities in the past.

But if our Martian visitor thus learns—not from Oxenstierna—"with what little wisdom the affairs of this world are conducted," he will also see that post-war political history reconfirmed the dictum of Tocqueville that nothing is more difficult for democracies than to have a rational and consistent foreign policy. If this would make him feel too much like Cassandra he would only have to look around to see that, with all the euphoric Pollyannas begotten by *détente,* it may be useful, if only for reason of strategic balance, to sin on the side of pessimistic realism. To give him some hope one can point out that rationality is not a conspicuous characteristic of Soviet foreign policy either. In the post-war years despite its success in achieving super-power status it had its own troubles and certainly a share of its own mistakes. They often stemmed from ideological blinkers. After all, the two great achievements of post-war American policy: the creation of NATO and the rapprochement with China to redress the weakening balance, were only made possible by the Soviet militantly abrasive posture and shortsightedness at the time. Internally, the *Machtpolitik* had to be paid for. Although the chronic Soviet troubles with food production may be due to the nature of collectivized agriculture, the relative penury of Soviet consumers is certainly aggravated by the very high spending on defence

[14] Erick Weit, Gomulka's interpreter reported in his book, *Eyewitness* (Andre Deutsch, London, 1973), p. 140, a conversation in East Berlin (on 22 April 1967) between Ulbrich, Gomulka, and Brezhnev who boasted about the successes of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Gaullist France: "Take de Gaulle. Have we not succeeded, at no risk to ourselves, in driving a breach through the imperialist camp? De Gaulle is our enemy and we are all well aware of it. The French Communist Party was narrow-minded enough to try to stir us up against de Gaulle for their own particular interests. But look at our achievements! We have weakened the American position in the heart of Europe and this weakening will continue."

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matters which, according to the Academician Sakharov and to an unofficial *samizdat* estimate may amount to 40 per cent of the GNP.[15]

IT is not surprising that in these circumstances the Soviet Union seeks help from outside for its economic and technological problems and that it is dangling the prospects of trade and profit before American, European and Japanese businessmen. There is nothing particularly new in the capitalist fascination with the Soviet market. In 1916, an American businessman Richard Washburn Child, published a book *Potential Russia* in which he rhapsodized about the gigantic prospects for trade with this huge country. The revolution put an end to this perspective, but during the Soviet period there were again surges of hope for a sudden astronomical expansion of trade with the Soviet Union. One such surge occurred early in the Depression, another at the end of the last war when Eric Johnson, the president of the US Chamber of Commerce, wrote in the *Nation's Business* (October 1944) that "Russia will be, if not our biggest, at least our most eager customer when the war ends." But there was no steady, much less spectacular, trade expansion either before or after the war. Once again, President Nixon's Moscow agreement revived such hopes and Messrs. Peterson, Hammer and Pisar kindled them to a high pitch. Yet, as Philip Hanson wrote in the *New Society* (26 April): "the ballyhoo about Soviet Fiats, American grain sales to the Soviet Union, and the surrender of Eastern Europe to Pepsi-Cola, can be rather misleading." Until recently, East-West trade has been small. The share of all communist countries in the foreign trade of the OECD countries was only 3·3 per cent of the total in 1971. In the same year, the share of the Soviet Union in American foreign trade was just 0·7 per cent.

The prospects for expansion of East-West trade are still limited for two basic reasons: one is the restricted ability to pay for imports, the other is the difficulty of conducting trade between market and centrally-managed economies. The "autarkic" development of such economies made their exports non-competitive, so that their ability to pay for any large increases in imports depends on credits. Granting them, particularly the long-term ones, may make the creditor country a hostage to political fortune and could even create internal pressures on its foreign policy from the investors concerned with the fate of their

[15] This may be too high, but there is a tendency in the West to overestimate the Soviet GNP and to underestimate the military expenditure in it. Precise evaluations are difficult because Soviet spending on military R & D is covered in statistics by "science" and that on other military items is hidden elsewhere. It is pertinent to recollect that when Naum Jasny published his estimates of Soviet agricultural production in the early fifties, his academic critics treated him as a crank. Soviet statistical disclosures in the late fifties revealed that he underestimated agricultural disasters under Stalin. A similar thing happened to the statistical estimates of the prison camps population by Dallin and Nikolaevsky which were later confirmed by *samizdat* sources.

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investments. In this way, the Nixon-Kissinger idea of establishing a Soviet vested interest in the status quo through economic deals may create conditions which would be more favourable to the Soviet than to the American foreign policy, because it is far easier for interest groups in the USA to pressure the government and far easier for the government in the USSR to disregard economic vested interests for political reasons.

DÉTENTE is thus fraught with risks for the West. Our Martian would, however, be right to think that his picture of the situation is incomplete if he does not learn of the opportunities *détente* may hold for the West. Potentially they do exist. The elaborate precautions taken by the Soviet bloc countries to avoid ideological contamination testify to it. If only *détente* could be used for Western political goals rather than as a rationalization for Western inability to pursue them! If the West could muster sufficient political will to exploit *détente* for its own purposes, rather than follow the Orwellian Soviet definition of it! With less risks in *détente* for the West and more for the Soviet bloc, Western Europe should be able to avoid the fate of Finland, provided that her relations with the United States improve rather than further deteriorate. The present American initiative aimed at this met a somewhat lukewarm response in Europe. In France it evoked outright hostility. One is reluctantly reminded of the tragic course of pre-war Western diplomacy, when the English and French continued to badger each other at the time of the rise in power of Nazi Germany. The English proposal for unification came at the moment of the fall of France (and was rejected).

Surely there is a lesson here for all those Europeans who constantly display anti-American attitudes but continue to count on American strategic support; and for all those Americans who accept the observation that the period of complete American supremacy is over but who often behave vis-à-vis the Europeans, politically and diplomatically, as if this were not the case. Applying shock-treatment or creating *shokkus* through inadvertence is not the most effective way of implementing the proclaimed policy of a new rapprochement with Europe and Japan. The Europeans with their economic strife and the Americans with their loss of political nerve may yet jeopardise not just the fate of Europe but of Western civilization in general.

After 1945, the Eastern half of Europe was lost. Now it is Western Europe which may face the gradual erosion of its status to that of a greater Finland or Sweden. Neutralization of Europe can only be a step in the direction of its eventual subordination to the Soviet Union. It is only the balance of power in Europe which has preserved the relative independence of Finland. Once this balance goes, the fate of Finland and of Western Europe will ultimately be sealed.

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TO realize the implications of such a shift in the balance of power and of the arguments used in the "Indian summer" of the current *détente,* one has to recollect that similar arguments were used at the time when, for the sake of post-war *entente,* the population of East European countries was sacrificed. Hopes for peace were more potent than any sober analysis of post-war prospects. The strategy adopted at Teheran and Yalta was already then "theoretically underpinned" by the analogy with the Vienna Congress and the Metternichian idea, of the concert of powers. Professor E. H. Carr provided it in *The Times'* (10 March, 1943) editorial comment in which he advocated the surrender of Europe "east of Germany" to Soviet hegemony and the creation of the concert of Great Powers: Great Britain, the USSR and the USA to rule the post-war world. *Où sont les neiges d'antan!* It was hardly a role which Great Britain was destined to play. As for the idea that the surrender of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination would guarantee a harmony of interests between Great Powers after the war, it soon proved to be an illusion. As Bismarck said: "No-one will ever be rich enough to buy his enemies by concessions." Then as now, the Vienna Congress provides an incorrect analogy and creates a fool's paradise for *détente* seekers. Our contemporary Metternichs may find it when it is too late.

In the meantime, they studiously disregard what risks for Europe (i.e. its remaining part) the illusions created by this policy entail. It is ironical that the Soviet magazine *Voprosy Istorii* (No. 3, 1973), in an article on the American New Left "historical revisionists"—Williams, Kolko, Le Feber, Alperovitz, Horowitz, Bernstein—claimed that they "provided the ideological basis for the recent course of Washington in the sphere of foreign policy." This is obviously an exaggeration and a distortion. But this Soviet perception is not altogether out of place. The illusions of the Nixon Doctrine are based on the same fallacies as the pre-Cold War Allied diplomacy. One can only hope that this time the American negotiators will remember the lessons of Teheran where Roosevelt refused to confer privately with Churchill during the conference and taunted him in front of Stalin, hoping to establish an intimate relationship with the latter.

The logic of this attitude led the American officials to disregard the strategic importance of Eastern Europe. As one of them recollected later:

> In our "spheres-of-influence" reasoning, in our anxiety to preserve good relations with the Soviet Union, my friends and I had hardened our hearts and in effect condemned Petkov and his like, just as we had consigned the populations of East Central Europe to communist tyranny.[16]

[16] H. Stuart Hughes, "The Second Year of the Cold War, A Memoir and An Anticipation," *Commentary,* Vol. 48, No. 2, August 1969, p. 31.

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This time it is the future of Western Europe that is at stake, however distant that prospect may look now. It would be a disaster if the new relationship between the USA and Europe was to be based on old illusions and not on realistic appreciation of the risks involved in the shift in the balance of power against the West which has occurred since the war. This would be a better basis for establishing continuous US-European collaboration than theatrical gestures, like the proclamation of 1973 as the Year of Europe (1960 was the Year of Africa . . .).

Mr. Brezhnev's visit to the United States contributed to the strain between Europe and America. It resulted in new tensions in NATO and created a new displeasure in France. It is ironic that in pursuing his " pentagonal world " idea, Dr. Kissinger managed to produce shocks among the weaker trio: in Japan, in Europe, and in China. In the past, the British balance of power policy aimed at strengthening the opponents of the strongest power on the European continent to prevent its domination. The present US policy may achieve precisely the opposite effect; so far it has helped to undermine the US—Japanese Treaty, to enfeeble the cohesion of the NATO alliance, and to impair its new relationship with China. This is hardly the way to strengthen the countervailing powers in the " pentagonal " balance postulated for the future. It is not surprising that Dr. Kissinger has to make all these unplanned additional trips to Japan, China, and Europe to explain away the shocks. The Metternichian concept of the concert of (the super) powers is not only inapplicable where the powers in question lack a common basis of legitimacy, but also incompatible with the concept of the " pentagonal " balance of power policy. This inconsistency may have far-reaching consequences for both the Old and the New World. They may get the worst of both worlds.

Having seen the evidence on the contemporary course of Western powers, the proverbial visitor from Mars cannot but agree that it shows alarming symptoms of political malaise. This is so, even though Western Europe faces only the risks of *détente* and not the dangers of war. He must come to this conclusion although he is simply an innocent Martian and not a knowledgeable European who cannot help having the feeling of *déjà vu*.

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America, Russia and Europe in the Light of the Nixon Doctrine

Richard Pipes *

IN Solzhenitsyn's *August 1914*, among the hordes of incompetent officers leading the imperial Russian armies to their doom, one figure stands out, that of Colonel Vorotyntsev. He alone has his wits about him as he rushes from one sector of the wobbling front to another querying generals and common soldiers, studying the topography, observing enemy dispositions, and, in the end, leading back to Russian lines a small band of retreating soldiers. All along, Vorotyntsev sees what needs to be done with a lucidity of which those actually entrusted with the responsibility for decisions are entirely incapable. Had someone like him been in charge, Russian troops surely would not have suffered the debacle of Tannenberg. Exasperated by the obtuseness of his superiors, at one point he asks himself: *Pochemu PONIMANIE vsegda sloitsia nizhe VLASTI?*—Why does understanding always lie beneath authority?

Why, indeed? If I could converse with the colonel or his creator, I would suggest the following answer: Because understanding, being a product of intellectual processes, concerns itself primarily with ends, with what needs to be done; authority, on the other hand, involving as it does management of men, belongs to the realm of applied arts, and tends to become preoccupied with means. Sometimes this preoccupation grows so obsessive that those in power lose sight of the whole purpose to which power had been given them. The more ambitious an undertaking, the more people involved in it, the greater the likelihood that over-concern with the means will produce stupendous mismanagement. (Hence Santayana's definition of fanaticism as "redoubling one's efforts after one has forgotten one's aims".)

All of which is meant to explain my temerity in presenting a critique of policies of statesmen whose intentions are no worse than mine, but who also happen to have access to information that is inaccessible to me. The great merit of free public opinion is that it acts as a corrective to statesmanship by raising questions of purpose, all too often obscured by concerns with implementation.

THE so-called Nixon Doctrine appears to be the product of two factors: the steady growth of Soviet military power and the concurrent decline of the American public's willingness to continue bearing

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a heavy load of international obligations. In some ways
factors are causally related, but it is safe to say that of its
would have been sufficient to produce the kind of change
policy which the Nixon Doctrine entails. The inevitability
kind of disengagement from the Truman Doctrine had become
even before Mr Nixon assumed office. In an essay published
Mr Kissinger outlined the principles of foreign policy which the Republican administration has been following ever since. In it, he called for a new world "order," one of whose features would be a more equitable spread of responsibilities among all the major powers:

> Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though the overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers. . . . A more pluralistic world . . . is profoundly in our long-term interest.[1]

This basic idea subsequently became elaborated into the Nixon Doctrine which—like the historic causes giving rise to it—rests on two principles:

1. With regard to the Soviet Union, America's only serious military rival, "confrontation" is to give way to "negotiation." Rather than attempt at every point of the globe to match and frustrate Soviet challenges with countermoves of its own, as the theory of containment had demanded, the United States will concentrate on locating areas of agreement between the two superpowers. No matter how insignificant or even trivial these agreements may be from the politico-military point of view (so the theory runs), they create an atmosphere of mutual trust which, in time, ought to be conducive to the solution of major differences. Concurrently, through increased trade, the USSR is to be enmeshed in a "web of interests" through which it will gain a greater stake in world stability;

2. In order to make foreign policy burdens lighter and more acceptable to its public, the United States will insist on its allies and friends doing much more. Peace—and, hopefully freedom—are everyone's concern.[2] The United States will be willing to help those whose security is threatened, but it will no longer rush to bail them out. In particular, Western Europe and Japan must be weaned from their overdependence on US military strength, and invest a larger share of their national product in defence.

Like every statesman in our history-obsessed age, Mr Nixon is anxious to win for himself a secure place in history books, for which

[1] Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," in Kermit Gordon (ed.), *Agenda for the Nation* (Garden City, New York, 1968), pp. 589, 599.

[2] I say "hopefully" because in recent years, responding to the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" propaganda policy, the United States has allowed the cause of peace completely to overshadow that of freedom, in which the USSR, of course, has no interest. It is certainly easier to search for peace at any price than on certain conditions.

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reason he is given to wild exaggerations of both the novelty and significance of his policies. Undoubtedly, the Nixon Doctrine marks a major departure from the foreign policy pursued by the United States since 1948. Whether it indeed inaugurates a "new era" in international relations, as we are insistently told, remains to be seen: such attributions are better left to history-writers than history-makers. As to its alleged novelty, here too the historian may be permitted a sceptical attitude. In terms of diplomatic practice, the Nixon Doctrine introduces nothing new: it merely combines two well-known and tested methods of handling international rivalries, the idea of the "concert" of great powers (US-USSR), and balance of power (US-rest of the world). The two elements of the Nixon Doctrine are not correlated in any apparent way with the result that the present administration pursues two separate policies.

TO raise questions about its originality or historic significance, is not to reject the Nixon Doctrine. Given the realities of the international and domestic situation in the late 1960s, it is difficult to see how the policy of containment could have been maintained. The only conceivable alternative—complete abandonment of world responsibilities—would have been much worse for the United States and its friends. The conduct of foreign policy under President Nixon has been, on balance, more skilful than under his immediate predecessors. The weakness of the Doctrine seems to me to lie in its theoretical underpinnings and it is these that I wish to question. Are its basic assumptions realistic? are they mutually compatible? A frankly pragmatic foreign policy would be immune from such critical analysis. A policy based on a view of a new world "order," one which promises to usher a new "era" is not. Doctrines, as is known, have a tendency to acquire a life of their own, to produce action in their own support. Such was the fate of the policy of containment: conceived and formulated on the basis of a realistic appraisal of communist intentions and American capabilities, it eventually degenerated into something corresponding to neither.

THE Nixon Doctrine rests on a certain conception of communism and of the Soviet regime. If one can judge by Mr Nixon's public pronouncements, it is his view that the adversary he faces as President is an ideological force tinged with fanaticism. This view may be a legacy of his early political career, begun when American anti-communist hysteria was at its height. It may also reflect a superficial education. Whatever the reason, there is nothing in President Nixon's speeches that indicates a rudimentary acquaintance with the histories of Russia and its Communist Party, or with the political, economic, and social realities of the contemporary Soviet Union. Apparently he is unaware that the rulers of the USSR and other communist states have a material interest in the preservation and expansion of their

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system, that their commitment is not merely an ideologically inspired set of attitudes.

Now attitudes can be changed, and it is this prospect that underlies Mr Nixon's apparently genuine optimism about future Russo-American relations. He seems persuaded that the logic of events requires the world, especially the industrialized nations, headed by the US and USSR, to draw closer and learn to cooperate in the solution of common human problems: the quality of the environment and the application of science, to mention but two. However, from the reasonable premise that nations *ought to* engage in such cooperation, Mr Nixon imperceptibly slips into the conclusion that they *will* in fact do so. He is remarkedly prone to change the conditional mood of a verb into an indicative one. By means of rhetorical devices, "should" turns into "shall" in his public pronouncements, and, one suspects, in the privacy of his mind.

What makes this faulty logic doubly dangerous is that it is bolstered by a more sophisticated but no less fallacious conviction of Mr Kissinger's that in modern times territorial expansion has become an anachronism:

> In the past, stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others. The traditional criteria for the balance of power were territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only by conquest. . . . In the contemporary period, this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power *are possible* entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. . . . If the Soviet Union had occupied Western Europe but had remained without nuclear weapons, it would be less powerful than it is now with its existing nuclear arsenal within its present borders.[3]

Mr Kissinger does not tell us what the effect would be on its power status if the Soviet Union had *both* its nuclear arsenal and Western Europe. One suspects that his views on the matter may have undergone some modification as a result of personal experiences with the unappeasable North Vietnamese appetite for territory. Nevertheless, the notion that expansion is profitable no longer underlies much of the Nixon Doctrine in theory and in practice, reinforcing the related view of great power conflict as out of date. Here too the conditional shades into the indicative without the author being apparently aware of the shift.

The political instinct of Mr Nixon and the historical convictions of Mr Kissinger lead them to the same conclusion: modern conditions impel mankind toward cooperation and render obsolete the spirit of rivalry, aggressiveness, and expansion, as well as the political-military techniques derived from it. In accord with this premise, conflict with

[3] Kissinger, "Central Issues," p. 590; the emphasis is mine.

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the USSR is to be de-emphasized and the maximum effort put into seeking out areas of mutual agreement. Personal contacts with Soviet leaders have amply demonstrated that they are anything but fanatical ideologues, and thus strengthened the President and his aides in the belief that they are amenable to pragmatic arguments.

Assuming that this analysis is correct, it is difficult to know where to start the critique of the Nixon Doctrine, so riddled with misconceptions and inconsistencies it is. To begin with the whole equation modernity = peace goes back at least a century and a half: to St Simon and the St Simonians, and, somewhat later, Herbert Spencer who had confidently predicted that the age of "industrialism" would soon replace that of "militarism." The two global wars, waged not by the so-called backward but by the most industrialized nations of the world should have laid this equation permanently to rest, but this apparently has not happened. Much of Mr Nixon's optimism has a pronounced Wilsonian ring, although, according to Henry Brandon, a sympathetic historian of his administration, Mr Nixon regards Wilson's "idealism" with suspicion.[4] Many of his ideas concerning the need to create a new order to prevent future conflict also remind one of General Smuts and his blueprints for the League of Nations.

LET us now now turn briefly to some specific fallacies:

1. Communism is not merely or even primarily an ideology; nor has fanaticism ever played a decisive role in it. True, communist movements prior to seizure of power attract ideologues and fanatics; but these are always got rid of after power has been acquired. Lenin began to slough off his ideological allies almost immediately after he had overthrown the Provisional Government; by accepting the extremely onerous peace terms of Brest Litovsk he gave his recalcitrant followers an unforgettable lesson in political pragmatism. The readiness of the Soviet regime to sacrifice any element in its doctrine for the sake of preserving and enhancing its power is a fact historically so well established that one is embarrassed to have to allude to it. There has never been a political doctrine or a government with a keener sense of the realities of power relationships (*sootnoshenie sil*) than the Soviet. The Soviet system is and always has been distinguished by extreme pragmatism. It is indeed a classic example of authority which, facing gigantic tasks of harnessing human resources, has utterly lost sight of its original aims.

2. This being the case, it is groundless to expect that the Soviet regime will become even more pragmatic. If the Soviet government has agreed to a partial *détente* with the United States—indeed, has insisted on it—the reason must be sought not in a growing awareness among its leaders that humanity shares a common destiny, but in

[4] *The Retreat from American Power* (Garden City, New York, 1973), p. 21.

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factors having to do with international power relationships. The Russians, it must be emphasized, interpret the "balance of power" much more broadly than do Western strategists, who tend to restrict it to military matters: they include and weigh under this rubric also economic, social, and psychological factors. Thus, they may be aggressive when the military balance happens clearly to favour their opponents (e.g. 1946–50), and conciliatory when it is evenly distributed (the present time), factors other than military being decisive in the calculation. The Soviet government launched the *détente* policy in 1956 for two reasons: because it desired a breathing spell for its population, which twenty-five years of Stalinism and World War II had left exhausted, and because it wished to extricate itself from the isolation into which Stalin's foreign policy had driven it. Since then, other factors had come into play. The primary consideration today is the conflict with China, which compels the USSR to reduce tension on the western front. Secondly, there are economic difficulties and need for Western technology and credits. Paradoxically, having attained nuclear parity, the USSR has a greater interest in a *détente* with the USA than when it was vulnerable to nuclear destruction. This is a practical decision. There is no evidence whatever in Soviet statements intended for internal consumption that the USSR shares President Nixon's and Mr Kissinger's ideas about the nature of contemporary international diplomacy. The adamant refusal to call off or even to restrain the "ideological war" is not a minor issue, as the White House appears to think: it signifies that from Moscow's point of view *détente* is a temporary expedient. Internally, the Soviet media ascribe the improvement in relations with the USA to a shift in the balance of power in Russia's favour. The USA is still depicted, as it had been in Stalin's day, as the central bastion of world imperialism and the principal backer of "fascist" regimes. There are no delusions *there* about the US having experienced a change of heart: its new policy is said to be the result of the realities of the power relationship exclusively. The unwillingness of the USSR to participate in the "new era" of international diplomacy is clearly demonstrated by the continued jamming of the Voice of America broadcasts. Because he regards communism primarily as an ideology, Mr Nixon prefers to disregard these facts, which he probably views as a kind of anachronism and, as a practical politician, tends to dismiss. If, however, he approached the USSR as a congeries of institutions designed to protect the special interests of the ruling elite, he would take a much more serious view of the Soviet insistence on the right to continue "ideological" war.

Anyone who reads the President's annual reports to Congress cannot help being struck by one glaring inconsistency. In the theoretical parts, which explain the premises of the administration's foreign policy, everything is sunny, but in the specifics, dark clouds appear. It is as if we were listening to an opera the first half of which was

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composed by Mozart and the second by Wagner: suddenly Pamino begins to sing the *Gotterdämmerung*. The Soviet Union which is supposed to be evolving from fanaticism to pragmatism and entering into a common partnership with the rest of the world, unaccountably arms itself at a pace and in a style which cannot be explained solely in terms of its security needs. The bewilderment of the President with this evidence is apparent in his 1972 address where he speaks of "developments in 1971 which make in unclear whether we are witnessing a permanent change in Soviet policy or only a passing phase concerned more with tactics than with a fundamental commitment to a stable international system." Among these developments the President lists the Soviet manufacture and deployment of weapons, its arms policy in the Middle East, its behaviour during the Indian-Pakistan crisis, and "the expansionist implications of Soviet naval activities."[5] This is a considerable list. Since these facts raise basic questions about Soviet intentions one would expect some analysis of their significance to ensue. However, in the next paragraph of the President's 1972 speech all these doubts are brushed aside as the catalogue of "positive developments" is resumed. One can only conclude that the present administration, while aware of evidence contrary to its premises, chooses to ignore it. The result is that the two superpowers cooperate in combating heart disease and protecting walruses off the Aleutians while at the same time competing in the perfecting of the most lethal kinds of weapons. The White House, bent on accentuating the positive, does not consider this cause for anxiety.

ANOTHER of the glaring inconsistencies in President Nixon's foreign policy is the failure in any evident manner to link the Russo-American *détente* with his demands on Western Europe concerning its security. In his recent keynote address (23 April 1973) Mr Kissinger lays heavy stress on the necessity for Europe to contribute more to its own defence, to rethink its defence strategy, and on the importance of keeping American troops in Europe, but he says nothing about the reasons behind these requests. The enemy is never mentioned. Against whom are all these measures intended? If the Soviet Union is indeed becoming a responsible power genuinely interested in maintaining world stability, then so much emphasis on military preparedness seems singularly misplaced. Or are these contingency measures? There is a serious gap between US policy towards Russia and towards Europe, one result of which is that Europeans do not take American exhortations about the need for a greater defence effort on their part very seriously.

The importance of Western Europe to the United States is such that, in the event of a direct Russian onslaught on it, the US would

[5] *US Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The emerging structure of peace; A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 9, 1972* (Washington, D.C., n.d.), pp. 5–6.

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certainly react in an appropriate manner. President Nixon is as aware as his predecessors were of the fatal consequences that would ensue if West European resources and talent were to come under Soviet control. But for this very reason a direct military attack on Western Europe by the Red Army seems most improbable. The Russians not only can have no wish to trigger a nuclear exchange, but they also have less apocalyptic reasons for caution: the desire to maintain good working relations with the United States; lack of experience with coordinated offensive operations on hostile foreign territory; mistrust of satellite armies and fear of disorders in the event of military reverses. The development by the United States of "smart bombs" capable of disorganizing enemy logistic lines without recourse to nuclear warheads further weakens the offensive capacity of the Russians in Europe. True, the Soviet Union maintains very large troop concentrations in Europe: it has chosen not to weaken them in order to build up its Chinese front, nor has it shown much interest in reasonable mutual force reductions. But from this it does not follow that the Soviet High Command seriously envisages the employment of its European troops in massive offensive operations. The primary purpose of the Soviet divisions stationed in Europe is intimidation. They are to preclude nationalist uprisings in Eastern Europe, and to remind Western Europe of the constant threat of a devastating war waged on its territory.

In view of these considerations which seem to me to have a high degree of plausibility, the heavy stress laid by Western planners on major military conflict with the USSR appears misplaced. Far too much effort goes into thinking and rethinking the possible Western responses to Soviet offensive operations against Western Europe, and far too little thought is devoted to other, more probable contingencies. On the military front, for example, some action may well take the form of intervention on the periphery of Western Europe, for instance in Yugoslavia or Greece, where external aggression could be preceded and assisted by internal subversion. Does "flexible response" provide realistic countermoves for this possibility? Would, for example, NATO units credibly threaten Poland or Czechoslovakia in order to deflect Soviet operations in the Balkans, should such be undertaken?

The West seems even less prepared to cope with what seems to me the most realistic threat to its integrity, namely slow, patient, piecemeal disintegration of Western Europe by combination of external and internal pressures. The Russian elite has unrivalled experience in uprooting neighbouring powers in this way; and so the Russian state has traditionally extended its frontiers and managed to attain the highest rate of territorial expansion ever recorded. Anyone interested in these methods would do well to study the history of the Russian conquest of Novgorod (15th century), Kazan (16th century) and Poland (18th century). The Ottoman Empire might well have fallen victim to the same process in the nineteenth century were it not for resolute

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British action on its behalf. Nor should it be forgotten that the scramble for "concessions" in late imperial China which only the outbreak of World War I prevented from ending in the dismemberment of China by the great powers had also been inaugurated by Russia (Manchuria, 1896ff.). This is a traditional manner of doing things, admirably suited to Russia's geopolitical situation and to its cumbersome and centralized political machine.

The first step in the eventual absorption of Europe by the USSR has been taken. After a quarter century, the West has finally come to acknowledge Russian occupation of Eastern Europe not only *de facto* but also *de jure*. The recent accords with West Germany mean, in effect, that the West has reconciled itself to Eastern Europe permanently passing into the Soviet sphere of influence and joining the rest of the Soviet empire.

The next step—control of Western Europe—is, of course, incomparably more difficult to accomplish. And yet preliminary measures must soon be taken by Russia to neutralize Europe's military threat for reasons which—in the first instance—have to do with its difficulties with China.

The USSR is not at all pleased with President Nixon's balance of power policy, and does all in its power to denigrate it as dangerous to world stability. Why? A "pentagonal" world, envisaged by President Nixon, confronts Russia with the prospect of a two-front war with two potentially hostile blocs: Western Europe acting in concert with the USA, and China allied with Japan. The prospect of a European–East Asian military *entente*, whatever its likelihood, must be a nightmare to Soviet statesmen and strategists. To counter it, the Soviet Union is vigorously pressing an alternative policy namely "collective security," which it would like first applied in Europe and then in Asia. The purpose of such arrangements seems to be to prevent the formation of potential anti-Soviet blocs by the introduction of the principle that no major political or military decisions anywhere in the world can be taken without the Soviet Union's direct participation. This is one of the reasons the USSR lays such emphasis on the development of a navy, a force which has always served great powers as an instrument of "world politics."

Essentially, the USSR hopes to neutralize the damage to its interests implied in the balance of power principle by establishing its physical (military) presence in every major strategic area of the globe and demanding a senior voice in all regional military-political arrangements. A "collective security" pact in Europe, should enable the Soviet Union to nip in the bud any designs of NATO to exert pressure on it should Russia became military engaged in the Far East. Similarly, an Asian "collective security" pact (Russia, America, India, Japan, etc.) could be used to isolate and contain China.

It is difficult to believe that the Soviet Union will get away with a scheme that so transparently serves its own interests and offers the

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others nothing in return but a limitation of options. I cannot see the purpose of a European "security pact" of which the USSR would be an active partner. Either the USSR is a threat to Western Europe, in which case it should no more participate in European security arrangements than a wolf be invited to join a self-defence organization of lambs; or it is not such a threat, in which there is no need for collective security. Certainly the Soviet Union has no need to fear offensive actions from NATO: past experience demonstrates that NATO does not intend to exploit Soviet difficulties to reconquer Eastern Europe. Nor does Western Europe confront a military threat from any other source than the USSR. One must conclude, therefore, that the immediate purpose of Soviet collective security proposals is to guarantee the USSR a secure western flank and free its hands for possible action in East Asia.

Such is the immediate aim of Soviet security proposals; but beyond them lurk long-term goals which carry ominous prospects for Europe. Russian participation in the politico-military institutions regulating West Europe—without, needless to add, corresponding opportunities being granted Western Europe in Europe's Eastern half—will provide Russia with a framework within which to initiate a process of internal disintegration of the kind mentioned above. The basic tactic would be to divide the "peace" party from the "war" party in every country; to pit one state against another (especially France against Germany); to weaken economic unity by deals with individual member states of the EEC; and, over the long run, to detach Europe from the United States.

This policy now has much better chances of success than one would have believed possible a decade ago. The essential point, in my opinion, is that post-war Europe has undergone a veritable social revolution which has decreased its willingness (although not its ability) to meet the kind of threat the USSR poses to its political integrity. Until World War II Europe had been socially a highly stratified area, in which the lower orders, as it were, "knew their place." Consumer goods beyond the essential ones, travel, most sports, spectacles and luxuries were outside the range of their pocketbooks and even of their vision. Leadership positions in the diplomatic and military services were reserved for descendants of the "feudal" class and propertied groups assimilated to it. Now with the help of American military protection and investments, this situation has radically changed. The rise of wages accompanying advances in industrialization and the savings in defence outlays, with the attendant lowering of costs of consumer products, have opened up to the mass of Europeans for the first time in history access to goods and activities previously considered the preserve of the social elite. At the same time the old "feudal" class has dwindled in influence partly because its past performance has discredited it, and partly because the social democratization of Europe has diminished the awe in which it had been traditionally held.

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Western Europe is in the throes of a consumer orgy which, with each passing year, diminishes its appetite for an active foreign policy and a major defence effort. West Europeans do not seem eager to assume responsibility for their political and military self-preservation and they see no need to do so, being convinced that the US cannot afford to let them fall into Russian hands. The policy of *détente* towards Russia pursued by the US reinforces this belief, and so does the Russian peace offensive.

Realistically speaking, the best chance of preventing future Russian encroachments in Europe and in Asia seems to me to lie in a co-ordination of West European and Chinese diplomacies and (eventually) military strategies. The Chinese seem to fully realize the advantages which would accrue to them from such a policy. But they are not strong enough at this time to carry any weight, nor can they assure Europe of significant relief in the event of Europe being menaced by the Russians. Strangely, American diplomacy seems to ignore this possibility, whether because it does not wish to alarm the Russians or because it genuinely believes that such a policy is impractical. Ultimately, however, this line seems to me to be more promising than the notion of an "Atlantic Community" pressed on Europe by the Nixon Administration. There is a curious inability in the White House to perceive the global ramifications of foreign policy, to understand that *détente* with the USSR produces effects on European attitudes toward Russia and the opening of American-Chinese relations could in turn affect Russian behaviour toward Europe. The balance of power element in the Nixon Doctrine cannot be made workable if an exception is made for the Soviet Union on the grounds of a special relationship between the two super powers. If balance of power politics are to be pursued in earnest then Russia must be considered a factor; and once that is done it will become obvious that the American-European relationship involves China also and possibly Japan.

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The USSR and the Third World

Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier

EVER since Stalin's death, the USSR has been acting as a friend of the newly independent countries and as supporter of their aspirations against the West. Although the goal of gaining influence in the Third World has remained constant, Moscow's methods and priorities have changed substantially. Since 1965, relations with Asia, Africa and Latin America have been increasingly marked by what is more aptly described as realism rather than moderation—as some observers have called it. Khrushchev's successors are still seeking expanded opportunities in the developing countries. But instead of resorting to flamboyant moves and boastful claims, they are patiently building up secure and solid gains that can more flexibly serve the interests of a great power in a variety of contingencies.

At least three reasons can readily be given for the Soviet Union turning to a more level-headed policy. For one, Russia has come to understand the concomitant responsibilities and constraints of being a global power. The time of expansion from an isolated position, when almost any step forward represented a gain, is over. What requires more attention is the problem of consolidating and managing a complex system of commitments and alliances.

Moreover, Russia is no longer competing with only one adversary. In addition to the West, it now confronts China—a major power threateningly posed along a disputed frontier, that has more claim than Russia ever had to close affinities with the aspirations of the former colonies, and that is successfully displacing the USSR as spokesman for the downtrodden and awakened East.

And finally, through hard and sometimes bitter experience the Soviets have realized that the hopes they formerly entertained about the natural alliance of the newly independent countries with the USSR, about their speedy evolution towards a kind of proto-socialism, were much too facile. Instead of being able to manage a fluid situation for their immediate advantage, the Russians have often become involved in underwriting the domestic policies of client states at considerable expense, or in supporting them in diplomatic tangles wherein their clients' interests outweighed those of Russia.

For reasons such as these, the Soviets have increasingly sought to give their relations with the new countries a solid underpinning: to establish methods of operation that would enable them to derive more benefits and to exercise more over-all control and to avoid one-sided commitment.

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THE new realism is reflected in ideology. Since the Soviet leadership still feels the need for ideological justification, clichés about the liberation revolution and the anti-imperialist front continue to be invoked. But there are signs that the Soviets no longer proceed according to rigidly defined neo-Marxist categories. On the simplest level, one can compare the May Day or October Revolution slogans of the mid-1960s with current slogans. Up to 1968, considerable effort was spent on specifying Soviet evaluation of the conduct of individual Third World countries and on recognizing and positioning their radicalism (at home and abroad) on a carefully arranged hierarchy of favourites. Since then, the slogans distinguish only between those states which have gained independence and those that have not, thereby signifying that the USSR assesses countries irrespective of their political coloration.

On a more sophisticated level, Soviet scholars no longer write interminably on the rapid growth of the working class in Africa to demonstrate that the proletariat will soon lead that continent to socialism. Indeed, such genuine problems as urbanization and consequent social instability are being examined. At international gatherings, Soviet delegates argue less vociferously that imperialist exploitation in the past and neo-colonialism at present are responsible for economic backwardness. And at home, serious research is concerned with such internal and crucial factors as demography, geography and resources, and the receptivity of traditional cultures to innovation.

Probably the most ideological aspect of Soviet foreign policy has been the Kremlin's reputed ability to control and manipulate the communist parties in other countries. Significantly, there has been a steady erosion in Soviet insistence that communists play either the leading or even an independent role in domestic politics. Since 1961, when the 22nd CPSU Congress pointedly omitted reference to communist hegemony in a united front, Moscow has been pursuing an increasingly liberal attitude on cooperation between communists and other political parties.

BUT compliance with the Kremlin's preference is another matter. Pro-Moscow communists resent being doormats on which nationalist leaders step in proceeding toward their own versions of the future. In the case of the Syrian party, Moscow has managed to persuade Khaled Bagdash, who in the mid-1960s opposed Russian efforts to downgrade the role of communists, to bring his followers into a National Front led by the Ba'ath under conditions quite unfavourable to the Syrian CP. With the Ba'ath monopolizing all political recruitment, organization and propaganda in the armed forces and among students, it is problematic what the communists can accomplish on their own or how they can survive as an autonomous unit. In contrast, Soviet attempts to moderate the activities of the Sudanese party, among

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the best organized and most independent-minded of Arab CPs, were to no avail. The Sudanese Party participated in an unsuccessful anti-government coup in July 1971. Even though Moscow felt obliged to protest to Khartoum on the ensuing executions, it also issued a number of ideological articles arguing that excessive self-assertiveness on the part of communist parties was not advisable.

Similarly, in inter-state relations, the present-day Soviet leadership has been avoiding radicalism. In order to attain greater manoeuvrability, the Soviets have been disengaging themselves from too exclusive a reliance on radical states and leaders. At first, Moscow sought to expand ties with moderate, non-revolutionary states. More recently, it has sought permanence for its presence in the Third World through a system of long-term Friendship treaties.

In seeking rapprochement with states like Turkey and Iran, the USSR has made cautious advances. The aim was not to put an end to either country's membership in NATO or CENTO but merely to establish good-neighbourly relations. The moderation has paid off handsomely—it has drawn the two countries away from rigid conformity to American policies; it has improved Russia's standing in two strategic regions; it has enabled Russia to participate in the economic development of both countries (quite profitably in the case of Iran); and it has given the Kremlin more options to exercise in the Near Eastern tangle.

In Southeast Asia, the Russians, having markedly improved their relations with Malaysia and Singapore, are now courting the Philippines. As soon as Manila lifted restrictions on travel to communist countries in 1968, Moscow initiated exchanges of cultural delegations. In 1970, it offered aid for developing an oil industry and it proposed establishing trade relations. Next on the list are diplomatic ties and the extension of Aeroflot's expanding Asian operations to Manila. In this and in similar cases, Moscow is guided by the strategic location of the country, not by its political coloration.

EXTENSION and normalization of relations through a policy of even-handed friendship no longer seems sufficient. Over the past two years the USSR has sought additional security through long-term Friendship Treaties with the UAR (May, 1971), India (August, 1971), and Iraq (April, 1972). The aim seems to be two-fold: the treaties put bilateral relations on a more permanent basis, removing them from the vicissitudes of governmental changes; they are a step toward a system of Asian collective security, which the Soviet Union first proposed unsuccessfully in 1969. The wording of the Iraqi treaty and Soviet commentary on all three documents indicate that Moscow would like to establish the principle of consultation in potentially dangerous situations affecting not only the two signatories but also the surrounding area. These treaties are regarded in the USSR as mechanisms to assure it a role of arbiter in areas which it considers vital to its interests, and as

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first steps toward a broader system of collective security in the Near East and Asia.

SINCE about 1964–65, Soviet aid and trade have shed their haphazard, politically-motivated character and have evolved into a purposeful programme intended to be economically beneficial to the USSR. Moreover, much of it is carefully designed to serve the strategic needs of the world's second strongest nation.

Figures alone cannot convey the scope of the programme—more than 5 billion rubles in credits, more than 500 aid projects, and 13·5 per cent of all foreign trade with the Third World—for it is not the magnitude but the pattern that reveals its portent. The Soviets now seek to capitalize on the international division of labour to supplement the needs of their own economy. Relations with the major economic partners are increasingly based on planning through permanent bilateral economic commissions and on long-term trade agreements that run concurrently with the current Five Year Plan. The present Plan, being the first one to undertake significant improvement in the living conditions of Soviet citizens, places substantial emphasis on imports from the Third World of consumer goods and of raw materials for production to alleviate chronic shortages at home.

The deals on natural gas and oil with countries to the south of Russia are prime examples of this economic expansion by means of aid projects. After Soviet geologists discovered rich natural gas deposits in North Afghanistan, the USSR concluded an agreement with Kabul in 1963 to construct a pipeline to the border for the export of gas in repayment for this and other projects. In Iran, the Russians undertook in 1966 to build various industrial projects in return for Iranian gas, for the export of which a pipeline was also constructed to the Soviet border. Similarly, the Soviets are engaged in a steady penetration of the Arabian oil market; here they readily offer projects in prospecting, refining and marketing in return for crude petroleum—an exchange that the nationalized petroleum companies find most attractive.

The benefits the USSR derives from these arrangements are extensive. They help to relieve the fuel needs of Soviet Central Asia as well as those of the East European allies, and they provide assured reserves for the power shortages projected for the USSR by 1980. Moreover, these extra supplies enable the USSR to export its own gas and petroleum to Western Europe in exchange for such scarce industrial products as large-diameter pipes, or to market it directly for hard currency. Furthermore, they enable Moscow, for example, to offer to construct an oil refinery in the Philippines with a guaranteed supply of crude oil. In this complex pattern, immediate domestic needs intertwine with long-range and far-flung plans of economic expansion.

Since the early 1960s, a marked pattern of aid projects serving strategic needs has also emerged. Western observers have focused on

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Moscow's military aid programmes as the chief, if not exclusive, instrument for gaining strategic footholds in distant nations. They have tended to overlook the skilful planting and coordination of projects like airfields, port facilities and road construction to create an infrastructure to serve potential military and naval needs all over the globe.

Space permits mention only of the design of Soviet maritime aid along important sea routes. The dramatic appearance of the Red Fleet in the Mediterranean and since 1968 in the Indian Ocean was preceded by years of patient preparatory work on naval facilities and intelligence-gathering under the guise of economic aid, such as the construction of shipyards at Alexandria in the UAR and at Basra in Iraq; the building of modern seaports at Hodeida, Yemen, and at Berbera, Somali; the modernization of Conakry's harbour in Guinea; or the creation of a modern fishing fleet for Mauritius. In view of this long-term pattern, the more recent Soviet involvement in developing the fishing industry and ports of Chile and Peru marks the USSR's entry into Latin America to establish ports of call, supply and repair facilities for its vessels.

THE new policy of realism takes different forms and pursues different aims in various parts of the Third World. Soviet disengagement from radicalism is most evident in Africa—once the focus of high expectations based on untested Marxist formulas. The proto-socialist policies of doctrinaire nationalist leaders—such as the build-up of the state sector or the creation of vanguard parties—proved to be unpopular and ruinous, and have resulted in the overthrow of their protagonists, beginning with Ben Bella in 1965. The overwhelmingly peasant, tribal structure of African societies, instead of paving the way for a direct transition to socialism, proved to be a source of political instability and a serious obstacle to economic development. The nationalization of Western business, instead of transferring wealth to native hands and into economic growth, merely deprived the governments of much needed income. Accordingly, current Soviet writings on Africa point out that " objective " conditions in tropical Africa are such that its peoples (unlike the more advanced countries of Asia and the Middle East) have to take greater pains with slower, transitional reforms.

In diplomatic relations, the USSR now maintains a circumspect distance from the self-styled radicals. It no longer heeds their pleas that by helping them Moscow would be advancing the cause of world revolution. Instead, the Russians have been cultivating ties with all the established regimes. With an eye to geopolitical realities, during 1965–66 they stopped ostracizing Nigeria, the biggest, most populous and economically advanced Black African state. Moscow backed the central government in the civil war as much for its own political advantage as for the long-range aim of ensuring stability on the continent by working within the established state system. Since 1965, the Soviets have established normal relations with moderate Senegal as well as with the conservative Ivory Coast.

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The USSR is unlikely to resume its support for a grouping of radical African states (as was the case during Nkrumah's days) in hopes of forming a pro-Soviet bloc, for such a polarization might eventually occasion a great-power confrontation in an area which is still of quite low priority to the Russians. Instead, the Soviets now support the OAU to underscore their beneficent disposition toward all African regimes. Moscow maintains nominal support of liberation groups in the still existing colonies. But it accedes to the African states' demands that aid to independence movements be channelled through the OAU's Liberation Committee, and it gives prominence to the work of the UN Committee on Decolonization. The less the outside powers interfere in Africa, the better from the Soviet standpoint. For that reason the USSR respects and works through established channels and insists that the African states observe the immutability of frontiers and desist from interfering in each others' domestic affairs.

IN Asia, the Soviet Union has been trying to forge a different type of balanced policy, not just to lessen tensions and to forestall great-power rivalry but to contain China and to assure a presence and a voice for itself. Originally, the USSR sought to establish a position of its own vis-à-vis the West by concentrating on a few countries, offering them grandiose aid projects, creating close ties and rendering partisan support in their quarrels with neighbours—to Afghanistan against Pakistan in the Pushtu area, to India's position on Kashmir, to Sukarno's territorial ambitions.

Since 1965, Russia has been extricating itself from such one-sided relationships. For one reason, it has found that local conflicts afford China a chance to interfere and gain a foothold. Secondly, it seems to have learned from the Near East experience that extreme polarization can lead to involvement in almost insoluble situations over which it can exercise only marginal control at times. Consequently, the Russians have been trying to use their power and persuasiveness constructively to bring about a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan. Even though India received Soviet military, diplomatic and moral support as the Bangladesh crisis became open war, once the fighting was over the USSR energetically resumed its role as peacemaker. It has been careful not to ostracize Pakistan and is trying to steer the two countries into reaching a lasting accommodation.

At the same time Russia has been cultivating and broadening ties with other Asian nations. In 1966, it initiated economic overtures to Malaysia (previously denounced as a neo-colonialist creation designed to perpetuate Britain's presence) and established diplomatic relations the following year. Similar overtures to Singapore met with success in 1968. In order not to lose a foothold in Indonesia, the Soviet government agreed in 1970 to reschedule Jakarta's debts on quite generous terms. And currently, economic feelers and cultural exchanges are being extended to Thailand and the Philippines.

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However, expanded bilateral relations are no longer deemed sufficient to shore up Russia's position. Even though the Asian security treaty, proposed by Brezhnev in 1969, had been ignored by most countries and was specifically rejected by Mrs Gandhi, the Russians were not deterred. When India found itself pressed by warnings from the US and China during the Bangladesh crisis, Moscow proposed the 20-year Friendship Treaty to New Delhi. Among other things, the Treaty provides for mutual consultations in case of attack or threat to either contracting party " with view to eliminating this threat and taking appropriate measures to ensure peace and security." Subsequently, there have been reports that both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been invited to sign similar pacts. Moscow's persistence in this matter indicates that it wants to create a regular mechanism for consultations (which the broad network of normal relations patiently built up since 1965 does not provide) to safeguard its interests on the subcontinent as the US and Britain withdraw from Asia and China's power grows rapidly.

IN the Near East, after relying for a long time on Egypt to activate and unify the Arabs against the remnants of imperialism and feudalism, the USSR is now resorting to a less drastic and one-sided diplomacy. The Soviets want to keep their presence in the area and to avoid war, but they have not hit upon a better formula than " trying to keep a foot in every camp " in order to avoid being outmanoeuvred by the US over the Arab-Israeli dispute and to remind the Egyptian leaders that they should not take Soviet support too much for granted.

Despite all the dangers and uncertainties of the alliance with the UAR, the USSR is unwilling to become dislodged from that country. When Sadat dismissed Ali Sabry, Moscow interpreted it as a step aimed at eliminating pro-Soviet influence in the government, and Podgorny arrived in Cairo in May 1971 with a 15-year Friendship Treaty that in return for military assistance assured the USSR not only of consultations on foreign policy but of direct contacts between " political and public organizations." (Sadat's subsequent expulsion of Soviet military personnel in retaliation for non-delivery of Mig-23s promised by Podgorny inadvertently performed a service for the Kremlin. It reduced Moscow's vulnerability in a highly exposed position and left Russian strategic interests undamaged since the Red Fleet's presence in the Mediterranean ports was not affected.)

Even though the USSR does not envisage the destruction of Israel, it gives lukewarm support to the Palestinian guerrillas. This support is to placate those Arab states, like Algeria and Syria, which encourage the Palestinians and to prevent the Chinese from pre-empting the field. But to gain stronger support for a political solution to the conflict, Moscow has sought to improve relations with such moderate states as Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and Morocco. Farther afield, it has cultivated cordial ties with Iran, which might be useful as a countercheck to excessive Arab ambitions.

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While avoiding overcommitment in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Moscow pursues a more energetic course in oil where it can exploit Arab needs and ambitions to its own advantage at much smaller risk. It is significant that the signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty of April 1972, which stipulated not only coordinated action in foreign policy and defence but also asserted the principle of "sovereignty of [each contracting party] over all its natural resources," was followed within two months by the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Co's pipelines and of the Kirkuk fields, which Baghdad had been threatening to do for ten years. Ten days later, the USSR came through with an economic aid agreement that provided for Soviet refining and marketing of the newly nationalized oil. And then Syria nationalized the IPC pipeline running through its territory. This concerted Soviet-Arab action delineates an important long-range policy in the making.

IN Latin America, the USSR pursues a policy of extending its diplomatic and trade ties while fostering an end to Cuba's political and economic isolation. It expects to gain more from this all-round normalization than from backing a revolutionary course, as was the case for a while after Castro's rise to power. The Soviets reason that letting the accumulated grievances against the US follow their natural course will bring assured results: America will have to accept the weakening of its position, and pay for it too—and that process will not cause added expenditure or worry for Moscow.

Current Soviet comments on Latin America show a much livelier interest in developments which indicate that the continent is asserting its independence from Washington—be it greater regional cooperation that dispenses with American participation or the nationalization of American business—than in mapping out a course for domestic politics. To be sure, some sort of domestic radicalism is preferred, but it is defined more in terms of eroding American influence than in terms of social reforms or the fortunes of local CPs. As elsewhere, the role of the communists has been minimized. The importance of the progressive military and socially committed Catholics has been acknowledged, and the pro-Moscow CPs are seeking participation in national fronts (Chile) or political alliances (Venezuela).

The Soviets are careful to cite Cuba only as an example of a country that overcame the endemic Latin American fatalism vis-à-vis the US and asserted its independence. Cuba's domestic policies are never cited as a model for others to emulate. The USSR welcomes all signs of Cuba's reintegration into the continental system—such as Havana's participation at the conference of the Group of 77 developing nations in Lima in October 1971 or Castro's visit to Chile. An end to Cuba's political isolation and economic blockade would lessen the need for enormous Soviet subsidies to Havana and would smooth the path for Russia's acceptance on the continent. Though it is as yet impossible to say whether it was Moscow or Havana that pressed for Cuba's entry

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into CEMA in July 1972, it should be noted that admission came only after the USSR had succeeded in persuading Castro to tone down his revolutionary rhetoric.

While Castro may still aver that he will shun any dealings with latifundists and the United Fruit Co, the USSR shows no such scruples. It has been seeking to broaden diplomatic and trade relations with all regimes. Currently, Moscow maintains close but correct relations with Chile's parliamentary marxist government to avoid compounding its difficulties and to prevent a backlash. It finds the operations of the Chilean coalition (in which the communists are a more moderate element than the Socialists) an apt demonstration of the Soviet contention that communism and democracy are compatible. Moscow is friendly toward the military regimes of Argentina and, especially, Peru where the army is carrying out reforms traditionally associated with the left-wing. And it has been seeking rapprochement with the "banana republics" of Central America.

SO despite certain over-arching characteristics of post-Khrushchevian policies (namely, the abandonment of close identification with radical regimes, the sharp cut-back in the lavish use of aid for political purposes, and the attenuated reliance on ideology to bolster claims at home and cement ties abroad), there are marked differences in the profiles of Soviet behaviour in various regions. In Africa, the USSR would like to see something akin to genuine disengagement of all powers; in Asia, a formal normalization of inter-state relations in which Moscow would have a guaranteed participation; in the Near East, avoidance of military conflict but continuation of the no-war-no-peace situation since tensions create opportunities for an expanded economic and political presence; and in Latin America, a judicious reliance on the rising wave of anti-Americanism.

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An Atlantic-Japanese Energy Policy

Walter J. Levy *

THE prosperity and security of the whole Free World depend on sufficient availability of energy on satisfactory economic terms. And during the next ten to twenty years, oil will provide the mainstay of the world's energy supplies. Because of the size of known reserves and the time for finding and developing new oil and other energy resources, the world's growing needs will be supplied predominantly by huge increases of oil imports from the Middle East, mainly from the Persian Gulf area.

Directly connected with the anticipated large oil imports, the consuming countries will face another set of problems. The cost of oil imports will rise tremendously with difficult implications for their balance of payments. There will also be serious problems caused by unprecedented foreign currency accumulations and the international use of such funds in the case of some of the major oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi.

We have also been witnessing a complete change in the political, economic, strategic and power relationships between the oil producing, importing and home countries of international oil companies and the national oil companies of producing and importing countries.

An energy policy for the oil-importing countries cannot be limited to the Atlantic Group of nations but must include Japan, the free world's second strongest single economic power and one of its largest oil importers. It should also encompass other developed nations such as South Africa, Australia and New Zealand and should take account of the position of oil-importing developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia. However, we will refer mainly to the Atlantic Group plus Japan in this analysis of the issues and changing relationships posed by energy-oil problems during the next ten years or so. It should, I believe, demonstrate the urgent necessity for the early establishment of an energy policy for a new Atlantic-Japanese partnership.

THERE is a practically unanimous conclusion that from now on—certainly until the early eighties—US energy requirements can be met only by very substantial increases in oil imports. If present US policies and trends are left to take their course, oil shipments from abroad will advance from about 4·7 million barrels per day in 1972

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to over 11 million barrels per day in 1980. Apart from the promising developments in the North Sea and the unknown potential in Japanese offshore waters or in other "safe" areas, Western Europe and Japan have in general very limited, if any, possibilities of developing dependable alternative energy supplies based on synthetic oil or gas because of their relatively small coal, shale, and tar sands resources. But even with the North Sea developments, the oil imports of Europe and Japan combined are estimated to advance during the same period from some 18 million barrels daily to 30 million barrels daily.

The preponderant part of all these imports—for the United States, Western Europe and Japan—would have to come from Middle East oil-producing countries. Their output should rise from 18 million barrels daily in 1972, to an estimated 35 to 40 million barrels daily by 1980. The United States will, for the first time, compete with Europe and Japan for major oil supplies from the Middle East, whose share in total US oil imports would, by 1980, amount to about 50 to 55 per cent and in those of Western Europe and Japan to about 75 to 80 per cent. There is little doubt that Middle East oil reserves are sufficient to cover these requirements, but without very large new discoveries this situation would change, probably during the 1980s. The USSR will most likely remain self-sufficient in covering its oil and other energy requirements and may, on balance, continue to be an exporter of oil and natural gas.

Two more sets of data are most relevant for the formulation and urgent implementation of an energy policy. The total value of US net imports of energy materials, mostly oil, may, according to US Department of Commerce data, easily reach $18 to $24 billion annually by 1980, those of Europe $23 to $31 billion and those of Japan $12 billion to $16 billion—as compared with $2·3 billion, $8·5 billion and $3·1 billion in 1970, respectively. The revenues likely to accrue to Middle East oil-producing countries can tentatively be estimated at about $40 billion annually by 1980—as against $9 billion in 1972—with Saudi Arabia alone accounting for as much as perhaps half of the 1980 total. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, a large part of these funds could not possibly be absorbed in their internal economies.

The United States must therefore share with Europe and Japan the deep concern about the physical availability, the terms of trade, the balance of payments impact, and the investment and monetary consequences of heavily increased oil imports. But the United States, as the only super-power of the Free World with global commitments for its defence, carries the additional responsibility of protecting its capability to perform as such, especially since the Soviet Union, and for that matter, the People's Republic of China do not primarily depend on external sources of energy. The United States cannot afford an accumulative over-dependence for its oil supplies on a handful of foreign, largely unstable, countries. Otherwise, its security—and that of its Allies—as well as its prosperity and its freedom of action in

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foreign policy formulation will be in jeopardy. But the United States does have a realistic and economically manageable alternative, which is to direct its energy policy towards accelerated development of its large domestic resource potential for conventional and synthetic hydrocarbons and nuclear energy. Even though such alternatives may now appear expensive, the cost of foreign oil imports is likely to escalate continuously, and will sooner or later—and probably sooner rather than later—approach the cost of alternative sources of supply that could be developed in the United States.

If all realistic actions to increase its domestic energy supplies were to be taken with utmost urgency, US dependence on total energy imports by the early 1980s might be limited to approximately 20 per cent—instead of over 30 per cent if present trends were permitted to take their course. US oil imports at that time would be substantially lower—perhaps reduced by about one third—than they would otherwise have been, and probably would not exceed the "danger" level. But the continuing dependence of Europe and Japan on Middle East oil —and to an important degree the United States—appears to be inevitable. And the build-up of Middle East oil revenues will reflect that.

IN addition to the problems of security of oil supplies in terms of physical availability and the worldwide financial impact of oil purchases by the importing countries and the oil revenues by a few producing countries, there are equally relevant issues affecting the economic, political and strategic future of the oil-importing countries. These are the result of a fundamental change in the relationships between the international oil industry and the producing countries, the importing countries and the home countries of the international oil companies.

Based on a dramatic expansion of oil production and exports, mainly in the Middle East, the international oil companies effectively supplied the bulk of the increasing energy requirements of the free world. From 1946 to the late 1950s the companies—on the basis of their rich Middle East oil concessions and, at least indirectly, benefiting from the immense strategic, political and economic power of the Unites States—were able to dispose of their oil reasonably freely and on favourable commercial terms. Moreover, the United States itself was on balance independent of foreign oil imports and possessed a sizable reserve productive capacity from which our Allies could benefit substantially during the Iranian and, with some short delays, also during the first Suez Crisis.

By 1960, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was established, the relative power position of the United States was beginning to decline as Europe, Japan and the USSR acquired new strength. It was also the time when the developing countries began to play a more important role in world affairs. The timing of the establishment of OPEC and its expanding influence in

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international oil operations was partly the result of a certain inability and inflexibility of the international oil industry and its home governments to anticipate, assess and adjust to the changes that had begun to erode their previous paramount position of political and economic influence in oil-producing countries.

During the next 12 years, from 1960 to 1972, OPEC and its members succeeded in achieving minor increases in the government take of oil-producing countries, and since the early seventies in enforcing a quantum jump in the royalty and tax payments levied on their production, capped in 1972 by the "participation agreement." Without going into details—and assuming present arrangements are implemented—participation means an immediate 25 per cent interest for the Arab oil-producing countries in the Persian Gulf in existing concessions, leading to 51 per cent control within nine years. National oil companies of the major Middle East oil-producing countries will thus become the largest sellers of crude oil. By 1984, under existing provisions, most of the important Venezuelan oil concessions will also have reverted from the oil companies to the Venezuelan Government. Algeria, Libya, and Iraq have already taken over a very substantial part of the previously foreign-owned production, and the current Indonesian oil contracts also leave the Indonesian National Oil Company free to dispose of a substantial part of the oil discovered by foreign oil companies.

During the same period, the US domestic oil outlook underwent drastic changes and its reserve productive potential began to disappear. By 1972, with imports of close to 5 million barrels per day, the United States had become one of the largest importers of oil, with the prospect of a continuously increasing dependence on foreign oil.

CULMINATING with the conclusion of the participation negotiations in 1972—which may still not be the final round of negotiations —there is little doubt that the major oil-producing countries, especially of the Middle East, have acquired an immense potential for power—as long as at least two of the more important producers are able to maintain a reasonably united front. In the case of Saudi Arabia alone, we face a situation which, within a few years, gives that country, with its overwhelming lead in reserves and production, a pivotal role in supply.

As discussed, their power is based not only on their effective control over immense oil resources on which the security and prosperity of the free world have become dependent, but will in due course derive also from their control over unprecedented financial resources extracted from the oil purchasers. Moreover, large monetary reserves will give them the freedom to restrict their oil production for political or any other reasons, even though they would thereby forgo current income. The control which the producing countries will be able to exercise over their oil production and exports is not only based on their participation in the oil-producing companies, but stems perhaps even

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primarily from the exercise of their sovereign power over companies operating in their countries. There is ample precedence for such use of power with the reluctant acceptance of the oil companies and their home governments: the Kuwaiti and Libyan restrictions on production; the prohibition of exports to certain countries, including in certain circumstances even the parent countries of the oil companies; the Venezuelan oil legislation establishing practically complete control over oil operations, which were totally under foreign private ownership. This list could be extended almost without exception to include foreign oil activities in any of the major oil-producing countries.

Fiscal arrangements and payments to the producing countries are subject to nearly unilateral determination by the producing countries, as reflected in the demands leading to the Teheran and Tripoli "dictates."

Peremptory demands for national ownership of tanker transportation, reinvestments in oil exploration, refining, petrochemical, LNG facilitities, and other related industries are bound to be made. The establishment of levels of production and the size and direction of exports for conservation, economic, political or strategic reasons are also by now "recognized" methods of control as exercised by many producing countries.

In this connexion it is perhaps noteworthy that the development of the tremendous oil resources of the Middle East does not really reflect any extensive industrial involvement of the economies of their countries or any important contribution by their people to the huge flow of oil outward and of revenue backward. The oil-producing industry operations in these countries—whoever owns them—are limited fundamentally to a small enclave, transforming an export of liquid gold from underground into a reverse flow of solid gold above ground.

As mentioned earlier, national oil companies will in due course become the largest group of crude oil sellers in the world. Even though, under recent arrangements, a substantial part of the national companies' entitlements will, for some period, be sold back to their foreign partners for distribution through their marketing channels, it is only a matter of time before the national oil companies will probably dominate the market for non-integrated third-party sales of crude oil. They will become major suppliers to national oil companies in many of the importing countries of the world and will probably also deal directly with the foreign refining and marketing affiliates of the international oil companies. In fact, effective competition in crude oil sales between the producing affiliates of the international oil companies and their partners, the national companies of the producing countries, may from a practical point of view, become very difficult if not impossible. The producing countries' governments might not only establish the levels of production but will also, through their policies, determine the tax-paid cost and the prices at which the greatly increasing quantities of crude oil to which their companies will become entitled with either

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be sold back to their foreign partners or offered by them to their own customers.

Coupled with the expansion of crude oil sales, the national oil companies of some of the major producing countries will obviously work out deals for joint refining and marketing in importing countries. Likewise, the producing countries, by taking over ownership or control of an ever-expanding tanker fleet to carry their oil exports, will thereby not only increase their revenues, but enhance their power over the international oil trade.

With Saudi Arabia, which will probably become the largest Middle East producer by far, being unable to absorb its vastly expanding oil revenues in its local economy, it is quite possible that by the early 1980s the surplus funds annually available to it may be $15 billion plus. The large and continuously growing inflow of foreign funds that would accrue to the treasuries of a few Middle East governments, and to a small number of their privileged citizens, will far exceed any accumulation of foreign exchange holdings in modern times. Realistically, such amounts could probably not be placed in long-term or short-term investments year-in year-out without risking severe international repercussions and potentially extensive restrictions on the free flow of capital. It is most unlikely that the United States, or any other developed country, would permit continued massive foreign investments on a scale that could conceivably result in foreign takeovers of important companies and industries. Moreover, the reverse flow of dividends and interest would soon add an additional unmanageable balance of payments burden to the oil import bill of many countries. Nor could the short-term money markets handle such excessive and most likely very volatile funds without undermining the world's monetary arrangements.

The dilemma confronting us is acutely disturbing as any proliferation of international restrictions on capital or short-term movements of funds would be most harmful to financial markets and the monetary system. In the affected Middle East countries, any restrictions on their investments abroad would probably be accompanied by restrictions on the output of oil. Obviously, if the income of oil-producing countries were to be "sterilized," it would be more advantageous and completely rational for them to limit their oil exports. This would then further aggravate world oil supply difficulties. However, controls over the level of oil production are unfortunately likely to be introduced, even without hostile political or economic motivation of the producing countries, for reasons of conservation and wise resource management—at least in some of the major oil-producing countries—and certainly as soon as their reserve-to-production ratio begins to decline significantly. A recent pronouncement by the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum has clearly suggested such a course of action. His statement was coupled with the suggestion that in order to

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assure continued supplies, oil imports from his country be given a privileged position in the US market.

Some of the major Middle East oil-producing countries will thus become two-pronged power centres; both as a supplier of oil and as an extraordinary accumulator of capital—with the latter further strengthening their ability to withhold oil from importing countries over a considerable period of time by drawing on their financial reserves for their budgetary and trade requirements. The size of the funds which the producing countries have at their command is, of course, based on their control of an absolutely essential resource, through which, by combined actions of OPEC countries—or perhaps even with the planned huge increases of Saudi Arabian production, the latter solely by itself—could exercise a tremendous power. Moreover, by tying the price of their oil to a commodity basket index, for example, any changes in currency values as such will not affect their actual purchase or investment capacities. There is little doubt that this accumulation of oil and of money power—obtained so to speak like manna from heaven, and, at least for the time being, not accompanied by any substantial contribution in political, managerial, or technical competence—would bring with it tremendous and lopsided shifts in the balance of power. Not the least of the dangers posed by this extreme concentration of oil power and "unearned" money power is the pervasive corruptive influence which such concentration is nearly inevitably going to have on political, economic, and commercial actions and behaviour in both the relatively primitive and unsophisticated societies of the producing countries and the advanced societies of the dependent industrialized nations. Lust for immense power which is there for the asking and greed for money in unheard of amounts could easily corrode part of their—as well as our—political and social structure.

There are further complicating factors that must be taken into account in any assessment of the future dependability of the area as the centre for oil and money power. Within the area itself there are many deep-seated conflicts such as those of Iran versus Iraq, Iraq versus Kuwait, Saudi Arabia versus Oman and Abu Dhabi, Libya versus the traditional Arab countries, and so on. There is also an underlying rivalry between Iran and the Arab States of the Gulf for hegemony in the area, which may sooner or later erupt into an open power struggle implicating the communist and non-communist allies or sponsors of the various Middle East countries. In addition to these conflicts within the area, there are, of course, the perennial dangers and potentially explosive implications raised by the Israeli-Arab conflict.

All these actual or potential confrontations fundamentally affect production operations and government arrangements of the oil companies. When the activities of the companies extend to several of these countries, they will most likely be drawn into any local area conflicts.

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Moreover, the producing countries will hold them responsible for their home government policies and expect them to support the producing countries' political, strategic or economic interests. The companies will almost inevitably be asked to match any arrangements which either their affiliates or any of the other international oil companies (or sometimes even any new company) make with governments of most other Middle East oil countries. And with the underlying rivalry between the Arab countries and Persia, either of them would feel compelled to be able to claim that it has struck the most advantageous bargain with the oil companies. National pride and jealousy are bound to provoke a one-upmanship that would lead—in the case of different kinds of arrangements on the two sides of the Gulf—to endless escalations and endless trouble. This is exactly what is happening as a result of the simultaneous negotiations on participation with the Arab nations on the one hand and on a differently-structured deal with Persia on the other hand—and also in connection with developments in Iraq concerning the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company. Accordingly, as in Iran and Iraq, any potential repercussions on the participation agreements with the Arab countries, especially the question of the companies keeping any equity interest in their various oil-producing arrangements, are still undetermined. Neither must it be forgotten that none of the national governments is really stable and that there are always serious doubts whether any existing arrangements would survive the end of any current regime.

THERE is, therefore, no doubt that the position of the international oil companies has undergone a fundamental change, with the participation arrangements high-lighting, but not fully describing the underlying metamorphosis in their functions and power relationships.

The publicly stated intent of what the producing countries have set out to achieve shows that participation, if all the arrangements were ratified and would hold as negotiated in 1972, is mainly a device through which they smoothly and by arrangements with the international oil companies plan to obtain complete control over their countries' total oil operations.

It represents a grand design by the producing countries to forge an alliance with the oil companies in which the producing countries, while pursuing their national objectives, would still be able to take advantage of the large distribution outlets, the investment capabilities and the technical know-how of the oil companies. This is reflected perhaps most succinctly in the pronouncements of Mr Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum. His whole approach is based on the assumption, as stated already in 1968 and repeated since, that the oil companies would one day turn out to be the natural allies of the producing countries. As he explains it, he wants participation because the weight of the national oil companies in producing countries should be combined with that of the oil companies so as to:

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(1) protect the concessions from nationalization by providing an enduring link between the oil companies and the producing countries;
(2) gain control over the oil operations while maintaining the flow of foreign capital and expertise and obtaining marketing outlets for the ouput;
(3) prevent competition between producing countries as sellers of crude in open market, which would lead to a drastic drop in prices and Middle East government revenues;
(4) maintain thereby price stability, and through the implementation of participation even secure an immediate increase in world crude oil prices from which the producing countries would benefit;
(5) achieve through this combination a position of influence in the oil markets;
(6) make it difficult for any producing country to insist on an "abnormal" increase in production.

As the Kuwaiti Finance and Oil Minister plainly put it, the true connotations of participation are nationalization or takeover. "What we called phased participation is in fact phased nationalization. This is precisely the situation and its implications."

It must be clear that even though the producing countries will start initially with a minority ownership, they will have a powerful voice on investment, production levels, size of exports and their destinations. As a corporate partner representing at the same time the sovereign, they possess all the power they need to control and direct the companies on all phases of the operations in the producing country and probably even on many phases of their operations abroad, holding their local interest in oil production as hostage.

In the immediate future, the bulk of the new "participation" oil will be bought back by the foreign companies for disposition through their own outlets and their profits on the resales together with compensation payments and the investment contributions of the new national partners will, to begin with, at least tend to protect their cash flows. But by 1976, the proportionate share of the quantities offered back by the national oil companies to the foreign companies will probably have declined substantially. As the Teheran agreement on government oil revenues terminates at that time, large new demands against the companies will undoubtedly be made then, and possibly even before.

In any case, the national oil entities of the various producing nations will in due course become practically the largest suppliers of oil—only somewhat delayed by the phasing out of "buybacks" by the foreign concessionary companies. They will thereby exercise tremendous market power through their terms of sales. In the meantime they will apparently attempt to use their private company partners, whose

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interests they would try to tie up inextricably in joint production ventures, to assure market stability.

Perhaps sensing this, an American top executive of an international oil company in an early statement on participation demands said that the key role of the international oil companies to satisfy the needs of both the producing and consuming countries is "best performed when the commercial enterprise is freed from the pressures of conflicting ideologies and of the clashing political systems. These differences inevitably arise when governments of producing countries have a direct participation in running the oil industry or when government-to-government negotiations are substituted for the company bargaining with the host government." The commercial framework of operations "would be subverted if we were to adopt an alternative of serving either group of nations exclusively." A top executive of one of the largest European international oil companies stated that a position of 51 per cent participation by the producing countries would be "almost intolerable" as the oil companies would have almost all the operating responsibility without any freedom of investment and without control of production levels.

Subsequently, another senior executive referred more positively to the new participation agreement with some of the oil-producing governments in the Middle East as an example of building "more stable future relationships," though he conceded, "I won't pretend this was an easy adjustment." However, he added, "We believe that we now have a new basis for doing business which meets the needs of both consuming and producing countries. At the same time, we have maintained the essential intermediary role of the private international oil companies as the most effective agents for the production, transportation and distribution of oil products."

I am afraid that the earlier pessimistic evaluations and reactions of the oil companies' executives to the participation demand will unfortunately prove to be the correct one, notwithstanding firm assurances by the present Saudi Arabian Government that Middle East oil should and will be viewed commercially and not politically. This is certainly not the position of most other Middle East producing countries and cannot realistically be depended on. A cold-blooded assessment of the real power relationships of the international oil company with the various countries where it operates must lead to the conclusion that its oil production, on which the continued operations of its upstream and downstream facilities are completely dependent is now or will soon be under the effective control of the producing countries. At the same time, the producing countries will probably deliberately arrange their own and the oil companies' affairs in such a manner that the industry's single most important after-tax profit centre will, as in the past, be located in the producing countries.

There is, therefore, very little doubt about the change in the role of the oil companies from a buffer and bridge between producing and

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importing countries to what may turn out to be a role of junior partners of the producing countries. The oil companies would not be able to continue to act as an independent-intermediary commercial force in international oil relations; instead the producing countries would tend to treat them as service companies that would undertake the essential world-wide logistic, technical, financial, production and distribution operations.

What we are facing is a subtle—though not too subtle—shift of the major centre of power over international oil from the home countries to the producing countries. Whether the companies like it or not, they would be compelled to protect their huge interests in the producing countries by adjusting and coordinating their policies and actions in accordance with the directives and policies of the producing countries, hoping that nevertheless the pattern of their operations in their home countries and the importing countries would not be seriously upset.

The role which the oil companies will be able to play in any of their future dealings with producing countries concerning oil production and its availability to importing countries as well as with regard to future tax payments, is thus severely circumscribed. In the light of present power relationships and the extreme supply and profit dependence of the oil companies on producing countries, they cannot be expected to take a strong and determined stand in such negotiations with the sovereign of the country on which their whole prosperity depends and whose national companies are their partners and will in due course acquire the controlling interest in their operations. Moreover, they will have to argue that as long as they are able to secure the availability of supplies to importing countries—even at steeply escalating costs—they also serve the interest of their customers by not risking a confrontation that could lead to interruption of supplies; and as long as the companies are able to recoup such costs from the consumer, they would also protect their own commercial viability. As one top executive of one of the largest European international oil companies pointed out some time ago, "Pressure from the producing governments on costs is something we can live with, provided we are not at the same time denied freedom to move prices in the market so as to maintain a commercial margin of profit." It is obvious that in such circumstances the importing countries and home governments can simply not afford to remain passive. The companies, as private organizations and under the terms of reference applicable to commercial corporations, cannot possibly be expected to carry by themselves the burden of protecting not only their own interests but also those of their customers.

There are thus serious doubts whether the kind of negotiating problems we are facing now can be handled effectively through a common posture of the companies or by any other kind of intercompany arrangements. The approach followed in earlier negotiations,

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when most of the oil companies with foreign production negotiated as a group with OPEC producing countries as a group on matters that would vitally affect the tax-paid cost and oil supplies of nearly every oil-importing country of the free world, must be subjected to a searching review. In particular it would appear that a broad understanding on energy policy among the various importing and home governments involved is absolutely necessary to avoid, or at least to contain, unrestrained use or misuse of bargaining power by the oil-producing countries to impose excessive demands on the international oil trade.

IT must be realized that the international oil companies will, during the next decade and probably much longer, continue to be most important in the refining and distribution of oil in practically all of the countries of the free world, based on their predominant investment position in all phases of the local oil industries. They will also represent the most diversified single source of crude oil supplies, even though ever increasing quantities will be sold in the international oil trade by the national companies of producing countries. The international oil companies will also continue to make perhaps the most important contribution to diversified exploration, to technology and to expanded upstream and downstream investments. The logistics of their worldwide operations will be invaluable to the importing as well as producing countries.

Nevertheless, the international oil companies and equally their home countries, especially the United States, are now facing a serious lack of confidence by many of the importing countries not only with regard to their supply capabilities but also with respect to their intentions in so far as they may relate to the protection of the interests of customer countries. A course by the United States that would, through the exploitation of its domestic energy resources, lower American dependence on Middle East oil and thereby reduce the competitive bidding-up and depletion of Middle East oil reserves would, however, be a constructive contribution to the oil position of the Free World. Such a policy should thus be recognized by Europe and Japan as an integral part of a broader approach to oil issues that are the common concern of all. But beyond that, the United States has additional possibilities to put a "first mortgage" on some of the richest oil resources in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia controls by far the largest known reserves developed by American oil companies; and the Saudi Arabian Government has already evinced its interest to conclude special deals with the United States for increasing oil deliveries. No doubt, Iran would be keen to do likewise. However, any acceptance by the United States of preferred treatment as a customer for Saudi Arabian and Iranian oil would be extremely disruptive to its relations with other importing and producing countries.

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The reactions of other importing countries to the Saudi offer is reflected in a statement of the French state-owned oil company Elf-Erap. It commented "What an inducement to the raising of crude oil prices if the money paid by Europe and Japan should be invested through the producing state in the country of origin of these companies strengthening their power. Who would still be able to maintain that the companies which produce in Arabia are impartial intermediaries between these countries and the European consumer?" Along the same line of reasoning Italy's national oil company ENI suggests that the Common Market conclude direct oil supply agreements, in return for cooperation in the producing countries' development plans, to prevent a supply monopoly of the major international oil companies, especially as American and European interests are not identical. Positions expressing similar reactions have been taken by several other major importing countries. This prevailing fear is perhaps best summarized in a 1972 draft recommendation of the West European Union which was unanimously approved by that body but apparently not endorsed by the Council of Ministers:

". . . much of the oil imported by Europe is shipped under the American flag. The Middle East oil question is therefore mainly a commercial matter for the United States.

"For Western Europe, on the other hand, it is a vital matter and the interests of consumers do not tally with the interests of the international companies. Increased participation in the capital of petrol companies by the Arab States or even nationalization would not necessarily be a catastrophe for Europe.

"A European oil policy should take account of these factors and in no case be linked with the international oil companies. This means Europe could reach agreement directly with oil-producing countries, help them to develop a national oil industry and purchase the oil thus produced. . . . Europe has no interest in becoming involved in a vain conflict for defence of the oil companies; its interest is to collaborate closely with the Arab States.

"The disadvantage of such a policy might be to make the European market over-dependent on the Arab States. But that is already the case since the Arab countries can cut off supplies of oil to Europe whether it passes through the international companies or is supplied direct. . . ."

In these circumstances, individual European countries and Japan might be tempted to outbid each other in an effort to curry special favours with Middle East oil-producing countries and to secure a privileged position for themselves. But whatever their motivation, the national companies of importing countries will greatly expand their foreign supply operations. While such diversification might or might not provide a modicum supply security, new ventures too would be subject to fundamentally the same kind of political and economic risks as those of the international oil companies. There may be some bene-

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fits in reducing certain contingencies that may arise from Anglo-American control over access to foreign oil by enhancing their national access to foreign oil; but the latter in turn will be subject to its own separate hazards, demonstrated by the French experience in Algeria or the threatened expropriation of Belgian-held interests in Egypt because of Egypt's disapproval of the Congo policy of the Belgian government.

Investments by the producing countries in importing countries are unlikely to take place or to be permitted on a really massive scale; but should this occur, these investments are still unlikely to provide a much higher degree of oil supply security if the producing countries for reasons of their own should decide to withhold oil supplies. Their downstream investments would not constitute an effective hostage in the hands of the importing countries because the latter's continued dependence on oil supplies would be of much greater urgency than the threat of expropriation, or the loss of current revenue from such investment would be to the producing countries. Moreover, foreign crude oil secured by a national oil company of an importing country would most likely be given a preferred position in the home market. If such arrangements were to become an essential part of the total supply of an importing country, its dependence on what would most likely be a rather limited number of sources of oil imports would make it even more vulnerable to interruption—and to unilaterally imposed cost increases that it would then be compelled to absorb within its own economy. If the importing countries would follow a course of "go it alone" in a *sauve qui peut* spirit, each one of them would also become the target for potential political and economic blackmail, such as some of them have already experienced. They would run the grave risk that their policies and actions would be subverted by considerations of securing or protecting their access to foreign oil; ultimately such an approach will prove to be futile, and the price for the oil and the political or other terms under which it could be obtained might easily become untenable.

Obviously a continuous process of yielding valid rights, not through genuine bargaining but under threats by the producing countries, and a general posture of subservience by the oil companies and the importing countries—as has occurred in recent international oil "negotiations"—must undermine not only the prestige of the importing nations and of the companies but equally the respect of any arrangements concluded with them. Only a coordinated approach to energy policy by the relevant importing countries could really prevent such harmful consequences.

THE change in power relationships affecting the operations of the international oil industry also has a far-reaching effect on the position of the companies in their home countries. Interest in their international oil companies has in the past centred around their supply

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capabilities for their own country and its allies, their support of the power position of the home country implied in control over international oil resources, the contribution of the companies to the balance of payments, and the essential role the companies played in meeting expanding oil requirements.

The ability of the companies to provide secure supplies because of their investment in foreign oil is now no longer absolute and assured. Experience during the first Suez Crisis in the case of the United Kingdom and France and during the Six-Day War in the case of the US and UK, has shown that even US, British or French controlled foreign oil could be—and was for a short period—embargoed for shipments to the home countries. While in earlier years the United States was only a marginal importer of Middle East oil, in contrast to the UK, in future the United States will become one of the largest single importers of such oil. On the other hand, with the development of the North Sea resources, the United Kingdom—if Common Market rules allow its domestic oil production to be reserved for its own use—might be able to achieve a substantial lessening of its dependence on Middle East oil imports.

The same questions hold for the extent to which Anglo-American ownership provides supply assurance to our allies. In fact, some of our allies fear that American ownership of foreign oil might endanger their supply if there should be a political conflict between the United States and the producing countries. Control over the international oil companies has been used in the past as a political instrument by the home countries in their relationship with importing countries. The United States apparently did so during the first Suez Crisis and in oil trade with Cuba, for example. The possibility of using control over foreign oil for the political-strategic purposes of the home countries is disappearing fast. It is the producing countries which now claim the power to supply or withhold oil for their own political and other interests.

The contribution of the international oil companies to the balance of payments of their home countries is indeed substantial; but relatively more important for the United Kingdom than for the United States. In the future, with large increases in US oil imports and the continued need for reinvestment abroad, the balance of payments concern of the United States with regard to international oil may concentrate more on the huge and escalating foreign exchange costs of oil imports rather than to the benefits of profit transfers from international oil operations. In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, the development of the North Sea resources may relieve its oil trade bill sufficiently to maintain a predominant interest in the profit transfers from British international oil companies. Therefore, the fundamental interest of the United States is moving closer to that of an oil-importing country. On the other hand, the UK, in a narrow definition of its self-

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interest, might pay more attention to the profit pattern of its companies from international oil operations.

There are, however, most important additional qualifying factors affecting the security position of the home countries and specially the United States with regard to their oil supplies—independent of their position as home countries of worldwide oil companies. What is relevant now is not so much any influence which the international oil companies may or may not be able to wield in producing countries, but the interest which producing countries have in maintaining an effective relationship with the United States. The United States is, of course, the most important political, economic, and military power of the free world and it also presents the highest-priced and one of the largest markets for imported oil. This explains Saudi Arabia's and also Iran's interest in trying to conclude special oil supply arrangements with the United States—not the investment of US oil companies in their country, which, as far as Iran is concerned, would be a minority interest. Moreover, the United States offers the most important potential outlet for their capital investments, and constitutes one of the largest sources for capital equipment, consumer goods, and military hardware; it can provide its customers with the most advanced technology. Finally, the United States is the only power that can effectively assure protection against communist—Soviet as well as Chinese—external and internal incursions. It is the one country which the traditional regimes of the two most important oil-producing nations of the Persian Gulf—Iran and Saudi Arabia—believe they can depend on for the maintenance of their governments against subversion, and also for the security of the Persian Gulf area.

Considering US possibilities for developing its domestic potential in conventional and non-conventional hydrocarbon and energy resources, and its opportunity for establishing a special oil relationship with the two most important Middle East oil producers—Saudi Arabia and Iran —there is little doubt that if it should ever so desire, the United States could go it alone.

The United Kingdom as mentioned above will, after the development of the North Sea oil fields, be less dependent on Middle East oil than any of its Common Market partners. Nevertheless, it was apparently the UK, in the Paris Summit Meeting of October 1972, which was pressing for an early formulation of an energy policy for the Community guaranteeing certain and lasting supplies under satisfactory economic conditions. This policy suggestion must be evaluated within the context of today's stark realities; that unilateral and diverse policies of the various European nations and of Japan cannot provide real supply security or contain the financial problems connected with the international oil trade; that the international oil companies can no more guarantee supplies to any of their customers in a crisis; that these companies no longer possess the bargaining strength, if left to themselves, to be effective negotiators with producing countries with regard

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to the availability and cost of oil; and that such a state of affairs would provide the most cogent reason for the various importing countries to work towards the establishment of an energy policy for a larger grouping of nations.

But the ultimate interest of the most important producing countries in the Middle East that have not fallen under Soviet domination is bound to remain the protection of their independence and that can only be achieved by close and friendly relationships with the United States. The United States will thus continue to be the dominant factor in world oil, not because of the foreign oil interests of its companies, but primarily because of its standing in the world balance of power. An energy policy applying solely to the Community would, I submit, be only the first step towards a really effective policy that must encompass the Atlantic group of nations and Japan.

BEYOND doubt, US relations with Europe and Japan are in disarray. There are many outstanding unresolved problems on defence, "burden-sharing," trade policy, the whole range of monetary issues including currency realignments, capital flows, and so on.

Perhaps instead of establishing a grand design which would encompass a resolution of all major contentions and areas of conflicts, it might prove to be more fruitful to proceed pragmatically on an issue-by-issue basis and try to tackle first those problems where the chances of an Atlantic-Japanese policy, or at least of an agreed upon coordinated approach, would seem to be most promising. Incidentally, it is interesting to recall that the European Common Market was preceded by the establishment of a much more limited joint effort, the European Coal and Steel Community.

What is likely to induce the various countries to agree to cooperation and mutual adjustments is the existence of a severe outside threat to their security and prosperity, resulting from their dependence on oil supplies from a few foreign sources coupled with the potential danger of a flood of foreign funds that could harm their own economies and the world's monetary system. The weak and unstable nations where the world's oil and money power centres are located could, for reasons of their own or reasons stirred up by the potentially adversary policies of the USSR or China, create great difficulties for the various countries of the free world. The United States as well as the United Kingdom would probably be able to resolve their own energy problems, partly at the expense of other importing countries. But as mentioned before it is to the United States, more than any other nation of the free world, that pivotal producing countries look for their political and strategic security; and this advantage could rebound to the benefit of all oil-importing countries. Neither the Common Market nor Japan alone or in combination could provide a comparable total package of advantages for the political, strategic, and economic well-being of the major Middle East oil-producing countries.

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If the United States abstains from any attempt to try to obtain unilateral benefits, however short-lived, and is willing to participate in an energy policy in a new Atlantic-Japanese partnership, it might thereby provide protection for its partners against potentially very serious oil supply emergencies. Obviously the latter must also reject the temptation of looking only at their immediate self-interest; a policy that they could not in any case pursue successfully. Only then would it be possible for the importing countries to adopt a rational policy for their energy imports and avoid bidding against each other or being played against each other with ever escalating political and economic demands being made upon them. Only then would it be possible for Atlantic-Japanese and especially US power to become an effective countervailing factor in international oil without having been sapped by discordant and conflicting attitudes of the individual importing nations toward the producing countries. The need for a coordinated policy is urgent because any delays in which conflicting approaches to producing countries are made, will accelerate not only the disintegration of our partnership, but will encourage arbitrary and dictatorial demands in the producing countries. Moreover, as some of the producing countries accumulate large surplus reserve funds, it might become much more difficult, if not impossible, for the importing countries to influence their policies.

It would appear then that Europe and Japan need something from the United States which it is in the interest of the US to give, i.e. its adherence to a coordinated Atlantic-Japanese energy policy, in, as the game theorists would call it, a positive sum game through which all sides would gain. This would provide the most persuasive basis for an agreement on a joint policy under which common problems could be resolved to the mutual advantage of all partners. This should not of course imply that any of the partners should necessarily be inhibited from pursuing separate diplomatic and economic initiatives within the broad spectrum of developing Middle East relationships and within the framework of an Atlantic-Japanese energy policy.

The OECD Oil Committee has for many years served as the main international organization encompassing the Atlantic-Japanese group of nations, providing a basis for the exchange of information and coordination and also for expert analyses on oil developments relevant to its members. Most important, it has established policies for emergency stockpiling and within certain limits for the emergency apportionment of oil supplies in the OECD European area; and during oil emergencies it has in fact served as a clearing body to achieve an equitable division of available supplies among its members.

The Common Market is presently engaged in a slow and difficult effort to establish an energy policy for its members, that would secure certain and lasting supplies under satisfactory economic conditions. But in the framework of the Common Market, even including Britain with its large interests in world oil, national policies of the individual

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members could severely slow up the establishment of a Community policy, if there is no overriding conviction on the part of its members that the Community countries in combination would decisively add to their individual political and strategic bargaining strength.

In the light of today's changed power relationships, an effective Atlantic-Japanese energy policy must inevitably go further than either the OECD or the Common Market have so far, but it would build on their valuable achievements. Fortunately there is, to a varying degree, substantial consensus in the United States as well as in the Common Market and Japan on the need for a coordinated or even joint approach to the energy problem and this is reflected in many official pronouncements during the last year or two. The United States, in a statement before an OECD Council Meeting during 1972, officially expressed its readiness for such cooperation. "It is imperative for the world's major consumers of oil and other forms of energy to take joint and coordinated action—starting now—to increase the availability of all types of energy resources; to lessen, to the degree possible, an overdependence on oil from the Middle East, to coordinate the response of consuming countries to restrictions on the supply of Middle East petroleum, and to develop jointly and cooperatively a responsible program of action to meet the possibility of critical energy shortages by the end of this decade." The OECD itself is again engaged in a study of the world energy situation which will hopefully produce concrete recommendations for actions by the member governments. The Common Market Commission considers it necessary to substitute or extend liaison between the Community and other energy-importing countries in order to provide a better exchange of information and achieve common solutions.

In 1971, the Japanese Overall Energy Council, an advisory body to the Minister of International Trade and Industry, recommended cooperation with other consuming countries (although to assure stable oil supplies at low cost, Japan should remain independent of foreign influence in most aspects of the oil industry's activities). To this end it is necessary for Japan to promote with them and their national oil companies exchange of information and mutual understanding and to explore possibilities for constructive cooperation on the part of oil-consuming countries toward the formation of an organization in which debates are held among the countries with international oil companies and the oil producing countries on the basic policy concerning the world oil situation. The Natural Resources Survey Mission, sponsored by the Japanese Foreign Office, said in its report published in 1972 that Japan must engage in active participation in international cooperation with advanced countries on oil matters and "must refrain from being passive as has been the case thus far. It must take full advantage of opportunities such as an OECD Oil Committee meeting where indus-

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trially advanced nations meet, through which Japan could clarify her oil policy on international cooperation before the OECD member countries."

THE major goal of an energy policy for a new Atlantic-Japanese partnership must be to cope with the common problems of the security of oil supplies and the financial issues related to it. It is impossible to guarantee that such a policy would lead to a satisfactory resolution of all problems, but it could perhaps contain them. Future bargaining in international oil may not then be lopsided i.e. between the producing countries as a group and the oil companies (be they the international or the national companies of importing countries) with the latter "negotiating" under the threat of being treated as virtually the captives of the producing countries. This could engage the extraordinary political, strategic and economic power of the Atlantic-Japanese group of nations. If such "countervailing power" to OPEC does become a factor in international oil, there will be some reasonable hope that OPEC would no longer be able, as Mr Yamani put it in October 1972, through its coordination and unity to "prove time and time again that it can enforce its demands."

Some fear has been expressed that such a grouping of oil-importing countries might unnecessarily provoke a confrontation with the producing countries. But circumstances have tipped the balance of power during the last few years. It was the producing countries which, through the establishment of OPEC, created a producing countries' organization which formulates policy guidelines for major oil-producing countries. Through the threat of withholding supplies from companies that will not submit to OPEC's demands and also through other means, it provides enormous power and overwhelming bargaining leverage for each of the producing nations. Moreover, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) has stated its intention to establish official relations with countries of the EEC, either collectively or individually. It announced in 1971 that it is setting up a committee to coordinate the relations of its member countries—in the Arabian Gulf, represented by Saudi Arabia, and in North Africa, represented by Libya and Algeria—with the EEC countries.

The energy policy could be broadly divided into the following categories:

1. Study and review of energy demand and supply including tanker, pipeline, and refining availabilities. A programme for optimum diversification of supplies.

2. A coordinated and/or joint research programme for the development of new energy resources, especially of atomic energy and from non-conventional sources.

3. Investment review and national or multinational incentive and guarantee programmes for the development of conventional and new energy resources.

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4. Review of arrangements by importing countries for oil supplies from producing countries, be it through purchases, service contract arrangements, concessions or otherwise. The establishment of broad terms of reference and/or of parameters for arrangements, acceptable to importing countries.

5. A programme of arrangements for stockpiling, rationing, and equitable sharing of import availabilities between all members in case of an overall or specific country emergency.

6. A coordinated and/or joint research programme on conservation of energy and on its implementation, including research on battery-powered cars, nuclear fuelled shipping, savings in motor car transportation, etc.

7. Review and coordination of programmes of economic development and technical assistance for producing countries.

8. Review of prices, costs and balance of payments effects of oil imports of member countries and also of developing countries. A programme of arrangement for support and adjustment if called for.

9. Review of government revenues of major oil-producing countries and of their impact on world trade, world capital flows and short-term money markets; and a programme of financial cooperation—if called for.

10. A review of the dependency of Middle East producing countries on the exports of industrial and agricultural goods and of military equipment, on shipping, services, technical knowhow, etc., from the free world's oil importing countries; and a continuous assessment of mutual interdependence and of the means that might be available to cope with an oil supply, trade, or finance emergency.

The administration of the energy policy might conceivably be entrusted to a special new high-level International Energy Council, composed of member states, with a permanent staff with professional and practical experience. The timing and method of its establishment, its organizational structure, the range of its executive and/or advisory powers, the procedures on voting and the rules governing ratification and implementation of its decisions or conclusions and its relationship with the various member countries and their oil companies would of course be determined by international negotiations.

THE above proposal presents only one of several possible approaches to an Atlantic-Japanese energy policy and its implementation. A great deal of thought must obviously be given to the problem of whether or not it would be feasible and advisable to restructure the present OECD Oil Committee or its High Level Committee so that the conclusion and implementation of an Atlantic-Japanese energy policy could be handled within the framework of the Committee. While this might require substantial changes in the powers and functions of the OECD Oil Committee, it might perhaps be more expeditious and easier to reach an agreement on a revision of the terms and conditions governing an existing international organization concerned with the oil policy of

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importing countries rather than to start from scratch and try to establish a completely new international body. The policy framework of the Council, however, it is established, would set the limits within which the countries as well as the oil companies would handle their affairs, taking into account their changing responsibilities and capabilities.

Through stockpiling, coordination of rational policy, and especially through an emergency import-sharing agreement among all members, an oil embargo by producing countries against selected countries would become much more difficult, if not practically impossible; in such circumstances the producing countries would have to be prepared to cut their oil supplies to all member countries—with unpredictable consequences. The conclusion of an effective arrangement for emergency import-sharing between the Atlantic nations and Japan would presuppose that each member country, including of course the United States and Japan, would be prepared to share with its partners its own import availabilities in an equitable manner on the basis of agreed principles. The establishment of substantial stockpiles of oil by the various importing countries, again including the United States and Japan, would provide them in case of emergency with time for possible supply-demand adjustments, for efforts to resolve equitably any underlying conflicts with the producing countries, or, if everything else fails, for initiating whatever measures are required to protect their security. These arrangements may well prove to be the touchstone of a broadly conceived energy policy such as outlined above; they may well be considered as the essential initial step on which it should be possible to achieve more easily an early international agreement.

Likewise, a joint or coordinated policy on dealing with supply, trade, and financial problems related to oil would have the best chance to lead to rational and manageable solutions of the very difficult issues that are bound to arise. The producing countries could no longer isolate consuming countries one by one. (OPEC itself has, in its own resolutions, introduced similar measures of solidarity among the producing countries.) Nor would the companies in their negotiations on prices and payments to producing governments which will come up for revision by 1976—and which OPEC's Secretary General has already described as the next major issue—be exposed to unilateral dictates as in the past. Their negotiating stance would be based on broad terms of reference such as those recommended by an International Energy Council (similar to the practice OPEC is applying in suggesting the basic position for producing countries). There need no longer be the somewhat improvised discussions and confrontation between oil companies and producing countries, as experienced between 1970 and 1972 in the Tripoli-Teheran and participation arrangements, brought about by ultimatums of the producing countries.

Under current conditions, as pointed out earlier, there would be very little if any bargaining leverage left with the oil companies if they were to depend solely on their own strength. Only a firm backing by all

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major oil-importing countries could provide the necessary countervailing power which would permit the oil companies to establish a credible negotiating stance. The companies, acting within their terms of reference and within the framework of a coordinated energy policy, could thus count on such backing that should enable them to handle international oil negotiations and their implementation.

In this connection, an additional factor in the assessment of the respective bargaining leverage by either side would undoubtedly be the awareness that there is a limit to which the oil companies, together with the importing countries, could be held hostage by a threat of access to reserves in producing countries; that it might in certain circumstances be preferable to abandon the hostage and to turn away from the reserves and reappear as competitive buyers of crude from the producing countries. Since captive concession-holding companies would no longer be at their behest one might expect that OPEC unity would erode and that producing countries would eventually compete with each other for export sales to the companies whose purchasing power would derive from past investment in and current control over transport, refining and marketing facilities—the power to dispose.

The importing countries, through economic and technical cooperation with the developing producing countries, should contribute to the advance in their standard of living, the diversification of their economic activities and the expansion of their general import and export trade. Hopefully, the producing countries will in due course become such an integral part of the world economy that they will be much less tempted to take radical measures which might sever these links. If the dependence of the producing countries on continued oil revenues, flow of trade and friendly political and economic relations with the free world is such that they could not risk more than a very short interruption, then and only then will the producing countries act with circumspection and probably be sufficiently discouraged from attempting to impose an oil embargo.

In particular, the producing countries would be constrained in confronting importing countries or their companies—if firmly backed by all major importing countries—with unreasonable demands if the turmoil resulting from a confrontation is likely to undermine the regimes of the oil-producing countries, or if they would have reason to fear that their actions might provoke dangerous international repercussions affecting their integrity and security. The producing countries are also aware that if their relations with the major importing countries should deteriorate gravely, they may have to rely on Soviet support, which could not provide anything comparable to the benefits they are enjoying from dealing with the free world, but could bring grave political and other risks. The more essential oil supplies from the Middle East are to the rest of the world, the more attractive a target it would offer for Soviet subversion and control. For the communist world, the concentration of oil and money power in a few small countries in the Persian

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Gulf, at their back door so to speak, presents an enviable opportunity to attempt to undermine the political and economic strength of the Free World by "peaceful means" through encouragement of all the nationalistic and centrifugal tendencies that already exist in the area. However, any serious threat to Middle East oil supplies could, in such circumstances, easily lead to a confrontation between the major powers. A united or coordinated Atlantic-Japanese posture with regard to oil provides the most persuasive safeguard for the security, prosperity and integrity of the importing as well as producing countries. An Atlantic-Japanese energy policy—is not designed to lead to escalation of international oil problems, as a prelude to a confrontation with OPEC, but it is, I submit, the only way to avoid confrontation. The Atlantic-Japanese group of nations could and would not sit by passively if the flow of international oil and the world's monetary arrangements were to be jeopardized by arbitrary conditions or unacceptable political and economic pressures. The mere awareness that there are practical limits to the exercise of "Oil or Money Power" by the producing countries may well prove to be the most effective deterrent to its misuse.

Inevitably, a newly established Atlantic-Japanese energy policy and measures designed to achieve optimum energy security for the free world would lead to a much greater involvement of governments in what had previously been considered industry affairs, with all that this may imply. But there are no realistic alternatives, and the time for action is now, if not yesterday.

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Détente: Western and Soviet Interpretations

Walter Laqueur*

DÉTENTE originally meant the release of the strained string of the crossbow and the discharge of the bolt. French dictionaries to this day define *détente, inter alia,* as part of the mechanism of a firearm. The Russian term for *détente, razriadka,* has similar military connotations.

In political language *détente* means something more positive than a mere normalization of relations but it is not quite the equivalent of *rapprochement.* It conveys the easing of strain or relaxation—detensive drugs in medicine reduce high blood pressure. In West-East relations there have been, broadly speaking, four periods of *détente* since 1945. The first, after Stalin's death, led to the Geneva meeting in 1955; the second, in 1959, was the period of Camp David; the third, the post-Cuban *détente* brought the nuclear test ban; the fourth has now been going on for more than three years and it has been the most far-reaching by a wide margin. The term "*détente*" has become something of a magic formula in the West. In the East on the other hand, the term (*razriadka*) is used much less frequently than "peaceful coexistence" (*mirnoe sosuchchestvovanie*). As far as the Soviet political dictionary is concerned *détente*—to quote a Soviet spokesman—stands for "coexistence without illusions." This approach has much to recommend itself, for "*détente*" (like "escalation") conveys a trend or a process, not a state of affairs; the indiscriminate use of the term is a source of confusion.

MY purpose is to discuss the different interpretations of *détente*—and of peaceful coexistence—in West and East. There are many discrepancies and they are important because they reflect profound differences in underlying approaches and philosophy. Most Western statesmen and political analysts, preoccupied with their own views on the subject, have shown little interest in the Soviet conception of *détente* and peaceful coexistence. Within the Soviet bloc there is a consensus about the advantages and limits of *détente,* though on certain specific issues, as will be shown, there is a great deal of vagueness—not perhaps all deliberate.

There is no such consensus in the West. Few people believe that during the last few years radical, irrevocable changes have taken place

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in the Soviet Union and that, as a result, lasting peace is at hand. There are even fewer people who believe that there has been no change whatsoever in Soviet policy, that alone among all great powers its policy is constant. In between these two extremes there is a wide gamut of opinion—and of misunderstanding. For example, many well-meaning people in the West sincerely believe that relations between West and East will be substantially improved by various "bridge building" activities—and that these activities are also desired by the Soviet Union. In a speech at the Virginia Military Institute in May 1964, the late President Johnson said: "We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid." And he went on to enumerate four reasons why such bridges should be built.[1] In the writings of Senator Fulbright the concept of "bridge building" occurs very often: "If however the US fails to lead the West in the building of bridges to the East then Western Europe will almost certainly continue to build bridges of its own," or "the building of economic and cultural bridges could pave the way for the reunification of Europe."[2]

The concept is admirable but the Soviet Union has always reacted violently against it. "Bridge building," according to one Soviet author, "is the old poisonous brew now being poured into freshly labelled bottles." It is an "imperialist trick," designed "to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat and the communist party's leading role under the slogan of democratization."[3] However, despite the fact that innumerable Soviet spokesmen and writers have stated countless times in the course of many years that they regard "bridge building" as a deliberate provocation, well-meaning Westerners continue to this day to propagate this concept.

A Familiar Western Version of *Détente*

According to one school of thought in the West there has been a basic shift in Soviet attitudes in recent years, even though, for domestic reasons, the Soviet leaders are not willing to admit it *expressis verbis*. This school holds that Soviet leaders, realizing that peaceful coexistence of the communist and capitalist countries is "an objective necessity for the development of human society" and that "war cannot and must not serve as a means of settling international disputes,"[4] have decided gradually to liquidate the Cold War. According to the same school of thought, the Cold War was the result of misunderstanding, suspicion and distrust, or, to a considerable extent, was the fault of Western statesmen who aggravated the struggle by "ideologizing" what was really an old fashioned conflict between great powers.

[1] *New York Times*, 24 May 1964.
[2] *The Arrogance of Power* (N.Y., 1967), pp. 212, 215.
[3] V. Kortunov, *International Affairs* (Moscow, August 1972), pp. 29, 32.
[4] To quote the programme of the CPSU adopted at its 22nd Congress in 1961.

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People of this school argue that if the Soviets are ready to establish friendly ties (or at least good neighbourly and business-like relations) with the West it would be foolish and self-defeating not to accept the outstretched hand. This view posits a vast potential for fruitful co-operation, for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, for bold and comprehensive schemes of cooperation; having liquidated the Cold War, everything should be done by the West to prevent a relapse into confrontation. This school of thought sees a need to reach agreement not only on disarmament but on a much wider spectrum of problems. According to this view, the reduction of strategic arms and force levels, however desirable, will not affect the sources of the distrust; only by political agreements, by a psychological readjustment, by a halt in propaganda warfare, by no longer viewing the other side as an enemy but as a partner in the great common task facing mankind in the years to come, can a gradual erosion of hostile attitudes come about. This, in turn, would require keeping criticism of the other side to the very minimum, becoming better acquainted with each other through cultural exchanges and, of course, engaging in various mutually beneficial enterprises (such as trade).

The more sanguine proponents of this school of thought believe that eventually such a policy will lead towards a convergence of the two systems and thus to lasting peace. The more sceptical among them expect setbacks during the era of negotiations and do not think that conflicts will altogether subside. But they, too, believe a return to the Cold War is most unlikely, given a minimum of good will on the part of the West. They argue that a reversal of present Soviet attitudes towards the West could be of no possible benefit to the Soviet leaders and their successors. This, put very briefly and, I believe fairly, are the arguments of an influential school of thought in the West. In many countries this is now the generally accepted official view.

Soviet View of Détente as Consequence of Growing Western Political and Military Weakness

Soviet leaders may welcome the sentiments underlying the arguments of this Western school, but they are nevertheless bound to reject them. Soviet policy—so the Soviet argument runs—has *always* been in favour of peaceful coexistence; there has been no sudden change in recent years. It has been in favour of it ever since Lenin wrote about it in the early twenties, and since Stalin first used this term. The Soviet contention is correct inasmuch as Lenin did indeed say on one or two occasions that it was quite likely that "during a whole period" states with different social systems would coexist on this planet. It is also true that Stalin in his very last theoretical publication (in 1952) at the height of the Cold War, wrote that peaceful coexistence was desirable as far as the Soviet Union was concerned. But to complete the picture it is only fair to add that Lenin also wrote that peaceful coexistence was merely postponing

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the decisive struggle ("a fight for life or death") between the two systems, and that they could not possibly live in peace forever. Stalin and his ideologists regarded peaceful coexistence and the Cold War as different sides of the same coin. Peaceful coexistence, in their view, was desirable to the extent that it strengthened the Soviet camp; if it failed to do so it ceased to be peaceful and became "imperialist aggression."

Present Soviet attitudes toward *détente* and peaceful coexistence can be briefly summarized as follows: "Throughout its whole history the USSR has consistently and steadfastly followed the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems"[5]; in the West, on the other hand—according to another Soviet author—a more "sober," "realistic" attitude has prevailed only in recent years, as the result of a radical shift in the global balance of power.[6] A recent Soviet writer refers to the "inexorably changing relationship of world forces" in favour of the Soviet Union, the "growing economic and military might of the Soviet Union," the collapse of the "superior strength concept," the "precipitation of the crisis in imperialism's foreign policy"; he maintains that the "rivalry between the USA and its Western partners is inexorably aggravated by time," that "new contradictions among the imperialists are ushered in by the scientific and technological revolution," and refers to the "dispute between the NATO allies over the possession of nuclear weapons."[7] Thus, "the trend towards a more realistic approach is the result of the crisis in NATO and the general instability of the Western military and political bloc": Capitalism and imperialism are adapting themselves to the new world situation; they have become weaker whereas the Soviet bloc has grown stronger. However, "it would be a delusion to think that the West has already surrendered its positions and abandoned its aspirations to restore and strengthen its influence."[8] It still constitutes "a tremendous threat to peace."[9] Soviet authors invariably quote, in this context, the resolutions of the last (24th) Congress of the CPSU according to which "reactionary tendencies and aggressive aspirations are most pronounced in the policy of US imperialism, which presents the greatest danger to the independence of peoples and world peace, and is the main obstacle in the way of social progress. What is especially characteristic of the USA is its aggressive foreign policy line. . . ." According to official Soviet doctrine the whole system of US military preparations does by no means rule out nuclear war.[10]

[5] B. Svetlov, "USSR – USA: Possibilities and Reality," *International Affairs*, February 1972, p. 15.
[6] A. E. Yefremov, *Europe and Nuclear Weapons* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1972), p. 367.
[7] Vidyasova, *International Affairs* (Moscow, January 1973), pp. 58–60.
[8] Vidyasova, loc. cit.
[9] Sanakoyev, *International Affairs*, November 1972, p. 12.
[10] E. Kulish, "Military Power and International Relations" (in Russian) (Moscow, 1972), p. 224.

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To summarize, again in the words of a Soviet author, if there is in the West a trend away from the Cold War dogmas towards the establishment of a fruitful political dialogue, this is the result of the "permanent crisis in NATO and other imperialist alliances." [11] Thus, "the objective course of events has compelled leading circles of the Western powers to revise their appraisal of the radical changes taking place in the world. . . . It is difficult to say how it will develop and how serious are the intentions of the West. . . . One thing is clear: the deepening of the crisis of imperialism's foreign policy is forcing political leaders of Western countries to formulate their plans and their policy towards the Soviet Union more cautiously than they did until now. What has been said, however, in no way implies that the imperialist powers have to some extent abandoned their global plans." [12]

Soviet interpretations of Western motives and intentions are essentially negative: *détente* has come about not as the result of Western goodwill (let alone greater Soviet willingness to come to terms with the West which, Soviet spokesmen claim, always existed); it is the consequence of growing Western political and military weakness. Soviet sources do not mention potential Soviet benefits from *détente;* such as diplomatic support in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Western loans to the Soviet economy, the effects of a massive infusion of Western technology, the probability of a slowdown in Western European integration, or a reduction of the American military presence in Europe.

From time to time a Soviet writer outlines constructive programmes for future cooperation with the West. An article by a Soviet diplomat, E. Chossudsovki, published in *Foreign Affairs* should be mentioned in this context,[13] *Genoa revisited—Russia and Coexistence*, even though it was not, I believe, published inside the Soviet Union. The Warsaw Pact, meeting in Prague (January 1972), put forward seven principles as a basis for West-East cooperation: the inviolability of existing frontiers; the non-use of force in relation among European states belonging to different social systems; equality, non-interference, respect for independence and sovereignty; mutually advantageous relations; disarmament; support for the United Nations. The resolutions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU omitted some of the more nebulous proposals, such as "support for the United Nations." At the same time they gave more precise formulation to certain military and political suggestions—concerning relations between West Germany and the DDR, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe, the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw treaty, the call for a European Security Conference. On several occasions Soviet commentators have gone beyond routine professions of their love of peace and goodwill towards all mankind and have pointed to the existence

[11] Vidyasova, p. 60.
[12] Sanakoyev, p. 14.
[13] April 1972.

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of global problems, such as the gradual depletion of important raw materials, which constitute, they say, a challenge to West and East and make common action between West and East desirable.[14] True, Soviet commentators always quote Western sources in this context, to show to what extent the West is dependent on the import of oil and other raw materials. But it is clear by implication that the Soviet Union, too, may have a certain interest in these matters.

The Soviet View of *Détente* and Peaceful Coexistence as a Form of Struggle

When Soviet authors refer to *détente* or peaceful coexistence they mean military, political, economic problems, to be discussed by both sides in their mutual interest. They do not imply, as many Western observers assume, that from now on the conflict between West and East will be limited to economic competition and that beyond this there will be a global arrangement "to live and let live." Acceptance of the international *status quo* is not part of Soviet doctrine. As F. D. Kulakov, a member of the Soviet party Politburo declared in April 1972: "Peaceful coexistence is the best base for practical solidarity with the revolutionaries of the whole world."[15] Practical solidarity, of course, means more than mere speeches and the publication of newspaper articles.

During the Khrushchev era Soviet legal authorities maintained that peaceful coexistence was a "central principle of modern international law." But they have been told since by the Party authorities that this was a serious ideological aberration: inasmuch as countries with different social systems are concerned, peaceful coexistence is always "a form of the intense economic, political and ideological battle between them."[16] According to official Soviet doctrine peaceful co-existence does not mean that communists in the West must invariably use peaceful means in their struggle; peaceful coexistence "promotes the intensification of all currents of the revolutionary process" and the development of "both peaceful *and* non-peaceful forms of the struggle of power." The Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is not identical with Western bourgeois-liberal ideas on the subject, nor is it identical with the concept of peaceful coexistence as formulated in the 1950s by the Afro-Asian countries (for instance at the Bandung Conference, 1955.)[17]

Soviet authorities do not maintain that relations between communist countries should be based on the principle of unlimited sovereignty and the total renunciation of force; otherwise it would have been difficult to justify the "fraternal assistance" extended to Czechoslovakia in

[14] V. Osipov, "The Logic of Coexistence," *Izvestiia*, 17 February 1973.
[15] *Pravda*, 22 April 1972.
[16] V. N. Egorov: *Peaceful Coexistence and the Revolutionary Process* (in Russian) (Moscow, 1971).
[17] Ibid.

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1968. Furthermore, wars of national liberation are not covered either by the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence, for they are considered progressive wars which ought to be supported. Soviet commentators have not been too specific on this count: For instance, it is not certain whether wars of national liberation can take place only in the third world, or whether the struggle of a national minority in a European country or the United States should also be considered "progressive" and therefore worthy of support. Nor has it been made clear how support for "little wars" can be squared with another frequently repeated thesis in Soviet literature that "there are not now, strictly speaking, local wars and conflicts; each one involves in our time the interests of dozens of states and becomes a problem for the whole world." [18] "Peace is one and indivisible," writes another Soviet author, repeating Litvinov's famous dictum.[19] There seems to be no answer to this contradiction—unless one argues that a local war that goes well from the Soviet view is not a danger to peace.

Détente and the "Intensification of the Ideological Struggle"

Nor does *détente* preclude "ideological struggle." At a dinner given in honour of Fidel Castro in June 1972, Mr. Brezhnev declared that "we are aware that success in this important matter [the struggle for peaceful coexistence] in no way implies the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle. On the contrary, we must be prepared for this struggle to be intensified and becoming an ever sharper form of the confrontation between the systems." [20] This *obiter dictum* is quoted in virtually every Soviet article on peaceful coexistence.

Mr. Brezhnev was not the first to stress this idea. The late Nikita Khrushchev emphasized on many occasions the impossibility of ideological coexistence. This motif has been taken up with increasing frequency during the last five years. The Plenum of the CPSU in April 1968 announced that the "ideological struggle had drastically sharpened"; the November 1971 Plenum stressed that the "role of the ideological struggle increases all the time on the international stage"; the 23rd Party Congress reported "the deep crisis of bourgeois ideology and its impending ruin." However, at the next congress it appeared that the news about the impending demise of "Western ideology" had been premature; it was now said that it had gone over to the offensive and as a result the ideological struggle had become even sharper. To emphasize the sharpening of the conflict Soviet commentators began to use the term "ideological war" rather than "ideological struggle." It was used, for instance, on the occasion of the Soviet Writers' Congress in 1970 and this led some Western observers to believe that it was basically a domestic issue, an announcement that there would be

[18] Vosipov, loc. cit.
[19] Sanakoyev, loc. cit.
[20] *Pravda*, 28 June 1972.

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no ideological slackening on the home front and no compromising with "alien and hostile influences."

However, it soon became clear that while "ideological war" also meant a crackdown on ideological dissent at home, it referred above all to the outside world. Soviet spokesmen, as shown above, have not quite been able to make up their minds whether the West or the East are on the offensive in the ideological war: "In ideology just as in other spheres of our relations with the West," Brezhnev said in 1970, "the Soviet Union is on the offensive and the West on the defensive: The impact of our ideology is tremendous; it is mounting with every day, undermining the main stay of the non-Soviet system from within." [21] On other occasions, however, a more defensive note was struck; to pursue the ideological struggle, it was said, is of particular importance "now that there has emerged on the world scene a turn towards *détente*." And, further on, according to the same writer "the ideologists of anti-Communism do not conceal their hopes that in conditions of a *détente* . . . the ideological staunchness of socialist states will be weakened and opportunities will arise for the ideological penetration of socialist countries with the object of undermining them from within." [22]

Two Western concepts which have particularly aroused Soviet displeasure are the theory of "convergence"—the assumption that capitalism and communism will gradually become similar—and the idea of the "end of ideology"—the thesis that ideology is on the decline, that social changes will in future be evolutionary, that an ideological foreign policy is incompatible with political realism. Appeals for "foreign policy pragmatism" have been emphatically rejected in the Soviet bloc.

Political Significance of the "Ideological Struggle"

Does the slogan about the "intensification of the ideological struggle" have any political significance at all as far as a *détente* and the future of West-East relations are concerned? If it is just a ritual incantation, meaning that from time to time Soviet ideologists will declare that profound ideological differences will continue to persist between the two systems, and that the ideological purity of the Soviet system is unsullied by any trade deals or agreements, it would indeed be unwise to make heavy water of such statements. But Soviet authorities have made it clear that "ideological struggle" refers to something which concerns not only professional philosophers, but also the continuing political struggle between West and East. And "political struggle," of course, has something to do with the realities of power.

A leading Soviet commentator in a polemic against the present writer has said that much. Peaceful coexistence between states with different social structures "does not put an end to the class struggle on the

[21] Quoted in Y. Kudinov and V. Pletnikov, "Ideological Confrontation of the Two Systems," in *International Affairs* (Moscow, December 1972), p. 64.
[22] Ibid.

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international arena, as it does not abolish the political and ideological struggle, nor the economic competition between the two systems." This had been precisely my own argument, but while Soviet authors may say certain things, Westerners apparently must not.[23]

"Ideological struggle," as Soviet authors envisage it, is not only justified but morally imperative; for as the Soviet Union stands for progress and mankind's highest ideals, attacking the reactionary West does not harm *détente*; on the contrary, it enhances its prospects. It also follows that any Western critique of the Soviet system is *a priori* reactionary, a danger to world peace, a threat to friendship between peoples; it poisons the atmosphere and jeopardizes *détente*; it is by definition slander, vilification, and subversion. Soviet commentators will concede that Westerners are under no obligation to accept Soviet ideology and politics, but to give expression to their dissent is tantamount to a relapse into Cold War mentality. We shall go on quarrelling about fundamentals, Soviet authors say, but this must on no account affect interstate relations.[24] At the same time other Soviet authors maintain that "the existence of deep, irreconcilable differences in the ideological sphere between countries belonging to different social systems naturally cannot but exert an influence on their interstate relations."[25] I do not profess to have an answer to this contradiction.

This much seems certain: if, as we have shown, ideological confrontation means not just philosophical disputations, but the continuation of the political and economic struggle, then there is a conflict with the frequently expressed Soviet desire to create an atmosphere of trust in international relations. Disarmament and economic cooperation involving long-term loans are indeed difficult to envisage except in a climate of mutual trust. The West is expected not to doubt the motives and intentions of the Soviet peace strategy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, does not necessarily accept at face value the professions of peace and goodwill made by other countries. A recent article on "China's peace strategy" has this to say:

> Many of Peking's extremist slogans have been largely muffled or temporarily abandoned. . . . What lies behind this "new policy," this so-called peace strategy? The cardinal and most characteristic feature of Peking's present policy is the undisguised aspiration to win a leading position on the international scene. . . . The Great Power nationalistic interests of the Chinese leadership are today the only criterion determining Peking's foreign policy. (They engage in) unprincipled struggle to win domination in the modern world . . . they are backing their hegemonistic claims by building up a powerful military potential. Consequently, the Peking leaders have not the least interest in strengthening international stability and easing peace and security. . . . In the vocabulary of the

[23] Osipov, loc. cit.
[24] Osipov, loc. cit.
[25] Sanakoyev, loc cit. p. 9.

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> Chinese leaders words such as "peace," "security" and "relaxation" appeared only recently and they are used only when China's policies have to be given a veneer of respectability. . . .[26]

The Soviet concept of "ideological struggle" is intrinsically contradictory. On the one hand peaceful coexistence is defined as doing away with arms races, local wars, nuclear blackmail, war psychosis, political subversion, economic blockade and a whole host of other Cold War tactics" and instead developing "good neighbourly relations between states."[27] On the other hand, when hard pressed by critics from the left who claim that the Soviet leadership has betrayed the cause of world revolution and that peaceful coexistence and revolution are incompatible, Soviet spokesmen argue that peaceful coexistence "calls for a decisive struggle against the reactionary imperialist forces" and that "peaceful coexistence does not imply terminating the class struggle internationally"; peaceful coexistence can only be achieved by a "persistent campaign against imperialism's aggressive policy."[28]

Soviet Attitude towards "Free Exchanges"

Soviet spokesmen firmly maintain that "communists have no reason to be afraid of the ideological conflict."[29] Such confidence is based on the assumption that "bourgeois ideologists totally ignore the socio-economic reasons for the spread of certain ideas and believe they can achieve great success merely by ensuring the penetration of bourgeois ideas into the socialist countries. . . . The numerous proposals made by bourgeois politicians and ideologists are based on the fundamental misconception that the course of history is determined by the choice of ideas and the ability to instil them in the masses. It is a grave mistake to accord such exaggerated importance to ideas. . . . In the socialist world socio-economic conditions for the propagation of bourgeois ideas are non-existent, since there are no social groups or classes whose interests these ideas would represent."[30] Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen react violently whenever the unhindered movement of ideas, information and people across state frontiers is mentioned. They emphasize that "communists have never agreed, and never shall agree to this kind of free contact." "The bourgeoisie and their hirelings may be worried about the paucity of opportunities for propagating their ideas in the socialist countries, but they need not expect the communists to facilitate this for them by agreeing to 'ideological coexistence,' thereby clearing the ground for the dissemination of bourgeois ideas where communist ideology now holds sway."[31]

[26] V. Rybakov, "Behind the Scenes of Peking's 'Peace Strategy,'" in *International Affairs*, November 1972.
[27] *Problems of War and Peace* (Moscow, 1972), p. 275.
[28] Yuri Krasin, *Sociology of Revolution* (Moscow, 1972), p. 233.
[29] *Problems of War and Peace*, p. 281.
[30] *Problems of War and Peace*, pp. 280–81.
[31] Ibid. p. 291.

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How does one explain the Soviets' total rejection of free contacts while claiming at the same time that they say they have nothing to fear from an ideological conflict? If the West is mistaken in attributing such great importance to ideas, and if, furthermore, the socio-economic conditions for the reception of Western ideas in the Soviet bloc no longer exist, then there would seem to be no reason whatsoever for such extreme sensitivity on the part of the Soviet Union. The West in its misguided attempts would merely waste a great deal of energy and money and its efforts would be in vain, for the Soviet people would, of course, reject these alien ideas with contempt. If the Soviet system is superior to the West this superiority by itself guarantees victory in the ideological contest. However, the "ideological struggle," as Soviet spokesmen envisage it, is one-sided—the diffusion of communist ideas in the West, which is done anyway through the activities of the communist parties, the distribution of Soviet literature, etc. At the same time the diffusion of Western ideas in the Soviet bloc cannot be permitted. The Soviet Union, in other words, does not want a contest on equal terms.

Soviet View of Other Political Movements

Yet another curious contradiction should be noted: While the full brunt of the Soviet ideological campaign is ostensibly directed against "imperialism" and "capitalism," political views that cannot by any stretch of imagination be classified as "capitalist" or "imperialist" are denounced with equal if not greater, intensity. The views of Mr. Bruno Kreisky, the Austrian Chancellor, as voiced in a recent interview, are of considerable interest in this context. Capitalism, according to Mr. Kreisky, is not a political force which constitutes a serious danger to the Soviet system. In many conversations with young communists from various East European countries, Mr. Kreisky found a great deal of dissatisfaction with an inflated bureaucratic apparatus, the lack of any opportunity to influence policy in their countries, economic shortages, etc. They do not believe, however, that the transfer of the means of production into private hands would provide a solution to these problems.[32]

According to Mr. Kreisky, the main challenge to the Soviet system is posed by democratic socialism. He notes that the Social Democratic governments now in power in various European countries have caused a great deal of uneasiness in Moscow, for Soviet spokesmen would much prefer an ideological confrontation with "capitalism," rather than a dialogue with democratic socialism for which they are ill-equipped. The attacks against democratic socialism in recent Soviet literature tend to confirm Mr. Kreisky's analysis, "Imperialism has been making even more active use of such trustworthy imperialist faithfuls

[32] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 January 1973.

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as right wing Social Democracy and various brands of reformism against the socialist countries"—writes V. Kortunov.[33] According to the same writer, "the imperialists' main hope in their struggle against the socialist community now lies in . . . polycentrism. . . . Their secret design is to shatter the moral and political unity of socialist society by raising ostensibly respectable slogans like 'democratic socialism' and 'pure democracy'. . . . They seem to be earnestly lecturing communists on how to build socialism. Numerous bourgeois researchers and their revisionist hangers-on have been holding forth on the ways to 'improve' its Soviet model and make it more 'humane, democratic and liberal'. . . . Right wing Social Democrats, revisionists and opportunists of every stripe often come together on a common platform of refined anti-Communism."[34]

Such irritation is quite understandable, for democratic socialists usually raise questions which, from the Soviet point of view, are very awkward indeed—questions concerning the discrepancies between Soviet socialist theory and practice. Soviet ideology has always claimed that its basic *raison d'être* is not the creation of a great steel industry or a powerful army but the building of a society of a "higher, more advanced type" than any previous one—a freer, more democratic, more humane society. These claims are disputed by the "reformists" and such criticism, needless to say, is bitterly resented by Soviet spokesmen precisely because it affects the very core of their doctrine. To prepare the Soviet public for these ideological challenges, Soviet readers are reminded that Lenin wrote as far back as 1911 that the main adversary of the Bolsheviks in the ideological field would not be old-fashioned ("*laissez faire*") capitalism but "reformism," which as Lenin put it, had become the formula of the modern "advanced" educated bourgeoisie.[35]

Soviet attacks against China and against democratic socialism are significant because they undercut the Soviet argument according to which "the ideological struggle cannot be brought to an end as long as there exist antagonistic classes."[36] Since there are no more "antagonistic classes" in China than in the Soviet Union, and since the democratic socialists are not less concerned than the communists with the fate of working people, and since the Soviet Union nevertheless wages bitter ideological war against these foes the official Soviet explanation is unconvincing even by its own premises. Thus, "ideological struggle" as the Soviets interpret it, has little, if anything to do with the existence of classes in a society; it is no more than a synonym for the political struggle against all those who happen to disagree with the current policy of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whether

[33] V. Kortunov, *International Affairs*, August 1972, p. 33.
[34] Ibid., p. 33.
[35] Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 229.
[36] *Problems of War and Peace*, p. 289.

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they are "capitalists" or Maoists, conservatives or liberals, democratic socialists or Trotskyites.

IDEOLOGICAL issues are frequently belittled or altogether ignored in the West, because the West, unlike the Soviet Union, does not have a unified, all-embracing doctrinal system. The idea that the foreign policy of other countries could be ideologically motivated seems outlandish if not altogether incomprehensible to Western pragmatists. They tend to forget that ideology provides a legitimacy to the Soviet regime and while it is frequently sidestepped or twisted in such a way as to justify "national interest," power politics or other purposes, it is still one of the basic factors shaping Soviet politics.

To summarize, again in the words of an authoritative Soviet source: "The cold war mongers (in the United States) have not laid down their arms," but, on the other hand, "having lost much of their room for manoeuvre, the US ruling circles were forced to reckon with the realities of the situation in international affairs, and in particular, had to take a more sober view of the prospects of Soviet-American relations." [37] Lenin, as so often, is invoked in this context too:

> While relentlessly exposing the crimes of US imperialism, the hypocrisy of US ruling circles and the aggressive, anti-popular nature of their domestic and foreign policies, Lenin stressed the need to reckon with the different shades of American opinion regarding Soviet-American relations. Lenin remarked: "Some American employers seem to be realizing that it is much more sensible to have a profitable business in Russia" . . .[38]

The United States, in other words, is not a friendly power or a potential ally in Soviet eyes. The Soviet Union is (to quote Malcolm Mackintosh) "basically hostile to the United States; she would like to see a weakening of America's power and influence all over the world, primarily in her military support for the West, and the use of her economic power in support of US foreign policy. Moscow would like to see America's alliances disintegrate and her resolution and determination to aid her friends fade and disappear." [39] But this does not preclude agreement on certain specific issues; after all, America is not the only hostile power in Soviet eyes. "*Détente* serves the interest of both countries" writes the Soviet journal *S. Sh. A.* (USA) in a recent issue; economically the prospects are "really enormous," scientific-technological cooperation has become a "necessity" in the words of this source. There exist, according to this view, certain common interests—arms control, consultations to control local crises and prevent their escalation, etc. To quote again M. Mackintosh: "These

[37] B. Svetlov, loc. cit., p. 17.
[38] Ibid.
[39] "Moscow's View of the Balance of Power" in *The World Today*, March 1973, p. 110.

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consultations are also valuable in Soviet eyes because they show the rest of the world that the Soviet Union is treated as an equal by the United States. At the same time, the USSR is anxious to conclude agreements with the US to allow her greater access to American technology." [40] Soviet declarations about "businesslike contacts," "constructive proposals," "mutually acceptable and positive solutions" have, of course, to be taken seriously and be fully explored. To take them seriously means, *inter alia,* to subject them to careful analysis.

[40] Ibid.

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Disparities in East-West Relations

Elliot R. Goodman

WHEN appraising the security outlook for Europe, one is struck by a number of disparities or asymmetries in the prevailing conditions and performance of East and West.

Since Khrushchev's fall, the Soviet defence budget, when measured in real terms, has risen steadily and sharply, in contrast to the decline in NATO defence budgets. As General Johannes Steinhoff, Chairman of NATO Military Committee, observed: "Warsaw Pact total defence expenditure has been increasing at a steady rate since 1965 while, over the same period, the defence spending of NATO's European members has only just managed to keep abreast of inflation. Indeed, for NATO as a whole, there has been a significant falling-off, in terms of constant prices, since 1968. It is a fact that the member nations of the Alliance have, since 1965, increased their overall wealth at a rate twice that of the rate of increase of their defence expenditures." [1] The calculations of John Tuthill, Director General of the Atlantic Institute, support this estimate: "The defence expenditure of all NATO countries (including France) for NATO purposes were about $80 billion in 1970, as compared with $88 billion (recalculated on the basis of 1970 constant prices) in 1960." [2]

The sophistication of Soviet military equipment has steadily grown as a result of continued Soviet emphasis on R. & D. According to General Steinhoff: "In the decade between 1960 and 1970, it is estimated that Russian expenditure on science and research tripled. In the single year 1969 to 1970, it probably rose by about 20 per cent, and in 1972, for the first time, the Soviet Union may well be spending, in equivalent terms, a total amount for research and development greater than that of the United States." [3]

Steinhoff sums up the resulting disparities in forces and equipment: "Virtually across the board and virtually in every area facing NATO, Russia has built up a most impressive array of arms—land, air and naval—with built-in flexibility, mobility and all-weather potential such as our NATO forces cannot claim to match; and all in the hands of highly motivated and well-trained serving men. It can be proved conclusively that the East has not only a preponderance of strength in

[1] Address by General Johannes Steinhoff to the Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Istanbul, 13 September 1972, p. 6.
[2] John W. Tuthill, "Economic Slowdown and NATO," *Survival*, March–April 1972, p. 59.
[3] *Steinhoff*, p. 5.

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almost all areas of military activity; but has also equipped her forces with very modern and continuously modernized equipment." [4]

One must note that this period of rapid Soviet military build-up has corresponded to the revival of the Soviet campaign for a European Security Conference, under which presumably some new all-European security system could be set up to replace the "military blocs" in Europe. It is not out of the question that such a system could, in the Soviet view, require the dissolution of NATO, while leaving intact Soviet military ties with the Warsaw Pact countries. Obviously NATO would not entertain this kind of negotiation, but it is clear that much *détente* euphoria can be cultivated in the West by talk of a Security Conference.

The question remains: if *détente* is truly the Soviet purpose in Europe, then why the steady and unprecedented military build-up at the same time? Could it be that the Kremlin hopes to engage the West in moves toward *détente* that will prove disarming, both literally and psychologically, while the East becomes militarily preponderant in the expectation of translating this military might into political influence at some point in the future?

The disparities in political and social systems of the two sides make it practically impossible for the NATO countries to match Soviet spending. In the West, where governments are much more dependent upon public opinion than in the East, there is a sizable element of opinion, particularly among the youth, that bases its views on unsubstantiated hopes and wishful thinking—the elements of *détente* euphoria. This generation, which does not remember when or why NATO was created, is frequently ahistorical and does not comprehend the facts that explain NATO's role. Far from wanting even to maintain present NATO force levels, they would advocate unilateral disarmament. These views are sympathetically received by a large section of Western opinion, in addition to youth.

It seems quite clear that non-defence demands will require a greater share of the GNP during the 1970s than was the case during the 1960s. And, due to differences in the social systems in East and West, the funds left for defence spending in the NATO countries will buy much less defence potential. To cite General Steinhoff again: "Over the past few years, the costs of military pay and allowance in the NATO nations have increased at a rate nearly double that of inflation; whereas personnel costs in the Warsaw Pact countries would appear to have stayed roughly level. As a result the West is now spending about one half of its combined defence budget on personnel; the Warsaw Pact about a quarter. While costs of succeeding generations of military equipment have been rising at a very high rate—in fact, again, almost doubling over 10 years—it is obvious that the prospects for qualitative

[4] Ibid. p. 4.

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equipment improvements in an era of declining defence expenditures are indeed slim! "[5]

Not only do the personnel costs eat up a much greater portion of the defence pie in the West than in the East, but also the terms of service are much poorer in the West. There is on the average a two-year conscription period for the Warsaw Pact states, while the terms of service are much less in many NATO states, and some have no conscription at all. Moreover as the United States moves toward an all volunteer army, wages will have to rise at a much faster rate than the overall wage indices in the country. This more expensive army will only be kept within its budget by considerable reduction of its size. The prospect would then seem to be: defence expenditures increasingly going to a better paid but smaller armed force, while improvement in the quality of the equipment is rather neglected. The Warsaw Pact states do not seem to be under similar constraints, or at least they seem able to resist the pressures in the NATO area.

ANOTHER disparity related to military equipment is the fact that there is widespread standardization and interoperability of parts in the Warsaw Pact states, due to the universal imposition of Soviet models, whereas NATO has been trying, largely in vain, to attain significant standardization ever since it was founded. This is especially important when one looks at the logistic support situations. NATO is crowded into a small rim of territory along Western Europe, the crowding made worse by the ejection of NATO installations from France. The congestion is not compensated for by a simply-managed logistic support system in which there is an easy meshing of component units and an interchangeability of parts. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has ample room for interior support lines and is able to mesh the component units easily.

THE geographical factor also creates a disparity in the sea power of the two sides. Since the Warsaw Pact countries form a contiguous land bloc in Central and Eastern Europe, they are not reliant on sea power for their internal lines of supply and communications. The NATO states are connected by the North Atlantic, while the three NATO countries in the Mediterranean are for all purposes, peninsulas, separate sub-theatres. NATO must be assured of the unhindered use of the seas through which the member countries supply each other. And as the industrial and defence structures in the NATO states have become increasingly intricate and interdependent, they have also become far more vulnerable. As Admiral Richard Colbert, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, has pointed out recently: "Today, protection simply of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean

[5] Ibid. p. 6.

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entails the ability to counter a Soviet submarine force which is nearly five times the size of the German U-boat force at the outbreak of World War II. And the Russian Navy is acquiring new high speed nuclear submarines far more rapidly than all the other navies in the world combined." [6] He acknowledges that the Soviet fleets are at a disadvantage when operating out of the Baltic and Black seas, since their egress through the Danish and Turkish straits might be cut off. However, he adds that "the fleets in the North Atlantic and Pacific bases contain the vast majority of their prime offensive capability—their attack and missile submarines. These do have ready access and could be deployed for war freely." [7]

The asymmetry of the naval missions renders irrelevant a simple linear comparison of numbers or tonnage of warships, in which the NATO states would still predominate. As Admiral Colbert put it: "We must work for the protection of our shipping and projection of our naval, air and amphibious power ashore whenever needed. *They* are working toward a mission involving *interdiction* of our shipping. . . . The Soviet Union has no need to engage the navies of NATO, in the classical sense, if they can neutralize our carriers at the initiation of hostilities and then prevent vital allied merchant shipping from functioning effectively." [8] "With their most important supply and logistics routes based on internal land lines of communication, the Soviet Navy need not concern itself with defence of shipping. Concentrating solely on the offensive mission of destruction and interdiction of our naval and merchant forces lends them enormous flexibility. They have the potential to accomplish this mission today." [9]

THE disparities in the geographical setting also importantly influence the prospect for an accord on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. The objective of MBFR, namely, to get equal or greater stability in Central Europe at lower force levels and lower cost, is certainly desirable. But given the asymmetries involved, how can this objective be reached? Would a pull-back of US forces across the Atlantic equal a Soviet force withdrawal behind the Bug? The return of the Soviet forces would be by a short overland route. The return of the US forces would involve a 3,000 mile combined land-sea-air line of communication, and obviously would be much more complicated. General Andrew Goodpaster, SACEUR, points out an asymmetry following from this, namely, that the advantage in the return of forces would lie with the attacker who would wish to seize the military initiative. The easier Soviet reinforcement

[6] Address by Admiral Richard G. Colbert to the Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Istanbul, 13 September 1972, p. 6.
[7] Ibid. p. 4.
[8] Ibid. p. 9.
[9] Ibid. p. 10.

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ability would permit the Kremlin "to decide the time, place, mode or weight of attack," and concentrate its forces at the critical points, which would not likely be adequately defended since NATO defensive forces "must prepare plans and dispose forces against many possibilities." [10] In order to forestall the rapid return of forces, General Goodpaster has emphasized the need for verification and early warning systems to be built into any MBFR accord. Without them the existing asymmetries will be greatly magnified. However, the implementation of verification and early warning schemes are much more difficult to carry out in closed than in open societies. There is the already existing fact as well that the Warsaw Pact enjoys overall military superiority in Central Europe. Goodpaster reports that "comparative air force strengths in Europe reveal that the Warsaw Pact has twice as many combat aircraft as NATO. Not only are they superior in numbers of aircraft, but they have more airfields, more shelter, better command and control facilities, and considerably more anti-aircraft defences." [11] In tanks, the Warsaw Pact has a 3 : 1 advantage, only partially offset by a good NATO anti-tank capability. Given this situation Goodpaster observes that "equal reductions in unequal forces could result in forces that are even more unequal." [12] Goodpaster's general conclusion is that "until now, no militarily acceptable and apparently negotiable MBFR scheme has been discovered which successfully compensates for the Warsaw Pact advantages in existing forces, geography and initiative." [13]

If the MBFR negotiations are advantageous for the East, why have the Russians not pursued them with more interest instead of hanging back? Ironically, one must note that on the few occasions when Brezhnev has mentioned MBFR his interventions came just in time to help Nixon defeat the Mansfield amendment when it was twice up for vote in 1971. On both occasions President Nixon pointed to the folly of unilateral force reductions, if mutual reductions were possible. Despite these Soviet statements, the USSR has steadfastly refused to entertain the mission of former NATO Secretary General Brosio as a NATO "explorer" on the question, and has been most reluctant to proceed multilaterally, while at the same time pushing for the convocation of a European *Security* Conference that would not deal with security. There is no question that Moscow is reluctant to withdraw forces that perform a policing function in Eastern Europe, but are *all* their forces required for this? I would think that resistance undoubtedly comes from their military-industrial complex, which has been reluctant to envisage a sizeable force reduction.

[10] Address by General Andrew J. Goodpaster to the Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Istanbul, 13 September 1972, p. 4.
[11] Ibid. p. 6.
[12] Ibid. p. 4.
[13] Ibid. p. 5.

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THE Soviet project of an ESC (European Security Conference) in the West was carefully renamed CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) so as to emphasize the inclusion of the non-European members of NATO which the USSR at first tried to exclude, as well as to ensure the discussion of some agenda items the USSR may have ignored. Since the preparatory meetings in Helsinki seem to have cleared the way for the convocation of the conference proper, the West must evaluate carefully how such a confrontation can affect it. The Soviet Union of course does not need to create a European security system to provide for its security in Europe. It has an organization now that can do that. Broadly speaking, it seems that the Soviet leaders hope to gain from this conference, and whatever meetings and institutions that may issue from it, the multilateral recognition of the legitimacy of their control of East Central Europe through sanctioning the territorial status quo in the East, as well as finding a formal basis for intervening in the politics of the West. In the latter case, there could be continued Soviet efforts that seek to obstruct the movement toward European union, and to dissociate the United States from Western Europe. There is a real possibility that important segments of the population in the West will be lulled into a state of *détente* euphoria which could both easily weaken the drive for political and military integration in Western Europe and accelerate the disengagement of the United States from Western Europe.

There is no inevitability about such events if the West will proceed together, basing its moves upon continuous and intensive intra-alliance diplomatic consultation. A heavy burden falls upon the United States, as the most powerful NATO state, to avoid acts of super-power arrogance that undercut the efforts of its allies. Unfortunately this has already happened with regard to the statement of principle that the North Atlantic Council was in the process of drawing up which would presumably guide allied relations with the East in a CSCE. Without warning or consultation with NATO allies, President Nixon signed a US-Soviet declaration of principles in Moscow in May 1972 that omitted mention of the need for freer movement of people and ideas between East and West, and made no mention of the right of self-determination. The Moscow declaration did include mention of "peaceful co-existence," communist code words that Soviet spokesmen could stretch to endorse the Brezhnev doctrine. Subsequently Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited several West European capitals and indicated that he would not accept any statement of principles from other Western states that went further than the joint Soviet-American declaration. Not only was the substance of the Western position weakened, but the very high-handed nature of American behaviour was damaging to the delicate fibres of mutual confidence and trust that was needed on the eve of a new phase of extensive East-West negotiations.

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On the other hand, the West has already gained by making its convocation dependent upon Soviet agreement on Berlin. It seems likely that this accord would not have been obtained, or at least not so soon, had it not been made a precondition for the Conference. The West could also try through the Conference to promote to its advantage contacts on a variety of levels and topics that could open up the East. In confrontation between open and closed societies, the closed societies have more to lose and Soviet leaders are not unaware of this. Following the Moscow meeting with Nixon, Brezhnev reminded the Soviet people of the basis upon which such talks and contacts had been conducted. He said in a statement of 27 June 1972 that "we approached the Soviet-American summit talks . . . from positions affirming the principle of peaceful co-existence of states. . . . In striving for the affirmation of the principle of peaceful co-existence, we realize that successes in this important area in no way signify the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle. On the contrary, we must be prepared for this struggle to be intensified, for it to become an increasingly crucial form of the confrontation between the two social systems. We have no doubt about the outcome of this confrontation, since the truth of history and objective laws of social development are on our side." [14] These rhetorical statements have been accompanied by a tightening of dictatorship inside the Soviet Union, especially as regards *samizdat* and other manifestations of dissent. That is, as Soviet society is faced with the prospect of increasing contact with the West, the political leadership will seek to compensate for this potential threat to its position by clamping down on those elements in Soviet society amenable to Western influences.

SPECIFICALLY, then, what can be done in the ensuing East-West negotiations? Clearly the overriding need is for the NATO states to engage in intensive and continuous alliance diplomacy so that the challenge of *détente* management can be met. With so many issues under discussion at one time, and with the need to hammer out common, or at least parallel, negotiating positions, the skill of Western diplomacy will be taxed as never before. In addition to SALT II, which is bilateral, there will eventually be two sets of multilateral negotiations in progress side by side in CSCE and MBFR.

How should the two multilateral negotiations be related to each other, and what would be considered satisfactory progress in one forum so as to justify further discussion in the other one? The NATO states all in varying degrees, oppose the spectre of a UN General Assembly on a European scale, where 34 nations engage in endless talk about a dozen different topics without ever firmly addressing the security issue and the fundamental factors involved in reducing force

[14] *Pravda*, 28 June 1972.

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levels. They fear that this kind of conference could largely serve Soviet propaganda aims, and encourage Western public opinion to press for unilateral force reductions.

But MBFR is complex—SALT looks simple by comparison—and one could not expect any prompt results from the MBFR talks. General Steinhoff has said: "While some people are inclined to consider MBFR as a forerunner—a sort of earnest of intent to press ahead with *détente*—I myself think that this is rather putting the cart before the horse. From my view, MBFR is not a 'point de depart.' I see it, rather, as the outcome of a *détente* which had already been set in motion." [15]

Western statesmen, in the end, may be forced to proceed with MBFR faster than the military would like, because the final choice may be between a bad deal on MBFR or the more unpalatable alternative of unilateral NATO force reductions. The latter would likely be disastrous in terms of the political implications that could flow from it. With faith shaken in NATO and further credibility lost in the US nuclear guarantee for Europe, the Soviet Union would remain as the strongest power in Europe. The separate European states might then likely seek to obtain the best terms available in their separate deals with Moscow.

In order to forestall unilateral American troop withdrawals from Europe, the members of the Eurogroup in NATO (that, is, all the European members except France, Iceland and Portugal) have already helped with the burden-sharing problems through the five-year European Defence Improvement Programme that will cost $1 billion, plus increasing their 1972 military budgets by an additional $1 billion and a pledge to increase their 1973 military budgets by an additional $1·5 billion. These are valid gestures and the Eurogroup is aware of the need to relieve the expense of keeping US troops in Europe, so that further moves might be forthcoming.

The most logical next step would be the creation of an international NATO security fund as elaborated by Dr Timothy Stanley which would assure that no nation would be forced to suffer a deficit in its balance of payments by virtue of stationing troops abroad in the cause of the common defence of the alliance. Allies with a balance of payments surplus as a result of such deployments should contribute to the fund so as to permit those in deficit to recover their losses. While this would principally involve the US and Germany, other neighbouring countries that benefited from the presence of US troops in Germany would also contribute if they were in a surplus balance of payments position. In the case of Britain, there might be two types of payments: Britain would be reimbursed for the deficit suffered by stationing troops in Germany, but at the same time would be charged for the surplus it enjoyed from the presence of US troops in Britain. The Stanley plan

[15] Steinhoff, p. 2.

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has received wide attention in NATO circles and in August 1972 it was approved by the Special Subcommittee on NATO Commitments of the US House Armed Services Committee.[16] Balance of payments, not budgetary costs, are the real problem, since little or nothing would be saved in budgetary terms by returning US troops from Europe—and a great deal would be lost in the military, political and psychological value of those troops so returned.

The basis for reaching some stable and meaningful *détente* with the East is thus dependent in the first instance upon successful West/West relations inside the NATO alliance itself.

[16] *The American Commitment to NATO*, Report of the Special Subcommittee on NATO Commitments of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, 17 August 1972, pp. 14978–80.

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The Accession of the USSR to the Geneva Copyright Convention

Adam Bromberg

THE question of Soviet accession to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC) has been under consideration in Moscow for a long time, not only in publishing circles but at the top of the party hierarchy. It appears that the matter was raised with the Russians at Yalta and Potsdam and at many subsequent meetings with US leaders.

From the various discussions among Soviet publishers on the question of signing the Berne (afterwards Geneva) Convention, I quote the following arguments for and against.

1. All the East European communist countries have acceded to the Convention (in its Geneva form in the case of Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Their experience has shown that this led to dispute only in a few exceptional cases. Although, to my knowledge, the moral rights of Western authors have often been infringed in Poland and elsewhere by such means as omission, revision, deprecatory prefaces, etc., Western publishers have not been inclined to seek redress through the courts. There has usually been some sort of informal compromise, sometimes after an appeal to the Ministry of Culture or of Foreign Affairs.

Nevertheless it always seemed to me that the argument which weighed most with opponents of accession in Moscow was the fear that Western authors might seek judicial redress and that the practices of Soviet editing and censorship would come to light. This fear of scandal was not allayed by the fact that it had not occurred in the other communist countries: those who argued in this way believed that Western authors and publishers might take a different line with the USSR and that this might be highly damaging to Soviet prestige.

2. Another argument was the effect on the foreign exchange position of those countries which had acceded: they found themselves with a negative balance in the copyright sphere, as comparatively few translations of East European works appear in the West, and the specialized and technical literature of these countries is very seldom translated. However, the amount of hard currency involved is not great, either absolutely or as a percentage of total imports. Except perhaps in Yugoslavia, the authorities have brought into effect a whole apparatus of taxation and foreign exchange regulations in order to reduce authors' royalties to a minimal level. They fixed the rate as low as possible—nearly always under 5 per cent, imposed a high tax (40 per cent in Poland) on hard currency payments, laid down that part of the sum was to remain in blocked accounts in the home country, applied un-

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favourable rates of exchange (in Poland, the least advantageous of the six "official" dollar rates), imposed conditions such as the use of Polish printing concerns, etc. As a result of the low prices of books compared to the West and the limited editions on which royalties were payable in hard currency, the Western author and publisher received, for every thousand copies sold in translation, the equivalent of the catalogue price of 5–10 copies of a fictional work, or 2–5 copies of a technical one, published in hardback in the language of a Western country.

For all these reasons, royalties did not cost the East European countries much. Since the West is much more interested in Russian literary and scientific works than in those of Eastern Europe, there would be even less reason for the USSR to fear a drain of foreign exchange in this sphere, and it might even enjoy a credit balance.

3. Another argument against accession was that although the USSR had not signed the Convention, the copyright in Soviet works was already to some extent protected abroad. This was so in the East European countries, chiefly on the basis of bilateral agreements. We may see in the case of Poland how "mutual" the benefit was: Poland publishes 200–300 translations per year from the languages of the Soviet Union—the figure has been as high as 700 in the past—while the Soviet yearly average for translations from Polish is about 50: in the peak year 1968 it was 116.

In general, few experts outside France and West Germany know of the protection of Soviet authors' rights in these two countries under the provisions of the Civil Code concerning "undue self-enrichment." Legal advisers on the staff of Soviet trade delegations, however, were quick to perceive the use of these laws and to secure court decisions for the payment of royalties to Soviet authors. French and German authors enjoyed no rights of this kind in the USSR.

Another form of voluntary, unilateral, protection of works printed in the USSR was afforded by the competition among Western publishers interested in translating Soviet journals and scientific works. These publishers, especially British and American, signed contracts with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the body representing Soviet "copyright" in foreign countries, for the payment of fairly high royalties in return for "exclusive" rights which, however, were not enforceable by law. The arrangement was chiefly aimed at Western competitors, against whom the firm in question thus staked out a claim. The only real advantage to the acquirer of the non-existent "copyright" was the promise, not always kept, that he would be furnished with the original drawings and photographs, the reproductions of which in Soviet works are extremely poor, and with the publication itself at the earliest possible date, before binding.

Some 200 scientific journals are published on the basis of agreements of this type, while about 100 Russian scientific books a year

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are acquired in this way and published in English translation. Thus Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga has always been greatly in favour of acceding to the UCC, expecting that this would mean a large inflow of foreign exchange.

4. Authors were likewise in favour of accession. Even at authors' congresses, speeches were made calling for a review of authors' rights and suggesting that they be protected abroad: this was done indirectly, by reference to the practice in East European countries.

THE accession of the USSR to the UCC required the adaptation of the Soviet law of copyright to the Convention. The decree of 21 February 1973 "On certain changes and additions to the Civil Code of the USSR and the Union Republics" extends the period of an author's copyright from 15 to 25 years after his death and forbids the publication of translations without the permission of the author or his heirs. Up to now, it has been legal in the Soviet Union to publish translations of both foreign and Soviet authors without their consent. The author had to be informed and to receive a royalty, though Russian authors did not enjoy the right to such a payment before 1970. In practice, few authors have ventured to protest at the distortion of their works in Russian translation; but any extension, formal though it be, of an individual's power to defend his moral rights is clearly a step in the right direction.

Formal announcement of Soviet accession fixes the effective date at 27 May 1973. We need not here review the whole of the UCC, but there are two points in which it differs from the Berne Convention and which have probably influenced the Soviet decision.

In the first place, the UCC does not oblige an acceding country to adapt existing agreements to the new conditions. The Russians no doubt wanted to avoid any question of settling accounts in respect of books already published, and this applies also to foreign publishers. The English doctrine of acts performed "in good faith" is especially important here. It seems to me that not only books published before 27 May 1973, but also those to which rights were acquired in good faith before that date, cannot form the subject of claims by Soviet authors or their heirs. Thus, for instance, the publishers who acquired from Feltrinelli the right to translate *Dr Zhivago* can go on publishing, or can reprint, the translation after the date in question. If Pasternak's heirs want to stop the translation being reprinted they must take action in Italy, by summoning Feltrinelli publishing house to cease publication and terminate all agreements authorizing the publication of foreign-language versions. They can at the same time demand arrears of royalties, sue for damages, etc. The publication of books by Soviet authors without their agreement is only forbidden in signatory countries after 27 May 1973.

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Another provision of the UCC which allows considerable freedom of interpretation concerns the right to include in a translation summaries of portions of a book, the printing of which is illegal in a particular country. I would expect the Russians to use this provision, contrary to the intention of its authors, as a means of giving *carte blanche* to editors and censors of translations of Western works. Almost anything the censors choose to cut out may be described as anti-Soviet propaganda, action against peace, insulting to the Soviet people, inciting to race hatred and nationalism or to "religious prejudice" and superstition.

AT a press conference on 9 March 1973 the Soviet authorities indicated their intention of enacting several further legal measures so as to regulate the establishment of contact between Soviet authors and their heirs (being Soviet citizens) on the one hand and Western publishers on the other, the methods of granting or withdrawing permission for publication and translation, transmitting and receiving royalties, etc. The terms of these rules may not yet be fully known, but it seems to me very improbable that, as suggested in the Western press (e.g. Nicholas Bethel in *The Times* of 2 March), foreign copyright matters are to be "nationalized." It would hardly occur to even the least humorously inclined of Soviet authorities connected with the police, foreign trade or culture to invoke their country's monopoly of foreign trade in this context. What the Russians are more likely to do is to adopt and improve the methods at present in use in Eastern Europe. In Poland, for instance, neither the criminal nor the civil law forbids anyone to sign contracts with foreign firms, send MSS abroad or receive royalties from foreign countries; but:

1. Customs regulations make it illegal to send or take MSS or notes to foreign countries without the permission of the customs authorities, i.e. the censorship.

2. Foreign exchange regulations forbid, on pain of a fine and long imprisonment, the conclusion of any foreign contract without the prior agreement of the competent authorities. Authors' agreements have to be approved before signature by the Ministry of Culture and Art; the consent of the Ministry of Finance is also required before a Polish national can draw any part of his royalties while abroad or receive hard currency from foreign countries, even if it represents a payment due under a legally contracted agreement.

3. ZAIKS (the Polish association of authors and scenic composers), like the corresponding organizations in other communist countries, works under official control and has a monopoly on the conclusion of contracts with foreign publishers and, the opening and operation of authors' foreign exchange accounts, into which all moneys due from abroad to Polish writers must be paid. This body acts as a convenient, discreet, "unofficial" instrument for preventing nonconformist writers

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from publishing their works abroad. The ban may apply to the whole output of an author who is in disgrace, or only to some of his works.

At a press conference in Moscow on 9 March B. I. Stukalin mentioned the intention of the USSR to set up a copyright bureau of this kind as sole agent between Soviet authors and foreign publishers. A similar threat is implicit in the decree of 21 February, which makes it clear that a Soviet author's copyright will only be protected if his MS is sent abroad in the manner prescribed by the regulations. An author who sends it abroad or gives permission for publication in any other way will incur (unspecified) penalties, and the banks, post office etc. will not permit him to receive royalties.

According to the decree, the Geneva Convention of 1952 "will apply to works first published on the territory of the USSR and to those not published, but found on the territory of the USSR in any objective form." The protection of copyright extends to any work originating in the USSR. The paradox here is only apparent.

A SOVIET author who has sent his work abroad illegally does not enjoy legal protection, but the work itself does, in accordance with the Convention. The author in question will be subject to legal penalties and will not be allowed to receive royalties. If the author gives permission for his work to be published abroad against the wishes of the authorities ("in a manner contrary to regulations"), Soviet law takes no notice of it: the work has no legal existence except as a proof of the author's crime. But once the author withdraws his consent to foreign publication or declares it invalid, Soviet law acknowledges that the work is under UCC protection. A Soviet lawyer can then withdraw consent to publication on the author's behalf, or, if the publisher cannot prove the author's consent beyond dispute, he can declare it invalid and sue the publisher for bringing out a pirated edition.

Yet despite the author's intentions the contract signed with foreign publishers in a manner contrary to regulations becomes invalid in the very moment of signing it.

The Decree No. 138 of 21 February 1973 issued by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is completed by the following fourth part of article 97 concerning copyrights in the USSR:

"Foreign owners of the Soviet citizens' copyrights are recognized in the USSR only if they have acquired these copyrights in the way prescribed by the Soviet regulation."

Such law, I believe, is unknown in the copyright legislation of any other country. It forms a "legal" basis for depriving the Soviet citizen of all the benefits following the publication of his work abroad e.g. he cannot receive royalties etc. Transfer of copyrights to foreign publishers, subject to customs regulations in other communist countries, acquires the status of a law in the USSR and its infringement will be probably treated as a criminal offence.

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Moreover, the fact that a foreign copyrights' owner is not recognized in the USSR has direct further consequences for the author who has transferred his copyrights to a foreigner without going through the official channels. According to this decree a writer has no control over his copyrights abroad and by transferring them to a foreigner he commits a fraud since he is not entitled to any copyrights. A legal representative of the USSR will be able to question the writer's possession of a copyright. It can be compared to an attempt to sign a contract by an incapacitated person (e.g. mentally deficient). Another example: a Soviet citizen, while on a visit abroad, sells his summer house in the USSR. Apart from the customs offence the contract is invalid from the very beginning because selling immovables to a foreigner requires special permission of the authorities. In a case like this no court will have any doubts on the matter.

Doubts may arise, however, on an investigation of an "illegally" signed contract when a legal representative of a Soviet state institution —and not the author—will appear as the only "legal" possessor and disposer of the copyrights of that particular author. Also, under the circumstances, Western countries can introduce changes in their legislation so that publishers acting in good faith could not be sued and publications stopped until the author personally appears before the court. It may be forbidden, for example, for a representative of an author (coming from a country where his works cannot be published for political reasons) to appear before the court. Special legal procedures may be created for the copyrights of the forbidden MSS which have come from countries with preventive censorship and where publishing houses are state-owned. Such measures can at least weaken the fatal effects of Soviet censorship on foreign publication of works forbidden in the USSR. The demand to introduce such changes in legislation, put forward by Jerome Weidman in the USA, will probably be supported by people of good will and publishers of all Western countries.

SEVERAL commentators in the Western press have expressed the hope that the USSR will avoid court actions in order to prevent awkward questions concerning the freedom of Soviet authors. This, if it proves true, would show a degree of sense on the part of the Soviet authorities similar to that displayed by those of Eastern Europe, who do not generally take action against Western publishers of nonconformist works. In any case Soviet lawyers would have their hands full if, after 27 May 1973, they attempted "on the authors' behalf" to track down all foreign editions of dissident works in order to stop sales and prevent publication.

If the Russians do decide in the immediate future to make a stir over this issue and take it to the courts, they will no doubt concentrate on instances where the publisher cannot prove that he had the author's

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consent and was acting in good faith. I would expect therefore that there will not be wholesale action, but rather a variety of steps against the major publishers, designed to prevent by one means or another the reprinting and translation of dissident works. Yet it is to be hoped that some publishers will have the energy and determination to go on publishing dissident Soviet works in spite of all difficulties, since otherwise Russian and world literature will suffer grievous loss.

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Broadcasting To Eastern Europe

Maurice Latey

THE question of " freer circulation of people, information and ideas " is likely to play an important part in the current East-West negotiations for *détente* in Europe and foreign broadcasting. The only relatively effective means of free circulation of information in the Soviet Union and most other East and Central European countries is bound to figure on the agenda. There are constant and abundant indications of the immense importance which the Soviet authorities attach to the matter. To quote one fairly trifling but amusing and typical example concerning the present writer when he was in charge of BBC broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Soviet satirical magazine *Krokodil,* in April 1969, published the following feuilleton by Arton Panfilov.

" On a dark damp chill November night in an old house in London —somewhere quite close to Bush House—a group of highly respectable gentlemen gathered round a circular table. They had come together to talk—to talk with the spirits of the dead!

The gentlemen lit candles and sat down in complete silence at the round table placing a porcelain plate in the centre. The seance had begun. . . .

For quite a time the spirits refused to answer. Then suddenly there came a sound—the bark of a dog!

The gentlemen looked at each other. They couldn't understand this. And then one of them—Victor Zorza, *The Guardian's* famous specialist on East European affairs realised what this meant.

' It is he ' said Zorza in a loud whisper, his eyes widening. ' It is he, Lord Haw-Haw!'

Zorza gave a conspiratorial wink to Maurice Latey, the director of the East European Service of the BBC. Latey, a man of quick and ready mind, immediately realised the advantage to be drawn from the situation and shouted ' Yes, yes! It is William Joyce himself!'

The rest of the company burst into a kind of chant ' The spirit of Willy Froelich is with us!' "

The writer goes on to explain who Lord Haw-Haw was, describing him as one of the first begetters of the dirty war of the radio waves; he continued:

" What Lord Haw-Haw advised these gentlemen remains a secret. But we can nevertheless get some idea of what he said from some incidental manifestations.

The staff members of the East European Service filed in order into Mr. Latey's office and the ' old wolf ' began his speech.

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'Ladies and gentlemen. We have received some new instructions. We are to try to achieve our aims by any methods available to us. All means are good. . . .'

'What do you mean by that? May we even lie?' The question was put in bad English.

Mr. Latey shuddered at such unthinkable crudity. But when he realised that the questioner was a member of Prague radio, called Nucha, who had only recently fled to England, Latey smiled condescendingly.

'Come, come my dear colleague! Not at any price. Telling lies is very bad. . . . Listen to what that American specialist whom we all so respect writes about this. We might say that he is our elder brother in this business. . . .'

With these words Mr. Latey picked up a ponderous tome. It was the book by the American propaganda theorist William Davison, *International Political Communication*. Mr. Latey opened it at page 183 and began to read. 'There are many intermediate nuances between truth and falsity. Omission or half truths are usually less harmful than lies.'"

The writer goes on to describe the old wolf of British propaganda giving instructions to another named broadcaster in the BBC Russian Service, Janis Sapiets, on how to distort an article from an Estonian journal and showing the result to the new Czech recruit. The *Krokodil* article concludes:

"The former citizen of Prague was pleasantly surprised. Mr. Latey continued: 'That is the kind of principle that guides us in the preparation of our broadcasts—but straight-forward lying, tut, tut, tut.'

And Mr. Latey screwed up his nose in a gesture of limitless distaste. As far as Janis Sapiets' so-called commentary on the article in the 'Estonian Journal' is concerned, Mr. Latey gave intsructions for this outstanding example of the work of his minions to be included immediately in the BBC's Czech transmission.

And the spirit of Lord Haw-Haw who had followed this scene with the closest possible attention sometimes found that he had to dash a tear of tender emotion from his eye, so much did the whole set-up, all this training recall those times, so dear to his heart, which he had spent in Dr. Goebbels' radio centres."

This rather highly coloured account of life in the BBC is worth quoting because it is typical of the line of attack on foreign broadcasts. The writer cannot plausibly accuse the BBC of lying directly but rather of subtle misrepresentation. He attempts to smear the broadcasts by association with Nazi propaganda and with Goebbels. He is clearly concerned with the effect on his readers of foreign broadcasts on Czechoslovakia. Above all, he gives evidence of the importance which the Soviet authorities attach to such broadcasts. He assumes the

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readers' familiarity with named broadcasters in the BBC's Russian Service. It is rather as if *Punch*, or the *New Yorker* were to produce a sketch with named broadcasters from Moscow radio's English service.

OF course the major illustration of the importance which the Soviet Government attaches to foreign broadcasts is the enormous jamming effort, which has been deployed to prevent them reaching the Soviet and East European listeners. The history of jamming is a particularly fascinating study because it throws light on the point where Soviet, foreign and domestic policies meet and interact. BBC broadcasts to most East European countries had started during the second world war. The first broadcast in Russian was a translation of Winston Churchill's famous speech on the occasion of Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. But that was a once-only effort and broadcasting on a regular basis was not started until 1946, in the brief honeymoon period between the end of the war and the onset of the Cold War. In the next few years, Stalin attempted to put the lid back on Soviet public opinion, to eliminate the effects of Soviet wartime contacts with the outside world. The Zhdanouschchina—the attempt in the late 1940s to suppress all independent thought—was the most massive attempt in history to equate truth with power. Stalin aspired to the condition of Humpty-Dumpty in *Alice in Wonderland*—" when I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less." It was at that time, in 1948, that George Orwell wrote *Nineteen-eighty-four*, a projection of a world in which that attempt had succeeded. And it was at that time that the great jamming network was built up to start operating, as far as the BBC was concerned, in April 1949.

The history of jamming from then on provides an accurate barometer of East-West relations. Its onset followed the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, the setting up of the Cominform, the great purges in Eastern Europe and coincided with the Berlin blockade, followed by the Korean War. The technique was to cover the wide open spaces with powerful short-wave transmitters on sky-wave and to supplement this with numerous low-powered ground-wave transmitters to blot out the foreign radio signals in the big cities. According to American estimates, some 2,000 transmitters were used and we know of between 200–250 powerful sky-wave transmitters used for the purpose. The cost is very high, certainly a good deal more than the cost of all BBC external broadcasting. The jamming network spread rapidly through the Soviet bloc, the local effort being supported by the big Soviet sky-wave transmitters. The interference had nothing to do with programme content. It was blanket jamming which commenced with the start of each language transmission and ended on its termination.

Western diplomats and broadcasting officials often protested against this. It interfered with broadcasting generally and contravened the

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international conventions covering broadcasting. The arguments on this matter took a monotonous course. The foreign broadcasts, we were told, were slanderous and offensive to the Soviet people. The broadcasting authorities received hundreds of letters demanding their suppression, and they were also considered illegal, since the Soviet Union had a law against the broadcasting of war propaganda. On one occasion the well-known Soviet journalist Yuri Zhukov quoted Mr. Khrushchev's remarks on seeing the film "Can-Can" in the United States—that it was obscene and not suitable for children, as an argument against Western broadcasts. This attitude of "Pas devant les enfants" was, of course, highly offensive to the Soviet listening public. And the Soviet officials, who were not actually responsible for the jamming—since it is carried out by the security police on high-level orders from the Politburo—often showed some embarrassment in producing these lame arguments. After all, jamming was the greatest confession of defeat in debate. Khrushchev himself who was always convinced that he could win any argument, was presumably sensitive on this point. Anyway, he is known to have taken a personal interest in jamming.

The first break in the barrage came in 1956 with the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Britain. Jamming of BBC Russian broadcasts ceased when they set foot on English soil, only to be resumed six months later when students at Moscow University had pinned up, on notice-boards, BBC bulletins giving news of the Hungarian rising. At the same time, the Poznan demonstrators in Poland had destroyed a local jamming transmitter and Gomulka, when he came to power, stopped the Polish jamming of foreign broadcasts. The Poles revealed that by doing so they had saved the equivalent of the entire cost of their domestic broadcasting and enough electricity for a medium-sized city.

The next break in the jamming clouds followed on Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to the Soviet Union in 1959. This led to an agreement on cultural exchanges, which contained a clause on the "normalization of broadcasting relations." Accordingly, jamming ceased in February 1960, but once again it proved to be a false dawn. It was resumed after the shooting down of the American U2 aircraft over the Soviet Union—but in a new and interesting form. The jamming was now selective. It was applied to any items in the BBC Russian broadcasts that were controversial from the Soviet point of view, and particularly to any mention of Khrushchev himself. This represented an extraordinary and quite unprecedented devolution of authority in the Soviet Union. The selective jamming served as a very accurate barometer of the state of East-West relations. On average, about 30 per cent of BBC Russian output was jammed but, at the time of the collapse of the Paris Summit Meeting the level rose to 80 per cent. This selective jamming guided by the markers of the big sky-wave transmitters, was a considerable technical achievement but, not surprisingly, it was more ragged and less effective than the earlier blanket jamming.

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The next, and longest, break in Soviet jamming came in June 1963. The Director General of Soviet broadcasting, Mr Kharlamov—a close associate of Khrushchev, who fell with him—visited Britain that summer and explained that it had been stopped because it was technically inefficient. This was true in two ways. The really determined Soviet listener could always hear by moving out of the centre of the cities, or by using one of the higher frequencies which was left free for monitoring purposes, or by listening in one of the unjammed languages such as English. In *The First Circle*, Solzhenitsyn relates how, as early as 1949, German prisoners were able to spread news from abroad in the camp by listening to the BBC in their own language. Secondly, the jamming was technically awkward for Soviet broadcasters since it overflowed onto neighbouring frequencies. On one occasion, Moscow radio's foreign broadcasting of one of Khrushchev's speeches was jammed by accident —an incident which was duly drawn to the attention of the Moscow Radio London Correspondent.

THE other East European countries followed the Soviet example of giving up jamming—the Rumanians first, explaining that it had been a Soviet responsibility all along, and the Bulgarians last. There followed a five-year period of comparative peace on the air, during which both the BBC and the Voice of America were free of jamming, although Radio Liberty which has been broadcasting around the clock in Russian and other Soviet languages, since 1953 from Munich, has throughout been subject to continuous blanket jamming.

This honeymoon period was brought to an abrupt end by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Only one BBC Russian broadcast, reporting the invasion and commenting on it, got through before blanket jamming was reintroduced. This was followed by violent attacks in the Soviet press on Western broadcasters, accusing them of being agents of espionage and of subversion and provocation in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union now jams the transmissions in Soviet languages, not only of Radio Liberty but also of the BBC, the Voice of America, *Deutsche Welle* and of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and Albania. Kol Israel is the latest victim since the summer of 1972. The Swedish and French Russian broadcasts have escaped jamming by avoiding all controversial material and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation is also free. Although the old crude noise jamming still persists, there has been some refinement in technique through the use of Soviet broadcasts abroad from the powerful Mayak station superimposed on foreign broadcasts. This method is more precise and involves less interference with neighbouring frequencies, but is also less effective. Outside the USSR, Bulgaria has as usual been the most eager to follow the Soviet example, jamming the Bulgarian broadcasts of the BBC, the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe from Munich. Jamming in Czechoslovakia has been, by comparison, ineffective and apparently half-hearted and virtually ceased early this year.

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This immensely costly operation was, for a long time, practically the only evidence Western broadcasters had of the effectiveness of their activities. But every now and then the curtain lifted to reveal very widespread and attentive listening—in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the Soviet Union the first breakthrough for the BBC came at the British Trade Fair in Moscow in 1961 where numerous conversations revealed far wider listening than had been thought possible under jamming conditions. Since then there has been steadily accumulating evidence of listening in most parts of the Soviet Union, culminating in a new wave of information from recent Jewish emigrants. It is not possible to put a figure to the audience, either in the Soviet Union or in the other East European communist countries for the simple reason that in most of them no scientific sampling is possible. Radio Free Europe estimates its audience in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania at over 30 million. *What is certain is that Western broadcasters to communist countries* reach an audience of many millions, which rises steeply at times of crisis. The evidence suggests that in terms of age groups, the most numerous listeners are between 20–30, then come the 30–40 year olds and then the teenagers. It seems that the tradition of listening to foreign broadcasts for reliable information, which was built up during the war, has been passed on to new generations; and when one meets listeners they may still tap out the "V" sign in morse code, which was the BBC call signal and the symbol of resistance to Nazi occupation.

In the Soviet Union the BBC Russian Service, which comes third in time on the air—a long way after Radio Liberty and the Voice of America—seems to have a special appeal to the technical intelligentsia and the equivalent of serious paper-back readers in the West, while Radio Liberty, which devotes much more time to Soviet internal affairs, has a special appeal to dissidents. This is borne out by an analysis published in Samizdat in the Soviet Union in March 1972 in reply to Senator Fulbright's attack on Radio Liberty. The author emphasizes the essential role played by Radio Liberty in publishing Samizdat material and the part which it plays in its broadcasts in Russian and 18 other Soviet languages in keeping alive cultural values. "No other radio station," he writes, "provides information about Russia in the same measure and with the same understanding." He claims that the Voice of America is the least jammed of the major Western stations because it broadcasts much music and its pop music programmes are popular with the young. Its news is much listened to but afterwards people tend to tune in to other stations because the Voice of America gives little news about Russia and devotes too much time to programmes on remote topics of American life. Similarly, the BBC is criticized for devoting too much attention to Ulster and Malta and the miners' strike. "However, since—in comparison with the Voice of America—the overall duration of programmes is shorter, the material about Russia is more concentrated. The BBC is well-known for its serious and thorough

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programme on Russian affairs. . . . Soviet listeners have established close spiritual ties with the BBC contributors—something which cannot be said about the Voice of America contributors. The political commentator, Anatoly Maximovich Goldberg and the Orthodox priest Father Vladimir are well-known in the Soviet Union. Often during a conversation one can hear words like—'Yesterday I was listening to the BBC, and on this point Goldberg considers that . . .'; or, 'I quite agree with you, and, by the way, yesterday this was mentioned on the radio by Father Vladimir.' All BBC programmes are of a very fundamental nature, so that, after a while, a regular listener to the station can acquire sound all-round knowledge."

The Samizdat writer pays tribute to the news service of *Deutsche Welle* and says that when all other stations are blocked out by jamming people turn to the Canadian or French broadcasts, although the latter are somewhat too like the Swedish broadcasts which seem to originate from the Communist Party or the Society for Friendship with the USSR. These are the views of one man who, since he is clearly in opposition, cannot be regarded as typical of most of the audience.

HOWEVER, granted that the broadcasts are listened to, what effect do they have? This is a difficult, if not impossible, question to answer with regard to any broadcast. One can only give individual instances. Thus the Hungarian radio, in its brief moment of freedom in 1956, sent a message of gratitude to the BBC for its objective and sympathetic reporting of the Hungarian rising. Moscow University students pinned up BBC reports of the rising. Thousands of young people went out to Peredelkino to attend the funeral of the great Boris Pasternak, which had only been announced by foreign radio. Listeners make tapes, not only of pop music, but also of religious and even industrial programmes. Similarly, very recently, many hundreds of Polish and Hungarian listeners have braved the censorship to send in requests for recordings or books offered by the BBC—some of them even going abroad to send their requests. There is also much evidence that the competition of foreign radio is raising the standards of liveliness and objectivity of domestic radio programmes in communist countries.

Then there is the impact on individuals. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who is also a listener to Radio Liberty, gave the BBC Russian Service the first announcement of his new novel, *August 1914* and specified the time of broadcast. In his Nobel Prize lecture he wrote of jamming "This is for us a dire peril: this stopping the flow of information between different parts of the planet. Modern science knows that stopping the flow of information leads to entropy, universal destruction. Stopping the flow of information makes international treaties and agreements illusory: within the 'jammed zone' it is no trouble at all to reinterpret any agreement, and even simpler, to suppress it as if it had never been (as Orwell understood very well). Those who live within the jammed zone are not so much earth-dwellers as an expeditionary

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force from Mars who, knowing nothing whatever about the rest of the Earth, are ready to go and trample it in the sublime confidence that they are liberating it."

The geneticist Zhores Medvedev, in his book *A Question of Madness*, describes his return home after his release in 1970 from a psychiatric hospital to which he had been confined as a result of writings unacceptable to the regime. He writes " After seeing to some current matters and looking through my mail, I decided to listen to the radio. After the unceasing radio reception from the hospital loudspeakers, which were switched on in the corridor from 7 a.m. till 22.00, it was a great pleasure to me to be able to choose what programme to listen to. At exactly 17.50 I got the British station, BBC, on my radio. They were broadcasting a news bulletin. Suddenly there came the announcement in the bulletin that according to reports from Moscow correspondents, '. . . the biologist Zhores Medvedev, who after his arrest on 29th May was detained in the Kaluga psychiatric hospital, has been released from it.' After the news, the BBC commentator Maurice Latey gave a special talk devoted to this event. He said that my unexpectedly quick release was the result of a struggle between the scientists and the bureaucratic leadership, and that the scientists had won. Maurice Latey said that the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn on 15 June had made a special protest against the imprisonment of perfectly healthy dissenters in lunatic asylums. The efficiency and speed of these correspondents was amazing, but I later learnt that they had received the report of my release from semi-official sources."

Clearly, such evidence of impact is gratifying to the broadcaster but it tells us little of the main purpose and effectiveness of foreign broadcasting to Eastern Europe. We are engaged in a very long-term process. The aim in the long run is no less than the creation of a common universe of converse—a noosphere (to use Teilhard de Chardin's word) for the global village. This, unfortunately, is just what Soviet ideologists dislike and fear most. That is why, at a moment of political *détente*, they emphasize the need for sharpening ideological conflict and why they attack any attempt at bridge-building between East and West as subversion.

BROADCASTING obviously has a vital role to play in this and each of the great broadcasting organizations has a distinctive contribution to make. The Voice of America represents a voice of power and listeners in communist nations are bound to be interested in what it has to say. But to many it is suspect as the voice of the great rival. The BBC has the advantage of an established tradition of reliable news and fair and independent comment and of a tone of voice well suited to such a dialogue. The British tradition of peaceful change and debate is very relevant to the task in hand. The disadvantages are that British news may often seem remote and information and comment on the

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internal affairs of eastern European countries must be limited to what can properly be said from London. That may be quite a lot but there is the further limitation of a much shorter time on the air, when compared with VOA and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Further, there is always a danger that the BBC may fall behind in transmitter power as well.

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have the advantage of ample time on the air, plentiful resources and much greater freedom to deal with the domestic situation in communist countries, since they set out to provide an alternative home service. The crusading days of the Dulles doctrine of liberation of the 1950s are well behind them. But however great their responsibility and reliability now, they still suffer from doubt about the whole basis of their operation—whose voice they represent. Hence the attack on them by Senator Fulbright and the attempt to give them a more solid constitutional support than the previous CIA subsidy. It is to be hoped that this attempt will succeed, since they perform a task of information which other radio organizations could not easily fulfil.

There can be no doubt that, in the debates on East-West contacts connected with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, one of the main communist objectives will be to get rid of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. That emerges clearly from any discussion with communist officials on the subject. They will also aim at a convention on exchange of information, which will impose restrictions on Western broadcasts. The nature of this convention can be inferred from the draft Soviet UN resolution on the use of artificial satellites for direct television broadcasting. This suggests that such broadcasting should be carried out only with the positively expressed consent of the receiving states and that all transmissions, which prejudice international peace or constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states, should be forbidden and that states may use measures for counteracting unlawful broadcasts, even in outer space. Since direct television by satellite is not likely to become a reality for many years to come, the Soviet Government, by raising the question now, shows the importance which it attaches to excluding foreign broadcasts. On the face of it, the resolution conflicts with Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights which lays down the right "to receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontier." Despite this, the Soviet resolution got a good deal of support in the United Nations and was approved in a somewhat watered-down form. So the debate on freedom of information, in connection with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is likely to be a vigorous one.

It will also be crucial, not least for its bearing on international broadcasting. In conclusion I may perhaps quote from a lecture which I gave nine years ago at the time of the fall of Khrushchev—views which have since been considerably attacked by communist spokesmen

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but which I think still hold today. "We are now in a position to answer the question: what good can these broadcasts do? They can help in remaking Europe, in healing the great schism of the past half-century, in creating a new Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This is the optimum aim, a very long-term one, which may well seem Utopian at the present time. It depends on the prediction—always perilous—of great and continuing changes in the nature of European communism. The difficulties in the way are obvious, difficulties of communication across the ideological gulf, difficulties of filling up the bucket of ignorance and misinformation with the small drops of truth which we can pour into it. Yet no one could have predicted ten years ago the remarkable changes that have already taken place. At present we are pushing at an opening door. The door may close again. In that case we have our minimum objective. Broadcasting can still keep our foot in the door. It can guarantee that the Stalinist model of a completely isolated communist world can never again be attempted with any hope of success; and that is a great service to the cause of peace."

There has been another attempt to slam the door since Czechoslovakia 1968, but we still have our foot in it, and it may even be opening again. This may seem optimistic in view of the Soviet attempt to couple increased economic technological and cultural contacts with intensified repression and ideological struggle. But such a conjunction is in the long run impracticable; and one of the reasons for this is broadcasting. To quote from the conclusion of that lecture: "Remarkable things have been accomplished already, in which broadcasting has played its part. George Orwell's nightmare described in *Nineteen-Eighty-Four* of a society completely brainwashed by modern methods of mass control and persuasion has been dispelled. We have seen the beginning of the end of what Boris Pasternak described in *Doctor Zhivago* as 'the inhuman reign of the lie' which meant that 'you should hate what you love and love what you abhor.' In fact, the moral of twenty-five years of broadcasting to Eastern Europe is a simple but hopeful one; it is that truth is great and will prevail—if we help it."

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Social Stratification and Sociology in the Soviet Union*

Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard B. Dobson

THE revival of Soviet sociology in the post-Stalin era is indicative of the changes in that society made possible by destalinization. Academic sociology is not possible in a fully totalitarian society. Such regimes as the Nazi, the Stalinist, and seemingly the Maoist, which demand strict adherence to an official creed and tolerate not the slightest opposition to the party line, dare not permit sociologists to shed light on the distribution of wealth and privileges or to find out "*kto kogo?*"—"who gets whom?" Although there is always a gap between social reality and the ideological justification of a social order, in a totalitarian system empirical facts may be much more damaging to the ideology, since it is proclaimed as a sacred truth and all-encompassing explanation of man's social life. It is feared that the sheer opportunity to analyse social reality empirically will supply ammunition to the critics of the existing order, to those who point to the discrepancy between what is and what should be.

In the United States and other Western countries, sociology has been a "critical discipline." In the heartland of modern sociology, the US, its practitioners have documented almost *ad nauseam* the extent to which American reality and the American creed of an egalitarian society are at odds. Sociologists have emphasized the failings of the school system in reducing the differences in ability and motivation among children from families of varying income and cultural levels. They have shown the limits of the efforts to curtail wealth or income differentials through progressive tax policy. They have documented the punitive consequences of low status on personality and health. With few exceptions, such writings have been cast in the context of criticism of the society and various of its institutions for repressing opportunity and inhibiting equality. American and other Western sociologists as a group have been more supportive of "liberal" or "left" egalitarian politics than those in any other field in academe.[1]

* This paper is part of a comparative analysis of the social role of different categories of intellectuals being conducted under grants from the Ford Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities to the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. We are also indebted to the Guggenheim Foundation and the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for Fellowships to Lipset during 1972–73 and the International Research and Exchanges Board which awarded a dissertation research fellowship to Dobson for 1972–73. For a broader treatment of some of these issues, see S. M. Lipset and Richard B. Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union," *Daedalus*, 101 (Summer 1972), pp. 137–198.

[1] S. M. Lipset and E. C. Ladd, Jr., "The Politics of American Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78 (1972), pp. 67–104.

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Although only slightly more than a decade old in its revived empirical form, sociology in the communist world bears clear resemblance to the field in other countries both in its value orientations and in findings, particularly in the area of social stratification.[2] Thus, as a perusal of the work of Eastern scholars makes evident, almost all their writings, like those of American students of stratification, evince a positive concern for a more egalitarian society. Accepting the communist goal of equality, they document the existence of considerable inequality in terms of power, income, status, and opportunity within their country and show its relation to family socio-economic background, sex, community of origin (metropolitan to rural), and less frequently to national or ethnic background.

The Soviet sociologists differ from their American and other western counterparts in assuming (at least publicly) that their society and governmental regime is in a transitional stage which will lead increasingly and inevitably to the achievable goal of real equality, i.e. communism, a system without differentiated strata or variations in reward. Unlike most western students of stratification they do not attribute the persistence of inequality in their country to the desire of the privileged to maintain a superior position for themselves and their kin. Their data are rarely presented as an explicit critique of some major aspect of the society. And although quantitative comparisons with the results of comparable research in non-Soviet societies are rarely made, there are frequent comments in Soviet academic journals that the research findings

[2] Lipset has compared earlier Soviet research in stratification with Western work in S. M. Lipset, " Social Mobility and Equal Opportunity," *The Public Interest*, No. 29 (Fall, 1972), pp. 90–108, and S. M. Lipset, " La mobilité sociale et les objectifs socialistes," *Sociologie et sociétés*, 4 (November 1972), pp. 193–224. Questions of social mobility were examined comparatively in S. M. Lipset and Reinhardt Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959). Pioneering work in the area of Soviet social stratification has been done by Alex Inkeles and Robert Feldmesser. See, in particular, Alex Inkeles, " Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status, and Power*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966), pp. 516–26, and Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959). More recent contributions include Zev Katz, *Hereditary Elements in Education and Social Structure in the USSR* (Glasgow: Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 1969); David Lane, *The End of Inequality? Stratification Under State Socialism* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971); Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order: Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies* (New York: Praeger, 1972); Zev Katz, *Patterns of Social Stratification in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1972); Zev Katz, *Patterns of Social Mobility in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.; Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1972); and Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia* (New York: Walker & Co., 1972). The authors wish to express their thanks to Dr Katz for his assistance in locating materials. A valuable collection of recent Soviet writing in this area is the volume *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR*, edited and translated by Murray Yanowitch and Weseley Fisher, with an introduction by S. M. Lipset (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973) (now in press). In the present article, the authors have sought to refer the reader to pertinent translations from the Russian, when such materials exist. Also noteworthy is the comparative study by Janina Markiewicz-Lagneau, *Éducation, egalité et socialisme: theorie et pratique de la differenciation sociale en pays socialistes* (Paris: Anthropos, 1969).

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demonstrate that the Soviet Union is more egalitarian and offers more opportunity than western countries, or that the situation is steadily improving, i.e. becoming more egalitarian. "Unpleasant facts" are explained away in non-invidious terms—for example, the lesser economic or educational achievements of some ethnic groups are attributed to their disproportionate rural background. Most recently, however, as we shall note later, some Soviet sociologists have also begun to accept "hereditary" occupational strata as a feature of their society and have suggested that these developments, too, should be seen as demonstrating the superiority of socialism.

Much Soviet sociological literature is designed to refute contentions made by western writers about Soviet society. Yet the answers to the western statements are often so weak or so clearly counter to the findings which the authors themselves, or other Soviet scholars, have published as to make one wonder what message they are trying to communicate. In a recent article Iu. E. Volkov refers to bourgeois ideologists who "circulate fabrications" which depict "a new ruling class" or "elite" in the Soviet Union composed of those "engaged in performing management functions in administrative-political, economic and other organs." But in answering this contention, Volkov rests his case on an ideological shibboleth—he acknowledges that the functions of management appear to be the same under capitalism and socialism, but insists the *essence* is different. Because of the socialization of the means of production, the only masters "are the working masses." Management under socialism "cannot be the expression of the self-seeking interests of a minority. . . . It can only be a more or less exact expression of the will and interests of the whole society." No empirical evidence is supplied to substantiate this point, and evidence which he presents later simply highlights the continued *absence* of the masses' participation in management.[3]

Only rarely do Soviet sociologists face up to the problem of power and inequalities associated with it. Yet such problems were once openly discussed in the one classic communist work which sought to confront the work of "bourgeois" sociology, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology* by Nikolai Bukharin. This book, first published in the Soviet Union in 1921, was a required party text during Lenin's lifetime. In it, Bukharin dealt with the arguments of Robert Michels. Michels, in a section "in his very interesting book" *Political Parties* (so described and quoted by Bukharin) contended that socialism "assigns at least as much power to the administrators as would possession of their own private property." Hence for Michels, socialism "seems to be nothing more than a substitution of one group of leaders for another"; the masses cannot govern.[4]

[3] Iu. E. Volkov, "Social Structure and the Function of Management," in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

[4] Nikolai Bukharin, *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology*, with an introduction by Alfred Meyer (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 309.

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Bukharin recognized that Michel's argument could not be easily dismissed and acknowledged that it was not certain who would turn out to be right, Michels or the Marxists. He emphasized the importance of the division resulting from "the differences between the work of those who command and those who obey, the differences expressed in the property relations," thereby linking authority relations under socialism with property rights.[5] He insisted, however, that Michels made certain incorrect assumptions about the working class' inability to govern.

> [What] constitutes an eternal category in Michels' presentation, namely the "incompetence of the masses" will disappear, for this incompetence is by no means a necessary attribute of every system; it likewise is a product of the economic and technical conditions, expressing themselves in the general cultural being and in the educational conditions. We may state that in the society of the future there will be a colossal overproduction of organizers, which will nullify the *stability* of the ruling groups.
>
> But the question of the *transition period* from capitalism to socialism, *i.e.*, the period of the proletarian dictatorship, is far more difficult . . . . There will inevitably result a *tendency* to "degeneration," *i.e.*, the excretion of a leading stratum in the form of a class-germ. This tendency will be retarded by two opposing tendencies; first by the *growth of the productive forces*; second, by the *abolition of the educational monopoly*. The increasing reproduction of technologists and of organizers in general, out of the working class itself, will undermine this possible new class alignment. The outcome of the struggle will depend on which tendencies turn out to be stronger.[6]

Presumably the abundant empirical Soviet sociological studies could shed light on Bukharin's judgments, but his book and particularly his thesis, once party doctrine, that "the ruling groups," the "class germ" would be prevented from dominating by the "over-production" of working-class activists who would "undermine this possible new class alignment," are ignored even in post-Stalinist Russia. Yet some of the descriptive analyses of contemporary Soviet sociology touch upon these issues tangentially. For example, O. I. Shkaratan notes that Soviet studies of the working-class indicate that, "although the members of society are equal co-owners of socialist property, they do not participate equally in the organization and improvement of production, they contribute unequally to the development of the economy and culture, and they are unequal in the degree to which they are the subjects of social activity."[7]

[5] Ibid. p. 282.

[6] Ibid. pp. 310–11.

[7] O. I. Shkaratan, *Problemy sotsial 'noi struktury rabochego klassa SSSR* (Problems of the social structure of the working class of the USSR) (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), translated as "Social Groups in the Working Class of a Developed Socialist Society," in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

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THE most comprehensive effort to account for a propensity for the emergence of a governing elite in the Soviet Union in Marxist terms comes, of course, from an even more heretical source than Bukharin, the Trotskyist opposition. For Trotsky, the rise of a privileged ruling stratum composed of those who do "not engage directly in productive labor, but administers, orders, commands, pardons and punishes" was caused by a variety of determinants, the most important of which was the underdevelopment of the means of production and resultant scarcity and want.[8] Under these circumstances, the state assumed special importance as an organizer of the economy and stimulator of economic advance in accordance with "bourgeois norms" and by means of material incentives; at the same time, those in commanding positions were able to expropriate a disproportionate share of the "surplus." "The state," Trotsky noted, "assumed directly and from the very beginning a dual character: socialistic, in so far as it defends social property in the means of production; bourgeois, in so far as the distribution of life's goods is carried out with a capitalistic measure of value and all the consequences ensuing therefrom. . . . So long as even a modest "Ford" remains the privilege of a minority, there survive all the relations and customs proper to a bourgeois society. And together with them, there remains the guardian of inequality, the state." [9]

Destalinization has permitted a revival of such discussions, without of course, reference to the analyses of the great heretic, Trotsky. In the early days of the Gomulka regime in Poland, a section of a western sociological work which approvingly summarized Michels' work and discussed the weaknesses of Bukharin's reply to it was translated and published in a major academic journal.[10] In Czechoslovakia before 1968, there was considerable writing devoted to analyzing power relations under socialism, which was critical of the one party system, pointing to the way in which the monopoly of power, in effect, created a new elite.[11]

[8] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed: What is the Soviet Union and Where is It Going*, Max Eastman trans. (New York: Merit, 1965), pp. 52–60, 138. For Trotsky's analysis of the composition of this stratum, see pp. 135–43.

[9] Ibid. pp. 54, 57–58.

[10] See the serial publication *Studia Socjologiczno-Politycyne*. Directly pertinent is Szymon Chodak, "Roberta Michelsa Socjologia Niemieckiej Socjaldemokracji," *Studia Socjologiczno-Polityczne*, No. 1, 1958, pp. 123–162, and by the same author, "How Was Political Sociology Possible in Poland," unpublished paper, Department of Sociology, Sir George Williams University, Montreal, Quebec.

[11] See Pavel Machonin, "Social Stratification in Contemporary Czechoslovakia," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (March 1970), pp. 725–41, and Lubomir Brokl, "Power and Social Stratification," *International Journal of Sociology*, 1 (Fall, 1971), pp. 203–83. These articles report on some aspects of a survey of 13,215 male heads of households carried out in Czechoslovakia toward the end of 1967. The most complete analysis is found in Pavel Machonin (a kolektiv), *Ceckoslovenská spolecnost: sociologická analyza sociální stratifikace* (Prague: Epocha, 1969). See also Jaroslav Krejci, *Social Change and Stratification in Postwar Czechoslovakia* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

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In Yugoslavia where Djilas and others have raised the issue of a "New Class," Tito himself continues to stress the need for a continuing struggle with the "technocracy, bureaucracy, the class enemy . . . who oppose the interests of the working class in our society." He describes the way in which some of the managers even "have amassed wealth through different machinations. . . . You have no idea how distressed I feel when I see the things we have been talking about, this rush to get rich, this scramble for the dinar. Yet I know extremely well how families with the lowest earning live."

Frankly acknowledging the problem of "authority in the hands of a few people," he asserts that those fostering the power of the bureaucracy are "in key positions, that is to say in the positions where material and financial resources are being handled and where decisions can be taken concerning the utilization of the fruits of other people's labour. This is where those forces may be found." And though the head of a communist system, he argues that "there are people in the Party who make it impossible to square accounts with them." Among other consequences of the growth of power and privilege is the fact that there "are fewer and fewer worker and peasant youths at the universities, because there is a fairly large number of those who are well off and who can afford to study." [12]

The second most important Yugoslav leader, Edward Kardelj, also acknowledges the significance of "social stratification" in the country, of "non-socialist, Stalinistic, capitalist, statist, group-property, class and other elements. . . . It is not difficult to discover such phenomena for something of all this can be found, to a greater or lesser extent, in all contemporary socialist societies. . . ." He goes on, however, to argue that it is not enough to simply criticize such developments or to analyze their source. Communists must look for means of overcoming them through fostering the real power of the working-class, "self-management" and forms of workers' control.[13]

At the other extreme are those who deny that persons in positions of authority receive privileges. For instance, attacking the notion of a "new class" made up of managers and administrators, one Soviet sociologist writes:

> This theory is untrue even in relation to capitalist society, since the assertion that ownership of the means of production has lost its significance with the formation of "an economic elite" and that, therefore, economic privileges belong not so much to the owners of the means of production as to the administrators, the managers, does not withstand criticism. Applied to socialist society,

[12] An interview with President Tito, "We Must Have a Vanguard and United Party," published in the Zagreb *Vjesnik*, 8 October 1972, as translated in the Yugoslav magazine *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 49 (August–December 1972), pp. 8–9, 11, 12–13, 21.

[13] Edward Kardelj, "Contradictions of Social Property in Contemporary Socialist Practice," *Socialist Thought and Practice*, No. 49 (August–September 1972), pp. 34–36.

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> it is all the more untrue, since socialist public property does not give any social group, including the intelligentsia, any advantages whatsoever. If one examines the advantages which are formed in the course of administering the production process, they probably accrue to the position of the director, the head of the workshop, etc. as commander and leader, but the latter in the last analysis is a representative of the whole people's state, the guiding force of which is the working class. The managers are accountable to society and are directed by it. In addition, direct control of their activity is realized by the whole collective of workers in the form of various unions, social organizations, [and] organs of popular rule. Consequently, the engineer and technical personnel are directed by the people itself and fulfil, in essence, its will.[14]

It is an obscure line of reasoning which brings the author to acknowledge that advantages, as a rule, accrue to the manager of an enterprise, while simultaneously denying that any social group receives advantages.

But even recognition that sharp inequality in various forms continues to be a major characteristic of communist society does not mean, of course, acceptance of any notion by East European scholars that it is a result of forces comparable to those operating in non-communist systems. Official doctrine, even in Yugoslavia, continues to insist that varying systems of predominant property and consequent social class relations prevent such comparisons. For the most part, therefore, the revived sociology of the post-Stalin era almost invariably rejects any assumptions about convergence of social structures. Those who have pointed to convergences in Poland and Czechoslovakia in their brief periods of total freedom no longer do so.

In this article, we have attempted to report some of the findings of Soviet sociology dealing with social stratification. Because of space limitations, we have been forced to drop our original plan to also deal systematically with the considerable body of comparable material produced by scholars in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia. As western sociologists will note, much of the evidence and even the interpretations suggested by Soviet scholars are quite similar to those

[14] V. I. Boiko, " Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury obshchestva i sotsialisticheskoe gosudarstvo " (Change of the social structure of society and the socialist state), in V. I. Boiko (ed.), *Sotsial'naia struktura naseleniia sibiri* (The social structure of the population of Siberia) (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1970), pp. 41–42. See also the Hungarian book by A. Kiss, *Az " uj osztaly "—fantazia vagy valosag?* (The " New Class "—Fantasy or Reality?) (Budapest: Kossuth Kiado, 1971), which is abstracted in *ABSEES*, II, 4 (April 1972), pp. 196–97. For a full-fledged analysis and critique of Soviet society from this point of view, see S. Stojanović, *Izmedu ideala i stvarnosti* (Between the Ideal and the Reality) (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969) translated as *Between Ideals and Reality: A Critique of Socialism and Its Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). See also the lengthy review in which his " myths " are exposed: N. I. Alekseev, I. I. Kravchenko, E. G. Plimak, " Mify ' etatizma ' i sotsializm bez mifov " (The myths of " statism " and socialism without myths), *Voprosy filosofii*, 1971, No. 5, pp. 45–63.

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found in analyses of social stratification elsewhere.[15] The evidence is clear that European communist societies are steeply stratified along all the dimensions normally discussed by sociologists in non-communist systems. A hierarchy is evident in the distribution of goods and services in society, the existence of considerable consensus upon positions of higher and lower prestige, the differentiation of distinctive life-styles, the patterning of social contacts, the structuring of satisfactions and aspirations, and so on. Particularly important is the continued existence of great inequalities in the cultural sphere in spite of measures to narrow the differentials between top and bottom in material conditions (e.g. wages and housing). The structure of inequality influences not only the direction which social mobility takes, but, of course, the opportunities which members of various socio-occupational groups have to attain desired positions. Here, too, it is evident that there are similarities between countries of the East and West. Examining this issue, we focus particularly on education which is both a prime channel of upward mobility and the most important means in communist societies by which status and advantages are perpetuated intergenerationally.

Sociologists' assumptions about stratification

Throughout the Stalinist period and the late fifties, there was an absence of sociological investigation into the nature of social inequality in the Soviet Union. According to the official view, propounded by Stalin in 1936 and uncritically repeated until recently, exploitation and other blatant forms of social inequality associated with capitalism had been abolished with the establishment of socialism in the thirties. Yet, the classless society remained in the future. Citizens continued to be paid according to the contribution which they make with their labour, and because of the continued existence of different forms of property (namely, state and collective), two corresponding " non-antagonistic " classes existed too—the working class (including both industrial and agricultural workers in state-owned enterprises) and the collective farm peasantry which laboured in the *kolkhozy*. In addition, there was a non-manual stratum, " the intelligentsia," which was distinguished from the working class by its type of labour. A similar conception of the social structure—with appropriate modifications—became the officially sponsored view in the communist countries of Eastern Europe as well.[16]

This view of society differed from traditional Marxist analyses which emphasized the existence of a class hierarchy based on ownership of the means of production, stressed the classes' contradictory interests, and

15 Various approaches to the study of social stratification are treated in S. M. Lipset, " Issues in Social Class Analysis," in his *Revolution and Counterrevolution* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 157–201.

16 See Zev Katz, *The Soviet Sociologists' Debate on Social Structure in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1971), and Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, pp. 32–51.

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posited the inevitability of class conflict. Society was seen as a well-functioning system in which all of these groups' interests were realized and in which the working class, as the "leading class," did not enjoy a position of privileged superiority, but simply constituted the more progressive social force. This conception likewise differed from Western models of social stratification in which groups, individuals or roles are ranked on one or more dimensions. Whether or not "class conflict" was thought to be the inevitable outcome, these schemes brought into relief the existence of social inequality.[17] But as the Polish sociologist Stanislaw Ossowski observed, the conception "combining classlessness with the maintenance of great differences in national income, which is contained in a certain version of the American Creed, is by no means alien to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies in relation to their own societies."[18]

Thus, in accordance with key ideological tenets, many sociologists in the Soviet Union have strongly attacked the notion—propagated, as they see it, by "bourgeois ideologists" and "revisionists"—that "socialist society" is stratified by social groups along a hierarchy of wealth, power, privilege, or some other valued attribute. As the prominent Soviet sociologist M. N. Rutkevich (now director of the Institute for Sociological Research in Moscow) stated forthrightly in the early sixties,

> The concept of "lower" and "higher" social strata is fundamentally inapplicable to Soviet socialist society. The USSR does not have "higher" and "lower" classes and strata, just as it has no special classes of "hooligans," "bribe-givers and takers," etc., which have been thought up recently by the Chinese leaders specifically to challenge the idea that the Soviet state belongs to the people as a whole . . . . We reject the theory of "social mobility" as anti-Marxist, as it is closely associated with the unscientific, arbitrary division of society into social "strata."[19]

More recently, he and F. R. Filippov reiterated this point:

> The [occupational] hierarchy, of which Lipset and Bendix write [on the first page of *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*], exists in capitalist society, although in fact it is different than in their

[17] Stratification schemes have usually been harshly criticized by Soviet sociologists and ideologists because they purportedly obscure the deepest and most significant cleavages in capitalist society—those between workers and owners—while also obfuscating Marx's "scientific" approach, neglecting the inevitability of class conflict, etc. See, for example, the discussion in G. V. Osipov, *Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia sotsiologiia (Kriticheskii ocherk)* (Contemporary bourgeois sociology: a critical outline) (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 220 ff. and V. S. Semenov, *Kapitalizm i klassy: issledovanie sotsial'noi struktury sovremennogo kapitalisticheskogo obshchesta* (Capitalism and classes: study of the social structure of contemporary capitalist society) (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), pp. 21–22, 48–51, 273–80, 282–89.

[18] Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, Sheila Patterson trans. (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 111.

[19] M. N. Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manual Workers in the Social Structure of Soviet Society," *Soviet Sociology*, 3 (Fall, 1964), p. 11.

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> scheme, since in it there does not appear any place for such a decisive factor as ownership of the means of production. The extension of this scheme to any " industrial society," *i.e.* modern society with a sufficiently high level of science, technology and production, is completely arbitrary. With the establishment of socialist social relations, the structure of evaluations of " prestige " changes fundamentally and the connection of these evaluations with capital disappears. This has been well demonstrated by the studies of Polish sociologists, in particular . . . .[20]

Though arguing against the application of stratification schemes to " socialist " societies, Rutkevich and Filippov grant that " one may speak of vertical gradation . . . to the extent that there is still inequality according to the degree of the complexity of labour," since " more complicated labour demands higher qualifications and education of the worker and therefore is rewarded by society more highly in accordance with the principles of socialism." [21] For this reason, one may speak of a worker's advancement from a job requiring less complicated labour to one requiring more as " interchange ' along the vertical,' i.e. as social promotion." [22] While carefully limiting the conception of vertical differentiation to " complexity of labour," Rutkevich and Filippov are still far from acknowledging that this is but one " dimension " of inequality, that types of inequality are systematically interrelated, and that the cumulative effect of these relationships is the stratification of social groups.

Yet, other communist sociologists assert that under socialism it is necessary to take into account a variety of variables determining the distribution of rewards among social occupational groups and that according to their position on these various " dimensions " social strata can be identified. Underlying this argument is the Marxist thesis that the decisive determinants of the class structure and the nature of social inequality under capitalism are relations to the means of production (notably, property ownership), the level of development of the productive forces, and the corresponding division of labour. With the establishment of socialism, not only is the exploitative " ruling class " done away with, not only does society cease to be divided into antagonistic classes, but

20 M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia* (Social interchanges) (Moscow: Mysl', 1970), pp. 17–18. Selections from this work are translated in Yanowitch and Fisher, eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

21 Ibid. pp. 41-42.

22 Ibid. p. 42. " But such a kind of interchange in our society," the authors add, " has a qualitatively different character from the transformation of a small property owner into a large one or from the entrance into the privileged classes and strata under capitalism. The attempts of some reactionary bourgeois sociologists to ' prove ' the existence of a social hierarchy in the old sense of the word in the USSR, their discussions about ' the Soviet elite,' and so on have nothing in common with Soviet reality. Such fabrications are of a slanderous nature and are widely used by imperialist propaganda in the ideological struggle against the socialist countries." (pp. 42–43).

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property itself ceases to be a decisive determinant of social status or class position.[23]

The Soviet sociologist O. I. Shkaratan argues that one of the distinctive features of the development of socialism is " the shift of previously secondary criteria to the foreground, as it were, and their transformation into the most characteristic marks of differentiation."

> When socialism eliminates private ownership, it eliminates its consequences, the antagonistic classes; but it does not yet do away with the division of labour into socially heterogeneous kinds . . . . With the elimination of the class hierarchy, the remaining socio-economic division of labour acquires direct and immediate (not intermediary) influence on the mechanism of interclass structure . . . . The basic social differences within the Soviet working class are therefore essentially differences in complexity of work . . . . The fact that members of one and the same class belong to groups of workers with different skills, holding unequal positions in the system of social production, is decisive today in determining the social importance of the individual.[24]

He goes on to describe how under socialism one finds salient division " between executive-type and executor-type labour, and in the case of the latter, between mental and primarily manual labour, and between skilled and unskilled labour." The " significance of differences associated with one's role in the social organization of labour is heightened under socialism," particularly among the higher occupations which tend to get quite differentiated in status, skill, and reward. And Shkaratan suggests, not unlike some leading American sociological methodologists, that the way to find the best set of categories for analyzing differentiation is " by determining the range of fluctuations of the principal socio-economic characteristics of groups with respect to mobility, income, wages, cultural

[23] The Polish sociologist Wlodzimierz Wesolowski stresses that " *the relationship to the means of production has been considered by Marx as the decisive criterion in the differentiation of classes because it determines a certain number of social attributes.*" Yet, under socialism in its pure form, this criterion diminishes in significance. " *The relationship to the means of production is the same for all citizens. And if there appear differences in income, nature of work, prestige, opportunities and political attitudes, these are not determined by this relationship.*" W. Wesolowski, " The Notion of Strata and Class in Socialist Society," in André Béteille (ed.), *Social Inequality* (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 126–27. See also by the same author, *Klasy, warstwy i wladza* (Classes, strata, and authority) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), and Jan Szczepanski, *Polish Society* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 138 ff.

[24] O. I. Shkaratan, " *Sotsial'naia struktura sovetskogo rabochego klassa* " (The social structure of the Soviet working class), *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1, 1967, as translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 19, No. 12 (12 April 1967), pp. 3–5. This thesis is developed more fully in his *Problemy sotsial'noi struktury rabochego klassa SSSR*, pp. 130 ff. Likewise the Hungarian sociologist Zsuzsa Ferge affirms that " theoretical reflections, as well as empirical data, indicate that to the extent that property relations lose their importance, other social relations gain in importance, and become factors of differentiation, notably those which are linked *to place occupied in the social division of labour.*" Zsuzsa Ferge, " La stratification sociale en Hongrie," in Andreas Hegedus (ed.), *Sociologues hongrois: Etudes, recherches* (Paris: editions anthropos, 1969), p. 166.

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level, family ties, etc., since the most adequate classification is the one that yields the lowest coefficient of variation." Such an analysis is important, for the actual "social position of a category of individuals is not fully determined by the position of each category in the formal structure of the enterprise: it is also defined by indices of the individual's position in the community, the social status of those associated with them, including, above all, members of their families, etc." [25]

Thus, we have come a full circle. Stratification analysis as such has been denounced as "bourgeois," "arbitrary," and "unscientific," but the thrust of the arguments which we have reviewed is that such analysis is even more applicable to socialist societies than to capitalist ones. As the Polish Marxist sociologist J. Wiatr states:

> Although the notion of strata. . . of prestige or income is not explicit in Marx, it may be used to analyze capitalism. However while capitalist countries are divided into classes, these strata will be subordinated to them in the analysis. The situation changes under a socialist regime. Even before the complete liquidation of exploiting classes, as is for instance the case now in Poland, the elimination of classes from the main activities and the annihilation of their social significance outline a structure which is less and less amenable to a division in classes and more and more amenable to stratification.[26]

Differences in income

From a Marxist point of view, any consideration of variations in life styles and behaviour linked to hierarchial differentiation should give salience to differences in economic rewards. Yet, given the scarcity of accurate, comprehensive, and comparable data, it continues to be difficult to arrive at reliable estimates of the extent of income inequality within the communist countries and all the more difficult to make valid comparisons among them and western nations.[27] This being the case, we shall limit ourselves to a few observations.

[25] See Shkaratan, "Sources of Social Differentiation of the Working Class in Soviet Society," in Yanowitch and Fisher, eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

[26] As cited in Michalina Vaughan, "Poland" in Margaret Scotford Archer and Salvador Giner (eds.), *Contemporary Europe: Class, Status and Power* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), pp. 336–37.

[27] For a recent attempt to assess the extent of inequality and a forthright presentation of the difficulties involved, see P. J. D. Wiles and Stefan Markowski, "Income Distribution under Communism and Capitalism. Some Facts about Poland, the UK, the USA and the USSR," Part I, *Soviet Studies*, 22 (January, 1971), pp. 344–69, and Part II, *Soviet Studies*, 22 (April, 1971), pp. 487–511. The authors conclude that Poland is more equal than the UK and that the latter is more equal than the USA. The most striking difference between capitalist and communist systems is seen to be in the distribution's extreme: that is, capitalism produces extremely rich people with a great deal of capital (p. 344). See also Frederic L. Pryor, "The Distribution of Nonagricultural Labor Incomes in Communist and Capitalist Nations," *Slavic Review*, 31 (September 1972), pp. 639–650. Pryor's analysis suggests that the distribution in salary income in the Soviet Union is less egalitarian than in other European communist states, and surprisingly comparable to that in the United States.

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As a result of a variety of measures taken in the post-war period, income inequalities in the Soviet Union are probably not as sharp as they were in the pre-war period, nor perhaps as pronounced as in the "capitalist" countries of Western Europe and the United States. Though wages constitute just one element in personal or family income, among the factors contributing to a lessening of income inequality have been measures designed to narrow wage and salary differentials. In the Soviet Union during the thirties, with Stalin's campaign against vulgar "equalization" and with the renewed reliance upon material incentives in the industrialization drive, disparities in wages became relatively large.[28] In 1932, engineering and technical personnel in industry earned, on the average, 263 per cent of the wages of ordinary manual workers, while routine white-collar employees earned 150 per cent of workers' average earnings. Yet, by 1955, the former were earning only 165 per cent of the average, while the latter were earning less (just 88 per cent).[29] The ratio of average wages of the top 10 per cent of workers and salaried personnel to the bottom 10 per cent was projected to drop from 5·8 : 1 in 1959 to 3·8 : 1 in 1965.[30]

The overall trend of decreasing wage differentials, however, has not been carried so far as to preclude considerable differences among occupations, and even a possible increase in the incomes at the very top. According to Soviet rates for the early sixties, for instance, it was possible for the director of a scientific research institute to earn 600 rubles and the director of a steel plant 400 rubles per month (excluding bonuses which might be as much as the equivalent of a full year's salary), while an ordinary typist would probably earn the minimum wage of 60 rubles.[31] More recently, it is reported that some prominent Soviet scientists earn upwards of 1,000 rubles per month.[32]

28 See Robert J. Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies: Welfare, Equality, and Community* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), pp. 165 ff., Zev Katz, *Patterns of Social Stratification in the USSR*, pp. 41–50, and Leonard J. Kirsch, *Soviet Wages* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1972).

29 The figures cited are from Murray Yanowitch, "The Soviet Income Revolution," *Slavic Review*, 22 (December, 1963), p. 688, and may include premia and bonuses. As Yanowitch notes, the narrowing results in part from policy choices and changes in the occupational groups. That is, the proportion of well-paid skilled workers increased appreciably over these years in the manual worker group, while the relative share of highly paid ETP probably declined. Because of major changes in the work force, it is likely that previous levels and differentials, used as incentives, were no longer deemed necessary.

30 Ibid. p. 692.

31 Ibid. p. 693. Recently it was decided that the minimum wage would be raised to 70 rubles in the seventies.

32 Hedrick Smith, "Siberia Science Center: In Theory, No Problems," *New York Times*, 6 April 1972, p. 2. Although the Chinese communist leaders have imputed "capitalist" features to the Soviet Union, while frequently stresssing the wealth and power of the "ruling revisionist clique," it should be noted that very substantial wage differentials are used in China, too. As Doak Barnett observes in a recent article, "The setting of a minimal floor under living standards has not meant, however, the disappearance of surprising and significant income differentials, despite the extraordinary stress that the regime has placed upon egalitarianism. Incomes at the top are as much as 15 to 20 times those at the bottom. A few figures in Chinese yuan will

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The most recent effort in the early 1970s to systematically analyse the available data, that of Mervyn Matthews, indicates the existence of "an upper elite composed of the few thousand most prominent families. . . ." He cites reports of salaries of up to 1,500 rubles a month for those in top administrative positions. Beyond this, "it is reliably reported that many people in this category can hope for very significant supplements to their income" through semi-confidential sources. These include "regular sums . . . offered to leading technical and administrative personnel for 'technical progress'. . . ." [33]

At the other end of the Soviet income scale are the large numbers who live in poverty. "Official public admission of poverty in the Soviet Union came in the mid-sixties," according to one report, with the introduction of "the euphemistic term, *maloobespechennost,* or 'underprovision. . . .'" At that time, Soviet researchers delineated the poverty line by calculating that a "normative minimal budget for a Soviet urban family" would be 51·4 rubles per person per month. Investigations which have indicated that poverty (in these terms) represents the condition of a sizeable part of the population include

> some recently published results of family budget surveys. One, covering some 10,000 workers of all kinds in Leningrad between 1962 and 1963, showed that over 40 per cent of their families had not reached a *per capita* income of 51 rubles per month. . . . Perhaps the most intriguing distribution, however, was published by a Soviet economist called S. P. Figurnov in 1962. Though his categories were vague, his figures seemed to suggest that among workers and white-collar families in the Soviet Union as a whole just over 30 per cent were, by Soviet standards, poor.
> Second, there are some data on the distribution of wages . . . . A handbook of Soviet labour statistics, published in 1967, showed that over 20 per cent of the people employed in the highly-paid building industry, and 60 per cent of those in the low-paid textile and food industries, were probably earning less than was needed to ensure the minimum *per capita* coverage.[34]

illustrate this. The lowest paid apprentices in economic enterprises receive Y 18 to Y 19 a month. Industrial workers fall into eight wage grades that range from slightly over Y 30 to a little more than Y 100 a month. 'Average' factory workers in Grades 4 and 5 . . . receive about Y 60 a month. State and Party cadres are today still classified, as they were before the Cultural Revolution, according to 24 regular grades (plus several below them). Those in the lowest regular grades—from 24 to 18—receive somewhere between roughly Y 40 and Y 90 a month . . .; the highest grades (a relatively small number of cadres from Grades 12 to 1) obtain salaries that reportedly rise to about Y 400 for Grade 6 and are higher above that. There are numerous grades of teachers and professors, with large differentials. . . . At Futan University in Shanghai, the salaries of 12 grades of university teaching personnel range from Y 60 for the lowest to Y 301 for the highest. . . ." A. Doak Barnett, "More thoughts out of China: There are warts there, too", *The New York Times Magazine*, 8 April 1973, pp. 103–4.

[33] Mervyn Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, p. 93.

[34] Mervyn Matthews, "Poverty in Russia," *New Society*, 19 (27 January 1972), pp. 174–75. For further elaboration on these data, see Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, pp. 84–90.

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The difficulty in securing accurate estimates of income variation in communist society is, however, compounded, as two leading Hungarian sociologists stress, by the fact that "differentiation according to hierarchical levels within socialist society does not appear merely in incomes. It has other forms too, which are frequently disguised and therefore most difficult to control. In the first place this concerns the goods and benefits which are generally considered socially desirable, but which are in short supply. Their distribution sometimes takes place in a preferential way and they become part of the privileges of certain strata of society, leading to considerable injustices."[35] A prime example is the distribution of housing, some of which is subsidized by the state and distributed administratively, rather than through the market, avowedly in order to equalize conditions among the social groups. But Ivan Szelenyi, a leading student of this question in Hungary, concludes on the basis of survey data that

> *those most likely to be found in class 1, that is, the class of housing that is subsidised by the state to the highest degree are those earning the highest incomes,* [*whereas*] *the least subsidised class 4, that is, those building their own one-family cottage, shows an over-representation of people earning less than the average income.* This is a paradox since the rent of new state flats was fixed at such a low level, in other words they were subsidized to the extent they were, so that those earning small incomes would also be able to afford to live there. . . *Rent subsidies thus turned into wage supplements increasing the differences between low and high incomes.*[36]

It has been estimated that the well-to-do Hungarian executives and professionals who succeeded in obtaining state-subsidized flats thereby receive indirect payments equivalent to the amount of five to ten years' wages of an average worker.[37]

[35] Andreas Hegedus and Maria Markus, "The Role of Values in the Long Range Planning of Distribution and Consumption," in Paul Halmos (ed.), *Hungarian Sociological Studies*, The Sociological Review Monograph 17, University of Keele, February 1972, p. 47.

[36] Ivan Szelenyi, "Housing System and Social Structure," in ibid. pp. 282–83. Szelenyi believes that such a result was inevitable in a stratified society like that of Hungary, given the dearth of housing space and the great popular demand. Under such circumstances, those of higher social status were able to argue effectively that "merit" as well as "need" should be used as a criterion in deciding who gets new housing. In view of the failure of the administrative system to distribute housing more equally, Szelenyi applauds the decision of the Party and government made in May, 1970, that rents should more fully express the value of the housing. Consequently, there has been a significant rise in the rents of good quality state-owned flats, although subsidies continue. As he says, "the most essential lesson is that rents should express the value of flats . . . [and] there is a recognition that an improvement in the housing situation of those with a low income demands arrangements of a social policy nature. . . . I am afraid that it might sound conservative enough to a Western reader, but we got to the conclusion that we need a market for the rich if we want to do something for the poor" (pp. 385–86).

[37] Hegedus and Markus, "The Role of Values in the Long Range Planning of Distribution and Consumption," p. 47.

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Much less is publicly known about such inverted "transfer payments" in the Soviet Union, but it is clear that they occur on a large scale there as well. This is the case with a variety of state-financed facilities such as use of automobiles by high executives, and special payments for vacations taken for "'a rest cure,' without a medical certificate or verification of treatment being needed. Some categories of personnel also have access to special shops and an excellent, closed trade network. . . ." [38]

It is particularly noteworthy, however, that, as in Hungary, amount and type of housing are correlated with the individual's social status. As Alfred John Di Maio observes, there has been a continuing conflict between two policies—on the one hand, distribution of housing to equalize conditions between social groups and, on the other, its use to realize the socialist principle "to each according to his abilities," i.e. as a reward. Statutes (since 1930 in the Russian Republic) made special provision for certain social groups to receive additional housing space. These include the elite of most party, state and economic organizations, members of the Academy of Sciences, artists, sculptors, writers and other members of "creative unions," inventors, military commanders, and certain groups of doctors and lawyers. Although of modest dimensions, the additional space is rented at the usual low rates and therefore results in increased income. Furthermore, the housing made available to the elite professional intelligentsia is often of superior quality. For instance, according to a study conducted in Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk, Academicians and Corresponding Members of the highly prestigious Academy of Sciences typically are allocated a cottage; professors and senior scientific workers are assigned an apartment with 97 sq. ft. per family member, plus an extra allotment of 216 sq. ft.; engineers, doctors, and junior scientific workers get an apartment with 97 sq. ft. per family member, the USSR legal norm; and finally, rank-and-file workers in construction and service obtain an apartment with at least 77 sq. ft. per family member, which is below the USSR norm.[39]

Special privileges also occur within the pension system. There clearly seems to be a "pension elite" in the Soviet Union. The statute on the subject provides that special high retirement awards may be made to "persons who have rendered exceptional service . . . in the areas of revolutionary, governmental, social, and economic activity . . . [and in] the fields of culture, science and technology." Thus retired military officers, university and academic personnel, and executives are among

[38] Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, p. 95.

[39] Alfred John Di Maio, Jr., *Soviet Urban Housing Problems and Policies*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, April, 1971, pp. 213–216, 219–226, and B. Michael Frolic, "Soviet Urban Sociology," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 12 (December, 1971), p. 238. These figures presumably refer to "living space," not total floor space.

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the categories which appear to receive pension awards far above the regular maxima.[40]

SUCH inequality in wealth and income may engender resentment and give rise to class conflict. As the Polish sociologist W. Wesolowski has observed, it is quite difficult to apply the principle " to each according to his work " which constitutes, in theory, both the determinant of wage rates in a socialist society and the principle legitimizing the consequent inequality. In the absence of " scientific " criteria for determining the amount of a worker's contribution or a firm consensus on actual rates, disagreement between social groups may emerge. The lack of such a consensus over the extent of wage and income differentials was revealed in a survey of the Polish urban male workforce which showed beliefs about such differentials to be closely related to one's social status and income.[41]

" Consequently," Wesolowski notes, " the contradictions of interests in socialist countries can result in something resembling antagonistic contradiction, since overpayment and underpayment may be viewed as a particular form of the ' exploitation ' of some people by others (in spite of the social ownership of the means of production)." [42] Such conflicts of interest may at times manifest themselves as significant political tendencies, particularly in the debate surrounding economic reforms in the centrally-planned " command " economies. Proponents of reform have argued for greater decentralization in decision-making relating to production and marketing and for greater reliance upon the market-mechanism for distribution. Not infrequently the advocates of reform have called, too, for an increase in wage differentials in order to spur workers' effort, ensure an adequate supply of talent for positions requiring scarce skills, etc. Some commentators have interpreted the struggle over reforms as a conflict entailing the material " class " interests of the highly skilled intelligentsia in opposition to the manual workers who have profited from the previously introduced equalizing measures.[43]

40 Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies*, pp. 81–84.

41 In the survey of male heads of households in three Polish cities, it was found that " Among the better-off professionals 44·9 per cent stated that income differences should be great, and the percentage of this answer declines as we pass from group to group, reaching a mere 16·9 per cent in the group of semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

" The opinions on income differentiation are most strongly correlated with levels of earnings. Among those earning below 2,000 zlotys per month only 22·8 per cent expressed the view that there should be a great income differentiation. Among those earning more than 4,000 zlotys this percentage rose to 61·1." W. Wesolowski and K. Slomczynski, " Social Stratification in Polish Cities," in J. Jackson (ed.), *Social Stratification* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 206, 208.

42 Wesolowski, " The Notions of Strata and Class in Socialist Society," p. 135.

43 For instance, in a recent study Frank Parkin argues: " it is not too simplistic to suggest that much of the impetus for economic reform did in fact come from certain groups in the white-collar intelligentsia who felt relatively disprivileged in an egalitarian system. This seems particularly to have been the case in Czechoslovakia immediately prior to the Soviet invasion in 1968. The advocates of reform in Czechoslovakia frequently and explicitly criticized the egalitarian incomes structure and

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Yet, in contrast to capitalist societies, class conflict in communist societies may more readily be directed against the state, which constitutes the official regulator of the way in which the national income is distributed (especially, as Wesolowski observes, when the state or party bureaucrats themselves appear to be among the "overpaid").[44] A striking example of such conflict is the mass strike by Polish workers in the winter of 1970–71, which followed from the government's decision to raise state-administered prices on commodities and which resulted in the fall of the Gomulka regime.

Occupational stratification in the Soviet Union

Although Soviet investigations into stratification have generally lagged behind those in Eastern Europe, not to speak of the much older body of work in the West, they have gradually become quite sophisticated in methodology and broader in scope. As we hope to make clear, much significant research and analysis have been done.[45] One of the more important of the recent studies is Iuri V. Arutiunian's *Social Structure of the Rural Population of the USSR*, published in 1971. Much of the rich empirical data contained in the book is derived from large-scale surveys carried out in the late sixties in a number of regions of the RSFSR—Kalinin and Moskovskii oblasts, Krasnodar Krai, and the Tatar Autonomous Republic.[46] While remaining in important respects faithful to key tenets of Marxism-Leninism, Arutiunian creatively adapts it to make it applicable to contemporary Soviet conditions. In so doing he emphasizes

argued in favour of higher rewards for qualified personnel and for those in positions of authority. . . . The struggle between members of the apparat and the white collar intelligentsia was to some extent symbolized in the internal party conflict between Novotny and Dubček. It is significant that in his unsuccessful attempt to retain the party leadership, Novotny and his followers turned to the industrial workers for support against the intelligentsia. . .

". . . it would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that those groups which were most enthusiastic in their support for the reforms were the white-collar specialists who seemed most likely to gain from the erosion of egalitarianism." Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, pp. 175–77.

That increases in the wage differentials have, in fact, accompanied the gradual implementation of the reforms appears to be substantiated by data from Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. See Tables 6.1 and 6.3 in ibid., pp. 173, 178.

44 Wesolowski, "The Notions of Strata and Class in Socialist Society," pp. 138–40.

45 For an overview of the early work, see the two volumes which resulted from the conference on problems in the study of change in the social structure of Soviet society held in Minsk in 1966: Ts. A. Stepanian and V. S. Semenov (eds.), *Klassy, sotsial'nye sloi i gruppy v SSSR* (Classes, social layers and groups in the USSR) (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), and Ts. A. Stepanian and V. S. Semenov (eds.), *Problemy izmeneniia sotsial'noi struktury sovetskogo obschchestva* (Problems of change in the social structure of Soviet society) (Moscow: Nauka, 1968). For a selection of more recent work, see Yanowitch and Fisher, eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR* (forthcoming).

46 See Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR* (The social structure of the rural population of the USSR) (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), pp. 340 ff.

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the importance of socio-occupational groups arranged in a stratification order.[47]

The special character of Arutiunian's research is reflected in the fact that it is the only set of studies which has attempted to evaluate even partially the ways in which workers exercise control over management in the USSR.[48] Rural respondents were asked whether they exercised influence on the decisions which were made in their work collectives. The purpose was to ascertain " the degree of a person's realization (though it be subjective) of his role as a co-owner of this or that form of socialized property. Essentially, this is the subjective perception of the degree of the actual socialization of property." [49] The results (presented in Table I) show that contrary to socialist norms, a very high proportion of the respondents felt that they do lack influence—the overall figures ranging from 51 to 57 per cent in the three regions. It is strikingly evident that the sense of lack of influence is directly related to social status. As Arutiunian observes, " The higher people's skill grade, the more they involve themselves in modern complex production, the higher is their responsibility for the fate of the collective, and the more active is their social role." [50]

It is impossible to know the extent to which these results are typical of the Soviet population. Some further and more general evidence of the way in which access to power (decision-making) is sharply stratified in the Soviet Union has been systematized by Matthews who points out that the proportion of the population who are Party members jumps considerably with indicators of higher occupational status or education. Thus, as of 1967, over fifty per cent of all candidates for, and holders of, academic doctorates were Party members, as were 33 per cent of all engineers and 25 per cent of managers and specialists. At the other extreme, only 9 per cent of the workers and 5 per cent of the peasantry

[47] Arutiunian argues that " role in the social production of labour " (an attribute singled out by Lenin for the delineation of classes) is " a sliding one, as it were, changing according to the accepted scale of classification . . . with a more concrete approach, with a narrowing of the interval of classification it becomes indispensable to refine and further differentiate social roles . . . In such a case, the socio-occupational group becomes the structural element."

" Social-occupational groups can be examined from different angles. On the one hand, they appear as intraclass groups, i.e. define the inner structure of the class. But on the other hand, since the distinctions between classes are being erased, while contiguous groups are acquiring all the more resemblance according to the character of work, they can appear as and be regarded as intrasocietal groups—strata [*sloi*]. In this view of the structure, society appears as a multilayered system, in which the intelligentsia is one of the social strata. In addition, [non-manual] employees, skilled workers of physical labour, [and] semi-skilled and unskilled workers of physical labour appear as independent substrata (or strata). Naturally, in the case of more detailed analysis these categories in turn are broken down into inner strata, especially as far as the intelligentsia is concerned." Ibid., pp. 98–99. These groups, defined according to productive functions and content and character of work, are arranged hierarchically according to indices of education, pay, and influence on decisions made in the work collective. See Ibid., pp. 12, 95–96, 353–55.

[48] In contrast, numerous studies have been carried out to investigate workers' self-management in Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, in Poland.

[49] Ibid., p. 106.

[50] Ibid., pp. 106–107.

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TABLE I

Proportion of People who Believe that they Do Not Exercise Influence on the affairs of their Production Collective

Social-occupational Group	Number of Respondents		Percentage who Believe they do not Exercise Influence			
	Actual *	Weighted	In Collective farms	In state farms	In administrative offices and agricultural enterprises	TOTAL
Krasnodar' Krai						
A_1	130	213	10	9	N.A.	9
A_2	148	243	28	18	24	21
B	135	146	48	33	50	44
C	414	637	45	61	32	50
D_1	117	767	48	66	67	55
D_{2-3}	536	3,593	59	74	67	65
Average	1,480	5,599	53	66	43	57
Kalinin Oblast'						
A_1	111	297	N.A.	8	N.A.	9
A_2	162	283	12	13	13	13
B	150	321	19	39	35	31
C	191	642	53	51	36	44
D_1	83	492	67	61	32	57
D_{2-3}	478	3,606	65	55	N.A.	58
Average	1,117	5,641	63	54	29	51
Tatar ASSR						
A_1	225	478	13	N.A.	20	12
A_2	164	258	17	36	N.A.	20
B	220	286	33	48	37	38
C	444	785	54	45	45	50
D_1	117	313	64	51	58	58
D_{2-3}	943	3,046	69	72	68	69
Average	2,113	5,166	63	55	50	56

KEY: A_1 Upper-echelon directors and specialists.
A_2 Middle-echelon directors and specialists.
B White-collar employees.
C Machine operators
D_1 Skilled manual workers.
D_{2-3} Unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers.

SOURCE: Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, p. 108, Table 20.

* Figures shown in this column have been adjusted to bring the number of respondents surveyed into correspondence with the socio-occupational groups' actual proportion of the rural population.

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belonged to the party. Looked at in terms of education, 35 per cent of those with higher education were members as contrasted to but 5 per cent of those with less than middle-school education, who comprised close to four-fifths of the population.[51]

Evidently the day is still remote when, as Lenin said, every cook will take a hand in management. Whether or not the foregoing data accurately reflect the relative concentration or dispersal of decision-making power (as we suspect it does), Arutiunian's findings point up the extent to which social status influences an individual's sense that he is able to determine his life conditions. Numerous studies conducted in the West have shown that those who rank lower on the socio-economic hierarchy have a greater sense of their own ineffectualness and impotence in determining political events. Such a sense of powerlessness is also reflected in their behaviour—for instance, those of lower socio-occupational status are usually less likely to participate in elections. It has long been argued that such is not the case in communist states where workers are co-owners of the means of production, consequently do not experience alienation, and are given ample scope to participate in management. However, research such as that by Arutiunian suggests that the situation is not dissimilar.

More typical of Soviet empirical work in this field is Arutiunian's use of his stratification scheme to analyze a wide variety of phenomena linked to higher or lower position. As he notes, behaviour is in part a function of level of occupation, type of job activity, and class affiliation. In this regard, in all regions in which research was conducted a generally standard picture was observed.

> The general regularity appears to be a growth of satisfaction with work connected with an increase in social status and skill level. As far as satisfaction with the cultural and life conditions of the countryside is concerned, it, on the contrary, is more inclined to decrease to the degree that skill level and education increase and the cultural demands of the population correspondingly grow.
> The higher the socio-occupational status of a group, the more active is its social behaviour and the greater is its inclination for mobility, both within the rural areas [through an increase in skill and occupational advancement] and outside of it [through migration to town].[52]

51 Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, pp. 217–24.

52 Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, pp. 265, 267. Arutiunian points out that there are some irregularities, however. " The most striking among them relates to the behaviour of the groups of directors whether of the middle or upper echelon. Unlike the specialists, they are less satisfied by their labour (the work regime elicits particular dissatisfaction), but nonetheless they do not display such a manifest inclination to migrate, as do the remaining groups of the intelligentsia. They express an intention to leave for the city less frequently than all the other rural social-occupational groups. Evidently, this is connected with [their] education which is not high for their status (in comparison with the specialist). Being ' the first people in the countryside,' they can recognize that here, in the country, they realize most fully their social potential [determined by] their education, and that given their preparation they would not occupy a corresponding position in town " (p. 267).

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The data presented in Table II makes evident the positive correlation between socio-occupational status and such " objective " indices as educational level and pay, indices which are in turn closely related to such " subjective " variables as degree of satisfaction with one's work, pay, and the management of the collective, as well as indicators of potential mobility. (Satisfaction with cultural and life conditions tends to be inversely related to social status, as Arutiunian observed, although the relationship is not clear in this table.) [53]

A variety of other Soviet studies indicate a hierarchical rank order for degree of job satisfaction associated with given types of work closely linked to a subjective sense of the possibilities for creative and interesting (non-routine) work, and the objective factor of income.[54] As in Western countries, the results of Soviet research indicate that " Men in occupations calling for higher skills wanted their work to be interesting. Those in lower-skill jobs tended to put much more stress on pay." The American Sovietologist George Fischer notes these findings bear out the contention of Alex Inkeles " that in all modern societies a relation seems to exist between the nature of an occupation and what part of it led to the most satisfaction." [55] Income *per se* is, of course, not the main source of satisfaction. A survey in Novosibirsk in the mid-sixties indicated a sharp relationship between sense of fatigue, " getting very tired " on the job, with pay and associated level of skill. Of those earning up to 30 rubles a month in the machine building enterprises, 57 per cent reported high fatigue, as contrasted with 25 per cent among workers earning between 90 and 127 rubles.[56]

Communist ideology and many Soviet writers suggest that their system is eliminating such differences by various measures designed to combine manual and mental work. More empirically minded analysts have challenged these optimistic beliefs.

> Nonetheless, the replacement of physical by mental work is not going at nearly the headlong pace that one might like and that literary men sometimes picture. . . . Unfortunately, this is the same old substitution of the wish, or of the desirable, for the reality. It is a fact that trends in the opposite direction are under way at the same time. For example, today we find, in machine-building enterprises, very many fewer of the all-round machinists or mechanics, the real creators of metal products, than we used to.

[53] See ibid., pp. 171–72.

[54] See V. N. Shubkin, " Social Mobility and Choice of Occupation," in G. V. Osipov (ed.), *Industry and Labour in the USSR* (London: Tavistock, 1966), pp. 90–93; A. G. Zdravomyslov and V. A. Yadov, " Effect of Vocational Distinctions on the Attitude to Work," in ibid., pp. 99–129; see p. 114 for data on the interrelationship of creativity and pay in determining satisfaction.

[55] George Fischer, " Current Soviet Work in Sociology: A Note in the Sociology of Knowledge," *The American Sociologist*, 1 (May 1966), pp. 127–32. A detailed translated report of Soviet research in this field is A. G. Zdravomyslov, V. P. Rozhin, and V. A. Yadov, *Man and His Work* (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1970). See pages 159–60 for the findings cited by Fischer.

[56] Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, p. 117.

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TABLE II

Differentiated conditions and attitudes of Collective Farm and State Farm Workers

	KRASNODAR *Krai*								KALININ *Oblast'*							
	Collective farm peasants				State farm workers				Collective farm peasants				State farm workers			
	All	Unskilled manual workers	Machine operators	Specialists and middle echelon directors	All	Unskilled manual workers	Machine operators	Specialists and middle echelon directors	All	Unskilled manual workers	Machine operators	Specialists and middle echelon directors	All	Unskilled manual workers	Machine operators	Specialists and middle echelon directors
Actual number surveyed	599	143	237	54	594	130	158	39	302	183	34	24	411	157	19	45
Education (in grades)	5·8	4·9	6·6	8·9	5·5	5·0	6·0	9·1	3·4	3·1	6·4	6·0	4·5	4·0	7·0	8·0
Work pay (in rubles)	70	55	85	100	67	52	78	96	45	34	70	82	58	41	77	89
Satisfaction *:																
with work	43	35	60	65	32	25	44	55	29	32	47	73	22	18	43	49
with pay	4	−18	3	41	−4	−22	−6	1	−7	−24	11	38	−12	−34	3	47
with management	66	61	62	87	57	50	59	76	59	50	63	89	47	46	48	56
with cultural and life conditions	18	35	20	26	14	14	20	2	24	33	32	35	2	8	4	−26
Indicators of mobility *:																
Seek to increase their occupational preparation	16	6	33	100	8	4	19	31	8	4	41	42	11	3	35	38
Want to move to town	14	13	13	9	17	13	16	23	22	25	15	15	26	15	39	31

SOURCE: Adapted from Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia*, Table 87, p. 281.

* Figures for "satisfaction" and "potential mobility" are the percentage difference between those giving affirmative and negative responses.

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> More and more frequently one sees in their stead operators of semi-automatic machinery who perform just a few operations, repeated over and over all day long. The introduction of conveyors, with the extreme division of labour characteristics of them, continues. . . .
>
> It follows that neither the sociologist nor the writer dealing with a theme based on the working class . . . [can] ignore all the actually existing groups of which the working class consists—including, particularly, the large category engaged in physical labour, which is especially monotonous particularly in jobs at machine tools. It is these types of work that are most oppressive for young people, particularly those who have a secondary education. Here lies the root of one of the factors making for labour turnover—even for population migration.[57]

Soviet scholars continue to contradict those in their country who suggest that economic growth and mechanization provide the solution to the high level of job dissatisfaction reported in many studies among unskilled workers. V. Churbanov reports, as of June 1972, that "50 per cent of our industrial workers perform unmechanical labour at present, and the proportion has declined only two or three per cent during each of the last two five-year plans. In fact, in absolute terms the number of such workers is increasing. . . . [O]ne worker in three in our country works on an assembly line. Indeed, most of the labourers whose work is to be mechanized by 1975 (50 per cent of all manual labourers) will then be performing even more limited tasks with even less intellectual content."

Churbanov goes on to suggest that the problem of job dissatisfaction in the Soviet Union will worsen because educational attainment is increasing much more rapidly than is the growth in the proportion of more interesting non-routine jobs. As he puts it, the problem "would in fact be better formulated as 'educated youth and uninteresting work,'" a phenomenon not unknown in the US.

> The higher a young person's educational level, the greater his need for interesting work. Yet most industrial work presently requires no more than a sixth to eighth grade education, and the scientific and technical revolution is not expected to keep pace with the spread of education in the next few years. The transition to universal secondary education, otherwise so desirable, will only exacerbate this problem.[58]

Differences in cultural consumption and life styles

Social inequality linked to the occupational division of labour is not limited to income and material conditions—on the contrary, as studies

[57] V. Kantorovich, "Sociology and Literature," *Soviet Sociology*, 7 (Summer, 1968), p. 29.

[58] V. Churbanov, "The Young Worker and Uninteresting Labour," *Molodoi kommunist*, No. 6, June 1972, pp. 64–71, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (7 February 1973), pp. 13–14.

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by both Western and East European scholars have shown, it appears more pronounced in the sphere of culture. Drawing on extensive research conducted in Hungary, Zsuzsa Ferge concludes, " Our data indicate that the revolutionary changes and the equalization realized in the realm of the system of production have influenced, in the first place, the material circumstances. As one moves away from the material conditions and approaches the superstructures, the signs of social differentiation become more and more perceptible." [59] Sophisticated Soviet surveys suggest comparable patterns there as well. Thus, in reporting on research among Leningrad workers, O. I. Shkaratan indicates that those in various hierarchically ordered strata tend to choose their friends from the same or proximate social-occupational groups. Sixty to seventy per cent of the friends of those in the highest three strata—organizers of production and personnel doing skilled or highly skilled mental work—are themselves specialized non-manuals, whereas the great majority of those in the lower ranking, less skilled categories are of comparable status. The extreme cases are represented by the personnel in highly specialized scientific and technical jobs and the unskilled manual workers. Half of the closest friends of the former group are concentrated among engineers or others with higher education, while less than one-tenth are among rank-and-file blue-collar workers. In contrast, the unskilled workers have more than three-quarters of their closest friends in the working class.[60] Marriage partners also tend to be of roughly the same general occupational status, although the extremes are not as great as in the case of friends' occupational status. Half of the spouses of those in the highly expert specialist category are also specialists with higher education, while one-half to two-thirds of those in the four lower ranking groups are blue-collar workers.[61]

[59] Z. Ferge, " La stratification sociale en Hongrie," in A. Hegedus, ed., *Socioloques hongrois: études, recherches* (Paris: éditions Antropos, 1969), p. 171. Likewise, on the basis of the studies made in Czechoslovakia, Pavel Machonin notes that " the income equalization, especially in income per capita, was far from leading to corresponding standardization of consumption or of cultural activities during leisure. In brief, the egalitarian arrangement was not such a significant aspect of the social structure of Czechoslovakia as we had assumed initially; and this was perhaps one of the most interesting findings of our study." Machonin, " The Social Structure in Contemporary Czechoslovakia," pp. 739–40. The Polish sociologists W. Wesolowski and K. Slomczynski also underscore this point: " On the whole, the differentiation in the absorption of cultural values appears to be more resistant to change than in the absorption of other values. Special significance should be attributed to what might be called a distinct reading threshold between the manual and non-manual groups." Wesolowski and Slomczynski, " Social Stratification in Polish Cities," pp. 210–11.

[60] Shkaratan, *Problemy sotsial'noi struktury sovetskogo rabochego klassa*, p. 428, Table 59. Shkaratan ranks the groups in the reverse order from that in the text above.

[61] Ibid. p. 445, Table 64. A different survey conducted in Leningrad at large showed that there is a high interrelationship between the level of education of the adult members of a family (the coefficient of correlation equals 0·8) and that the differences in educational level have been diminishing from generation to generation so that the families are becoming more homogeneous according to the spouses' level of education. A. N. Baranov, " *Gorodskaia sem ' ia i lichnost ' "* (The urban family and the personality), in *Sotsial'nye issledovaniia*, 7th ed. published serially by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), p. 80.

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The fact that Soviet citizens tend to choose their friends from among those of comparable status is borne out by other surveys, including the survey of different socio-occupational groups in Taganroga reported by L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov and the study of the social structure of Akademgorodok by M. V. Timiashevskaia. This tendency was enhanced [62] by the close correlation between high social status and large allocations of housing space, for the higher an individual's social position, the more precious housing space he or she receives. "This is one of the problems of people with higher incomes in new urban communities," said one Soviet sociologist in an interview reported by B. Michael Frolic. "Research shows that privilege tends to beget privilege. Give a group a certain status, commensurate with its achievements in socialist society, and the dynamic of urbanism tends to reinforce this special status. They turn away from other groups, abstracting themselves from the community." [63] Timiashevskaia's research also brings out that the higher the education, occupational and general social standing of a person, the more frequent his interpersonal contacts with friends from work and with those of common recreational interests, while the fewer with his neighbours and family. Members of group I spend more than two-thirds (72 per cent) of their free time with friends from work and from leisure-time pursuits and less than one-third (28 per cent) with relatives, neighbours and childhood friends, whereas members of group IV behave in the opposite fashion (32 per cent and 67 per cent).[64]

[62] Analyzing data from a survey in the town of Taganrog, Gordon and Klopov found that about three-quarters of the men and women "specialists" surveyed (79 and 74 per cent, respectively) regarded a fellow "specialist" as his or her "best friend" (same sex). A comparable number of male workers (73 per cent) named a fellow (male) worker as their "best friend," but curiously, female workers were found to deviate from this pattern inasmuch as their "best friends" (female) were distributed much more evenly among the socio-occupational groups (28 per cent workers, 36 per cent non-manual employees without specialized education, 24 per cent specialists, 12 per cent "others"). Occupational-related interests appear to be less important for friendships among working women than men, a fact reflected in data showing that women devote much more time to family affairs in conversations with friends than men do. Gordon and Klopov, *Chelovek posle raboty*, pp. 152–154, and in the Appendix, Table 27. The Akademgorodok study is reported in Frolic, "Soviet Urban Sociology," pp. 238–39.

[63] Ibid. p. 242. Katz, *Patterns of Social Stratification in the USSR*, p. 61. These groups are defined by type of work and skill level as in Table III.

[64] Since the Akademgorodok is an unusual city, being populated predominately by personnel engaging in scientific research, the figures given in Table III should not be taken as representative of the urban population at large. More representative are the data derived from a larger scale survey of members of the urban workforce conducted by L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov. These show a generally lower distribution of consumer durables, as well as considerable differentials according to social status. For instance, among men with 5 to 7 years of education, the number of individuals owning washing machines, vacuum cleaners, and refrigerators, respectively, come to 10, 10, and 16 per cent, whereas the comparable figures among men with a specialized education are 60, 34, and 68 per cent. The importance of education as a determinant of life-style is noted by the authors, who comment that "in the workers' milieu being more highly educated is by no means always linked with substantial differences in family wellbeing." They further stress that possession of such labour-saving devices has a strong effect on how women spend their time—especially, by reducing the very heavy burden of house-

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AS in the study of workers made by Shkaratan, the analysis of the social groups in Academgorodok revealed considerable differences in material conditions and in life styles among the groups. As Table III indicates, certain items are positively associated with social status—especially, the possession of a refrigerator, a library of 100 or more books, a vacuum cleaner, piano, or accordion, and a car or motor boat. With some other items, the relationship is not so simple. More individuals in group IV own sewing machines and television sets than do those in the high-status group I. The latter "reversals" reflect differences in life style not uncommon in the West as well. Those in the more educated groups spend more time reading; they are probably also more likely to have sewing taken to a seamstress.

TABLE III

Distribution of Cultural and Personal Goods Among the Population, According to Socio-Occupational Group

AKADEMGORODOK
(in percentage)

Commodity	*Group I*	*Group II*	*Group III*	*Group IV*
1. Radio receiver	100	96	91	87
2. Sewing machine	75	80	90	80
3. Washing machine	90	75	88	75
4. Refrigerator	85	78	65	52
5. Television set	68	60	65	80
6. Library (over 100 books)	90	80	38	25
7. Bicycle, motorcycle, or motor scooter	50	42	70	40
8. Vacuum cleaner	68	34	30	10
9. Piano, accordian	45	30	20	8
10. Car or motor boat	22	10	8	8

Group I: Top managers and specialists.
Group II: Middle-level managers and specialists.
Group III: Lower specialists, white-collar employees, and workers.
Group IV: Low-skill white-collar employees and workers.

SOURCE: M. V. Timiashevskaia, "O nekotorykh sotsial'nykh posledstviiakh gradostroitel'nogo eksperimenta" (Regarding some special consequences of an urban planning experiment) in O. N. Ianitskii, et al., eds., *Urbanizatsiia i rabochii klass v usloviiakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoi revoliutsii* (Urbanization and the working class in the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution) (Moscow: Institute of the World Trade Movement, 1970), pp. 286–87, as presented by Zev Katz, *Patterns of Social Stratification in the U.S.S.R.*, pp. 5, 48.

In a review of the data collected on the rural population in several regions, Arutiunian also points to the "serious differences" between various socio-occupational groups' use of the means of cultural diffusion and communication:

> The most "democratic" is the radio, which is directed identically to the intelligentsia, employees, machine operators, and unskilled workers. The newspaper is somewhat more "discriminating"—

work for women in less educated and lower income families. L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, *Chelovek posle raboty: sotsial'nye problemy byta i vnerabochego vremeni* (Man after work: social problems of everyday life and nonworking time) (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), p. 111.

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> it is to a great extent the property of rural intelligentsia. This is all the more true if one is referring to the female half of the population. The overwhelming majority of the rural intelligentsia as a whole regularly reads newspapers, [whereas] among unskilled workers less than half do. Books are especially " selective." While about half of those in the intelligentsia are in the habit of reading [literary works], among unskilled workers approximately 1/10th to 1/15th regularly read books.[65]

In the view of some Soviet scholars, cultural differences such as these which we have reviewed are becoming all the more important as sources of social differentiation and stratification. Thus, L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov observe that " in the workers' milieu strata are being distinguished ever more distinctly which differ not ' by their relation . . . to the means of production,' etc., but by their level of culture in the broad sociologocial sense of this term as a designation of the totality of life conditions, norms, traditions, and knowledge directly determining man's behaviour. . . . In other words, ' conditions of [the] life situation ' are not as closely connected with social production factors as they once were; in the contemporary stage they take on a relative autonomy. . . ." [66] At the same time, the formal education which an individual obtains becomes all the more important as a determinant of his values, life style, and behaviour.

Occupational prestige

In spite of the propagation of egalitarian values and the official stress on the honourable nature of " work " itself, there continue to be pronounced differences in prestige between individual occupations and occupational groups in the Soviet Union and other communist societies. It was observed in the research on the urban male workforce in Poland conducted by W. Wesolowski and K. Slomczynski that a majority of the respondents in all of the socio-occupational groups claimed to ascribe equal prestige to all occupations, but believed that others did not. Yet, when asked to rate twenty occupations in terms of their relative prestige, the overwhelming majority of such self-proclaimed egalitarians actually

65 Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, p. 177.

66 L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, " Some Problems of the Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class," in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility (in press)*. The authors regard this development as a feature of an historically evolving socialist society: " Cultural divisions were, of course, always one of the elements of the structure of the working class. However, in a society with a developed class structure, cultural divisions as a whole occupy a subordinate position, since they depend directly and immediately on class membership, i.e. actually on a man's position in the system of production. . . . In developed socialist society the situation changes noticeably. The tendency toward the erosion of class boundaries, the general dynamism and mobility of social life are such that social production factors begin gradually to lose their exclusive culture-forming properties. Membership in one or another production layer no longer determines all conditions of life (or, as Lenin said, the entire life situation) with such strength as was the case only a few decades ago. . . ."

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assigned prestige differentially. The researchers infer that although many Poles avow their commitment to egalitarian principles, they do not necessarily manifest them in practice.[67] Earlier studies by Polish sociologists had also shown the existence of a prestige hierarchy in which there was a high degree of consensus on the rankings and a strong association between an occupation's status and the degree of education and skill required for it.[68]

Similar findings have been reported more recently by Soviet sociologists. Thus, in the course of the survey of the rural population conducted by Arutiunian, respondents were asked, "If you were starting life at the beginning, what would you want to become?" Dividing the proportion of people preferring to be in one of the occupational groups by the proportion actually employed in the group, Arutiunian calculated a coefficient which was thought to indicate both the degree to which the people's aspirations had been realized and the relative prestige of the occupational groups. He writes:

> The research corroborated the high prestige of occupations of mental labour and the rather low prestige of unskilled physical labour, which, as is well known, so far predominates in the countryside. . . . It was revealed, for instance, that the number of those employed in *intellectual* occupations was no less than 10 times smaller than the number of "aspirants" (i.e. those preferring that type of labour). In the group of unskilled workers, conversely the proportion actually employed exceeded by 5 times the number of "aspirants." The [occupational] demands and their realization corresponded with one another in the groups of skilled physical labour, both manual and mechanized. The results of the research in various regions present a rather strict correspondence or, more aptly stated, a scale of prestige of the rural occupations.[69]

These findings are represented graphically in the model of "factual" and "ideal" social structure constructed from data from the survey (see Figure 1).

When parents were polled on their aspirations for their children, there was considerably more discrepancy between the "ideal" and "factual" social structure. Whereas according to the retrospective model (Figure 1) the number of people employed principally in unskilled and semi-skilled occupations should have been 2·5 times less than the actual, and the intelligentsia should have been 7 times larger, in the projected "ideal" model representing parents' aspirations for their children, unskilled workers performing physical labour should be 6 times less than the factual.[70]

[67] Wesolowski and Slomczynski, "Social Stratification in Polish Cities," pp. 205–6.
[68] See Adam Sarapata and Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "The Evaluation of Occupations by Warsaw Inhabitants," *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (May, 1961), pp. 581–91, and Adam Sarapata, "Stratification and Social Mobility in Poland," in Jan Szczepanski (ed.), *Empirical Sociology in Poland* (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publications, 1966), pp. 37–52.
[69] Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, p. 236.
[70] Ibid. p. 239.

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FIGURE 1

Actual and Ideal Model of the Social Structure of the Rural Population

KRASNODAR *Krai* KALININ *Oblast'*



A_1 high-echelon intelligentsia (i.e., top specialists and directors)
A_2 middle-echelon intelligentsia
B white collar workers (or employees, i.e. *sluzhashchie*)
C equipment operators (*mekhanizatory*)
D_1 skilled manual workers
D_2 semi-skilled manual workers
D_3 unskilled manual workers

_____Actual social structure
\- - - - - - - -Ideal social structure

SOURCE: Iu. V. Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, p. 238.

A SIMILAR picture was obtained by V. N. Shubkin in a comparison of the life plans of secondary school students and their realization.[71] Shubkin had done extensive research on occupational "attractiveness" at the Novosibirsk State University during the sixties. Several thousand graduating high school students were asked to rate 74 occupations on a ten-point scale in terms of their general attractiveness. Average scores for individual occupations were then computed, and studies were made of variations by sex, social background, rural or urban residence, etc. As Table IV shows, a general hierarchy of occupational groups emerged. All groups of respondents—male and female, urban and rural—assigned relatively high standing to scientific and engineering occupations, while assigning low standing to agricultural, sales, and service occupations. Workers' jobs in industry, construction, and transportation occupied intermediate positions. Rural respondents rated manual occupations,

[71] Ibid. p. 237, n. 2.

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TABLE IV

"Attractiveness" Rating and Rank-Order of Occupational Groupings by Students Graduating from Secondary Schools, Novosibirsk, 1963

(Rating: 10 points=most attractive, 1 point=least attractive)

Occupational Groupings [a]	Girls		Boys		Urban		Rural	
	Rating	Rank	Rating	Rank	Rating	Rank	Rating	Rank
Specialists in education, public health, and culture	7·27	1	5·09	5	6·40	3	6·53	1
Scientists	6·82	2	5·62	4	6·70	2	5·89	3
Engineers in construction	6·81	3	6·24	1	6·75	1	6·40	2
Engineers in industry	6·08	4	5·73	3	6·05	4	5·81	4–5
Engineers in transportation and communication	5·87	5	6·02	2	6·03	5	5·80	4–5
Nonspecialists in education, public health, and culture	5·78	6	3·46	12	4·57	7	5·40	6
Workers in transportation and communication	4·85	7	5·08	6	4·71	6	5·24	7
Specialists in trade and services	4·61	8	3·47	10–11	4·38	8	3·90	12
Workers in construction	4·30	9	3·69	8	3·93	10	4·25	9
Workers in industry	4·05	10	4·02	7	4·08	9	4·05	10
Specialists in agriculture	4·02	11	3·47	10–11	3·68	11	3·98	11
Nonspecialists in agriculture	3·74	12	3·66	9	3·20	12	4·32	8
Nonspecialists in trade and services	2·89	13	2·29	13	2·60	13	2·75	13

[a] The term "specialist" is applied to persons whose jobs usually require a higher or secondary specialized education.

SOURCE: V. N. Shubkin, "The Utilization of Quantitative Methods in a Concrete Sociological Investigation of Problems of Labor Placement and Occupational Choice," in *Kolichestvennye metody v sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniiakh*, ed. A. G. Aganbegian (Novosibirsk, 1964), pp. 234–35, 258–67, as presented in Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge "The Social Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review*, 28 (December 1969), p. 622.

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including those in agriculture, slightly higher than did those in towns, while assigning lower ratings to highly skilled occupations, especially humanistic branches of scholarly work.[72]

Realizing that " attractiveness " is only one criterion of social ranking, and not necessarily the best measure of social status, some other social scientists have carried out more refined, multi-dimensional analyses of people's perceptions of the occupational hierarchy. For instance, in a study conducted in Leningrad in 1965, V. V. Vodzinskaia divided 624 graduating students selected from five Leningrad secondary schools into two groups. The basic group containing 100 students was asked to rate 80 occupations on a ten-point scale according to four criteria—possibility for creativity in the work, possibility for growth (for increasing one's skills, improving oneself, and for advancing occupationally), amount of earnings derived from the work, and social prestige (the " authority " which the occupations possess in public opinion).[73] Finally, members of this group were asked to rate the occupations in terms of their general attractiveness, according to their personal predelictions. The control group of 524 students was divided into five subgroups of equal size, each of which was instructed to evaluate the occupations according to one of the criteria. The ranking of occupations according to the various criteria was found to be very similar and highly intercorrelated.[74]

72 See V. N. Shubkin et al., " Quantitative Methods in Sociological Studies of Problems of Job Placement and Choice of Occupation," Part I, *Soviet Sociology*, 7 (Summer 1968), pp. 3–24; Part II, *Soviet Sociology*, 7 (Fall 1968), pp. 3–31; V. N. Shubkin, " Youth Starts Out In Life," *Soviet Sociology*, 4 (Winter 1965–66), pp. 3–15, and also by the same author, " Youth's Value Orientations in Occupational Choice," a paper mimeographed for the VII World Congress of Sociology, Varna, 1970. A good review of the early findings by Shubkin and others is found in Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge, " The Social Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review*, 28 (December 1969), pp. 619–43.

73 For some time there had been a tendency in Soviet social thought to regard social prestige as an altogether secondary phenomenon, essentially subjective and unworthy of scholarly attention. In contrast, Vodzinskaia stresses its importance:

" In studying the prestige of occupations in our society, one can judge the degree of social differentiation and social homogeneity of society. Being a fact of consciousness, the evaluation of occupations according to the criterion of prestige gives information about the value system and the value orientations dominant in society. The prestige hierarchy of occupation gives prominence to certain value characteristics, to which special weight is attached. Finally, according to the prestige of occupations it is possible to determine not only the place of the occupation in public opinion, but also to trace the process or social change which has occurred in a specified historical period."

It is suggested that study of occupational prestige is even more important in socialist societies than capitalist societies because under socialism " relation to occupational labour and the results of labour become the basic indices of social position." V. V. Vodzinskaia, " Orientatsiia na professi " (Orientations to occupations), in V. A. Yadov, *Molodezh' i trud* (Youth and labour) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1970), pp. 99–100. This article is translated in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

74 V. V. Vodzinskaia, " O sotsial'noi obuslovlennosti vybora professii " (On the social determination of the choice of occupations), in G. V. Osipov and J. Szczepanski,

[*Continued on page* 147]

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TABLE V

The Evaluation of Occupations in the Soviet Union: Average Ranks According to Five Criteria: Possibility for Creativity (C), Possibility for Personal Development and Growth (G), Expected Earnings (E), Social Prestige (P), and General Attractiveness (A)

Graduating Secondary School Students, Leningrad, 1965 [a]

Occupations, grouped by sphere of labor and skill level [b]	Average evaluation according to the criteria				
	C	G	E	P	A
Science: maths, physics, and natural science	8·67	8·71	8·60	9·03	7·43
Science: humanities	7·31	7·32	7·30	7·92	6·31
Education and public health	7·18	7·16	7·29	8·40	6·22
Industry	6·69	7·90	7·39	7·93	6·57
Transportation and communication	6·58	7·75	7·30	7·94	7·00
Construction	6·55	7·49	7·47	8·28	6·16
Education and public health	5·07	4·98	4·81	6·50	3·62
Service sphere	4·76	5·77	5·62	6·56	3·82
Agriculture	4·18	5·86	5·39	6·36	4·05
Transportation and communication	3·95	4·78	4·46	5·79	4·40
Industry	3·90	5·08	4·44	5·43	4·01
Agriculture	3·63	3·80	3·37	4·72	2·84
Construction	3·43	3·70	3·52	4·87	2·97
Service sphere	3·30	3·10	2·34	3·78	2·50

[a] 80 occupations were rated by graduating secondary school students on a ten-point scale. The data presented in this table is from the "basic group" which evaluated the occupations according to all five criteria. A control group was broken down into five groups which evaluated the occupations according to a single criterion. The evaluations of the two groups were seen to be very highly correlated (being above ·92 in each case).

[b] Occupations have been divided by sphere of activity and skill level. The groups which have been italicized contain only those occupations which require a higher education, whereas those which are not italicized require less education and fewer qualifications. The order of occupational categories follows the average ranking in the first column (C).

SOURCE: V. V. Vodzinskaia, "O sotsial'noi obuslovlennosti vybora professii," p. 50.

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Table V, containing data on the average score of groups of occupations as ranked by the basic group shows that the overall configuration is much like that in the Novosibirsk study. The students placed at the top specialized occupations in science and engineering, while relegating to the bottom of the heap less skilled jobs in the spheres of service, agriculture and construction. Comparing the results with those obtained by Shubkin, Vodzinskaia notes that the evaluation of jobs' attractiveness given by the Novosibirsk graduates were generally more in line with those given by the rural graduates in Leningrad. The Leningrad rural youth rated certain occupations, such as scientific work in the fields of medicine, philology, and philosophy and secondary school teacher, about the same as did the Novosibirsk sample, but relatively lower than boys in Leningrad city.[75]

Within the Leningrad sample, the general differences by sex, social background, and rural or urban residence were similar to those in the Novosibirsk group. Parents' income and educational level were systematically related to differences in prestige rankings. Children of working-class origin appear to perceive a greater prestige spread between low and high occupations than do those from intelligentsia families. That is, as in western studies, those from less privileged backgrounds perceive a more steeply stratified system than do those from the higher strata. Vodzinskaia takes these variations as indications of differences in value orientations among the various social groups stemming from the varying socialization in their families.[76]

THERE is considerable consensus among Soviet authorities that the low esteem evidenced by many Soviet youth for farm or manual work is a major cause of a pattern of youth unemployment and dissatisfaction with working. Many on leaving secondary school refuse to take any job unless and until they can manage to get admitted into some higher education institution, and so enter on the ladder to a prestigious occupation. As Vodzinskaia observes on the basis of the survey of Leningrad secondary school students: "Soviet youth's life plans and

eds., *Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva: Sovetsko-pol'skoe sravnitel'noe issledovanie* (Social problems of labour and production: Soviet-Polish comparative research) (Moscow: Mysl', 1969), pp. 49–53. The correlation between evaluations of "attractiveness" and other criteria, in the basic group, were as follows: possibility for creativity, ·86; possibility for growth, ·82; social prestige, ·81; and pay, ·62. The correlations between "attractiveness" and other ratings given by the control groups were prestige, ·96; growth, ·95; creativity, ·87; and pay, ·81. Thus, for the basic group, the criteria which correlate most closely with "attractiveness" in the respondent's own estimation was possibility for creativity, with expected pay in second place. The researchers infer that the latter are most important when young people actually make their occupational choices. In the case of the control group those members were asked to rate the occupations without respect to their own personal occupational preferences, an inversion was observed. There attractiveness was found to correlate most strongly with social prestige and possibility for growth. Evaluations given by the basic and control groups, when correlated, had coefficients in excess of ·92.

75 Vodzinskaia, "Orientatsiia na professii," p. 90.

76 Ibid. pp. 96–97.

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expectations are characterized by a single tendency—a striving to receive a higher education and to find a place of their own in the sphere of highly skilled intellectual labour." [77]

Many recent articles note the serious problem created for the economy by such discontent with low-level employment. Thus Yu. P. Averichev reports: "Many former tenth graders [graduates] go into production work under pressure and consider such work to be temporary. A total of 80 per cent of the young people who come to the borough employment commissions in Krasnodar have failed higher school entrance exams. The working conditions do not interest them. What they care most about is the opportunity to prepare for the next competitive examinations. . . ." [78] The Kiev Young Communist League asked 5,000 school children what they wanted to be, and an article summarizing the results points up the problem the predominant reluctance to consider manual jobs poses:

> Let us transport ourselves magically to a desert island where each of the pupils has become what he wanted to be. We find many designers, but only seven construction workers and one work superintendent. Every tenth person is a doctor, but there are only five nurses. Manufacturing is hopelessly bad, with only 80 factory workers. There are nearly 300 teachers and state security officials. There are hundreds of journalists and writers, but no printers to publish their work. We find one restaurant director, 23 cooks and no waiter—but with only seven livestock specialists, one tractor driver and one fisherman it is hard to feed all the scientists, actors and coaches at work on the island.[79]

Following the publication of a survey of the occupational preferences of a sample of Russian youth, the manager of an industrial plant wrote to the press asking, "Where am I to find my turners and milling machine operators," occupations which were placed 75th and 76th out of 80 occupations in one community. Two articles in *Pravda* by Georgi Kulagin, the manager of a Leningrad factory, complain that the emphasis on classes for "gifted children" and the rewards for higher education serve to denigrate manual occupations. As he notes:

> Families and children fight for admittance to such courses, because otherwise they would feel "inferior". Naturally not all are of a high enough standard, and many who could be excellent workers become very bad technicians and functionaries, thus providing a loss to society twice over. "Enough of the classes for the elite",

[77] Vodzinskaia, "O sotsial'noi obuslovlennosti," p. 39.

[78] Yu. P. Averichev, "Guiding Pupils into Trades," *Sovetskaya pedagogika*, No. 7, July 1972, pp. 12–19, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (7 February 1973), p. 14.

[79] Val. Rushkis, "And Here We are on the Island," *Komsomolskaya pravda*, 21 September 1972, p. 4, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (7 February 1973), pp. 14, 27.

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appeals Kulagin. "The school must ensure a more realistic preparation for a working life. And we must remember that we need engineers, but we need workers too." [80]

Concerns of this type have been repeatedly voiced by Soviet scholars and policy-makers since research on these topics revived. V. Kantorovich noted with dismay that the distaste exhibited by Russian youth for farm and manual work "is not as exceptional as it might seem."

> Sociologists have noted a highly critical attitude toward physical labour, bordering on squeamishness, exists among some upper-grade secondary school students in Leningrad. It was this, actually, that the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Party on the School Reform (1958) dealt with: "Some of those who graduate from school regard it as demeaning for them to engage in physical labour."
>
> . . . [I]n our country (and this is by no means limited to the ranks of the salaried professionals) people are prepared to condemn a juvenile—and, even more, the parents of one—who will work *for pay*. . . . Abroad, children from diverse strata of society (except the elite, of course) regularly earn money by working as baggage-handlers, salesmen, dish-washers, maintenance workers, and so forth. Should one be surprised that having been trained from childhood only for mental work, for study, the Leningrad secondary students . . . had decided that they were born only for the professions and not for any other kind of work? When life compels them to "become a worker," this is taken as demeaning and even as a catastrophe.
>
> . . . It is dinned into the ears of the young person that he has free access to all occupations which enjoy standing in his eyes, and that he can advance to the highest status in our society . . . . In effect, this aphorism strips all but the thoroughly intellectual occupations of all attractiveness, and thus misleads young people by picturing as excessively easy the difficult choice of a "place in life." [81]

[80] "Young Soviet Citizens No Longer Wish to Be Workers," (a summary of an article by the Moscow correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera* (Milan), Giuseppe Josca. *SIPE* (International Student Press Service, Rome), 3 (October/November, 1971), pp. 12–14.

[81] Kantorovich, "Sociology and Literature," pp. 32–33. Although the main concern about work values expressed both in sociological and party writings relates to the lack of respect for manual labour shown by many youth of working-class origins, some Soviet leaders, sounding like American conservatives, have even begun to complain about the decline of any interest in work among the more privileged youth. The First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee in a speech in June, 1972, attributed such behaviour to affluence among the Soviet elite: "It is no secret that, with the higher material standard of living, many families seek to protect their children from any kind of work. Then we are surprised when families of good and industrious people rear softies, people with no sense of responsibility. It is gratifying that today children do not have to undergo the poverty and misfortune that many people of our generation experienced. But it is bad that the content of their lives becomes idleness and the search for casual adventures and friends.

. . . it is necessary to take a more decisive stand against the frame of mind in which young people demand only rights and privileges of various kinds for themselves but have no sense of duty and refuse to give anything to society. . . . The cultivation

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KANTOROVICH'S suggestion that the Soviet ideological emphasis on equality of opportunity has the effect of demeaning occupations which require less training is comparable to the analyses of the dysfunctional consequences for American society of the stress that "all should strive for the same lofty goals since these are open to all."[82] This comparison may not be as foreign to East European scholars as one might think. Poland's most influential sociologist, the late Stanislaw Ossowski, pointed out:

> The Socialist principle "to each according to his merits" is in harmony with the tenets of the American creed, which holds that each man is master of his fate, and that a man's status is fixed by an order of merit. The Socialist principle allows of the conclusion that there are unlimited opportunities for social advancement and social demotion; this is similar to the American concept of "vertical social mobility." The arguments directed against *uravnilovka* [equalization or levelling of wages] coincide with the arguments put forward on the other side of the Atlantic by those who justify the necessity for economic inequalities in a democratic society. "The maximisation of effort in an achievement-oriented society calls for considerable inequality"—wrote [the American sociologist, J. J. Spenger in 1953. This sentence could equally well have been uttered by a statesman in the Soviet Union or the Peoples' Democracies.[83]

In specifying the consequences of the emphasis on opportunity for all, Robert Merton has suggested that failure to achieve success is felt more severely in a "classless" society than in those which place more overt emphasis on hereditary social position, or in which the ideology dominant in the less affluent strata persuasively rationalizes their inferior position by attributing it to structural factors, such as discrimination or social barriers. This leads him to infer that in societies stressing equality, "the greatest pressures toward deviation are exerted upon the lower strata. . . . Several [American] researchers have shown that specialized areas of vice and crime constitute a 'normal' response to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary success has been absorbed, but where there is little access to conventional and legitimate means for becoming successful. The occupational opportunities of people in these areas are largely confined to manual labour and the lesser white-collar jobs. Given the American stigmatization of manual labour *which has been found to hold rather uniformly in all social classes*, and the absence of realistic opportunities for advancement beyond this level, the result is

in young people of a sense of order and self-discipline should not end with the 'hair' problem. It is good that many bitter words were spoken at this congress about long-haired sloppy individuals who no longer look like human beings. . . ." A. Snieckus, "The Soviet Woman is an Active Creator and Educator," as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24 (26 July 1972), p. 6.

82 Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 193. See Merton's discussion on pp. 185–248.

83 Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, pp. 110, 114.

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a marked tendency toward deviant behaviour." In short, it is "the *combination* of the cultural emphasis [on opportunity] and the [limitations in] the social structure which produces intense pressure for deviation. . . . Despite our persisting open-class-ideology, advance toward the success goal is relatively rare and notably difficult for those armed with little formal education and few economic resources." And in a note, Merton goes on to emphasize that "Numerous [American] studies have found that the educational pyramid operates to keep a large proportion of unquestionably able but economically disadvantaged youth from obtaining higher formal education." [84]

Soviet social scientists have not argued (publicly at least) that similar processes produce criminal or other forms of deviance in their society. Their empirical findings, however, are congruent with Merton's analysis. Thus, Kantorovich points out "that sociologists take a sceptical attitude [of the popular image] that it is . . . the professional-and-intellectual (higher earning) section of young people who take that path of crime. It turns out that the percentage of young criminals is high in another environment—that of those who have dropped out of school, those in what is called inadequate families, and then [among] those whose parents have little education and low levels of skill. . . ." [85]

In seeking to explain the existence of such sharp differences in occupational prestige, and the consequent competitive pressure on youth to try to get ahead, another Soviet sociologist, L. Liss, has presented a Soviet version of the functionalist theory of stratified differentiation, in terms quite similar to those presented by western sociologists, who have been attacked by radicals for providing an ideological rationalization for inequality. Liss states that the "prestige of an occupation is formed on the basis of societal needs." This means that many will compete for entrance to higher education and consequent chance for high status occupations, although relatively few will succeed. "The resulting contradiction between societal and individual interests is resolved by means of competitive selection of the most deserving, prepared and capable individuals who have passed their entrance examination." [86]

Sex stratification

Since the early days of the revolution, the Communists have been committed to the establishment of equality between the sexes. To free women from male domination, the drudgery of domestic work, and the confines of the home and to expand the possibilities for their self-realization has been a repeatedly avowed goal. The overcoming of illiteracy, the expansion of women's participation in the educational

[84] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, pp. 198–99. (Emphasis in the original.)
[85] Kantorovich, "Sociology and Literature," p. 32.
[86] L. Liss, "The Social Conditioning of Occupational Choice," in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

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system, their recruitment into many professional occupations, and the provision of day-care centres and maternity benefits are some of the positive steps which have been taken towards this end.[87]

However, sociological research conducted during the past decade has brought into relief the still remaining discrepancy between the goal of full equality and the actual status of Soviet women. Once again, the facts which contradict the ideological self-image are presented in the context of pointing up how much improvement has been made. Still Gordon and Klopov report women workers have "half the free time" of men, because they do much more of the housework. They "have fewer possibilities for raising their qualifications, for mastering the more complicated and responsible types of jobs. It is characteristic that the average wages of women are lower than those of men."[88] Arutiunian found that in contrast to men "women have a more enduring orientation towards the family than towards work."[89] Two different scholars, Vodzinskaia and Liss, report surveys indicating "the existence . . . of certain stereotypes of occupational preference according to sex."[90] Fields requiring mathematics are predominantly chosen by male students, while in a subject like languages, 90 per cent are female. Not surprisingly, therefore, Liss notes "the actual feminization of a number of occupations in whole branches of the economy."[91]

Other statistical data assembled by Soviet sociologists point up both the extensive participation of women (they are over half the wage and salary earners) and the extent to which they remain underprivileged politically as well as economically. Thus, they form but a fifth of Party members, five per cent of those holding ministerial posts in all republics, four per cent of the members of the Party Central Committee, one per cent of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and zero per cent at the summit in the Politburo.[92] Within given occupational categories which are heavily female, such as education or health, it seems clear that women

[87] The most comprehensive study on Soviet women is Norton T. Dodge, *Women in the Soviet Economy: Their Role in Economic, Scientific, and Technical Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). See also Bernice Madison, *Social Welfare in the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968), and by the same author, "Social Services For Families and Children in the Soviet Union Since 1967," *Slavic Review*, 31 (December 1972), pp. 831–852, as well as Donald R. Brown, ed., *The Role and Status of Women in the Soviet Union* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), esp. Mark G. Field, "Workers (and mothers): Soviet women today," pp. 7–55.

[88] Gordon and Klopov, "Some Problems of the Social Structure of the Soviet Working Class," in ibid. The burden of housework on women is more amply documented and discussed in their recent study. See Gordon and Klopov, *Chelovek posle raboty*, pp. 96–128.

[89] Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, as translated under the title "Culture and the Social Psychology of the Soviet Rural Population," in ibid.

[90] Vodzinskaia, "Orientatsia na professii," and Liss, "The Social Conditioning of Occupational Choice."

[91] Ibid.

[92] G. R. Barker, "La femme en Union Sovietique," *Sociologie et sociétés*, 4 (November 1972), p. 185. This article and the one by Lennon cited below are very good accounts of the Soviet sociological literature dealing with the situation of women.

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are much more likely to be found in the lower echelons than men. Thus women constitute about four-fifths of all school teachers, but less than 30 per cent of all school principals.[93] As of 1970, 39 per cent of all scientific workers, including academics, were women. But, it should be noted that they formed 50 per cent of the assistants, 26 per cent of the research associates, 21 per cent of the professors, and but 10 per cent in the most prestigious sector, the members of the Academy.[94] In medicine, as of 1969, M. Sonin reported in *Literaturnaia gazeta* that though "men comprise 15 per cent of all medical personnel, they are 50 per cent of all chief physicians and executives of medical institutions. . . ." [95] Women are also rarely to be found in the more important press or other media positions.

Within industrial and rural economic organizations a similar pattern is reported. Surveys in 50 enterprises in different areas in 1965 found that "women work mostly in the lower skill groups; at the majority of the factories, there were no women at all in any of the higher skilled groups." [96] On Women's Day 1967, G. Rowina noted: "Although they make up one-half of the industrial labour contingent, women are employed as supervisors, shop chiefs, and in comparable leadership positions one-sixth to one-seventh as frequently as men." [97] The picture in the rural economy is even less favourable. Many reports indicate that "work demanding manual labour falls to women, while the men work as accountants, section leaders and farm managers." [98] A recent detailed study of rural structures in Belorussia reports that women are considerably under-represented "among administrators of various enterprises and organizations." The author Z. I. Monich says: "this is a clear undervaluation of a woman's capabilities, since when candidates are put forward, preference in the absolute majority of cases is given to men. At the same time, women themselves often refuse leadership posts because of the double burden placed on them by housework and family." [99]

IN seeking to account for such differences, Soviet sociologists point to many continuing variations in the family roles of men and women which serve to handicap the latter. One Soviet study suggests in terms that closely resemble western analyses of comparable data:

93 See "Women in the USSR: Statistical Data," *Soviet Sociology*, 11 (Summer 1972), pp. 57–86, esp. pp. 63, 69–75.

94 Barker, "La femme en Union Sovietique," p. 175.

95 *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 16 April 1969, as cited in Lotta Lennon, "Women in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 20 (July–August, 1970), p. 50.

96 Zev Katz, *Patterns of Social Mobility in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Studies, MIT, 1972), p. 44. See V. B. Mikhailiuk, *Ispol'zovanie zhenskogo truda v narodnom khoziaistve* (The utilization of women's labour in the economy) (Moscow: Ekonomika, 1970), pp. 110–11.

97 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 8 March 1967, as quoted in Lennon, "Women in the USSR," p. 51.

98 *Komsomolskaia pravda*, 16 February 1969, as quoted in ibid.

99 Z. I. Monich, *Intelligentsiia v strukture sel'skogo naseleniia* (Minsk: Nauka i teckhnika, 1971), as abstracted in *ABSEES: Soviet and East European Abstracts Series*, 2 (April 1972), pp. 77–78.

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> The main reason [for the lower professional status of women] is that they are less mobile [geographically], which is connected with having a family [to take care of]. As a rule, the place of residence of the family is determined by the place of work of the head of the family—the man. This has an impact on the appointment of specialists to positions . . . . [As a result], there are many cases where women who are specialists with a diploma do not work at all or work at jobs which could have been filled by less qualified persons.[100]

The fact that many women university graduates will not be able to use their training in high-level positions and that they work fewer years than men because of family responsibilities is used by some university people as a reason for giving " preferences to males during selection for scarce [university] places." [101] This may explain the fact that as demand for university admission grows much more rapidly than supply of places (a phenomenon discussed in a later section of this paper) the statistical data indicate their participation relative to men is declining in the more advanced and prestigious scientific and professional fields, e.g. research. And British Sovietologist G. R. Barker stresses that some Soviet sociologists justify these trends by suggesting that " Women represent bad investments if the main social goal is the maximization of productivity." [102]

The handicaps experienced by Soviet women, of course, extend far beyond the limitations placed on their opportunity to move to take advantage of job opportunities. Thus, it is clear, though relatively few Soviet women do not work outside the home, they continue to bear most of the burden of maintaining the household, cooking, shopping, and taking care of the children. Over half the men do little or nothing in the house. Conversely, women prepare most meals, they give 73 per cent of the parental help in their children's school work, are involved in 75 per cent of the visits to their children's schools, and supply over four-fifths of the general assistance to small children.[103] The situation of working Soviet women is more difficult than that of their sisters in the West because of the lesser availability of consumer services, such as supermarkets, and hard goods. Among working-class families, 15 per cent have a washing machine, 17 per cent a refrigerator, and 20 per cent a vacuum cleaner. Commercial services are relatively rare. Thus for 244 million people there are only 33,500 shoe-repairers, 3,600 laundries, and 1,100 dry cleaners. It has been estimated that auxiliary services only cover 5 per cent of the work of women. Restaurants are relatively scarce compared to western nations. In 1962, only 4 per cent of all meals were

100 Mikhailiuk, *Ispol'zovanie zhenskogo truda v narodnom khoziaistve*, pp. 112–15, as quoted by Katz, *Patterns of Social Mobility*, p. 44.
101 Ibid. p. 45.
102 Barker, " La femme en Union Sovietique," pp. 180–81.
103 Ibid. p. 176; see also Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, pp. 102–05.

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taken outside the home. Day care centres handle less than a quarter of the children who could profitably use them.[104]

The variations between the sexes are, of course, accentuated among the poorer strata. Studies conducted in different parts of the Soviet Union indicate that the greater the family income, the less time spent on domestic chores. A Moscow study " indicated that poorer women spent twice as much time on household duties as richer ones. . . . The poorest women spent just about three times as long as the richest looking after children, cleaning, and shopping. Washing clothes seemed to be almost the prerogative of the poor." Similar variations by sex and income level are reported in the recent large-scale survey by Gordon and Klopov, who find that women in families with per capita family incomes of 50 rubles or less spend more than 32 hours per week on housework, those in the 51–75 ruble bracket, more than 28 hours, and those in families whose per capita income exceeds 75 rubles, about 22. (Men in the same income categories devote only 13, 12, and 9½ hours to housework each week.) Although men spend considerably more time in social intercourse outside of the family and in diverse cultural pursuits than women at the same levels, the differentials are reduced in the higher income groups.[105]

Soviet sociologists have commented on the negative effects of the " double burden," of being a housewife and a breadwinner, on women.

> Research has convinced us that the possibilities for liberating woman from the " double burden " are being realized only in small degree. As a result of women's entry into production, negative consequences have accompanied the positive ones: worsened physical and psychological condition, lowered general tone of conjugal and family life, restriction of social and cultural contacts.[106]

The way women react to these burdens may be seen in the results of a survey of Leningrad working women conducted in 1969. Not surprisingly, " 70 per cent admitted they felt fatigue on their jobs. Their illness rate was twice as high as that of working men. To the question, ' Is it difficult for you to combine family obligations with work on the production line?' Forty-four per cent answered ' bearable,' 31 per cent answered ' hard,' and 25 per cent answered ' very hard '." [107]

On the subjective side, Soviet opinion surveys also produce large minorities, even close to cosmopolitan urban centres, willing to endorse " chauvinist " attitudes which run counter to official ideology. Thus in

104 Barker, " La femme en Union Sovietique," pp. 177–78.

105 The Moscow study is reported in Matthews, *Class and Society in Soviet Russia*, pp. 103–104; the other data is presented in the Appendix to Gordon and Klopov, *Chelovek posle raboty*, Table 46.

106 A. G. Kharchev and S. I. Golod, " Production work of women and the family," in G. V. Osipov and J. Szczepanski (eds.), *Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva*, as cited in Lennon, " Women in the USSR," p. 55.

107 Ibid. pp. 54–55. This survey is reported by G. A. Slesarev and Z. A. Yankova, " Women at the Production Enterprise and in the Family," in Osipov and Szczepanski (eds.), *Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva.*

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one district outside Moscow, Arutiunian found that 30 per cent of those queried in a sample survey thought it is better for the wife to devote herself exclusively to the home and the children. Even more surprising, 25 per cent of the intelligentsia agreed that it "was proper for a husband to punish his wife." [108]

In evaluating reports such as these, it is important to remember that as with the studies of occupationally related stratification, Western research brings to light comparable patterns of privilege and inequality associated with sex roles. For instance, the Columbia sociologist Harriet Zuckerman has noted that women "comprise something like 6 per cent of the PhDs" in the scientific fields in the United States, but that only eight out of 866 members of the highly honorific National Academy of Science were women in 1971. In Britain, women make up about 3 per cent of the members of the Royal Society.[109] Similarly, medicine, which is mainly a feminine profession in the Soviet Union, even though men still predominate at the upper levels, is overwhelmingly reserved for males in the United States. Certainly Americans have no reason to point to the existence of sex-linked inequalities (or any others) as evidence of the moral superiority of their own society.

Ethnicity

There is, of course, a great diversity of national and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, and the problems posed by the disparate national values and levels of development have been pointed up by many commentators. Thus, a New York *Times* dispatch from Baku, the capital of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, discusses the way in which the "Azerbaijani style of life, reflecting centuries of Moslem influences, refuses to conform to the Communist model":

> No less a figure than Gelder A. Aliyev, the Communist party chief, has been complaining about nepotism, forced child marriages, corruption on a grand scale, the urge for private ownership and the penchant for private trading—"plundering of socialist property for mercenary reasons," he called it—and the practice of bribing examiners at universities for entrance or graduation. . . .
>
> The clannishness of the Azerbaijanis, their skill at arranging deals under the table and their general undisciplined ways have long been a problem for Communist leaders—apparently at a greater scale than in many other regions. Some local Communists blame centuries of Moslem domination over this southern territory . . . . "Islam is more aggressive and more reactionary than other religions," asserted Gasham Asianov, editor of the Communist youth paper *Yunost* . . . . "This religion teaches people to think about themselves and their families . . . . We lived about 1,300 years by

[108] Barker, "La femme en Union Sovietique," pp. 184–85.

[109] These data are drawn from an important, as yet unpublished, paper by Harriet Zuckerman, "Women and Blacks in American Science: The Principle of the Double Penalty" (Lecture at the California Institute of Technology, 1971).

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this religion, by this ideology," he explained. "We have lived under Soviet power only 50 years. During 50 years it is very difficult to change human nature." [110]

Similar criticisms have been voiced about the values and behaviour of the Georgians. They, too, seemingly "are clearly determined to preserve as much of their own way of doing things as possible—which includes a notorious addiction to private enterprise of all kinds" and the Tadzhik Party Central Committee, reacting to such problems, has "pointed out the need to wage an uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology and any manifestations of national narrowness and parochialism." [111]

IT is stressed by Party ideologists and Soviet sociologists that a gradual process of equalization or convergence between the nationalities is taking place. According to the Party programme (1961), the present "drawing-together" (*sblizhenie*) of the nationalities will eventually culminate in their "merging" (*sliianie*) into a politically unitary and culturally homogeneous entity (presumably in the still distant future).[112] The "coming-together" of the ethnic groups is analogous to the changes occurring in the class and occupational structures, where, it is maintained, differences between classes and types of work are gradually being effaced. As evidence of this process, scholars point to the high rates of economic growth in the less developed regions, the accompanying changes in the occupational structure, and the expansion of social services and educational facilities, all of which serve to narrow the gaps between the more and less developed regions and national groups.

Nonetheless, at the present time, the regions and ethnic groups are clearly stratified according to indices of economic development, cultural and educational level, and occupational structure. On a variety of indices, the Caucasian nationalities (i.e. Armenians and Georgians), Baltic peoples (Latvians and Estonians), and Russians rank high, groups such as the Belorussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Kazakhs occupy an intermediate position, and the Central Asian peoples and Moldavians fall towards the lower end of the scale. Regionally, in

[110] Hedrick Smith, "Islamic Past of Azerbaijan Republic Frustrate Moscow's Marxist Plans," *New York Times*, 13 December 1971, p. 25.

[111] "Dissidents Among the National Minorities in the USSR," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin*, 16 (30 August 1972) CRD 224/72, pp. 4–5 and D. Rasulov, "Under the Leninist Banner of Internationalism," *Pravda*, 23 September 1972, pp. 2–3, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24 (18 October 1972), p. 28.

[112] As the Communist Party Programme, adopted in 1961, states, "The boundaries between the Union republics of the U.S.S.R. are increasingly losing their significance; since all the nations are equal, their life is based on a common socialist foundation, the material and spiritual needs of every people are satisfied to the same extent, and they are all united in a single family by common vital interests and are advancing together to the common goal—communism. . . . Full scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of the national relations in the U.S.S.R. in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved." Herbert Ritvo, ed., *The New Soviet Society: Final Text of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: The New Leader, 1962), pp. 191–192.

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terms of the proportion of urban to rural population, it is evident from 1970 census data that Estonia (66:34), the Russian Republic (64:36), Latvia (64:36), and Armenia (61:39) are much more urbanized than such republics as Tadzhikistan (38:62), Kirgizia (38:62), Uzbekistan (37:63), and Moldavia (33:67). Among the nationalities themselves, the disparities are greater. At one extreme are the Jews, some 95 per cent of whom were urban in 1959, as compared with about 60 per cent of the Russians, only a fifth of the Uzbeks and Tadzhiks, one-eighth of the Moldavians, and a tenth of the Kirgiz. Similar disparities are evident in the class composition of the national groups: in 1959, whereas almost all of the Jews and 79 per cent of the Russians fell into the "workers and employees" category, only 30 to 36 per cent of the Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, Turkmens, and Uzbeks were in the same group.[113]

The social and cultural differences between the nationalities find continued expression in their rate of participation in the educational and political systems, in spite of attempts by the party to achieve greater equality. For instance, the 1970 census data revealed that whereas 27 Georgians (out of every 1,000 at or above the age of 10) were enrolled in institutions of higher education, only 11 Moldavians were getting a higher education.[114] Among the members of the Communist Party, certain nationalities (Armenians, Georgians, Russians, and presumably at one time Jews) have been consistently over-represented, while others (including the Central Asian peoples, Azerbaijanians, and Moldavians) have been and continue to be under-represented. At the summit of political power (the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat) Great Russians and other Slavs have tended to be much more heavily represented.[115]

[113] 1970 census data on the republics' rural and urban population ratios are derived from *Narodnoe khoziaistvo, 1922–1972* (Moscow: Statistika, 1972). 1959 data are from *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR* (Results of the all-union census of the population, 1959: USSR) (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962), pp. 190–196, and A. A. Isupov, *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (The national composition of the population of the USSR) (Moscow: Statistika, 1964), pp. 44–45. A good overview of nationality policy and some aspects of national differences is found in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Allen Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 143–202.

[114] S. J. Bruk, "Ethnodemographic Processes in the USSR (On Materials from the 1970 Census)," *Soviet Sociology*, 10 (Spring 1972), p. 354.

For further elaboration on the problems faced by non-Russians in the Soviet educational system, see Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the* USSR (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), and Jaan Pennar, Ivan I. Bakalo, and George Z. F. Bereday, *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: With Special Reference to Nationality Groups* (New York: Praeger, 1971). Some of the problems are viewed within a comparative perspective in Raymond Poignant, *Education and Development in Western Europe, the United States and the USSR* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1969).

[115] In 1965, Russians constituted 62 per cent of the party membership, though only about 54 per cent of the population. David Lane, *Politics and Society in the USSR* (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 134. At the highest levels, they have tended to be even more heavily represented. In 1962, according to calculations by Huntington and Brzezinski, they made up 75 per cent of the Presidium and Secretariat. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 132.

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The nationalities' varying cultural standards and social structure continue to have a significant effect upon the status of women. Especially in the republics where Moslem traditions have been strongest, women play a less active and independent role in the social and occupational spheres. For instance, despite much improvement, there continue to be marked differences among the republics in women's attendance of institutions of higher education. Whereas during the 1970-71 academic year 53 per cent of the students enrolled in higher schools in Lithuania and 51 per cent in the Russian Republic were women, the corresponding proportion was 40 per cent in Uzbekistan, 37 per cent in Azerbaijan, 35 per cent in Tadzhikistan, and 34 per cent in Turkmenia. Somewhat greater are the differences by nationality within the republics. Thus, 54 per cent of the Latvian students in the Latvian Republic were women, whereas in Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia only 22 per cent of the titular nationalities' contingent of students were female.[116]

The extent to which ethnic belonging allows one to gain advantages, facilitates social ascent, or is closely associated with social privilege in the Soviet Union is a complex and controversial issue. In major cities of the Baltic and Central Asian republics, Slavs tend to make up the majority of the population. Not infrequently members of the indigenous population complain that Russians succeed in securing a disproportionate share of economic, housing and educational advantages. For instance a group of Latvian Party members published an appeal to Western communist parties in 1971 to intervene on behalf of minority peoples. The document complained about the increased presence of Russians in leading positions, and the importation of specialists and other highly skilled personnel from outside. All of this made for forced assimilation.[117] Such problems may be compounded in the Central Asian republics, where there has been a massive influx of Russians during the Soviet period. The latter are concentrated in the cities and form a disproportionate share of the more highly skilled and remunerated part of the population.[118]

[116] *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kultura v SSSR* (Public education, science and culture in the USSR) (Moscow: Statistika, 1971), pp. 197–204.

[117] "Dissidents Among the National Minorities," pp. 4–5.

[118] As a result of a massive influx of nonindigenous peoples (mainly Russians and Ukrainians), the proportion of the indigenous "Muslim" peoples in the five Central Asian republics declined from 78 per cent in 1926 to 55 per cent in 1965. Kazakhstan, in which the Kazakhs came to constitute just a third of the population, became the first Union republic in which the titular nationality was a minority. Yet, in Turkmenia, Uzbekistan, and Tadzhikistan, the "Muslim" peoples continued to be very heavily represented, making up more than three-fourths of the population. Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier Quelquejay, *Islam in the Soviet Union* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 169. The very high birthrate of these Central Asian peoples (see note 121, below) has more than offset continued immigration in the 1959–1970 period, however, both in absolute and relative terms. In contrast, in Latvia and Estonia, the Slavic population has grown rapidly since 1945 and the indigenous population, having a low birthrate, continues to decline in relative terms.

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Moreover, Russian culture occupies a favoured position among the national cultures, and the Russian people itself is given the honorific title of "elder brother" in the Soviet family of nations in official pronouncements. Assimilation of some aspects of the dominant culture (specifically, mastery of the Russian language) is in most cases essential for minority group members' advancement, since it is usually required for completion of advanced education and placement in responsible positions. As Sh. Rashidov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, stated recently:

> Each Soviet citizen is boundlessly proud of the fact that he belongs to the great Soviet family and that the Russian people are the older brothers to all the peoples in this family.
>
> To be an older brother in the family of socialist nations is a great honour. And this honour comes to the Russian people because it has been and is yet the most numerous people in our country. The Russian people's role as that of a leader of nations in the collaboration of fraternal peoples is primarily established by the fact that on its shoulders it bore the greatest burden in the struggle against the Tsarist autocracy and the bourgeois nobility class, and for human happiness and society's progress. . . . The Russian people are an example of hard workingness and heroism, and unselfish assistance to all fraternal peoples, both great and small. To the Russian people belongs the chief role in building socialism in the USSR; they make the most significant contribution to communist construction. The priceless contribution of the Russian people is that they gave us Lenin—a great leader and teacher and a passionate fighter for the happiness and safety of workers throughout the world. . . .
>
> Soviet people of all nationalities study the Russian language with great interest and strive to master its richnesses. This attempt is a clear reflection of the belief of all the peoples of the USSR in their holy union with the Russian people and of their love and respect for their older brother. The Russian language has become the second native tongue of all our country's peoples and has passed the test of international community and cooperation. The Russian language is a powerful accelerator in the process of bringing nations together. The Russian language is a banner of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples.[119]

Soviet sociologists inquiring into the extent of the convergence of national cultures consequently give much attention to the spread of the Russian language. As A. I. Kholmogorov states in his work *International Traits of Soviet Nations*, "*a mutual and dual process is developing in the linguistic life of the peoples of the USSR: a further development and improvement of the national languages, and intensive spreading of the language of cross-national communication* [Russian].

[119] "Russian Language Used Heavily to Unify Soviet Nationalities," excerpts from an article by Sh. Rashidov, *Kommunist Uzbekistan* (Tashkent), No. 6, 1972, in *Joint Publications Research Service: Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs*, No. 278 (25 August 1972), pp. 37–38.

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A new socialist type of bilingualism has come into being . . . . In our multinational state, the socialist type of bilingualism, international in content, is developing on a voluntary basis—on the basis of the equality of the languages involved in that process." Appraising this development in the Latvian Republic, he applauds the fact that 78 per cent of the Latvians surveyed report a knowledge of Russian, but deplores that only 24 per cent of the Ukrainians and 31·5 per cent of the Russians living there have learned the Latvian language.[120] In general, although knowledge of Russian has been on the increase, the inverse relationship between level of socio-economic development and birth rates—with the resulting marked disparity between the rate of national increase of the Russians and the Central Asian peoples, in particular—suggests that the spread of Russian culture, like other processes of ethnic "convergence," has its contradictory features, as well.[121]

Another of the empirical studies which treats some aspects of this problem was conducted by Arutiunian who dealt with mobility and stratification in the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The Tatars, a predominantly rural people, though including a large upwardly mobile segment, are much less likely to go on to higher education than Russians living in the area. Though Tatars constitute 60 per cent of the population, they form only 37 per cent of those who attend higher education institutions and 27 per cent of those in graduate work. In the Almetevsk District, the percentage of students who were Tatars in 1967–68 was 59·7 per cent in grades 5–6; but only 50·6 in grades 9–10. Arutiunian, who presents these data while repeatedly stressing the improvement in the achievements of the Tatars, furnishes a "materialistic" explanation for such ethnic differences:

> Those national groups which reside primarily in rural localities naturally have less opportunities for social advancement than the more urbanized national groups. It is no accident, for example,

120 A. I. Kholmogorov, "International Traits of Soviet Nations (Based on Data From Concrete Sociological Studies in the Baltic Area) [Part I]," *Soviet Sociology*, 11 (Winter–Spring, 1972–73), pp. 300–302, 318–320.

There is now a considerable literature by Soviet sociologists dealing with ethnic differences, attitudes and patterns of behaviour. For examples of these see articles in Stephen P. Dunn (ed.), *Sociology in the USSR* (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969), esp. pp. 42–106, 145–97, and *passim* and "Ethnosociology and Ethnic Relations," a special issue of *Soviet Sociology*, 11 (Winter-Spring 1972–73), pp. 211–422. Many other issues of *Soviet Sociology* contain relevant articles.

121 Between 1939 and 1970, the largest growth in population occurred among the Azerbaijanians, Uzbeks, and Turkmens (an increase of more than 80 per cent) and among the Kazakhs, Tadzhiks, Armenians, and Kirgiz (more than 60 per cent), as compared with only 29 per cent for the Russians, 15 per cent for the Ukrainians, and 15 per cent for the Belorussians. In 1969, the natality rate in the Central Asian republics was approximately twice as high as in the remaining republics. Much of the western part of the country—the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and considerable portions of Russia—are no longer capable of increasing in population without migration; their present net reproduction rate is less than one. Yet, in Central Asia, it is about two, which means that the population there would double in the next 30 years, if the present rates persist. Bruk, "Ethnodemographic Processes," pp. 346, 362, and see Roman Szporluk, "The Nations of the USSR in 1970," *Survey*, 17 (Autumn 1971), pp. 67–100.

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> that the relative share of primarily " urban " national groups in the student body is disproportionately high (Russians, Armenians, Estonians, Latvians), while the share of most predominantly rural national groups (Kirgiz, Moldavians, Tadziks, etc.) is disproportionately low. Moreover, the more advanced the level of professional training, the more apparent are the differences associated with the extent of urbanization of national groups.[122]

This interpretation makes sense and undoubtedly explains a large part of the ethnic variations.[123] Yet a look at data reported by Arutiunian clearly suggests that the children of Russian unskilled workers and collective farmers do much better in school than Tatar offspring. Seemingly there are differences in the situation of Russians and Tatars living in the Tatar Republic beyond these subsumed under the heading of rural-urban variations which affect their achievement potential. Arutiunian indicates some of the underlying processes at work in his comment that " of particular importance in stimulating mobility are the immediate surroundings, above all the cultural atmosphere and general climate in the family, especially the extent to which the family knows and uses Russian. More than 60 per cent of the individuals in the mobile population group of the Tatar ASSR are fluent in Russian or in both the Russian and Tatar languages, while in the immobile group the corresponding figure is about one-half as great—34 per cent." [124] In other words, assimilation to the dominant group's culture facilitates upward mobility in the USSR much as it does elsewhere.

In another report on the study, Arutiunian explores the relationship between a number of variables and the intensity of " negative national attitudes " (i.e. ethnic discrimination toward one's superior on the job or toward cross-national marriages). Not surprisingly, he found a relationship between knowledge of Russian among Tatars and a lessening of discriminatory attitudes. But examining the hypothesis that individuals' upward mobility is associated with a lessening of " negative attitudes," Arutiunian found that the data did not confirm this proposition. Upwardly mobile professionals do not necessarily show less discrimination than do field-hands, although downward mobility (moving from mental to physical work during one's career) is associated with an increase in negative ethnic attitudes.[125]

This finding leads him to posit two different socio-cultural bases for discriminatory views. One of them is cultural insularity and social backwardness, associated with traditionalism, belief in religion, and

122 Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR*, as translated under the title " Social Mobility in the Countryside " in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

123 See also S. S. Savoskul, " Socioethnic Aspects of the Intellectual Culture of the Rural Population of the Tatar ASSR," *Soviet Sociology*, 11 (Winter–Spring 1972–1973), pp. 349–368.

124 Arutiunian, " Social Mobility in the Countryside."

125 Iu. V. Arutiunian, " A Concrete Sociological Study of Ethnic Relations," *Soviet Sociology*, 11 (Winter–Spring 1972–73), pp. 334–342.

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lack of education, whereas the other is "primarily related to a set of socio-economic causes—the supply and demand relationship for skilled employees, the opportunities for social advancement and occupational advancement, and so forth." Those who are better educated have higher aspirations, and if these are not fulfilled, they feel frustrated. In a situation where they are competing for positions with members of other nationalities, such frustration may give rise to discriminatory attitudes. Thus, although the relationship between social mobility is "nonlinear and complex," as Arutiunian notes, he concludes that the "more favourable the conditions for the [upward] mobility of non-Russian personnel, the more successfully possible tension in ethnic relationships is eliminated." [126]

Social Mobility

Early in this article, we quoted a paper written by M. N. Rutkevich in the early sixties which rejected the "theory of 'social mobility' as anti-Marxist." For some time Soviet scholars sought to maintain that the concepts of upward and downward mobility used in Western scholarship could not be applied to their own society. As the discipline developed, however, they gradually undertook research on the topic while continuing to insist that there is a qualitative difference in the nature of mobility in different social systems. Such surveys have been conducted particularly with reference to educational achievement and opportunity.

Thus far, Soviet sociologists have avoided comparative studies of stratification and social mobility, although it would be rather easy for them to replicate the many surveys conducted in the US and other Western countries, but much as has been done by sociologists in Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia.[127] The Soviet mobility surveys are limited to special non-comparable samples of employees in given plants, industries, special districts, and various categories of students. All available data show a considerable difference between the achievements of those from privileged backgrounds as compared with their less fortunate age mates. At every level of the educational system, from primary school to higher education, the less privileged the socio-economic background of a student, the lower the marks he is likely to obtain, the less prestigious the type of education he is enrolled in, and the fewer the grades he will complete by the time he enters the labour market.[128] Thus V. N. Shubkin reports findings that

[126] *Ibid.*, pp. 339–342.

[127] For a discussion of some of these comparative analyses, see below, p. 170. See also Philip Cutright, "Occupational Inheritance: A Cross-National Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 73 (1968), pp. 400–16.

[128] For the Soviet Union, see Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge, "Social Class and Education: Soviet Findings and Reactions," *Comparative Education Review*, 12 (October 1968), pp. 248–67, as well as M. N. Rutkevich (ed.), *The Career Plans of Youth*, trans. and ed. by Murray Yanowitch (White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969). This translation of a Russian volume has 16 articles, many of which document the relation between socio-economic background and edu-

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TABLE VI

Plans of Graduating Students of Secondary Schools And their Actual Status Following Graduation, By Parents' Occupational Background [a]

NOVOSIBIRSK, 1963

Occupational Background of Parents [b]	Plans of Graduating Students (in percentage)			Actual Status of Graduates (in percentage)		
	Work	Combining Work and Study	Full-Time Study	Work	Combining Work and Study	Full-Time Study
Specialists, Urban	2	5	93	15	3	82
Specialists, Rural	11	13	76	42	—	58
Workers in Industry and Construction	11	6	83	36	3	61
Workers in Transportation and Communication	—	18	82	55	—	45
Agricultural Personnel, Non-Specialists	10	14	76	90	—	10
Trade and Service Personnel	9	15	76	38	3	59
Others	12	38	50	63	12	25
Total	7	10	83	37	2	61

NOTES:

[a] These figures are based on a 10 per cent sample of graduates of secondary schools of Novosibirsk *oblast* in 1963.

[b] Where both parents were living this was determined by the occupation of the father.

SOURCE: V. N. Shubkin, "Molodozh' vstupiet v zhizn'," *Voprosy filosofii*, 1965, No. 5, p. 65, as presented in Murray Yanowitch and Norton T. Dodge, "Social Class and Education: Soviet Findings and Reactions," *Comparative Education Review*, 12 (October 1968), p. 260.

show that family "level has a serious influence upon the children's interests and strivings. . . . The standard of living, housing conditions, etc., have a major influence upon a child's grades, upon his occupational inclinations, and consequently upon the opportunity to obtain an education. As a result of all this, the social structure [origins] of those entering first grade differs markedly from that of those who graduate and, even more, from that of students in higher educational institutions." [129]

cational achievement with data from the Urals region. On Poland, see Joseph R. Fiszman, "Education and Social Mobility in People's Poland," *The Polish Review*, 16 (Summer 1971), pp. 5–31, and by the same author, *Revolution and Tradition in People's Poland: Education and Socialization* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972). On Hungary, see Susan Ferge, "Some Relations Between Social Structure and the School System," in Paul Halmos (ed.), *Hungarian Sociological Studies*, The Sociological Review Monograph 17, pp. 217–46.

[129] Shubkin, "Youth Starts Out in Life", p. 10.

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TABLE VII

Activities of Secondary School Graduates According to Socio-Occupational Background

LENINGRAD CITY AND *oblast'*
(in percentage)

Social group	*Activities*			
	Working	*Combining work and study*	*Studying*	*Total*
Children of collective farm peasants and agricultural workers	55·2	3·4	41·4	100·0
Children of workers in industry, construction, transportation and other branches	27·5	14·2	58·3	100·0
Children of specialists *	16·5	10·5	73·0	100·0

* Since the "employee" group is quite heterogeneous, the researchers concentrated upon a group of occupations requiring higher or specialized secondary education. Included in this category are the children of engineering-technical personnel, doctors, teachers, and "scientific workers."

SOURCE: V. V. Vodzinskaia, "O sotsial'noi obuslovlennosti vybora professii," in G. V. Osipov and J. Szczepanski, eds., *Sotsial'nye problemy truda i proizvodstva*, p. 56.

These generalizations are also documented statistically in the report by Shubkin and a group of Novosibirsk Soviet sociologists who found a "correlation between monetary income per member of the family and overall grades . . . [of children which] show [s] that there is a positive correlation between the factors under examination, i.e. that class grades increase with rise in monetary income." Combining "five factors (father's occupation, monetary income, father's and mother's education, and number of square metres of housing per member of family) yields us the maximum correlation. . . ." [130]

The direct effect of economic inequality and poverty is also shown clearly in a study of the backgrounds of Sverdlovsk youth (15–17) who went to work before finishing secondary school. The great bulk of them were from workers' families, in fact, from families with per capita incomes of 20 to 50 rubles per month, i.e. below the poverty level. "A considerable portion of the youngsters live in unfavourable housing conditions, and many are without fathers." [131]

The same pattern is reported in studies of the factors affecting opportunity for higher education. Studies conducted in Novosibirsk (presented in Table VI) and in Leningrad (shown in Table VII) show a steep grada-

[130] Shubkin et al., "Quantitative Methods in Sociological Studies of Problems of Job Placement and Choice of Occupations [Part 1]," pp. 6, 7, 9.

[131] A. A. Kostenko, B. I. Livshits, and V. A. Mishchenko, "The Problem of Realization of Career Plans of Working Youngsters," in Rutkevich (ed.), *The Career Plans of Youth*, p. 74. See also V. S. Tsukerman, "The Role of the School for Working Youth in the Career Plans of Youngsters," in ibid. p. 96.

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tion in access to higher education among secondary school graduates and a sharp disparity between the extreme groups of urban specialists and rural unskilled agricultural workers. Reviewing such findings, MIT Sovietologist Zev Katz calculates that the chances of the children of peasants gaining higher education as compared with those of the urban intelligentsia is " something between 1 : 16 and 1 : 24. . . . If data were available for still more narrowly defined groups, such as the children of *unskilled* farm labourers and of parents belonging to the *higher* intelligentsia, the disparity in chances for higher education would probably be twice or three times greater. . . . A study of the average length of schooling received by children in the towns of Ufa and Orenburg, for example, showed that the children of peasant families received an average of 7·31 years of schooling, the children of working-class families 7·66 years, and the children of the intelligentsia (broadly defined to include all non-manuals) 12·22 years." [132] Similarly, the Soviet sociologist L. Liss notes the discrepancy between the educational level of students' parents and that of the general population. Thus, while only 6·3 per cent of the urban males in Novosibirsk have a higher education, the corresponding figures for the parents of secondary school graduates and of applicants to higher educational institutions are 20 and 40 per cent, respectively.[133]

There is a hierarchy among institutions of higher education or specialized secondary education in terms of the general social standing of the occupations for which the students are being prepared. As a rule, the higher the prestige of the department or specialized institute, the higher the social background of those enrolled. Surveys conducted in Novosibirsk over a number of years in the late sixties revealed that at technicums workers and their children comprised 62–65 per cent of the students and employees and their children 22–24 per cent. Yet, at higher educational institutions in the same region the corresponding figures were 40–42 per cent and 49–52 per cent. Within the latter category, significant differences were observed: workers and their children made up 19–28 per cent of the students at the university, 28–40 per cent at the Medical Institute, 37–47 per cent at the Electrical Engineering Institute, and 55–63 per cent at the Institute for Railroad Engineers.[134] In Sverdlovsk in 1968 first year students of working class background heavily predominated in the mining institute (62·3 per cent of the first-year students), constituted less than half of the first-year university student body (43·7 per cent, with 3·8 per cent from peasant background), but made up a small fraction of those at the medical institute (26·8 per cent).[135] Within the university, children of high intelligentsia origin (i.e. whose father is a specialist) are particularly heavily represented in cer-

[132] Zev Katz, " Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, 20 (May-June 1971), pp. 32–33.
[133] L. Liss, " The Social Conditioning of Occupational Choice."
[134] Ibid.
[135] Rutkevich and Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshchenila*, p. 135.

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tain quite prestigious and intellectual disciplines. For instance, surveys conducted in 1963 and 1965 showed that children of specialists made up more than half of the students in the physics department of the Urals University.[136] Another survey of students enrolled in three high-prestige departments of Leningrad University conducted in the summer of 1967 showed that the offspring of specialists occupied 60·6 per cent of the available places.[137]

IN spite of the ideological stress on equality of opportunity, Soviet sociologists do not avoid pointing to the continuity of privileged status within the higher levels of society. Thus, L. I. Sennikova found in line with other studies reported above that the more prestigious the school, the higher the background of those enrolled. She commented on her findings: "This is a completely understandable phenomenon. Such higher educational institutions as the Medical Institute and the University are attended by larger numbers of children of doctors, teachers, and the like, for among the intelligentsia these occupations are often 'hereditary'." [138] Another Soviet sociologist, V. I. Shubkin, also suggested that such patterns of intergenerational occupational continuity in high level positions are to be expected since "the greater the scope for creative work provided in any occupation, the greater the continuity between the occupations of the parents and the children. . . . This close correlation of the occupations of fathers and children is based on community of creative demands and interests. It has nothing in common with the social predestination in the type of society in which private property and inequality prevail." [139]

While the intergenerational continuity of elite status in the Soviet Union may have "nothing in common" with the similar phenomena in the west, it would seem that what these Russian scholars are saying is that it is perfectly understandable that those reared in a privileged ("interesting," "creative") environment will be highly motivated to continue living at that level. And abundant reports in Soviet publications indicate that affluent Soviet parents can do much to assure that their offspring also do well.[140]

Shubkin, who has been much involved in mobility research, has not attempted to quantify the "close correlation," but a more recent study by Arutiunian includes such an estimate. Analyzing data from the Tatar Autonomous Republic, he reports a "coefficient of determination" for the relationships between parents' educational level and that of their children of 50 per cent or more, the equivalent of a correlation coefficient of over ·7.[141] While it is impossible to make any exact comparison with

136 Stepanian and Semenov, *Klassy, sotsial'nye sloi i gruppy v SSSR*, p. 121.
137 Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," p. 33.
138 L. I. Sennikova, "Higher Education as a Factor in Social Mobility," in Rutkevich (ed.), *The Career Plans of Youth*, p. 148.
139 Shubkin, "Social Mobility and Choice of Occupation," pp. 92–93.
140 See below, p. 174.
141 Arutiunian, "Social Mobility in the Countryside."

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American research, given the variation in classifications employed and nature of the sample, few American studies have ever reported a relationship as high as Arutiunian's.

THESE findings clearly may be explained in traditional economic terms. Yet increasingly both Western and Soviet sociologists look for the determining factors in cultural values associated with varying socio-economic positions, rather than for the direct effect of economic advantage or disadvantage. Thus, Shkaratan contends that by the end of the 1960s, the " socialist system had, in effect, eliminated in the great majority of cases, the influence of economic circumstances on the achievement of the career plans of children from different social groups. However, the influence of inequality in social and cultural background still remains." [142] Various sociologists in eastern Europe, like their Western counterparts, stress the causal role of class-linked culture which is transmitted in the family and which affects propensity to take advantage of educational opportunity even when economic barriers do not appear to exist. They point to the way in which sharp differences in family material and cultural standards and in the calibre of the schools available to those from varying occupational and regional backgrounds determine who go on to secure higher levels of education and consequent better jobs. The Hungarian sociologist Mária Márkus reports national data indicating a high correlation between parental occupation and primary school grades. Almost half (44·6 per cent) of intellectual (professional) background were marked " excellent," with another 39·3 per cent " good." The corresponding figures for children of white collar workers were 24·3 and 40·6; for the offspring of skilled workers, they dropped to 11·5 and 32·3; and were only 6·6 and 25·4 for the children of the unskilled. She suggests that the main cause of these differences is not primarily economic circumstances but rather the way they affect " the cultural situation of the family, the norms and values the child receives." And Dr. Márkus goes on to argue that the school at present does not make up for the cultural handicaps of the poorer student particularly if their daily home life continues under " the same disadvantaged conditions." [143] A Soviet scholar, V. V. Ksenofontova, places a similar emphasis on family culture. " The differences in career plans of workers' and specialists' [upper-level white collar] are not caused primarily by

142 Shkaratan, *Problemy sotsial'noi struktury rabochego klassa SSSR*, as translated under the title " Social Ties and Social Mobility " in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

143 Mária Márkus, " Quelques problemes sociologiques du choix de la profession et de son prestige," in A. Hegedus (ed.), *Sociologues hongrois: études, recherches*, pp. 199–200. Findings reported by another Hungarian sociologist corroborate Márkus' conclusion: " The equal chances of realizing the [occupational] desires are reduced by the very stratification of these desires, the limited possibilities of the parents to help and the differences in the environmental conditions . . . *[T]he school results reflect the unequal possibilities of the aims to be reached.* . . . It seems unequivocal

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material circumstances. . . . A much greater role in this matter is played by family traditions, particularly by the family's cultural level and general living conditions." [144]

Concern for modifying the ascriptive pattern leads sociologists in communist countries, such as the Hungarian Mária Márkus and the Russian V. Kantorovich, to argue for "transfer payments" in education—that is, for a considerable increase in the amount of money spent on the education of the underprivileged. The latter raises an issue discussed by critics of western educational systems and related to our earlier discussion of the way some transfer payments benefit the more well-to-do, namely, that publicly supported "free" higher education actually represents a subsidy from the less privileged to the education of the advantaged. Thus Kantorovich asks: "to what degree free services which in our country add 35 per cent to total wages and salaries, act in the proper direction, particularly 'to give a boost' to the children of the materially least prosperous and least educated parents. Which family—that with many children, or one from the non-manual category with but a single child—receives more material aid per capita from the free benefits provided by society?" [145]

It should be noted, however, that the group of Novosibirsk scholars who have devoted so much energy to analyzing the determinants of occupational choice and of social mobility are also relatively pessimistic about efforts to affect the correlations with family related factors, by manipulating the school curriculum. As they comment, "The personal plans of graduates from the schools are, to a considerable degree, conditioned by their families and, in particular, by the occupational and educational level of their parents. . . ." [146]

ALTHOUGH Soviet scholars seek to demonstrate the moral superiority of communism, since it clearly has resulted in increasing opportunity, they are faced with the need to evaluate the extent to which mobility is a function of a more ideologically egalitarian social and economic system, as contrasted to reflecting structurally determined openings which may increase or decrease depending on the rate in which different positions are created. Two sociologists, M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, take Lipset to task for anticipating a decline in opportunities to secure higher positions as the society stabilizes following the end of the rapid growth demanded by early industrialization and the needs of post-

that both the worst school results and the majority of mere pass average results can be found among the children of those parents who perform some unskilled physical work, while . . . results of 4·5–5 are reached by the children of intellectual [i.e. professional] parents." Judit H. Sas, "Expectations From and Demands Made Upon Children in a Rural Community," in Halmos (ed.), *Hungarian Sociological Studies*, pp. 262–63.

144 V. V. Ksenofontova, "Career Plans of 8th and 9th Grade Students and their Realization," in Rutkevich (ed.), *The Career Plans of Youth*, p. 49.

145 Kantorovich, "Sociology and Literature," p. 35.

146 Shubkin, Artemov, et al., "Quantitative Methods . . .," p. 24.

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Revolutionary and post-war eras.[147] They denounce this analysis as being " readily utilized at the present time not only by bourgeois propagandists of anti-communism, but . . . [as] also widely applied by right and 'left' revisionists in their anti-Soviet propaganda." Yet Lipset's propositions basically sought to elaborate on the theoretical analysis of the sources of mobility in communist societies by the Polish sociologist, Stanislaw Ossowski, who argued persuasively that the basic processes which affect rates of social mobility are structural, being linked to the pace of economic development rather than to the type of political or economic systems, and should, therefore, be comparable in socialist and capitalist countries. Writing in the mid-1950s, he observed:

> A socialist system needs economic development even more than a capitalist one . . . such development is a necessary condition of its success and even of its existence. Therefore one of the immediate aims of the leaders of the socialist states was to reach the level of more advanced capitalist countries in industrialization, urbanization, development of communications, and mass education. *All these processes imply an increase in social mobility in socialist countries as well as elsewhere,* and since they were induced by social revolutions we can therefore postulate a plain causal relation between social revolution and—this increase of social mobility. *But it is the " Social-economic expansion " and not the revolutionary introduction of a socialist order which can be considered a necessary condition of this increase.* Increased mobility of this type could have been accomplished also if the capitalist system had persisted. . . .[148]

A RECENT Hungarian study of social mobility presented in a comparative context in an explicit effort to test Ossowski's thesis indicates that the results correspond to the expectations of the Polish scholar. In two separate sets of comparisons, first using the simple manual-non-

147 Rutkevich and Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia*, p. 44. See in translation, " Principles of the Marxist Approach to Social Structure and Social Mobility," in Yanowitch and Fisher (eds.), *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

148 Stanislaw Ossowski, " Social Mobility Brought About by Social Revolution," (Paper presented at the Fourth Working Conference on Social Stratification and Social Mobility, International Sociological Association, Geneva, December, 1957). Emphases added). This paper is discussed in Lipset and Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society*, pp. 281–82. For a recent effort to differentiate theoretically and empirically between structural mobility and " exchange " or " circulation " mobility, see D. Bertaux, " Nouvelles Perspectives sur la mobilité sociale en France," *Quality and Quantity*, 5 (June 1971), esp. pp. 102–11 and *passim*. In stressing the importance of changes in the occupational structure induced by economic change, we are not, of course, denying that social revolutions may increase mobility by opening doors for the advancement of members of the lower classes, while simultaneously displacing members of the previously privileged classes. However, in the long run changes in the economy are a more important determinant of the rate and direction of social mobility, especially under those regimes which place economic development as one of the foremost goals of their revolutionary policy. In the case of the Soviet Union, there is no doubt that considerable upward and downward mobility followed as a direct consequence of political and social changes wrought by the Bolshevik Revolution, and yet, far greater was the massive mobility achieved in the thirties as a result of the planned industrialization campaign.

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manual dichotomy for five non-communist countries and Hungary, and second measuring mobility among a much wider set of occupational class categories in Britain, the United States, and Hungary, R. Adorka found that when comparing outflow rates, i.e., the percentage shift from fathers' generation to sons, the Hungarian rates are more or less similar with those of other countries. When contrasting inflow rates, the proportion of sons in a given stratum who come from a parental class, a larger proportion of Hungarians in higher positions came from manual or peasant background than did those in the non-communist countries. But he notes that as Ossowski had suggested, this was "*a consequence of structural factors and ultimately of the rate of economic development.*" That is, it reflected the fact that since, during the period of the comparison, Hungary's "occupational structure was at the lower level of development than that of the United States and England . . . the change of occupational structure was probably faster in Hungary than in the United States and England." Clearly as Adorka states, the "doubling in one generation of the percentage of intellectuals [professionals] with university qualifications and of top executives implies an inflow of 50 per cent of persons originating from other social strata even in the case of the total occupational inheritance of the children of intellectuals." [149]

IN the Soviet Union, Rutkevich himself has pointed to the general character of the changes in industrial societies in which the "progress of technology and culture demands an accelerated rise in the number of scientists, engineers, technicians, teachers, physicians and other experts, as well as of categories of white-collar personnel in the service occupations." After noting that "the 'white-collar' group in American industry had overtaken the 'blue-collar,'" he emphasizes that "the number of engineers and technicians in our country has increased over two and one-half times in 20 years and is continuing to rise rapidly today." Thus, "*the relatively faster increase in the numbers of the non-manual category* . . . [brings about] the entry of workers and collective farmers and their children into its ranks." Rutkevich goes on to generalize that "movements from one social group in Soviet society into another are determined not by personal, subjective desires (although these certainly play a role), but by objective social necessity. We speak, in the first place, of the movement of a portion of the peasantry into the ranks of the urban workers, white-collar personnel, and professionals, and, secondly, of the increase which we have been examining in the numbers of the non-manual personnel, at the expense of other social strata, due to the general progress of society." [150]

149 R. Adorka, "Social Mobility and Economic Development," *Acta Oeconomica*, 7, No. 1 (1971), pp. 40–41.

150 Rutkevich, "Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manual Workers," pp. 4–5, 11.

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Yet, during the past decade, as Zev Katz has emphasized, Soviet sociologists have gradually come to recognize that with the end of major social and economic changes, the structural sources for a continuing high rate of mobility are declining. As he notes in his comprehensive review of recent Soviet researches: " today all major categories in the Soviet population are becoming more and more hereditary: for the first time in Russian history a largely hereditary urban working class has appeared. Also, for the first time in Russia a large hereditary class of highly educated people has formed." [151] Rutkevich and Filippov documented such conclusions in their report of a 1967 Sverdlovsk survey which indicated the younger the manual workers, the higher the proportion of them of working-class parentage (70 per cent for the under 20s, 61 per cent for the 20–25 age group, and 47 per cent for those 46 or over). A reverse correlation occurred among the upper-level specialists: although 100 per cent of the under 25 age category were of non-manual origin, the proportion declined steadily by age group to 25 per cent among those 46 or older.[152]

RUTKEVICH and Filippov are not alarmed by such developments. Rather they contend the fact that the " children of white-collar workers and specialists ever more rarely become workers " in the Soviet Union illustrates the superiority of socialism over capitalism.[153] They stress:

> A typical trait of social mobility under capitalism is that, as a rule, upward mobility is reversible. . . . In socialist society, it is entirely the opposite . . . [since] as a rule, it is an irreversible upward movement, insomuch as it occurs on the basis of the general and continuous rise in the welfare of all social groups of the working-people.[154]

Two other Soviet sociologists, Gordon and Klopov, have also stressed the emergence of more hereditary occupational strata in a recent (1972) article. They indicate that as a result of the decline in the rate of growth of the working-class in the 1960s, " The share of the old-time workers is rising. . . . This is a result of the process of social stabilization of the working class which finds expression in lowering the ' external ' sources of its replenishment, and, as a further consequence, in a constant rise in the weight of hereditary workers in its ranks." [155] Not surprisingly, they go on to argue, much like Rutkevich and Filippov, that such developments are progressive, since the earlier pattern of rapid mobility " had

151 Katz, *Patterns of Social Mobility*, p. 28.
152 Rutkevich and Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia*, p. 89, Table 3, as presented in ibid. p. 29.
153 Rutkevich and Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia*, pp. 87–88, as cited in ibid, p. 79.
154 Ibid.
155 L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, " Sotsial'noe razvitie rabochego klassa SSSR," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2, 1972, pp. 4–5, as cited in ibid. p. 78.

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negative aspects . . . it led to a diminution of the share of the hereditary proletariat, to a lowering of the standards of urban culture." [156] Thus, as Katz stresses, leading Soviet scholars now proclaim " hereditary status as a *positive* and irreversible principle of socialist society."

The declining rates of economic growth in the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union have led some analysts to take a much dimmer view of the situation and to assert outrightly that social barriers may become more rigid. Another Hungarian sociologist, Zsuzsa Ferge, observes that as the rate of growth of non-manual positions decreases, there will have to be increased downward mobility out of the elite groups if a comparable rate of movement into the elite is to be maintained. Yet, the very stratified structure of Hungarian society makes this outcome unlikely, because those in higher status groups will do their utmost to see that their children retain their privileged position, especially by ensuring that they gain a higher education. " Thus, the mobility channels can be enlarged and the movement of individuals according to their qualities and their inclinations can be realized only if the mobility towards the bottom loses its meaning of descent in the objective sense of the term, only if it does not entail notably more difficult conditions for those who change their position." For that result, radical measures to reduce social differences, including a substantial redistribution of wealth, would be required, and such reforms could only be successfully accomplished, in her judgment, through the creation of a greater material wealth, that is, through further economic growth. The paradox is that to step up the rate of growth, it may, in fact, be necessary to rely heavily upon material incentives and, thereby, to increase social-economic differences in the short term. Thus, there appears to be a vicious circle, with a less " open " or " mobile " society the likely outcome.[157]

THE processes which have slowed the rate of mobility in the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries can hardly be attributed to inevitable socialist developments which do not reflect deliberate social policies benefiting some strata at the expense of others. This may be seen particularly with respect to admissions policy for higher education, which, as the Polish sociologist Wesolowski has suggested, is likely to be a sphere of contention between upper and lower strata in a socialist society.[158] The disadvantages faced by those from worker and peasant

156 Ibid.

157 Z. Ferge, " La stratification sociale en Hongrie," pp. 182–83.

158 As Wesolowski stresses, because of the importance of education as a determinant of an individual's social status in a socialist society, there is " ground for contradictions of interests between the social strata in regard to the criteria providing access to secondary and higher educational institutions. This contradiction concerns the operation of the channels by which education, as a factor which is instrumental and ' autonomous ' with regard to income, is distributed. . . . The culturally differentiated conditions of individual homes accounts for differences in the initial levels of children of different social strata. Hence, workers and peasants accept the preferential system

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background in this regard have been increasing. As Rutkevich and Filippov note, this is a consequence of the fact that the numbers seeking entrance to institutions of higher education are growing much more rapidly than places. They conclude: " Competitive selection in admissions to higher education institutions . . . in the future . . . will apparently play an increasing role as a kind of screening ' sieve.' " [159]

The growth of the competitive pressures can be seen in the admission statistics reported for the 1972–73 academic year. Only 22 per cent of secondary school graduates could enter daytime higher education. This may be contrasted to 25 per cent in 1960, 50 per cent in 1950, and 80 per cent in 1940.[160] The large majority of secondary school graduates take the examinations to continue their education. Consequently, as the ratio of failures to successful candidates increases steadily, the chances of those from less privileged backgrounds inevitably decrease.[161]

Rutkevich and Filippov reiterate the results of the many Soviet studies, noted earlier, which document a considerable correlation between family socio-economic background and school achievement on every level. And they emphasize the extent to which such stratification biases, accompanied by greater competition for university places, results in a steady increase in the proportion of students from intelligentsia backgrounds, while that from working-class and peasant origins declines:

> Given the number of applicants, which is now several times greater than the number of vacancies in first year courses at higher schools, society is interested in selecting those who in a few years are capable of becoming the best specialists . . . . It is quite obvious that, given equal abilities of youngsters, those families in which the parents have higher educational attainments provide greater opportunities for preparing young people for the competitive examinations. . . . In ignoring the conditions under which applicants are trained, and in making judgments based only on the applicants' knowledge, admissions committees in effect sanction inequality of opportunity.[162]

of access to schools, a system in which supplementary points are awarded to their children to compensate for their social milieu. This system acts against the chances of admission of the children of the intelligentsia. This is why the culturally privileged prefer a system of selection based exclusively on the results of examinations testing pure ability. The latter system tends naturally to reduce the chances of the children of workers and peasants." Wesolowski, " The Notions of Strata and Classes in Socialist Society," pp. 142–43.

159 Rutkevich and Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia*, as translated under the title " Social Sources of Recruitment of the Intelligentsia," in Yanowitch and Fisher, *Social Stratification and Mobility* (forthcoming).

160 See P. Oldak and V. Gruber, " The Higher School: Wide-open Doors and Crowded Steps," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, No. 42, 18 October 1972, p. 10, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (7 February 1973), pp. 15–16.

161 See V. N. Shubkin, " Youth Starts out in Life," p. 11, and S. S. Voronitsyn, " Class Distinction in Soviet Higher Education," *Bulletin of the [Munich] Institute for the Study of the USSR*, 17 (November, 1970), pp. 39–40.

162 Rutkevich and Filippov, " Social Sources of Recruitment of the Intelligentsia."

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There can be little doubt that Soviet sociologists are sensitive about the implications of these trends. Sennikova, who also pointed up the "decline in the proportion of workers and peasants (in terms of social composition) among the students," sought to answer the criticism that this change violates socialist values. She wrote that this drop "does not by any means signify that Soviet higher schools have lost in the slightest degree their distinguishing feature—their genuinely public character. Employees and the intelligentsia are also part of the people, the working people." [163]

The growing bias in favour of academic achievers, heavily of privileged origins, goes beyond admission to higher education. In the autumn of 1972, the regulations for granting and paying stipends to students were changed to increase the emphasis on "achievement" and downgrade financial need. "The amount of the stipend is increased by 25 per cent for students who have received excellent grades and distinguished themselves in public, scientific or technical work." [164] In awarding stipends to students with grades of "satisfactory," an "educational institution's stipend committee may in individual cases consider the students' financial situation." [165]

The advantage held by the scions of the privileged in securing admittance to higher education is not simply a consequence of their cultural advantages and more affluent home environment which enable them to achieve better secondary records and to excel in examinations. In addition, their families can provide special tutoring for them, and can afford to keep them off the labour market while preparing for new entrance exams (a phenomenon in the Soviet Union, Japan, and many other countries). They may use various kinds of pressure, "pull," or even bribery of admissions officers to gain admission. As Khrushchev pointed out in 1958, "In some cases, the higher educational institution accepts not the candidate who is well qualified but the one with an influential papa or mama who can help in getting son or daughter into the higher educational institution. . . . [O]ften it is not the most deserving who gain admission but those who have an inside track to the people in charge of determining who is to be accepted at the higher educational institution and who is not. This is a shameful phenomenon." [166]

MORE significant than pull or bribery is the ability of the privileged in the Soviet Union, as in the United States or other steeply stratified societies, to use their income to hire extra resources for their children. In 1969, the Rector of Moscow University, in discussing the advantages which some had in gaining admission, pointed to the fact that "many

163 Sennikova, "Higher Education as a Factor in Social Mobility," p. 147.
164 Ye. Rozanova, "The Student Stipend," *Izvestia*, 30 September 1972, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24 (25 October 1972), p. 31.
165 *Izvestia* Legal Service, "Stipends for Technicum Students," *Izvestia*, 31 January 1973, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (28 February 1973), p. 43.
166 Quoted in Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies*, pp. 97–98.

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children frequently make use of the services of private coaches." In that year, 85 per cent of those admitted to the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics at his university had received private special instruction before they took the entrance examinations. This fact provoked *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (The Young Communist paper) to comment:

> With the approach of summer, many teachers at higher educational institutions display feverish activity . . . . For the duration of the coaching " boom," some even give up their summer holidays . . . . They have worked out a scale of payments for their services: the average fee is 5 rubles an hour, but the children of well-to-do parents pay more.
> . . . Some fond fathers and mothers will go to any lengths to obtain a " guarantee " that their son or daughter will be accepted. Behind the closed doors of secluded houses, countless meetings and " confidential " negotiations take place [since some of the tutors are " prepared, on the basis of their connections, to guarantee success in the entrance examinations."][167]

A recent report (February 1973) indicates that this situation is continuing without interference. A Soviet teacher writing in *Izvestia* notes that both parents and teachers are concerned that secondary education does not prepare students for the higher school entrance exams. As a result a private tutor is often hired " to raise the pupil to the level required by the higher school. . . . Now it should be noted that the time is long past when tutors were called in only to ' rescue ' those who were lagging behind. Nowadays their services are being used more and more widely by good pupils . . . because they know of instances wherein graduates who relied on excellent school grades and do not ensure themselves a ' margin of safety ' with the help of tutors discovered their limitations during the entrance. In other words, much more often than is generally realized a secondary-school student's fate is determined not by the instructors at his state educational institution but by a private tutor." [168]

The educational assets of the scions of the privileged in the Soviet Union are not limited to the superior cultural environment in their homes or the ability of their parents to purchase private tutorial help for them. Major urban areas have specialized high-level secondary schools, those which factory manager Georgi Kulagin, whose complaints in *Pravda* we

[167] As quoted in Voronitsyn, " Class Distinction in Soviet Higher Education," pp. 42–43. This practice occurs elsewhere in the communist world. An article in the Bulgarian paper *Trud* (20 October 1970) reported that many " teachers, lecturers, readers, and scientists have been organizing private schools and courses. . . . A victim of this racket said ' my family are at the end of their resources, we have paid more than 700 leva for private lessons.' " As reported in *ABSEES: Soviet and East European Abstract Series*, January 1971, p. 138. In a subsequent issue of *Trud* (11 November 1970), letters discussing the situation appeared, in which it was commented that " Frequently the parents' desire to secure a place in the university for their children appears to justify the expenditure of large sums of money on private tuition." *ABSEES*, April 1971, p. 142.

[168] G. Nikanorov, " The Teacher's Prestige," *Izvestia*, 13 February 1973, p. 5, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 25 (14 March 1973), p. 29.

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quoted earlier, described as "classes for the elite," to which "families and children fight for admittance." Although these schools, like the universities, are open to talent, a Soviet educational authority notes that they "naturally attract a high percentage of the children of the intelligentsia." [169] A recent report of such schools in Leningrad makes clear how they, like elite schools in the West, help maintain existing advantages.

> These children take an intensive programme, and they are taught by the best teachers, not only secondary school teachers but higher school teachers as well . . . . 98 to 99 per cent of the graduates of these schools pass the competitive examinations [for university]; and they not only enter the higher schools, but, more important, graduate from them with higher marks . . . . The alumni of the specialized schools make up one-third of all of the students in Leningrad University's physics and mathematical-engineering divisions.[170]

IT is interesting to note that in the communist countries, as in the United States, some seeking to reduce inequality of opportunity continue to suggest as one approach to affirmative action on behalf of the children of the poor, the lowering of standards of admission and/or creating special quotas for those of lowly origins who do not qualify for admission by universalistic competitive standards. During the Khrushchev era efforts were made to modify the inegalitarianism in higher education by requiring that 80 per cent of those who entered higher education to have been previously employed for at least two years, and by making vocational training obligatory in all secondary schools. These efforts designed to affect occupational choice, to upgrade manual work, had little effect according to the sociological surveys. The quota for those with work experience was dropped in 1965, ostensibly because it lowered the quality of higher education, and was evaded in practice by many institutions. "Soviet educational authorities have pretty definitely rejected the ideas that standards should be lowered in any way for the disadvantaged and the unprepared. If the drive for equality of educational opportunity is to continue, Soviet educational authorities believe that it must take two forms: equalization of the quality of primary and secondary education, particularly as between the cities and the small towns and villages; and special programmes for launching the graduates of inadequate schools into higher education on an equal footing with other students." [171] It should be noted, however, that entrance require-

169 Quoted in Katz, *Patterns of Social Mobility*, p. 67.

170 I. Kossakovsky, "There is Such a School," *Izvestia*, 23 March 1972, as quoted in *ibid*, pp. 65–66.

171 Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies*, p. 127. For further discussion of the 1958 reforms and the reasons for dropping them, see M. N. Rutkevich, "Social Requirements, the Educational System and Career Plans of Youth," in Rutkevich, ed., *The Career Plans of Youth*, pp. 2–9.

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ments favour those from culturally privileged backgrounds. In a statement issued in 1969, "Minister of Higher Education, Vyacheslav P. Yelyutin, has made it clear that the sole qualification for admission is the applicants' level of formal knowledge. The long-standing ban (from 1936) on any kind of testing but academic subject-matter tests has thus far made it impossible to include aptitude or achievement tests as admissions criteria." [172] The effect of these changes, as sociological investigations make clear, has been a decline in the proportion of workers and peasants (in terms of social composition) among the students.[173]

Arguments against special preference and quotas have been made by Soviet scholars. V. N. Shubkin, who has played such a major role in calling attention to the way in which a competitive educational system serves to maintain hereditary social privileges, also sharply challenges the proposal of formal ascriptive standards as a means of remedying the situation. "Efforts to establish preferential conditions for admission to higher educational institutions for particular social groups, regardless of level of preparation, not only will not help to solve the problem but, on the contrary, may reduce the general level of education, which would be equivalent to holding back the progress of science and technology." [174] V. Kantorovich also argues that inequality stemming from varying family cultural backgrounds, e.g. the fact that "children will develop more rapidly in the family of a professor . . . cannot be resolved by the use of reduced entrance examinations. . . ." Rather he urges that "there is no reason why forms of additional positive help to able children from low-income parents cannot be given: for example, schooling in certain ethnic districts of the USSR is a year longer than usual." [175]

Other analysts of the discriminatory processes such as Rutkevich and Filippov also reject, as an egalitarian or "socialist" solution, giving "priority to particular categories of [deprived] youth depending on their social characteristics . . . since it would contradict the principle of

[172] Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies*, p. 124.

[173] It is significant to note that the Chinese communists became quite sensitive to the stratification biases inherent in a competitive examination system for determining entry to higher education and consequent elite positions during the 1960s, and actually eliminated examinations during the Cultural Revolution. Chinese writers noted the existence of "extreme inequality" between the children of the rich and poor in the Soviet educational system. Yet with the end of the Cultural Revolution, as China seeks to create a stable developing society again, its leaders appear to be reverting to policies comparable to those of the Soviets. Examinations, denounced as capitalist devices, have been restored in 1972. Teachers had complained that their classes were "slowed to the pace of the poorest students," that automatic promotions led to incompetents being certified as qualified. At the university level, there is a "swing away from the worker-peasant-soldier applicant toward the academically better prepared, but ideologically less well qualified graduates of the city middle school." See Donald J. Munro, "Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China," in John M. H. Lindbeck (ed.), *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 256–301, and John Burns, "China Restoring Exams in Her Schools," New York *Times*, 25 September 1972, p. 3.

[174] Shubkin, "Youth Sets Out in Life," p. 11.

[175] Kantorovich, "Sociology and Literature," p. 35.

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equality of citizens under Soviet law." And they argue further that since social progress depends on putting the most capable and best qualified in leading positions ("specialists"), "the accelerated progress of socialist society urgently requires the admission of youth to higher educational institutions in accordance with the main criterion—the ability to master a future speciality." [176]

These comments, of course, have a familiar ring in western and American ears since they have been debated here in the context of "open enrolment," or special preference "quotas," for admission to higher education for those from deprived ethnic, racial, or class backgrounds. A large segment of higher education in the US and other countries have adopted policies designed to make it easier for underprivileged and less trained youth to attend college. Though the issues and the relevant research are highly comparable, it is noteworthy that Rutkevich and Filippov reject any possible comparison stating flatly:

> In capitalist countries, competition for admission to higher educational institutions does not exist in our sense of the word. Everything depends on the ability to pay for one's studies. . . . Competition in knowledge and abilities is replaced by the "competition of the purse." [177]

AS noted, Soviet scholars, unlike some of their colleagues in other communist countries, have abstained from efforts to make quantitative comparisons between their own findings and those in Western countries, thus avoiding the possibility that such efforts might result in ideologically embarrassing conclusions. The nature of the problem that they may be skirting can be seen in the results of an effort to compare the findings of highly comprehensive and sophisticated surveys of rates and patterns of social mobility in the United States and in the most industrialized communist country, Czechoslovakia. Czech sociologists systematically compared their 1967 data with those gathered by Blau and Duncan in 1962. Zdeněk Šafeř, a Czech scholar, concludes that the "openness of both systems . . . is surprisingly great." He stresses this finding to refute "the hypotheses frequently presented in the Western sociological literature concerning the 'mobility blockage' of the socialist countries." [178] That is, Safer argues it is not true that socialism means a lower rate of social mobility, that in fact their rate is as high as that under capitalism.

It may be worth noting that, as far as we are aware, no Western sociologist has suggested the existence of a "mobility blockade" in commu-

[176] Rutkevich and Filippov, "Social Sources of Recruitment of the Intelligentsia."
[177] Ibid.
[178] Zdeněk Šafeř, "Different Approaches to the Measurement of Social Differentiation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Society," *Quality and Quantity*, 5 (June 1971), pp. 205–206.

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nist countries. It may be, however, that such a hypothesis is current among internal critics of the system. For example, the Soviet dissident author, Andrei Amalrik, after discussing the sharp differences in the standard of living of ordinary people and the elites in the Soviet Union, argues that the country has an " upper class which is trying to avoid any change and to prevent society from having any mobility, and . . . make permanent the breakup of our society into tightly closed castes." [179] Contentions such as these have been refuted by fiat by the prominent Soviet sociologist, M. N. Rutkevich, in the context of also challenging the supposed statements by unnamed Western sociologists that communism inhibits social mobility.[180]

Results similar to those of the Czech-United States comparison have also been reported by Polish and Yugoslav sociologists. The Polish study involved an analysis of mobility rates in seven countries, one communist, Poland, and six non-communist, which found slightly lower rates of upward mobility in Poland than in the United States, West Germany, Sweden, Japan, France and Switzerland. The author, however, drew no general conclusions concerning the mobility propensities of different systems. In any case, his estimates of the proportion of city populations of urban origin who were upwardly or downwardly mobile did not vary greatly among the seven countries, although Poland remained towards the lower end (24 per cent mobile as contrasted with 30 per cent in the United States).[181] Vojin Milic, the author of a Yugoslav study based on 1960 data, which shows patterns similar to other countries, rejects making international comparisons of changes between manual and non-manual strata on the grounds that Yugoslav manual workers do not conceive of white-collar jobs as socially higher. He does, however, report that " the children of [white-collar] employees were relatively about ten times more heavily represented among [university] students than the children of workers, and even more [heavily] than the children of peasants." In a more comprehensive analysis of intergenerational mobility using multiclass (occupations) categories, Milic secured results similar to those found in studies in Sweden and Denmark.[182]

179 As cited in I. F. Stone, " Can Russsia Change?" *New York Review of Books*, 18 (24 February 1972), p. 22.

180 As Rutkevich stated, " Often we find assertions that Soviet society is an example of ' rigid ' structure, because in it the progression from one to another stratum, from ' lower ' to ' higher,' is allegedly extremely difficult, as distinct from the ' flexible ' structure of capitalist society. These assertions are slander pure and simple." Rutkevich, " Elimination of Class Differences and the Place of Non-Manuals," p. 11. This statement, of course, runs counter to more recent interpretations which view the decline of certain forms of social mobility as a positive consequence of a socialist system. See above, pp. 172–3.

181 Adam Sarapata, " Distance et mobilité sociale dans la société polonaise contemporaine," *Sociologie du travail*, 8 (January–March 1966), p. 19 .

182 See Vojin Milic, " General Trends in Social Mobility in Yugoslavia," *Acta Sociologica*, 9, Nos. 1–2 (1966), see p. 133, and notes 10 and 12 on p. 135.

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Sociological scholarship and social criticism

Yet after pointing to the repeated patterns of convergence (if that word may be allowed) in findings and interpretation between Soviet and Western sociologists dealing with stratification it must be reported that in one important respect the Soviet scholars seemingly differ: they are much less likely to supply members of the political opposition than their American counterparts. As noted earlier, American survey data indicate sociologists have been more disposed to be involved in varying kinds of radical and anti-war protest than those in other fields and are more prone to favour left or radical views than their academic colleagues. In the Soviet Union, however, where natural scientists have constituted the core group of protestors in the 1960s, sociologists have simply not been visible among the various dissident groups and publications.[183]

These differences in political behaviour of American and Soviet sociologists clearly do not reflect the fact that the latter have been either unable or unwilling to study and publish unpalatable facts exposing the " contradictions " of their society. But the Soviet scholars operate in a country in which the governing regime takes adherence to its ideology seriously, demanding that the social sciences support the dominant dogma. In effect, social science and sociology, in particular, are allowed freedom to do research on the condition that none of their findings appear to challenge communist ideology. In a speech delivered in December 1971, to the heads of Social Science Departments at Higher Educational Institutions, M. A. Suslov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, told them explicitly that " The most important conditions for the fruitful development and effective utilization of the social sciences in communist construction are the allegiance of these sciences to Marxist-Leninist methodology . . ." and exhorted social scientists to intensify " the Marxist-Leninist tempering of all Soviet students." [184]

Some indication of the pressures under which Soviet sociologists live may be found in a detailed report of a five-day-long meeting " of the departments of philosophy of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the CPSU " held from 20 to 25 November 1969 to discuss the first effort to present a textbook in the field, Iu. A. Levada's *Lectures on Sociology* (1967). Twenty major scholars spoke, each one attacking the errors of the work, basically for not emphasizing the " contradiction between capitalist-oriented and Marxist sociology." One speaker sensed " in the *Lectures* a certain influence of Talcott Parsons and other bourgeois sociologists." The last critic to speak condemned the book because it dealt with " a sociology above classes " and attempted to find links between Marxism and

183 See S. M. Lipset and Richard B. Dobson, " The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union," *Daedalus*, 101 (Summer 1972), pp. 148–63, 166–68.

184 From " The Social Sciences are a Combat Weapon of the Party," *Pravda*, 22 December 1971, p. 2, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 23 (18 January 1972), p. 10.

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western sociology. Sociology cannot be " neutral with respect to the class struggle, the struggle of ideologies." [185] More recently, writing in *Kommunist* in July 1972, V. Yagodin, the Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, attacked the

> " Institute of Concrete Social Research, the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of World History, and certain other scientific institutions . . . [for] doing a poor job in mobilizing scholars to produce fundamental works in the social sciences, raising the scientific and ideological-theoretical level of research, intensifying the struggle for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, and strengthening effective ties between theory and the practical tasks of communist construction. Individual scholars, including communists, are not displaying the requisite Party spirit or the necessary class and concrete-historical approach in passing and resolving scientific problems, are failing to take account of the full complexity of the ideological struggle in today's conditions, and are not engaging in active, aggressive criticism of bourgeois and revisionist concepts. Certain research projects are being done on a low scientific, ideological and theoretical level, and contain serious methodological and political mistakes in their treatment of fundamental problems of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of communist construction." [186]

These caveats are not unknown to sociologists in other Communist countries, as well. For example, in a recent review of the state of sociology in Poland, the foremost Party sociologist W. Markiewicz declared that " what we must do is to develop historical materialism in a creative way " and warned that " if a fully qualified sociologist comes out in Poland in defence of the theory of convergence, the functional theory, or the theory of structuralism, he knows well that by doing so he declares himself to be an open adversary of Marxism.[187]

185 V. E. Kozlovskii and Iu. A. Sychev, " Discussion of Iu. A. Levada's Course of Lectures on Sociology," *Soviet Sociology*, 9 (Winter 1970–71), pp. 475–494.

186 V. Yagodkin, " Party Life in Scientific Collectives," *Kommunist*, July 1972, pp. 51–64, as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24 (8 November 1972), pp. 10–11. It is interesting to note that a solution to the problems of increasing research effectiveness and ideological purity at scientific institutes both in the natural and social sciences, fostered by the Party, is to stimulate " the further development of socialist competition at research institutes." Among other things this means " a system that makes researchers' earnings directly dependent on the results of their work. . . . The basic indices for determining the amount of incremental pay a researcher is to receive are as follows: qualitative level and significance of the work performed; observance of plan deadlines; and results of the utilization of research findings in applied science and in practice " (p. 10). This competitive " solution " to the problems of improving scholarship in the Soviet Union indicates anew the extent to which the Soviet Union depends on the " carrot," on inequality of reward as a major stimulus for work.

187 Wladyslaw Markiewicz, " Poland," in Jerzy J. Wiatr, ed., *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971), pp. 116–117. He further asserts that the attraction of Polish sociologists to American sociology " has led to a considerable limitation of the sources of intellectual inspiration, to depreciation of classical writers, neglect of the achievements of the social sciences in other countries, including the Socialist countries, and to a narrowing of the front in the ideological struggle." (p. 135).

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The Communist Party tries to use sociology for policy formation and administration, while at the same time trying to limit its critical tenor. As the Soviet sociologist Elana Osipova says, "The subordination of sociological research to the solution of concrete social problems has led to the new forms of relations between sociology as a science and communism-building as a practice." [188] Along with these relations come certain obligations. As the Polish emigré sociologist Alexander Matejko observes,

> In the Soviet Union there are almost no sociologists who would dare to commit themselves to any opposition. In other countries non-Marxists are at best tolerated as long as there are not enough new fully loyal cadres. Sociologists who do not join Party ranks or do not play the role of at least loyal fellow travellers are tolerated as long as they are needed. However, the authorities are resistant to promoting them to the higher professional and institutional ranks, giving them research grants, and allowing them to attend international conferences.[189]

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that many sociologists will look for ways to avoid sensitive topics or to mute the critical tenor of their writings. Some will speak of the need to "protect" their discipline.[190] Those who touch upon politically sensitive topics will try to "balance" what they say, adding something positive for anything which may be construed as a negative appraisal. Others will adopt a scholastic tone, making what they have to say virtually unreadable, or will concern themselves with questions of methodology.[191]

AND yet, the conducting of social research, even within ideological confines, is a sign of the change which is occurring in the Soviet social system. As Aleksey Yakushev, a sociologist who has defected to the West, brought out in a discussion,

> In Stalin's day, ideology was a kind of rule-book laying down a code of behaviour, and no one ever asked whether there was any truth, justice or conviction behind it. Social science consisted solely of a set of functional principles; it presupposed a blind faith and had no use for any argument or proof, and it was the best formula for the preservation of the Soviet system. But this edifice crumbled; now a process of ideological decay is taking place which, strange though it may sound, embraces not only the creative intelligentsia but also sections of the ruling caste . . . . A new group

188 Elena V. Osipova, "The Soviet Union," in *ibid.*, p. 185.

189 Alexander Matejko, "Sociologists In Between," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 5 (Summer 1972), p. 292.

190 "The peculiar situation of sociology in countries where orthodox Marxism is still the official doctrine provides an easy justification for sociologists just to keep quiet. In private conversations the leading personalities in sociology, regardless of whether they belong to the Party, often take a defensive attitude. According to them, sociologists have to be particularly careful not to do anything to harm their discipline." *Ibid.*, p. 286.

191 *Ibid.*, pp. 300–303.

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> . . . emerged and established itself, not without difficulty, exclaiming: We are blind! Give us some real information, not for the general public, heaven forbid, but for us, so that we know what is happening in this country. It is impossible to go on any longer like this! Some sort of decisions must be taken, and we are blind . . . . And so gradually the pressure from below increases. . . . A gradual and halting erosion of ideology is taking place, a new content is being imparted to the old terminology.[192]

" People are beginning to recognize," says Yakushev, " that in the social sciences one must have facts, that there must be concrete methods of research. The right to some degree of freedom from ideology, won by the natural sciences much earlier, is now beginning to extend to the social sciences." [193] Given the increasing recognition of the importance of sociology, as MIT Sovietologist Zev Katz points out, the Party leaders " —indeed, the sociologists themselves—find themselves in a painful dilemma. For if sociology is to be a truly effective instrument for improving the Soviet system, it must be somewhat independent and critical, to point out where the failings of the system lie. . . . The party is as yet reluctant to do this, and it therefore continues to try to keep sociology within safe bounds." [194]

Perhaps because their empirical studies bring to light so much which is implicitly critical of the *status quo*, revealing the great disparity between the ideological image of their society and actual conditions, the sociologists may feel it necessary to voice a greater formal loyalty than do those in other scholarly fields whose work, as such, does not touch the party line. Yet it should be noted in conclusion that such overt " conformist " behaviour does not completely protect the sociologists. In August 1972, an editorial in *Pravda* once again criticized " significant shortcomings " in the work of the social science institutes. It called attention to " serious mistakes and confusion in the interpretations of certain fundamental theoretical propositions. It is necessary to adhere without deviation to the principle of the Marxist-Leninist Party line . . . in analyzing the social processes of our times." [195] Another account notes that the discipline still faces considerable opposition from within the party leadership and remains " in constant turmoil." Alexei M. Rumyantsev, the first Director of the Institute of Concrete Social Research, established to coordinate work in the field, was recently removed, " in a shuffle apparently intended to make the sociologists more responsive to party officials in the Central Committee. This was followed by a purge at the Institute by a special Central Committee commission which reviewed the professional qualifications of all the sociologists. . . ." [196]

192 " Censorship and Science," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, 11, No. 2 (1971), pp. 118–20.
193 Ibid. p. 119.
194 Katz, " Sociology in the Soviet Union," p. 40.
195 Editorial—" Current Tasks in the Social Sciences," as abstracted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 24 (13 September 1972), p. 24.
196 Robert G. Kaiser and Dan Morgan, " East Europe Turning to Sociologists for Some Answers," *The Washington Post*, 23 December 1972, p. A14.

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In conclusion, we wish to stress that the patterns of inequality which we have examined can easily be paralleled with reports from American and other Western sociological studies. Readers not familiar with that literature should turn to it before drawing any conclusions about the degree of inequality in different social systems. Surely, no citizen of the United States, Western Europe, or the Communist world who believes in equality can find reason for smugness about the situation in his own part of the world. Structural factors favouring the enlargement of privilege and inheritance of social position characterize all existing societies. If any conclusion can be drawn from the evidence showing the recurrence of stratified differentiation after deliberate efforts to reduce it, it is that the struggle to limit inequality requires a constant and conscious effort to restrain privileged elites from exploiting the less knowledgeable and less powerful sections of the population. And in so far as sociology points up the nature of inequality, particularly in systems such as the American and Soviet which proclaim the objective of a "classless" society, it furthers efforts to approach that goal.

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Family and Sex in the Soviet Union and the USA

Paul Hollander *

IN any society the most obvious characteristic which determines the conditions of life for the individual is his or her sex. We shall therefore first enquire into the manner in which sex differences are associated with other differences in American and Soviet societies. The equality of sexes is among the professed values and, to different degrees, the claimed achievements of both societies. There are, however, considerable differences both in regard to the origin of the claim and its actual fulfilment. In the United States the equality of women is only tenuously related to the general espousal of egalitarianism. As a rule inequality in American society has been conceived as deriving from the limitations of opportunity imposed by religious, class, race, or ethnic origins. The desire to overcome the traditional disadvantages associated with the sexual status of women played no prominent part in the aspirations of the various generations of immigrants to the United States. Rather, the improved status of women was perceived as a natural by-product of the equal opportunity of their husbands. For most Americans the status of women continues to be seen as dependent on the status of their husbands and not on their autonomous efforts or positions outside the home. The equality of women as an ideology evolved slowly and haltingly, as have their gains in their struggle to broaden the traditional sexual role definitions. In this process American cultural values have offered limited help.

By contrast there has been far more support for the equalization of the sexes in the Soviet value system—and in its historical source, Marxism. There is an explicit concern in the writings of Marx and Engels with the exploitation of women in capitalist society, manifested in the suffocating respectability of the Victorian family, sweatshops of industry, or houses of prostitution. Marx and Engels were interested in the problem in part because it fitted well into their analysis and indictment of capitalist society. Correspondingly the process of equalization was also quite different in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Equalizing opportunities for women was among the clearly formulated demands of the October Revolution and the ideas underlying it.[1] The social order that was overthrown was among other things, associated with the exploitation of women sanctioned by tradition. The liberation of women from the burdens and limitations imposed by a part feudal-peasant, part capitalist society (such as pre-revolutionary Russia) was inseparable from the liquidation of other forms of exploitation. Women

* This is an excerpt from a forthcoming book by Paul Hollander, *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison*, to be published by Oxford University Press.

[1] Kent Geiger, *The Family in Soviet Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 11–71.

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were seen as victims of capitalist property relations, of the concern with pecuniary matters typical of the bourgeois mentality. Since the equalization of women in the Soviet Union was tied to revolutionary change and revolutionary ideology, its tempo was much faster. The changes in the conditions of women were thoroughgoing in areas of life which were easy to bring under formal institutional control, such as educational and employment opportunity, but slow and incomplete in those areas more difficult to reach through legal-political intervention. The difference in the nature of equality achieved by women in the two societies may be summarized by observing that in the USSR women progressed much further *outside* the home in the attainment of occupational, educational, and political rights. By contrast, in the United States they are probably more advanced in being treated as individuals in interpersonal relations, and in regard to status and authority *within* the family. Concretely this means that in the Soviet Union more occupations are open to women than in the United States (legally as well as practically), that women have a better chance to rise within these occupations, and that they are encouraged to participate in political activities as much as men are. At the same time they are poorly represented on higher decision-making bodies.[2] The limitations of political equality (or perhaps the indifference of women toward politics in the USSR) is illustrated by the women's proportion among party members. Only 21·2 per cent. of the party members are women, while they compose more than half the total population. It is also noteworthy that there are no women members of the highest decision-making body (the Politbureau and earlier the Presidium) and relatively few among the members of the Central Committee. There are also hardly any women in the diplomatic corps or the foreign service in positions of importance. There is only one on the Council of Ministers at the Union level. Soviet women are also more seriously enjoined to take advantage of educational opportunities. For a university-educated woman in the USSR it is unthinkable to settle back to the role of housewife upon the birth of children and to let her training fall into disuse. It is, of course, important to bear in mind that this is partly a result of economic pressure: in a society where the standard of living is low and one breadwinner typically does not earn enough, the proportion of employed women is bound to be higher. Thus it may be argued whether or not access to equal and full employment for Soviet women is a net gain or a partial loss, a blow struck for fuller self-realization or a routinized response to economic necessity. A a Soviet worker put it in a letter to a newspaper: "I'll put it bluntly, in workingman's fashion. There are five children in our family. There are plenty of cares. But my wife goes to work. She works because my earnings do not provide for all the needs of our family. No, today work is not a spiritual need for women. Rather, it

[2] "On Results of Admissions to Party and Changes in the Composition of the CPSU," *Partiinaya zhizn*, transl. *CDSP*, May 8, 1968, p. 12.

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is a material necessity." [3] Yet it might also be argued that work for men, or most men, is not a spiritual necessity either (or a form of self-realization) but also an economic necessity and habit. If so, working women have made a stride toward equality.

The Soviet regime has been highly successful in breaking down the biases toward certain occupations viewed as inherently masculine, particularly in the sciences. Moreover, as noted earlier, approximately 75 per cent. of the physicians in the USSR are women [4]—a fact that also reflects the lesser prestige of the medical profession, whose practitioners command relatively modest salaries. Soviet women have also gained complete, and perhaps unwanted, equality in their access to heavy manual labour, including mining, construction, and street cleaning. As a leading Soviet economist observed ruefully: "Women who are no longer young are doing highway repair work. This hard work requires considerable physical effort. Alongside them stands a strong man, calmly watching their work and filling out work records. Even today this is not an unusual situation. The moral aspect and the ethical aspect, so to speak, and the economic aspect here are all cause for concern." [5] Visitors to the Soviet Union have also frequently commented upon the unusually heavy concentration of women among street cleaners.

THE status of women in American society is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, generations of foreign visitors have almost unanimously expressed astonishment about the freedom and independence enjoyed by American women. Tocqueville, of course, was among those who had something to say on the subject: "In the United States the doctrines of Protestantism are combined with great political liberty and a most democratic state of society, and nowhere are young women surrendered so early or so completely to their own guidance. Long before an American girl arrives at the marriageable age, her emancipation from maternal control begins; she has scarcely ceased to be a child when she already thinks for herself, speaks with freedom, and acts on her own impulse. . . . She is full of reliance on her own strength, and her confidence seems to be shared by all around her. . . . It is rare that an American woman, at any age, displays childish timidity or ignorance." But he also observed that "In America the independence of woman is irrevocably lost in the bonds of matrimony. If an unmarried woman is less constrained there than elsewhere, a wife is subjected to stricter obligations." He also noted that ". . . the Americans do not think that man and woman have either the duty or the right to perform the same office . . ." and, most significantly, that "in no country has

[3] "Whose Job Is the Kitchen," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, transl. in *CDSP*, September 6, 1967, p. 7; on the general relationship between women's equality and their employment, see also Williams, Jr., op. cit., p. 71.
[4] Mark Field, op. cit., p. 118.
[5] L. Kantorovich, "A Specialist's Opinion: Utilizing the Capacities of Each," *Trud*, transl. *CDSP*, June 5, 1968, p. 3.

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such constant care been taken as in America to trace two clearly distinct lines of action for the two sexes and to make them keep pace with the other, but in two pathways that are always different." [6]

In much of their interaction with men American women reflect little of the traditional submissive roles they have been assigned to in most societies through much of history. The American woman's typical control over family finances is another expression of power and influence, at least in one sphere. Nor is it without significance that, unlike other, less "subtly" oppressed minority groups (for example, Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and American Indians) the life expectancy of women in the United States is eight years longer than men's.[7]

At the same time a closer look at American life reveals a wide range of disadvantage and discrimination which women are subjected to and large areas of inequality. Perhaps the most significant examples can be found in the areas of income and employment. Though it is no longer legal, women are often paid less than men for the same job; they also find it difficult to advance to managerial or executive positions and are rarely recruited for training programmes for such positions.[8] There is also informal discrimination against women in a variety of occupations, from engineering and forestry through law to horse-racing and medicine, among many others. Such informal discrimination is usually an outgrowth of traditional conceptions and stereotypes about the proper role of women and the nature of femininity. The latter usually implies an allegedly innate incapacity to master certain skills or perform certain tasks defined as manly or masculine. Women also face disadvantages in education. These are twofold. On the one hand, informal discrimination operates in admission policies to certain types of institutions and areas of learning. On the other hand, at least until very recently, women themselves tended to avoid occupations like engineering, forestry, law, business administration, and medicine, which were generally viewed as unsuitable for women; in turn their avoidance of these occupations was seen as proof of their incapacity to master the requisite skills. The further education of women has also been hampered by their familial obligations: child care and housework, which characteristically have made it impossible to make (occupational) use of the education already obtained, let alone pursue it further. As we move higher in the level of education the ranks of women thin out: while they enter college in approximately the same numbers as men, only one-third of the B.A.s and M.A.s are earned by women and only one-tenth of the Ph.D.s.[9]

[6] Tocqueville, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 208, 212, 223, 225.

[7] In 1968 life expectancy at birth for men was 66·6 years and 74·0 for women. There was however a difference between white and black rates, although even among blacks life expectancy of women was almost eight years longer than that of men: white male 67·5; white female: 74·9; black male: 60·1; black female: 67·5. Source, *Pocket Data Book*, p. 64.

[8] *American Women—Report of the Presidential Commission on the Status of Women*, (New York, 1965), pp. 30, 45–46, 56.

[9] Ibid., pp. 27, 91.

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It is safe to say that American society and culture assign little importance to the equal rights of women to work. At least until recently work for women has been viewed more as a temporary economic necessity, than an ideal or a potentially important form of self-fulfilment. It is also widely felt in American society that social status and decent material circumstances are to be reflected in the male's ability to provide for the whole family without the wife's employment.[10]

These attitudes are expressed in the severe limitations of institutional assistance to working women, especially those with children. There are hardly any child care institutions, and still fewer supported or subsidized by the government, municipal, state, or federal. Although more than one-third of the labour force is composed of women, "Across the country, licensed day care is available to some 185,000 children only. . . ." One would guess that this is fewer than that which is available in *any one* of the small Scandinavian countries with populations roughly one-twentieth (or less) of that of the United States. (It should also be noted here that, contrary to widespread beliefs, Soviet child care facilities are quite limited, too: ". . . As of 1960 pre-school institutions enrolled no more than about 14 per cent. of the eligible age group on a permanent basis, with another 8 or 9 per cent in the summer season." [11]

At the same time in America, "Almost 3 million mothers of children under 6 work outside the home. . . ." [12] The absence of child care institutions is not the only impediment women face in finding or training for a job. Significantly, working women cannot even deduct from their taxes the wages paid to a baby sitter. Uniquely among the highly urbanized and rich societies, the social security and welfare system of the United States makes no effort to provide assistance to pregnant women or mothers with small children—unless they are destitute welfare cases. Legally defined (or routinely granted) maternity leaves and benefits are almost unknown in America. (In the Soviet Union pregnant women who work, and most do, are given eight weeks' leave with pay before and after the birth of their child and after that period are given time off to nurse the baby. They are also assured of retaining their job while on leave.[13]) The Presidential Report on the Status of Women in the United States (cited above) observed that

> The general federal system of social security makes no provision for compensating a working wife for loss of income due to childbearing. Forty-six of the 50 states also ignore it. Yet in about 70 other countries, governmental action has provided for such protection, mostly as part of broader programs of insurance against

[10] Given the fact that over 40 per cent of the labour force consist of women it is reasonable to assume that in many cases economic necessity is more than temporary and that the second income plays an important part in the family budget.
[11] Geiger, op. cit., pp. 192–93.
[12] *American Women*, p. 36.
[13] David & Vera Mace, *The Soviet Family* (Garden City, 1964), p. 255.

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> income loss due to sickness or temporary disability. No more than a third of American women have such insurance from either private or public sources. . . .[14]

Here again the message of American culture is clear to women who want to work (or have to) and be mothers at the same time: they may do so at their own risk, so to speak, and can expect little help or sympathy from society.

The inequality of women is further reflected in their lack of power and influence in most sectors of life (other than the family, neighbourhood, and voluntary organizations) and in many instances of residual legal inequalities.[15] This is especially visible in politics. There are two women senators in the United States Senate (of 100 senators) and 11 representatives in the House of Representatives (of 435 members). "Only 2 women have held cabinet rank in the federal government; only 6 have served as ambassadors or ministers . . . no women are on the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals. . . . Of 307 federal district judges, only 2 are women." [16]

Many further examples could be cited. Indeed discrimination against women could easily rank as a social problem but for the fact that it has not been perceived to be one. Until recently the inequalities of women have not been defined as socially problematic,[17] in part because the facts of discrimination were not fully known (or were ignored) and in part because such discrimination was defined as just or natural by society at large and the majority of women as well. This outlook may, however, be changing with the recent emergency of the women's liberation movement and the attendant rise of public awareness of their problems.[18]

There is some similarity between discrimination against women and ethnic minority groups, Negroes in particular.[19] The practices of discrimination, insofar as admitted, are accompanied by stereotyping, and the stereotypes are justified by biological factors: skin colour in one

[14] *American Women*, pp. 63–64.

[15] Leo Kanowitz, *Women and the Law—The Unfinished Revolution* (Albuquerque, 1969).

[16] *American Women*, pp. 72–73; see also Martin Gruber, *Women in American Politics* (Oshkosh, 1968).

[17] This is not to say that concern with women's rights is a new phenomenon. Yet for several decades before the late 1960s the issue was largely dormant. It should also be pointed out that earlier attacks on the inequality of women were narrower in scope than the recent liberation movement's, some spokesmen of which define even matters like the vaginal orgasm as politically relevant. (According to them the "myth of vaginal orgasm" is part of the male conspiracy to deprive women of their autonomy—in this case by making them believe that men are essential for the sexual gratification of women.)

[18] See further, for example, Caroline Bird, *Born Female—The High Cost of Keeping Women Down* (New York, 1968); also Kate Millet: *Sexual Politics* (Garden City, 1970). For a critique of Millet's book and of certain characteristics of the Women's Liberation Movement, see also Irwing Howe, "The Middle Class Mind of Kate Millet," *Harpers*, December 1970.

[19] See also Marlene Dixon, "Why Women's Liberation?" *Ramparts*, December 1969, esp. p. 59.

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case, sex in the other. The exclusion of women from many activities, occupations, or decision-making positions is usually justified by reference to their inherent uniquely feminine qualities, or to their "natural" subordinate status in relation to men. With women as with blacks, discrimination and inequality often form a vicious circle and become self-fulfilling. If women believe that it is against their nature to learn to fly planes or to run for political office or to become mathematicians, there will be few women pilots, senators, or mathematicians. This in turn can be used to justify existing stereotypes about the attitudinal and intellectual proclivities of women, who, as statistics testify, gravitate toward occupations associated with the traditional feminine roles, such as teaching, nursing, or social work. Also as with Negroes, most of the discrimination against women is informal and illegal. Despite such similarities there are also important differences between the consequences and comparative disadvantages of sexual as distinct from ethnic discrimination. Most importantly there is no clear correlation between being a woman per se and a lower social status (or between sex and social class) whereas such a correlation has been well established as far as blacks are concerned. It may be argued that this is so because the social position of women remains largely determined by their husbands or fathers, a circumstance that does reflect a more subordinate status. This however does not alter the proposition concerning the relationship between sex and class and race and class. A well-housed, well-clothed, and educated middle-class woman in a comfortable suburban home may be bored, relatively isolated, depressed, and arrested in her self-development, but such deprivations are of a different order than, for example, those visited upon the impoverished black slum dwellers of *both* sexes. Yet it may be also true that *among* the otherwise disadvantaged blacks women are *more* deprived and exploited, and that being poor *and* a woman is often a double disadvantage. It could, however, be argued that the position of Negro men has been worse than that of Negro women in regard to access to work, if value is being placed on being employed, regardless of the nature of the work that is available. It would be also untenable to insist that a lower-class Negro male is better off than a white middle-class woman or for that matter a black middle-class woman. Nor is a lower-class white male, needless to say, more privileged than a white woman of higher social status.

Beginning in the middle of the 1960s small groups of American women—mostly educated and middle class—began to show signs of intense dissatisfaction with their culturally sanctioned roles, in particular the "housewife drudge" and the "sexmate."[20] Although

[20] Donna Keck, "The Art of Maiming Women," *Women—A Journal of Liberation*, Fall 1969. Interestingly enough, a somewhat similar typology of the roles of American women was proposed in a well-known essay of Parsons many years ago. See: "Age and Sex in the Social Structure of the United States" in Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory Pure and Applied* (Glencoe, 1949), esp. pp. 225–28.

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women's liberation groups often emerged in association with or in the context of left-radical movements, the men and women supposedly dedicated to the same goals and ideals did not for long cooperate. Members of the SDS and other radical groups (white and black) have been accused of "male chauvinism" (and "sexual fascism") as frequently as members of the Establishment,[21] indicating that such attitudes transcend manifestly shared political philosophies and commitments. At the same time many militant and vocal groups within the women's liberation movement retained the radical rhetoric and outlook of the male-dominated New Left and its mood of total alienation from democratic institutions and procedures, as well as the belief that capitalism is the source of all social evils, including discrimination against women.

ALTHOUGH discrimination against women is not sanctioned in any area of Soviet life and although the authorities are committed to eradicating it completely, inequalities and disadvantages persist in the lives of Soviet women, manifesting themselves in the private rather than public realm. Soviet women continue to carry the full burden of household work (called the "second shift" in Soviet discourse), thereby preserving an important traditional prerogative of males. Study after study shows that because household work is not shared, Soviet women have considerably less free time (and even sleep less) than Soviet men, usually two-thirds to half of that enjoyed by men.[22]

Passages from a well-known Soviet novel conjure up the mood of weariness and exhaustion encountered at the end of the work day by Soviet women who wish to meet their traditional obligations toward their family:

> Many of the women in the trolley, like Ludmilla Afanasyevna, were carrying not handbags but big bags like small suitcases that could hold a live piglet or four large loaves of bread. At every step and with every shop that flashed by the window Ludmilla Afanasyevna's thoughts turned more and more to her housework and her home. Home was her responsibility and hers alone, because what can you expect from men? Her husband and son, whenever she went to Moscow for a conference, would leave the dishes unwashed for a whole week . . . they just saw no sense in this repetitive, endless self-renewing work. . . . Today was Friday. On Sunday she absolutely must get through a lot of washing that had piled up. This meant that dinner for the first half of the week had to be got ready and cooked, come what may, on Saturday evening (she prepared it twice a week). As for putting the wash to soak, that had to be done today, whatever time it meant getting to bed. Even though it was getting late, now was the only time left to go

[21] See Dixon, "Why Women's Liberation"; also Susan Brownmiller, "Sisterhood is Powerful," *NYT Magazine*, March 15, 1970, p. 128.

[22] See, for example, G. Hollander, op. cit., pp. 177–78; also P. Hollander, "Leisure: The Unity of Pleasure and Purpose" in A. Kassof, ed., *Prospects for Soviet Society* (New York, 1968).

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> to the main market. . . . She was standing in line behind two men when suddenly there was a hubbub in the shop. People were pouring in from the street, forming lines at the delicatessen counter and at the cashier. Ludmilla Afanasyevna started, and without waiting to collect her goods in the grocery department hurried across to a line-up at the delicatessen counter and at the cashier. So far there was absolutely nothing to be seen behind the curved glass cover of the counter, but the jostling women were absolutely confident. Minced-ham sausage was going to be sold, one kilo for each buyer. What a stroke of luck! It was worth going back of the line a bit later for a second kilo.[23]

The woman in the narrative was a highly skilled physician with an important postion in a hospital.

It should be added that the Soviet authorities are not unaware of these problems. Men are from time to time admonished in the press for not helping women in the house,[24] and the importance and desirability of producing more labour-saving devices and household services (for example, laundries, self-service shops, canned or frozen foods), are constantly stressed. Freeing women from onerous housework is among the desired goals of the regime even though progress has been very limited. Some experimental gestures in this direction were made in the designs of the so-called "house of future" or "new way of life" apartments. They had no kitchens (only so-called kitchen compartments), but dining rooms on each floor and, of course, professional catering. Press reports and discussions made it clear, however, that these apartment houses were both extremely costly to build and to maintain (they had various other unusual facilities such as swimming pools, Finnish sauna, social centre, winter gardens, hairdressing shop). One article pointed out: "It is obvious that the building can be tenanted only by highly paid working people. But if this is the case, then, in the first place the meaning of the experiment is lost, for socialist society is not oriented upon a limited group of people who can enjoy greater benefits than others, by virtue of their material status. And in the second place, it is practically impossible to conduct the experiment in these circumstances, for the planners themselves expect to include among the tenants some whose earnings are relatively low—the staff of service personnel (and it is not small—350 people, including the families, or 16 per cent of the entire population of the building!). Or is full service excluded for these people?"[25] Thus they are unlikely to become prototypes pointing to new trends in the organization or reduction of housework in Soviet society.[26]

[23] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Cancer Ward* (New York, 1969), pp. 91–92.
[24] For instance, "Argument with a He-man." Reprinted in P. Hollander, ed., *American and Soviet Society* (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), pp. 204–6.
[25] "House of the New Way of Life: A Building with Privileges?" *Literaturnaya gazeta*, transl. *CDSP*, February 12, 1969, p. 16.
[26] See also "The Building in Which We Shall Live," *Literaturnaya gazeta* transl. *CDSP*, February 5, 1969, pp. 16–18.

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While we noted earlier that compared with American women, Soviet women achieved a far greater equality of opportunity in the occupational realm, there is evidence to indicate that in this area too they still face considerable disadvantages, that sex remains an importance differentiating factor in attitudes toward work and work satisfaction. Thus a major Soviet sociological study referred to earlier noted that:

> . . . Interest in the content of the work is significantly more pronounced among men (42.2 per cent among men and 28.4 per cent among women). . . .
> Among young female workers, 54.7 per cent, as against 43.2 per cent of males, did not choose their jobs but acted in response to "circumstances." In the group of heavy manual labour, 80 per cent of women workers entered this line of work in response to "circumstances," generally despite their desire to work in a more skilled and . . . more mechanized job. . . . On the whole, the level of demands, in terms of the content of labour and the amount of wages, is significantly lower among women than among men. . . .
> Numerous data from this and other social studies indicate that the female worker finds herself, up to the present time, in considerably less favourable conditions, relative to the man, for the development of the personality. . . .
> As we have seen, female workers frequently have a lower level of general education and occupational skill; since they are generally employed at less skilled jobs, they have at their disposal relatively fewer opportunities for creative work in industry. Women, over the sample as a whole, give lower indices for degree of initiative on the job. . . . The shortening of the workday . . . does not greatly increase the amount of free time enjoyed by the woman with a family. She still devotes the lion's share of the additional non-working time to housework, while the man receives a perceptible addition to his leisure and can use this as he sees fit.[27]

The persistence of certain traditional forms of sex differentiation is also indicated by the discrepancy between male and female attitudes toward drinking and law breaking. Relying on Soviet sources an American student of Soviet deviant behaviour noted that "Drinking remains, by and large, a male activity" and, commenting on juvenile delinquency, that "Data on the sex of offenders . . . shows the same underrepresentation of females observed in other societies. Generally, girls make up less than five per cent of juveniles handled by the courts." Equally revealing of prevailing cultural assumptions is that insofar as Soviet authorities blame inadequate parental supervision for juvenile delinquency the prime solution is seen in the reduction of the *mothers'* working hours.[28]

[27] *Man and His Work*, pp. 155, 260, 261, 303, 304.
[28] Walter D. Connor, *Deviance in Soviet Society—Crime, Delinquency and Alcoholism* (New York, 1972), pp. 40, 87, 98.

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The Family

In comparing the American and Soviet family we face not only the usual problem of having more information—statistical and sociological —about the American family but also that of generalizing about the family in each of these complex, highly differentiated societies. In fact most generalisations about the American family have been based on the model of the American middle-class family (often suburban) that captured the imagination of American social scientists, journalists and advertisers in the post-World War II decades. This was the norm and the prototype.

No corresponding models or stereotypes have yet evolved in the Soviet Union unless we include the official ones extolling the Soviet socialist family and its unique virtues. Given an even greater ethnic and regional diversity and a comparably differentiated class structure, it is as difficult to generalize about the Soviet as about the American family. Three factors however impinge on the character of the family in both societies. They are: (1) The levels of modernization (interpreted here to include physical and social mobility, the ideology of free choice, the technology of communications, educational and employment opportunities for women, persistence or disappearance of religious beliefs and practice, the ease or difficulty of divorce, and the availability of birth control). (2) The standard of living (in particular access to private apartment or house and to household labour-saving devices and services, the possibility of automobile ownership and the like). (3) Public-political pressures and policies (including the presence or absence of an official "family policy," ideological assumptions about the desirability of the institution of the family itself, and the presence or absence of extrafamilial alternatives or supplements to child rearing).

The survivals of a traditional peasant society are still perceptible in Soviet family life. For example, it is common for three generations to live together—a practice that cannot be attributed *solely* to the housing shortage or the desirability of free domestic help even in a society where most mothers work and there is a shortage of kindergartens and day care centres. The traditional aspects of the family also survive in collective farms, where the family retains many of its economic functions and where the household is the membership unit.[29] The survival of traditional attitudes is apparent in the findings of the Soviet sociologist Kharchev, who reported that 80 per cent of the respondents (in a sample of young couples drawn from Leningrad) sought parental consent before marrying and almost 78 per cent obtained it.[30] It will also strike many American readers as anachronistic that among Soviet parents obedience from their children is still a fairly widespread expectation, as is respect for adults, including the aged.

[29] Stephen P. Dunn and Ethel Dunn, *The Peasants of Central Russia* (New York, 1967), pp. 47–48.
[30] Hollander, ed., op. cit., p. 177.

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At the same time, the Soviet (as the American) family has been weakened by high rates of social and physical mobility (including job assignments which may separate a couple for years) and by the decline of the traditional religious supports of family life.

More difficult to assess is the influence of the standard of living on family life and stability. There is little doubt that a combination of the survivals of peasant tradition and conditions of material scarcity do not constitute an ideal setting for the emergence of romantic patterns. Such patterns pre-suppose not only the legitimacy of highly individualistic criteria in selecting marriage partners but also considerable freedom from material need. Nonromantic, practical factors are likely to carry more weight when they have a greater survival value. A peasant or farmer is more likely to appreciate a sturdy wife who can help with his work than a doctor of philosophy or a stockbroker. A man or woman of comfortable means can afford to disregard the occupation or dowry of his or her potential spouse. In a society that suffers from a chronic shortage of housing people contemplating marriage are very apt to consider what type of housing one's bride or bridegroom can look forward to. In other words, the less people can take material goods and services for granted, the more likely they are to be materialistic. The possession of a car (even an expensive one) is unlikely to be a major attraction in an affluent society; not so in one in which the car is at the pinnacle of the material, indeed "spiritual," aspirations of tens of millions of people. The exclusive or overwhelming emphasis on personal-emotional compatibility is a luxury the poor can less afford than those better off. Correspondingly, freedom from parental matchmaking is more likely in a society where the young can look forward to greater economic security and earlier independence from their parents.

The predominance of romantic criteria is also less plausible in a society where not only goods and services, but also leisure, is in short supply. Because life is difficult, because men and women spend much time in making a living and managing their households, there is also much less free time at every level of society. Even young people have less leisure, resulting from the regime's policy of providing a profusion of organized activities, both work and recreation, to minimize idleness or the misuse of free time. Further differences between the American and Soviet family can be observed in their respective exposure to political-ideological factors and pressures.

In the United States no political attempts have been made (or seriously considered) to alter the structure or functioning of the family (black or white) or to bring it under political control. The family, at least until recently, has been assumed to be a semi-sacred, inviolable, and imperishable social institution which the government had no intention and little power to tamper with.

A brief review of Soviet family policies and ideologies over a period of time presents us with a very different picture. The develop-

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ment of Soviet official attitudes toward the family shows interesting paradoxes. We would expect a totalitarian regime which has tried to "atomize" society (that is, to bring the citizen into direct, immediate contact with the state) to mount an implacable campaign against the family, that bulwark of privacy and focus of apolitical attachments and values. The myth persisted in the West (well beyond the time when there was some evidence to support it) that the Soviet regime had embarked, and proceeded far along, the destruction of the family. Actually, the more totalitarian the Soviet regime became, the more committed it was to the maintenance and strengthening of the family. How can we account for this?

In the early and mid-1920s when Soviet society was in its truly revolutionary stage many of its leaders and supporters were seriously anticipating the withering away of the family, some among them favouring the acceleration of the process. At the time a genuinely radical break with the past seemed incomplete without abolishing one of its most deeply entrenched and traditional institutions, the family. The equalization of the sexes, another objective of the regime, also appeared to be obstructed by the family. (It was assumed by some leaders that the family could not survive the complete equalization of the sexes—a sound sociological suspicion supported to some degree by the parallel processes of equalization and growing instability of the American family.) Hostility towards the family was also rooted in the views of Marx and Engels, who considered the bourgeois family an exploitative institution par excellence, a microcosm of large-scale economic exploitation tied to the division of labour,[31] private property, and egotistic individualism. Marx and Engels, as well as many of their followers, believed that the major functions of the family in class society were economic. These, however, could be taken care of by other appropriate institutions under socialism. Monogamous mar-

[31] Interestingly some women's liberationists in the U.S. have recently proposed a new but strictly and contractually specified division of labour among spouses codified in the marriage contract. It is a proposal at once trendy and quite conservative in its implications. Its novelty lies in the implied repudiation of the model of marriage (widespread in modern, secular societies) which is, at least initially, romantic, emotionally diffuse and resting on mutual trust.

If marriage becomes a contractual relationship, as it used to be in more traditional societies, in which the duties of the spouses was sketched at least in broad outlines and financial arrangements were spelled out, it ceases to be a romantic one based on trust. The ideal that marriages be based on mutual trust and emotional attraction is hardly compatible with spelling out the specific duties of the spouses (for instance, who will cook, take care of the laundry, look after the children, when and how often, and the like). The contractual specification of such obligations reflects the fear, on the part of women proposing such arrangements, of being exploited by their husbands and perhaps a deeper ambivalence toward marriage and men as well. Whereas the romantic and still dominant assumptions about marriage imply that the spouses can rely on one another without minutely spelling out who does what, when.

The current idea of the marriage contract also reflects a fundamental lack of comprehension of the fact that enduring *and* satisfying *personal* relationships of mutuality and complementarity cannot be secured by the constraints of a written contract but must be based on a more elusive, diffuse, and deeper sharing of values and understandings.

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riage reminded Marx and Engels, and many of the early Bolsheviks, of private property relations, acquisitiveness, and possessiveness. It is important to realize that this antagonism toward the family was based, to a large extent, on the image of the Victorian bourgeois family, in the life of which pecuniary considerations had indeed played an important part. To Engels in particular, bourgeois marriage was akin to lifelong prostitution: the exchange of sexual favours and household work for financial support and social status. The bourgeois family was said to be an adjunct to prostitution: the double standard and the prostitution of the poor were the price paid for the stability of respectable family life. Among the early Bolsheviks, then, there was considerable hostility toward the family.

Nothing shows the change in attitudes better than a comparison of the views expressed by the revolutionaries of the 1920s and the functionaries of later days. Reflecting the spirit of the twenties, Madam Kollontai said:

> There is no escaping the fact: the old type family has seen its day. . . . The family is ceasing to be a necessity . . . as it was in the past; on the contrary it is worse than useless since it needlessly holds back the female workers from more producive and serious work. . . . On the ruins of the former family we shall soon see a new form rising. . . . The Workers' state has need for a new form of relation between the sexes. The narrow and exclusive affection of the mother for her own children must expand until it embraces the children of the great proletarian family. In place of the individual and egotistic family there will arise a great universal family of workers. . . . This new relation will assure to humanity all the joys of so-called free love ennobled by a true social equality of the mates, joys which were unknown to the commercial society of the capitalist regime.[32]

By 1936 the official views on the family and free love were quite different:

> When we speak of strengthening the Soviet family, we are speaking precisely of the struggle against the survival of a *bourgeois* attitude towards marriage, women and children. So-called "free love" and all disorderly sex life are bourgeois through and through and have nothing to do with either socialist principles or the ethic and standards of conduct of the Soviet citizen. Socialist doctrine shows this and it is proved by life itself.[33]

In all probability the early Soviet attacks on the family were not the outcome of careful totalitarian calculation aimed at the destruction of a potentially hostile social institution. Rather, these attacks were motivated by the idealistic objective of maximizing the freedom of the individual, seen as hampered in self-realization by the family.

[32] Quoted in Robert V. Daniels, ed., *A Documentary History of Communism* (New York, 1960), pp. 195, 197. Vol. I.

[33] *Pravda*, editorial quoted in Daniels, op. cit., p. 45, Vol. II (italics added).

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It is worthwhile to underscore the difference: in the West, particularly in the United States, the family has been seen traditionally not only as the "cradle of human nature" but also as a bulwark of freedom and individualism. In early Soviet thinking it was seen exactly in the opposite light: the stronghold of oppressive, exploitative personal relations which mutilate rather than liberate the individual.

From the early 1930s, however, the Soviet regime has become increasingly committed to the preservation of the family—a commitment seemingly inconsistent with the nature of totalitarianism. The Soviet support of the family offered for some Western sociologists incontrovertible proof of the resilience of this basic institution; it appeared that even a totalitarian system had to make peace with it. But according to Barrington Moore, the survival of the family in the USSR had no such far-reaching theoretical significance: "The Soviets, the argument runs, were compelled to adopt the family as a device to carry part of the burden of making Soviet citizens, especially after they perceived the undesirable consequences of savage homeless children, largely the outcome of the Civil War. [However] . . . with their very limited resources and with other, more pressing objectives they had no genuine alternatives. Steel mills had to be built before creches, or at least before creches on a large enough scale to make any real difference with regard to child care. In the meantime, the services of the family . . . had to be called upon. . . . The Soviet experience does not constitute by itself very strong evidence in favour of the 'functional necessity' of the family."[34] This is noteworthy since the Soviet family was not basically different in structure and functions from those in capitalist societies. We make this point because of the Soviet claim that the "socialist family" is totally different from the capitalist one—an implicit justification of its preservation. It would be far more accurate to say that the *ideal* socialist family is very similar to the ideal family of the capitalist societies including the United States: based on authentic emotional commitment, fidelity, devotion to children, companionship, and friendship between the spouses. There are only two major differences between the American and Soviet family ideal: the official Soviet ideal includes political-ideological compatibility and participation of women in socially useful, that is, productive work. The role of homemaker, mother, and companion has been the mainstay of ideal womanhood in America, at least until recently. Sexual compatibility and satisfactions are also more heavily emphasized in the American ideal, whereas they are generally ignored in the Soviet one. The official family ideals, if not the actual policies, have changed little since the 1930s. The Soviet regime has never seriously tried to destroy the family. On the other hand it would not be quite true to say either that it has made peace with it. Rather, the

[34] B. Moore, Jr., "Thoughts on the Future of the Family" in his *Political Power and Social Theory*, pp. 162, 183.

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Soviet regime has chosen to neutralize the family as an agent of (potentially deviant) political socialization.

Leon Trotsky viewed the preservation of the family as one of the retreats from the regime's original ideals, a contradiction related to the insufficient material basis upon which the Soviet system tried to create the new social relationships: "The real resources of the state did not correspond to the plans and intentions of the Communist Party. You cannot 'abolish' the family; you have to replace it. The actual liberation of women is unrealizable on the basis of 'generalized want.'" [35] Trotsky, too, noted that Soviet society could not provide the material basis for removing the housekeeping and child care functions of the family. But more importantly, he was also sensitive to the ideological-political implications of the changed policies: "The most compelling motive of the present cult of the family is undoubtedly the need of the bureaucracy for a stable hierarchy of relations and for the disciplining of youth by means of 40 million points of support for authority and power." [36]

Trotsky's point brings into sharp focus the relationship between the increasingly totalitarian character of the regime under Stalin and the new official attitude towards the family. In terms of ideology and social control the issue was: what are the alternatives to the family if it is destroyed? In theory one alternative would have been the provision of new institutions for child care, household functions, and stable emotional-sexual relations. This, as indicated above, was not feasible for practical reasons. The resources of the new state did not permit costly new departures. The other alternative would have been a chaotic increase of personal freedom, a most unstable constellation of sexual-emotional relationships, and the likelihood of severe social disorganization. Although a totalitarian society may aspire to do away with the family as long as it is a competing source of socialization, it has certainly no interest in allowing "free love," or less regulated human relationships to take its place. Contrary to some Western notions about the family as a source of resistance to political controls, the family has proved more compatible with totalitarianism than extrafamilial love and sexual relations and the attendant fluidity of human relations. It is not impossible that Soviet leaders might have sensed that authoritarianism, rigidity, and uniformity in political relations and institutions are incompatible with the tolerance of freedom, diversity, and mobility in interpersonal relations. It is difficult to maintain a social order in which there is unlimited freedom in one sphere (the personal-emotional-sexual) and severe limitations on freedom in others, such as the political and economic. The same point was made by Alexander Gerschenkron: ". . . the dictators are likely to assume that looseness in matters of sex may loosen behaviour in other areas, and in particular may affect the political discipline of the

[35] Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed* (New York, 1965), p. 145.
[36] Ibid. p. 153.

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ruled." [37] The deprivation of freedom might proceed more smoothly if there are no pockets of it left in some areas of life that can provide standards of comparison. Free love and sexual-emotional excesses are also discouraged by totalitarian rulers for more tangible reasons. They make undue alternative demands on the energies and interests of the citizen. By contrast the family as a rule does not deplete sexual energies; rather it is a framework in which sexual-emotional relations can more easily be stabilized.

As far as ideological interference on the part of the family is concerned, under Stalin Soviet parents learned that it was unwise to try to inculcate values into their children that might contradict the official ones, those disseminated outside the family. Concurrently the Soviet schools, pioneer and Komsomol organizations have taken over the task of political socialization. This does not mean that the regime has written off the family completely as an ally or auxiliary socializing agency in the civic-political realm. Soviet families have always been encouraged to support the official values of society and assist in their inculcation. Yet occasional official complaints suggest that most families prefer to remain neutral and apolitical in their child-rearing activities:

> It is not enough to see to it merely that the children study well and are models of behaviour in the school or the street. It is the parents' sacred duty to instill in their children from an early age such precious qualities as conscious love of the socialist homeland, devotion to the cause of communism, honesty, diligence and the desire to serve the people loyally and defend the gains of the Revolution. This calls for constant and concerned penetration into the spiritual world of the children and patient and comprehensive upbringing work, for which Sundays open up especially great opportunities. . . . Few fathers and only some mothers talk with their children on civic themes, apparently believing that our Soviet reality itself moulds one's communist world view. Some parents even forget to ask their son or daughter what assignments he or she is fulfilling in the Young Pioneer detachment or the Young Communist League group and rarely take an interest in the children's public activity in school.[38]

The socializing influence of the family has been still further reduced as children spend more time in other social settings—such as the school and youth organizations—and as parents do not have enough time to spend with their children because of the demands of their work and their own participation in public and quasi-public activities. Finally the influence of the family weakens when there is insufficient

[37] *Continuity in History and Other Essays*, Cambridge, Mass., 1968, p. 306. The importance of congruent authority patterns for political stability is stressed by Harry Eckstein in his *Division and Cohesion in Democracy* (Princeton, 1966).

[38] "The Parents Are at Home Today," *Pravda* (editorial), transl. *CDSP*, February 26, 1969, p. 43.

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privacy for undisturbed interaction between its members—a condition provided by crowded housing and the general difficulty of attaining privacy in Soviet society.

Under these circumstances the family ceased to be an ideological threat to the regime, or a source of competing values and norms. It is possible that improving standards of living will increase the importance of the family as a unit of shared recreation, consumption, and intimacy.

WHILE the problem of family versus state (or the political neutralization of the family) does not exist as such in the United States, there are certainly other factors which tend to weaken the influence of the family. In almost every urban-industrial society, family instability has increased, probably in part because of the decline of familial functions, the reduction of the services its provides. As Robert Nisbet has pointed out:

> Historically the family's importance has come from the fact of intimate social cohesion united with institutional significance in society, not from its sex or blood relations. In earlier ages, kinship was inextricably involved in the process of getting a living, providing education, supporting the infirm, caring for the aged and maintaining religious values.[39]

In American society the institutional significance of the family has been eroded especially fast. Its socializing functions have been undermined not by political institutions or the ideological jealousy of the authorities, but by the growing belief that the experience of one generation is irrelevant for the next. It is the same belief that has also begun to weaken the influence of educational institutions, whose control by adults is being increasingly contested.

Sexual Morality, Divorce, and Birth Control

Even in societies where sociological inquiry is *not* subject to political control and ideological legitimation (as is the case in the US), the prevailing norms of sexual conduct are difficult to ascertain. Quite possibly, more has been written and published on these matters in the United States than in any other society at any time, yet much remains unknown. For example, it is difficult to know how much of the "Sexual Revolution" is a behavioural reality and how much a creation of the mass media, some social scientists and journalists who are overeager to characterize every form of change as revolutionary. While in 1964 *Time* Magazine in its article on "The Second Sexual Revolution," asserted that there was only a "tattered remnant" of a sexual code, and that people in the 1960s were "adrift in a sea of permissiveness," in 1966 it was reported in the *New York Times*

[39] Robert Nisbet, *Community and Power* (New York, 1968), p. 59.

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(in an article summarizing the results of many studies and opinions of experts) that "nonvirginity among college women [was put] at 20% or less."[40] The article quoted John H. Gagnon, a senior trustee at the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana University, who observed that "the rules on speaking about sex have changed and . . . because Americans talk more about it they conclude there is more of it."

A study of the sex life of a group of middle-aged, upper middle-class Americans found that

> . . . this [culturally] pervasive accent on sex seems not to have much shaped the habits and tastes of the Significant Americans in line with the ubiquitous image. Many remain clearly ascetic where sex is concerned. Others are simply asexual. For still others sex is overlaid with such strong hostility that an *anti*-sexual orientation is clear. . . . The overriding fact seems to be that for the majority, by the middle years, sex has become almost nonexistent. . . .[41]

Have things changed drastically since the mid-1960s? Conceivably they have. For example, if it is true, as was reported in 1970[42] that 10 per cent of high school students in California were estimated to have venereal disease—then, unless standards of medical care have deteriorated, promiscuity must be on the rise. It is certainly plausible that there has been a relaxation of sexual constraints in American society in the 1060s. The Youth Culture, as we noted in Chapter 4, is hedonistic, disdains self-restraint, and glorifies all forms of self-expression. Millions of young (and not so young) Americans have joined the battle against real or felt personal-social isolation. Sexual relations do hold out the hope for breaking out of isolation and for intensifying personal relationships. On the other hand, drug use relegates sex to a secondary place in the hierarchy of pleasures. (Nor does promiscuousness per se deepen the significance or the intensity of the act.)

Despite all the publicity the topic receives, few well-established facts are available on the sexual behaviour of Americans. The level of premarital activity and adultery, the number of prostitutes and the volume of their business, the ages when most women (or men) lose their virginity, the number of "group marriages" and "cooperative families," and the types of communal living arrangements which

[40] *Time Magazine*, January 24, 1964, p. 54; and "A U.S. Sex Revolt? It's Mostly Talk," *NYT*, July 11, 1966. A gradual change toward permissiveness (and particularly toward permissiveness with affection), rather than a sexual revolution is frequently viewed as characteristic of our times, see, for example, Erwin O. Smigel and Rita Seiden in their "Decline and Fall of the Double Standard" in *Sex and the Contemporary American Scene*, *The Annals*, March 1968.

[41] John F. Cuber with Peggy B. Haroff, *The Significant Americans—A Study of Sexual Behavior Among the Affluent* (New York, 1965), pp. 171–72.

[42] On CBS evening news, July 21, 1970. See also "VD: The Epidemic," *Newsweek*, January 24, 1972.

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include or exclude some form of casual polygamy [43]—these and other similar matters remain unknown. We do know, of course, that censorship is rapidly retreating across the land, and that the mass media and entertainment allow forms of sexual display which were prohibited not long ago; that an increasingly (and sometimes incredibly) wide range of sexual services and goods (including, for instance, electrical vaginal stimulators) are for sale. At the same time in the same society some political groups wage war on antiseptic sex education in secondary schools; the sale of contraceptives is restricted in many states, and abortion is banned in most. Robert Welch, leader of the John Birch Society, probably spoke for a good number of Americans when he said that "The communist design to promote sex education . . . is a final assault upon the family as a fundamental block in the structure of our civilization. . . . The program is also designed to destroy one whole generation of American youth." [44] Similarly, it was proposed in Monmouth County, New Jersey, that unwed mothers (or at least those on welfare) be prosecuted for criminal adultery or fornication.[45] The examples of such contradictions could be multiplied. The dedicated opponents of what they perceive to be sexual licence or permissiveness are just as determined to establish a relationship between sexual libertarianism and the evils of communism as Herbert Marcuse and his followers are convinced of the relationship between the evils of sexual repression and capitalism.

It has been claimed that many Americans approach sex in a spirit more appropriate for work than play, that they are unspontaneous, anxious, technique- and "achievement"-oriented as if suffering from a combination of bad conscience and misplaced work ethic. A study of sex manuals concluded "That sex involves effort is a pervasive theme" and that "Sex . . . is considered a kind of work. . . ." [46] Such an approach toward sex might also be linked with competitiveness and manipulativeness. The competitive person, in work as in play, measures himself against other people or against certain standards or norms. He wants to maximize his performance in whatever he does. Not making the most of any opportunity is felt to be threatening. Moreover, insofar as sexual activity has become for more and more people not just a means of satisfying biological and emotional needs but also a more generalized form of self-expression, the inten-

[43] Students of the subject have variously given estimates of "mate swapping" as ranging from the participation of 2½ million to 8 million couples, as well as one to 10 million people. (See Duane Denfield and Michael Gordon, "The Sociology of Mate Swapping," and Gilbert D. Bartell, "Group Sex Among Mid-Americans," both in *The Journal of Sex Research*, May 1970, pp. 95 and 114.)

[44] "Nixon Naming of Three Decried by Welch," *NYT*, January 7, 1969.

[45] "Curb on Child Aid Backed in New Jersey—Welfare Board in Monmouth Favors Plan to Prosecute Parents of Illegitimates," *NYT*, September 15, 1966.

[46] Lionel S. Lewis and Dennis Brisset: "Sex as Work" in Edward McDonagh and Jon E. Simpson, eds., *Social Problems: Persistent Challenges* (New York, 1965), pp. 76, 77.

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sity of gratification becomes crucial. The comments made by a critic of Norman Mailer's literary approach to sex speak to this point:

> There is something faintly touching and not a little bit absurd in attributing to poor coitus a burden of such momentous gravity. Indeed, Mailer's characters display the sort of elaborate . . . awareness of themselves and the symbolic significance of their every genital thrust which renders the possibility of their experiencing true passion or release highly unlikely.[47]

While most Americans are undoubtedly less metaphysical about sex than Norman Mailer and his heroes, a cruder manipulative approach has an appeal to all those who believe that most things in life can be reduced to techniques—a belief that has deep roots in American culture and appears in forever new guises (such as the recent expectation that a sense of community can be accomplished in small, more or less randomly selected groups of people who mechanically bare their souls—and sometimes their bodies as well—to one another). Manipulativeness is, of course, also built into such a venerable American institution as dating. An advertisement for a booklet by Ann Landers, guidance counsellor for millions of Americans, offers to help the reader "To learn how to keep your boyfriend in line without losing him, send for Ann Landers' booklet: 'Necking and Petting' and how far to go." To be sure, neither manipulativeness nor compulsiveness exhaust the range of attitudes toward sex. There has also been a growth of "permissiveness with affection" and a more casual, yet non-instrumental approach towards sex, the origins of which can be traced to the 1920s.

It is not easy to make broad generalizations about sexual mores and practices in American society. There is much diversity—some of it class- and age-patterned, some of it regional—but there is doubtless a growing tendency towards permissiveness and the relaxation of standards (other than those of personal gratification) governing sexual behaviour.

A sociologist (in 1968) saw the present American sexual situation in the framework of a well-worn historical parallel:

> There is a haunting similarity between the situation of modern America and that of ancient Rome at the height of its imperial powers. . . . The harsh ascetic standards of the founding period were crumbling in favor of an opportunistic code . . . among the sources of pleasure none was pursued with greater intensity than those of a sexual nature.[48]

[47] Robert Boyers, "Attitudes Toward Sex in American High Culture," *The Annals*, p. 39.

[48] Theodore N. Ferdinand, "Sex Behavior and the American Class Structure: A Mosaic," *The Annals*, p. 77.

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THE picture is quite different in the Soviet Union. Most striking is the absence of an observable preoccupation with sex, vast and intense in America but barely noticeable in Soviet society.

The libertarian sexual ethic of the 1920s notwithstanding, the roots of Soviet puritanism go deep. It did not originate with the Stalinist reconstruction of Soviet society. Lenin's views on sex, more bourgeois and conservative than revolutionary, were the forerunners of the neo-Victorian respectability fully restored under Stalin. Lenin impatiently rejected the preoccupation with sex and early sexual experimentation which prevailed among some segments of the revolutionary youth. He deplored concern with matters sexual and expressed, for example, a middle-class distaste for the efforts of German communists to organize prostitutes, calling it "a morbid deviation." Most of all, he objected to the dissipation of energy which he felt was inherent in excessive sexual activity:

> "The youth movement is also affected with the modern approach to the sex problem and with excessive interest in it." Lenin emphasized the word "modern" with an ironical, depreciative gesture: "I have been told that sexual questions are the favorite study of your youth organizations too. . . . Young people particularly need the joy and force of life. Healthy sport, swimming, racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind and many-sided intellectual interests . . . that will give young people more than eternal theories about sexual problems. . . . The revolution demands concentration, increase of forces. . . . It cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions. Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois. . . . Self control, self discipline is not slavery not even in love.[49]

It would be tempting to tie these views of Lenin to his great fear of and preoccupation with the spontaneity of the Russian masses. "Sexual excesses" might have been viewed as one of the aspects of the Russian national character the Bolshevik leaders were determined to stamp out. At the same time it is also quite possible that Lenin's attitude toward sex was a reflection of a purely personal (puritanical) disposition.

Whatever the private sexual concerns of Soviet citizens, they are hardly reflected either in the mass media, entertainment, or published materials. Nor is it very likely that under the smooth surface there lies a seething popular obsession with sex. Prudishness and modesty appear to be fairly widely distributed popular attitudes, although, as will be shown later, there is also some recent evidence to the contrary. Some of these attitudes may be attributed, at least in part, to the persistence of the values of a traditional peasant society. Not only is close to half of the population still rural, but even those in the cities are in large measure first generation urbanites. Still more significant is the fact that, according to recent calculations, "only

[49] *The Emancipation of Women—From the Writings of V. I. Lenin* (New York, 1966), pp. 104, 107, 108.

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one eighth of all Soviet women may be considered more or less completely urbanized." [50] Again, these are only impressions and surmises. There has been no Soviet Kinsey, or Ira Reiss, no Masters and Johnson. It would be difficult to conceive of a Soviet social scientist (except in the 1920s) making the following statement *and* having it published:

> Even if the result of further research is to the effect that an increase in sexual promiscuity and sexual license is symptomatic of the decline and breakdown of the traditional officially monogamic family unit as the exclusive marital form, we must look further to social policy and social philosophy, and, rather than decrying and resisting those changes, look for new ways to cope with them and ways to develop novel types of family structures and family policies with new and hopefully expanded means of sexual fulfilment. . . .[51]

From the early 1930s until the 1960s there was hardly any public discussion of matters relating to sex in the USSR. Not only were no inventories made about the frequency and form of sexual activities of the citizens, but references to sex were practically eliminated from fiction, movies, and theatre as well. Before 1955 abortions were illegal and contraceptives often unobtainable or in short supply and of limited variety. More recently some official concern has developed over the effects of the long suppression of public discussion of sex. Poor marital relations, coarseness toward women, and even sexual crimes have been attributed to ignorance about sex, still sometimes called "a delicate subject"! The loss of virginity of a fifteen-year-old girl not only resulted in criminal proceedings against the perpetrator ("for corrupting morals of a minor") but also in the observation that such problems arise in part "because adolescents have no communication with their elders on this subject." [52] Another article provides interesting clues to both the persistence of Victorian moral standards and the youthful deviations from them. Again a man was "accused of debauching minors":

> A picture was unfolded before the court showing how in the course of a few months the most sacred thing in a woman's life was trampled on, how girls went beyond the purity of the first timid kisses, the freshness of feelings, their joyous youth, and went from childhood directly into the depth of depravity. . . . [The article concluded:] In the relations between the sexes we have discarded much that was hypocritical and that had been implanted by religion and the pedagogy of private boarding schools. But

[50] William M. Mandel, "Soviet Women and Their Self Image," paper presented at the Far Western Slavic Conference in May 1970, p. 1.

[51] James R. and Lynn G. Smith, "Co-Marital Sex and the Sexual Freedom Movement," *The Journal of Sex Research*, May 1970, p. 142.

[52] "If It Were Only An Isolated Case," by Candidate of Jurisprudence V. Baskov, Moscow Assistant Prosecutor, *Izvestia*, transl. *CDSP*, 21 October 1964.

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> somewhere and in some way, it seems to me, we have gone overboard. Some young people have interpreted the lifting of harmful prohibitions as a lifting of all prohibitions.[53]

Interestingly enough the same article also accused the mothers of the two girls (aged fifteen and sixteen) of failure "to guard their daughters." When a leading Soviet daily newspaper talks about "some young people" in a critical context such as the above it is likely that the author had in mind large numbers of people.[54] Thus we cannot rule out the possibility that there is much premarital sexual activity, at least in some segments of Soviet society, a possibility supported by the high rates of illegitimacy. While precise, nationwide statistics are, as usual, unavailable, there are suggestive bits of information: "A Soviet legal specialist estimated that there were 11 million illegitimate children in the USSR in 1947, a year in which 3,312,000 unmarried mothers were receiving grants for support of their children." [55]

Although, as noted earlier, a Soviet Kinsey Report is yet to be written, we do have some interesting figures concerning sexual attitudes in the USSR. Unfortunately, as is often the case with Soviet empirical investigations, there is little information provided about the method of sampling, the size of the sample, and the method of eliciting the information. The study we are referring to probed attitudes toward premarital sexual relations. The sample consisted of students and professional people (the latter defined as "scholarly and scientific personnel of Leningrad academic and research institutions.") They approved or disapproved of premarital sexual relations in the following proportions:

	STUDENT		PROFESSIONAL	
	Men	*Women*	*Men*	*Women*
	Per cent		Per cent	
Approve	58	38	62	55
Condemn	16	27	14	7
Indefinite	31	35	24	38

It was also found that in a sample of 500 *unmarried* students (it was not clear whether or not this was in the same sample reported above)

[53] "Grandfathers and Grandmothers," *Izvestia*, transl. *CDSP*, 4 December 1968, pp. 11 and 12.

[54] In this respect the Soviet and American mass media often play diametrically opposed roles. In the Soviet Union the mass media frequently understates social problems, at least those which have significant ideological implications. One might say that reportage on such problems resembles the proverbial iceberg. "Some people" mentioned suggests a vast number who go unmentioned. In the American mass media the situation is often very different. Social problems, especially those which can be presented in a lurid, sensational manner, are often overdramatized and exaggerated. In this manner, however, a commercially oriented mass media may perform the useful function of muck-raking or societal self-criticism, no matter what the underlying motives are.

[55] Geiger, op. cit. p. 259.

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85 per cent of the men and 47 per cent of the women had sexual experience, presumably intercourse. (The actual questions were not reproduced.) [56]

Figures such as the above would suggest that popular attitudes, among some segments of the population, are certainly less puritanical than the tone of many official discussions would suggest. According to one Western observer, "Behind the appearance of modesty and decorum . . . Russia is considerably more permissive than any Western society I know. . . . Lovemaking is extraordinarily casual, in the emotional as well as physical sense. There is almost total freedom, with very little talk about it, and less guilt." [57] In the dissertation cited above, other surveys undertaken by the author were also reported. These dealt with permissibility of premarital sex with a loved one, as against a mere acquaintance. The results were not surprising: far larger proportions of the respondents favoured sex with love than without (a finding consistent with a large body of research in the United States). Remnants of the double standard did show up: "men are more liberal toward their own sexual behaviour than toward that of women, and women are more liberal toward male sexual behaviour than toward their own" [58] —again a fairly widespread pattern in this country. Apparently the samples used in these studies were heavily weighted toward the educated groups from Leningrad (although one of the surveys mentioned included blue-collar workers as well, without indicating their proportions). This weighting naturally raises questions concerning their generalizability to the population as a whole or even to the urban population.

IT is somewhat less difficult to make comparisons between family instability, and divorce in particular, in the two societies. One thing is clear: there has been a striking increase over the past decade in Soviet divorce, as a result, in part, of easier divorce procedures. This meant the abolition of large fees, reduction of prolonged waiting periods, and doing away with public (press) announcement of the intent to divorce. In uncontested cases and at the request of both parties, marriages can now be dissolved through the registry without legal proceedings. There still is, however, a one month waiting period before a wedding and three months' before divorce is granted.[59]

It also appears that many reasons adduced to explain the high divorce rates in the USSR are similar to those which have been pro-

[56] S. I. Golod, "Sociological Problems of Sexual Morality," *Soviet Sociology*, Summer 1969, pp. 12, 13; this article is a translation of the dissertation abstract submitted by the author to the Philosophical Faculty of Leningrad University in 1968. The limited information concerning sampling, referred to in the text, may be a result of selective translation in this case.

[57] *Message From Moscow*, p. 115.

[58] Golod, op. cit.

[59] Theodore Shabad: "Simplified Soviet Divorce Law Expected to Bolster Family Life," *NYT*, December 28, 1965, p. 7; and also "Report of Marriage and Family Law," *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, trans. *CDSP*, July 24, 1968, pp. 16 and 17.

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posed to account for divorce in the United States. Soviet divorce rates are also similar to those in this country and are among the highest in the world. The following figures indicate changes in divorce rates (per thousand population) in the two countries:

	1940	1950	1955	1960	1965	1967	1968	1969	1970 [60]
US	2·0	2·6	2·3	2·2	2·5	2·7	2·9	3·2	no inf.
USSR	1·1	0·4	no inf.	1·3	2·8	2·7	2·7	2·6	2·6 [61]

More research has been done in the US about the factors associated with family instability, since divorce rates have been high for decades. The explanations of the upsurge in Soviet divorce rates are less well established, although they include the institutional facilitation of divorce that took place in 1965.

Thus until recently both American and Soviet society maximized the institutional obstacles of divorce although in the U.S there are great variations among states concerning divorce procedure. It is not easy to assess in which society divorce is more difficult at present. Given sufficient financial resources required for travel, legal advice, or both, it is fairly easy (if time-consuming) to obtain divorce in the U.S. In the Soviet Union the major hurdles were more bureaucratic than financial, although there were also fees to be paid. The changing Soviet divorce laws have faithfully reflected the fluctuating family policies of the regime. The 1920's was the famed period of "postcard divorce," replaced by the new stringent regulations in 1936 and 1944, which were eased in 1965. In part because American divorce laws have changed relatively little over the last few decades (except for a few states), it is likely that the rising rates of divorce in the U.S. had little to do with legal facilitation, but reflected other social conditions. Correspondingly, the growth of divorce in the Soviet Union in the recent years reflects more than merely the greater legal opportunity. The increase of Soviet divorce is associated with factors at work in both societies: the continuing decline of traditional family controls, the desire for more choice in every area of life, improved opportunities to focus attention on the personal-emotional aspects of a relationship and—in the Soviet case—the transition from a highly repressive to a somewhat more permissive social order. In both societies the existing arrangements for divorce constitute what might be called a "cultural lag"; they are greatly out of step with the values and attitudes of large portions of the populations. This is especially marked in the United States, where a very high popular toleration of divorce is juxtaposed with an archaic legal structure which has produced proliferating patterns of circumvention. The

[60] *Pocket Data Book*, p. 68; and *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1970*, Washington, D.C., 1971, p. 60.

[61] *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR v. 1970 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1970) (Moscow, 1971), p. 52. It should be noted that this publication does not provide figures for the same years as the *Pocket Data Book*.

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institutional obstruction of divorce has different sources in the two countries. In the U.S., it is clearly a survival of religious values; in the Soviet Union—in addition to the factors discussed earlier—it is related to the right of the state and the collective to exercise supervision over the personal life of the citizen. Practical considerations also play a part; the Soviet state is not anxious to take over the upbringing and care of children who are products of broken homes and parental irresponsibility. In many Soviet articles discussing family problems a great emphasis is put on the need to enforce court rulings on alimony.

The comments of Soviet sociologists probing the causes of divorce have a familiar ring. For example:

> People of different cultural and moral levels and of different backgrounds and ways of life mix. They leave behind them traditional forms of control by the family, by the public opinion of the village street, by relatives. No social or material factors hinder them from marrying—and from soon realizing that they had been hasty. . . .
>
> Research has been and is being conducted in different parts of the country, but the results are amazingly similar. Two-thirds of those questioned cite spiritual and moral differences as the cause of disruption of marriage.[62] Economic conditions turn out to have an ever smaller effect (about 5 per cent) on the family. And almost 100 per cent of the husbands and wives consider love, mutual respect and sharing of cultural interests to be the foundation of family life. . . .
>
> Young men and women today make greater moral demands of marriage. They seek to embark upon married life at an earlier age than ever before and very often the romantic ideas of married life are wrecked upon its prose—an inability to run a household, to keep to a family budget, to give in to one another when disagreements arise.[63]

This article also pointed out that, as in the United States, high rates of divorce do not indicate loss of confidence in the family, since most of those divorced remarry. On the other hand, drunkenness plays a far more important part in the break up of marriages in the USSR than it does in the United States.

But no matter how important personal compatibilities are, no matter how much a rise in expectations has contributed to family instability

[62] Many of which doubtless spring from class differences. Perhaps the phenomenon can be explained in part by Trotsky's scathing observations made decades ago: "One of the very dramatic chapters in the great book of the Soviet will be the tale of the disintegration . . . of those Soviet families where the husband as a party member, trade unionist, military commander or administrator, grew and developed and acquired new tastes in life and the wife, crushed by the family, remained on the old level. The road of the two generations of the Soviet bureaucracy is sown thick with the tragedies of wives rejected and left behind," Trotsky, op. cit., p. 156. Naturally the disruptive effect of such circumstances is not confined to Soviet society.

[63] I. Kasyukov and A. Mendeleyev, "Sociologist's Opinion: Must a Family Man Have Talent?" *Nedelya*, transl. *CDSP*, April 19, 1967, p. 25.

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in Soviet society, more tangible circumstances of life continue to play a part. This fact was pointed out by A. G. Kharchev, the most eminent Soviet family sociologist:

> . . . it would be one-sided at best to assert that the solidity and well-being of the family collective depends solely on the moral complexion of those who start the family. Without exception all the readers who sent letters to the editor about the article "The Family Is a Cell of Society" agree that many conflicts, disorders and misunderstandings in family life occur because of poor organization of everyday life, and that people responsible for living arrangements and services to the population still fall far short of squaring accounts with the Soviet family.[64]

Equally interesting and sociologically plausible are the observations offered by V. Perevedentsev, a well-known Soviet economist who often writes about sociological topics:

> . . . divorce was highest among the intelligentsia and the lowest among the collective farmers. . . .[65]
> Because so many women now have good jobs they no longer are dependent economically on their husbands. . . .
> . . . the rising number of divorces has caused society to be more tolerant. . . .[66]

The factors generally associated with marital instability in the United States have often been stated. Religious sanctions against divorce have lost much of their force, as have familial pressures with the decline of the extended family; the threat of economic insecurity and the total dependence of women on men have also diminished (probably one of the motives that prompted many women in the past to stay married); the practical "services" provided by the family have become fewer with the narrowing of its functions; greater social and geographic mobility provides opportunities for more people of more varied, and potentially more incompatible, backgrounds to meet and marry; greater economic security has made early and more ill-considered marriages possible; improvements in the material conditions of life together with the growing meaninglessness of religious values have increasingly predisposed people to seek private, personal, emotional fulfilment (offered by the family) and to make, correspondingly, greater psychological demands on it.[67] And, of course, despite many persisting restrictions, divorce is also becoming somewhat easier in the United States as ex-

[64] "Once More on the Family" in P. Hollander, ed., op. cit., p. 194.
[65] Soviet collective farmers are the most tradition-bound segment of the population, which explains their low divorce rates, while the intelligentsia encompasses a wide variety of white-collar occupations (including those with modest incomes) who tend to be urban and mobile both socially and geographically.
[66] "Soviet Population Expert Deplores Rising Divorce Rate," *NYT*, September 7, 1969.
[67] See, for instance, William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York, 1963), esp. pp. 81–86.

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emplified by the recent changes in California law, which now permits couples to dissolve their marriages on grounds of "irreconcilable differences."

As these conditions are likely to persist in American society the divorce rate will remain high, and may even continue to grow. Similarly, in Soviet society where several of these trends are also present, a high divorce rate will continue and possibly increase.

IN matters of birth control Soviet policies followed the familiar zigzag from early permissiveness to the totalitarian policy of encouraging population growth beginning in the 1930s and back to the somewhat more permissive policies of the last fifteen years during which abortion has become both legal and widely available. The greater variety of birth control techniques and devices available in the United States reflect a more advanced medical technology and a developed "consumption economy," rather than a more enlightened public policy toward family planning (as contraception is still called euphemistically).[68] While birth control is widely practised in both societies it continues to be hedged in by various restrictions, especially for the unmarried. In the United States, the main resistance comes from the Catholic Church, a force with which Soviet birth control advocates do not have to contend. In both societies it is the more highly educated strata who are most willing to use birth control; those who have the largest families are, or have been frequently found among the lower socio-economic groups. In American society, however, particularly in the years following World War II, it was something of a fashion among middle- and upper-middle-class families to have three to five children, a number well above the then national average of children per family. This was not a reflection of the lack of contraceptives, but rather an attempt, facilitated by material affluence, to find fulfilment in the family, especially on the part of women.

Birth rates in the Soviet Union have significantly declined over the past decades: 1940—31·2 (per thousand of population); 1950—26·7; 1960—24·9; 1968—17·2 (thus approximating American rates which were 24·1 in 1950, 23·7 in 1960, and 17·5 in 1968).[69] The reasons for the decline of Soviet rates presumably include improved access to birth control methods, the persistence of overcrowded housing and the growth of material expectations which accompany the process of urbanization and secularization.

Equally noteworthy are the regional variations within the USSR: in Azerbaijan and Turkmenia, for example, the rate in 1962 was over

[68] In the Soviet Union the limited range and availability of contraceptive devices was suggested by a study published in 1965 which found that in a sample of small town and rural women who required abortions, 52 per cent used no form of contraception and only 5 per cent used diaphragms and/or jelly. The pill was not even mentioned. (Cited in David M. Heer, "Abortion, Contraception & Population Policy in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies*, July 1965, p. 82.)

[69] *Pocket Data Book*, p. 59; *Narodnoya Khozyaistvo v 1970 g*, p. 47.

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40 per 1,000 while it was 16 per 1,000 in the Baltic Republics.[70] The figures reflect the persistence of tradition in parts of the Soviet Union. According to another Soviet source, these geographical (and associated cultural) variations "have been in existence for a long period of time and remain virtually unchanged." Low birth rates or, according to the same article, a preference for having no more than one or two children, are viewed as a threat to society, confronting it with the problem of an aging population and the associated "reduction in manpower reserves." The author's recommendation is the following:

> . . . It would be best for society and the family itself if each family were to have two or three children. Children are not only the hope and future support of their parents but also the future of our state. Therefore, the raising and care of children should be regarded not as merely the private concern of married couples but as socially useful labor. . . .[71]

Another article written by V. Perevedentsev voices the official apprehension that declining birth rates could undermine or weaken the world power status of the USSR by reducing her share of the world population.[72]

In the final analysis in both American and Soviet society it is still the context of the family in which most people expect to find their major emotional gratifications and source of security.[73] This is a curious situation in view of all the real and alleged problems which beset the family, including the role conflicts of spouses, the possibilities of rejection of the parents by children, and the awareness of the predictable routinization of sexual and emotional pleasures in marriage etc. Why should it be that despite such problems (and notwithstanding very high divorce rates) people continue to pursue happiness in the family? Perhaps it is in large part by default of other institutions that the family persists as a continued source of attraction, and also by the sheer weight of convention. But more important may be the circumstance that other groups and relationships have proved still more transient and unsatisfactory as sources of emotional sustenance.

[70] Henry P. David, *Family Planning and Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe* (New York, 1970), p. 42.

[71] Valentei and G. Kiseleva: "The Family, Children and Society," *Pravda*, transl. *CDSP*, October 29, 1969, p. 10.

[72] V. Perevedentsev: "Continuation of a Controversy," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, transl. *CDSP*, April 10, 1968, p. 9.

[73] Even those who reject traditional forms of family, members of hippie and other communes in America, talk about *their* "family," thereby paying tribute to an institution they otherwise hold in low respect.

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Sociology—For Whom?

Melvin Croan

THE accomplishments no less than the tribulations of sociology as an academic discipline can serve both to illuminate the general process of socio-political change in communist Eastern Europe and to highlight important differences between individual countries of the region. As long as Stalinist regimes held sway, sociology everywhere was suppressed as ideologically reactionary and politically subversive. Since the discipline's revival fifteen or so years ago, its development has been uneven. Under the post-Stalin dispensation, it has been beset by a host of novel problems, ranging from the theoretical issue of the precise relationship between "Marxist sociology" and historical materialism to such practical matters as the proper scope and focus of sociological research and the politically permissible degree of critical thrust. The state of sociology in Eastern Europe today is, therefore, of far more than mere academic interest.

The present volume,[1] one in a series on "Perspectives in Sociology" under the general editorship of Herman Lantz, contains chapters on the status of sociology in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, each authored by one or more sociologists from each particular country. Jerzy Wiatr, a Polish political sociologist, provides a general introductory overview which guardedly alludes to the ideological obstacles and political problems confronting sociology throughout Eastern Europe.

NOT surprisingly, the individual country chapters vary enormously both in the scope of their inventory of research and teaching and in the readiness of their authors to address themselves to basic dilemmas. In both respects the chapter on the Soviet Union is downright embarrassing. It reveals little about what is actually going on in Soviet sociology; rather, it merely echoes the Party's call that sociology "become a mighty weapon of social prognostication, planning and management." Much the same instrumental note is sounded in the considerably more informative chapter on Poland, written by Professor Markiewicz of the University of Poznan. Reflecting the obscurantism of the last years of the Gomulka regime, Markiewicz stresses the need for "ideological consolidation" and further sees fit to warn his fellow Polish sociologists that their rank and prestige will depend on how effectively they serve the building of socialism. By contrast, the chapter on Hungary, while offering fewer details on the state of the discipline

[1] *The State of Sociology in Eastern Europe Today*. Edited by Jerzy J. Wiatr. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971, xxiv, 273 pp. $8.95.

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in that country, cautions against "manager sociology" in the service of the political authorities and enters a brief for a sociology that will contribute to "social progress" rather than to "the maintenance of the status quo." Its author, András Hegedüs, the sometime Stalinist premier, has himself been engaged in a major sociological study of bureaucracy which even the relatively tolerant Kadar Government considers suspect of "revisionism."

The lengths to which a critical Marxist sociology might lead is indicated in the chapter on Czechoslovakia which acknowledges the discipline's contribution to the 1968 reform movement. The author, writing shortly after the Soviet invasion, expresses the hope that critical sociological enquiries might continue but that, alas, scarcely proved possible with the tragic decimation of Czechoslovak intellectual life as a whole. The chapters on Rumania and Yugoslavia also document the time and place of their composition. While the former stresses the Rumanian contribution to "the sociological theory of the nation in socialism," the latter notes the preoccupation with "self-management" to the detriment of other areas of sociological investigation and laments the lack of coordination between various research institutes.

As "the first introductory guide to East European sociology—its status and prospects"—to cite the dust jacket—the book is necessarily a disappointment. Yet, almost in spite of itself, it does offer "valuable insights," which together with other, more complete and better balanced data may someday contribute to a genuine "sociology of sociology" in Eastern Europe.

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The Soviet Passenger Car Industry

William P. Baxter

ARISTOTLE predicted that the time would come when men ceased to enslave other men and had mechanical slaves, that it would be possible to lift drudgery from flesh and lay it on machines.[1]

> The Soviet government recognizes that to fulfil the communist ethic of raising the standard of living of the workers, they must depart from the leftist extremist belief in barracks-like communist life, providing a grossly equal minimum of individual wants.[2]

Such statements show that Soviet economic planners recognize the rising demands of Soviet consumers. In conducting consumer research, Soviet scientists discovered that the average Soviet citizen desired a passenger car above all other consumer goods.[3] How well these desires are met provides a measure of the influence of the citizens of the Soviet Union on their government, and of the interest of the government in meeting the desires of its citizens.

THE automobile never received the attention under the Tsars that it received in the Western world. While the automobile was replacing the horse, and Henry Ford and others were building their industrial empires, the automobile remained in Russia a toy for a few rich people. A few amateurish enterprises operated in 1901 to support the small fleet of imported cars, and a group of small enterprises existed around St. Petersburg manufacturing an insignificant number of cars from imported plans and sub-assemblies. And by 1918 this fledgling industry had a branch in Nizhny Novgorod, where a total of six cars were manufactured that year. (There were only 10,000 motor vehicles of all types registered in Russia in 1914.[4] In comparison, Ford Motor Company alone manufactured 248,307 automobiles in that year.[5]) More importantly, the Russian-Baltic Coach Building Works in Riga, between 1908 and 1915, manufactured a total of 450 cars from imported sub-assemblies and plans.[6]

1 John B. Rae, *Henry Ford* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969), p. 159.
2 U. A. Zamosikin, L. N. Zhilina, N. I. Froloba, "Sdvigi v Massovom Potreblenii u Lichnost" (Progress in Mass Consumption and the Individual), *Voprosi Filosofi*, Vol. 6 (June 1969), p. 22.
3 Ibid. p. 33.
4 Polina Aleshina et al., *Gorkovskii Avtomilnyi* (Moscow, Profizdat, 1964), p. 10.
5 Allan Nevins, *Ford: The Times, the Man, the Company* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), p. 644.
6 "Avtomobilnaia Promyshlennost" (Automobile Industry), *Bolshaia Sovietskaia Entsiklopedia*, Vol. I (1949), p. 258.

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During the first world war, this production of automobiles was interrupted, although the Ryabushinsky Kuznetsov Company in Moscow manufactured a modest number of vehicles and repair parts in support of the war effort. After the revolution, the factory was renamed The Moscow Automobile Society (AMO). At first, AMO was entirely occupied in keeping the existing fleet of vehicles running, but in 1920 Lenin urged that a Soviet-built and designed automobile be produced to meet the needs of the country. In 1924 the first 10 trucks rolled off the AMO assembly line amid great fanfare and celebration.[7] That was the first and last production of the year.[8] Although hailed as a Soviet achievement, the vehicles were actually produced from plans and sub-assemblies bought from FIAT of Italy.[9] In 1925 production was started in Yaroslavl, but total production in the USSR for that year was less than 1,000 vehicles of all types.[10] The 1928 edition of the *Malaya Sovietskaya Entsyclopediia* noted that "automobiles are not produced in this country."[11]

The Soviet passenger car industry was actually created during the first five-year plan. On 31 May 1929 the Soviet government signed an agreement with Henry Ford to build what became the Gorki Automobile Plant (GAZ) and to train Soviet technicians to operate it.[12] The plant went into operation in 1931. In 1932 the first Soviet manufactured passenger car, the GAZ A, actually a Model A Ford, was produced.[13] The historians of the Gorki Automobile Plant claim that the first Soviet-designed car, the GAZ MI, went into production on 16 May 1936. This 54-horsepower, five-passenger sedan with a top speed of 100 kilometres per hour was actually an improved Model A Ford.[14] In the same year, the Plant Named Stalin, a Moscow truck plant, produced the first Soviet six-passenger sedan—the ZIS 101.[15]

By 1937, Soviet automobile production had reached 200,000 units per year, including 18,300 passenger cars, placing the USSR fourth among world producers.[16]

The second world war interrupted the production of passenger cars in the USSR, although the Gorki Automobile Plant produced a military sedan, the GAZ 67-b, a rough equivalent of a jeep. In 1943, Stalin ordered the production of the ZIS 110 sedan, a seven-passenger luxury sedan with a 140-horsepower motor and a top speed of 140 kilometres per

7 Aleshina et al., p. 9.
8 Ibid. p. 11.
9 G. A. Vvedensky, "Soviet Passenger Automobile Industry," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. XVI (June 1969), p. 31.
10 Aleshina et al., p. 12.
11 Vvedensky.
12 Aleshina et al., p. 18.
13 Ibid. p. 25.
14 Ibid. p. 84.
15 Vvedensky, p. 32.
16 "Avtomobilnaia Promyshlennost" (Automobile Industry), *Ekonomicheskaya Entsiklopedia Promyshlennost i Stroitelstvo*, Vol. I (1962), col. 31.

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hour.[17] This car was obviously intended for high government officials, but one can only speculate that a motive behind this directive was an effort to enhance Soviet prestige at Yalta and other high level international conferences.

After the reconstruction of Soviet industry following the second world war, the USSR again started to manufacture passenger cars. In 1948 the new Moscow Small Displacement Automobile Plant Named Lenin Comsomol, successor to AMO, started production of the Moskvitch 401, first of a series of popular four-passenger sedans. At the same time, the Gorki Automobile Plant started producing the GAZ M 20 "Pobeda," a five-passenger, medium-class sedan.[18] In 1950 the GAZ plant was renamed ZIM, Plant Named Molotov, and introduced a new six-passenger sedan with a hydraulic clutch, the ZIM 12.[19]

In 1957 the automotive industry was destalinized and much name changing took place.[20] ZIM became GAZ once again, and ZIS was redesignated ZIL, Plant Named Likhachev. Vehicle designations were also changed. The ZIS 110 was remodelled and became the ZIL 111. The "Pobeda" was renamed the "Volga," and the ZIM 20 became the "Chaika" (Seagull). The year 1957 also saw the introduction of a new car manufactured at the Zaprozhets Automobile Plant, the ZAZ 965. This four-passenger sedan is the cheapest Soviet automobile to own and operate.[21]

The Soviet passenger car fleet now comprises the ZIL, the Chaika, the Volga, the Moskvitch, and the Zaprozhets. Within the past few years, another model was added to the fleet, from the new Volga Automobile Plant. This complex is being constructed at Tolyatti by the Italian firm FIAT in accordance with a contract signed in the USSR on 4 May 1966. This contract called for the design and construction in the USSR of a modern automobile plant having an annual output of 600,000 VAZ 2101 sedans, a Soviet version of the popular FIAT 124 sedan.[22]

Principal Locations of Soviet Passenger Car Plants

There is a lack of detailed data about separate enterprises, so the subject must be treated in a general manner. As in the United States, one finds that the industry is generally concentrated in a few locations. The total percentage of output of the automotive industry of the USSR by region is as follows[23]:

17 Vvedensky.
18 Ministerstvo Avtomobilnogo Transporta i Shosseinykh Dorog, RSFSR, Gosudarstvenyi Nauchno-Issledovatelskii Institut Avtomobilnogo Transporta, *Kratkii Avtomobilnyi Spravochnik* (Moscow: Naychno-Tekhnicheskoie Izdatelstvo Avtotransportnoi Literaratury, 1958), p. 7.
19 Vvedensky.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 "Fiat's New Wheeler," *Time* (Atlantic Edition), 6 May 1966, p. 49.
23 Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoi Upravlenie SSSR, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR v 1968 Godu* (Moscow: Statistika, 1969), p. 130.

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*RSFSR	80·9
Ukrainian SSR	12·9
White Russia	3·5
Georgia	1·5
Moldavia	0·3
Kirgizia	0·8
Armenia	0·1

* These percentages represent production of all types of motor vehicles, not only passenger cars.

As we have seen, all passenger cars, except the Zaprozhets, are manufactured in the RSFSR.[24] If the total production of motor vehicles in 1968 was 800,836 units, one can estimate that approximately 103,300 units were manufactured in the Ukraine.[25] This estimate is consistent with other sources. Soviet sources also have announced that the total production of commercial type vehicles in 1968 was 520,504 units, and that 16·4 per cent of this output, or 85,600 units, were manufactured in the Ukraine.[26] By subtraction, we can estimate that 17,700 Zaprozhets passenger cars were produced in 1968. The accuracy of this figure depends on whether or not the Soviet planners use the same parameters in each of the tables of *Narodnoe Khosiastvo,* but it at least gives some guidance, and it does not differ greatly from other estimates.

The minister of the Automobile Industry of the USSR, H. M. Tarasov, announced that the 1968 output of the Moscow Small Displacement Automobile Plant Named Lenin Comsomol was approximately 100,000 units.[27] At that time, this plant was the only source of Moskvitch passenger cars, and since this plant is not listed as a producer of any other motor vehicles, we may assume that this figure represents the production of Moskvitches in 1968. By subtraction, we can estimate that the Gorki Automobile Plant produced 162,600 passenger cars in 1968, obviously more Volgas than Chaikas. There is no way to break this figure down any further.

In addition to the above figures, the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant (UAZ), located in Lenin's birthplace, produces the UAZ 469, the Soviet equivalent of our jeep. However, there are no figures available on production of this model. The Soviets officially classify it as a truck, but it is mentioned here due to its similarity to a passenger car.[28]

Modernization of existing plants and creation of new enterprises will greatly increase productive capacity. Modernization and automation

[24] Alec Flegon, *Soviet Trade Dictionary* (London: Flegon Press, 1964), p. 274.
[25] Tsentralnya Statisticheskoe Upravlenoe SSSR, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR v 1968 Godu*, p. 261.
[26] Ibid. pp. 136 and 261.
[27] H. M. Potapov, "Vam Otvechaiut Ministerstvo i Vedomstvo" (The Ministry and the Department Answer You), Radio Moscow Broadcast (Moscow: 2030 hours, 12 February 1969).
[28] *Kratkii Avtomobilnyi Spravochnik*, p. 32.

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of the assembly line at the Moscow Small Displacement Automobile Plant Named Lenin Comsomol are expected to raise production to 200,000 units per year.[29] This capacity, and the output of Moskvitches from the new Izhevsk Automobile Plant were expected to raise production of this model to 400,000 units per year in 1970.[30] As production at Izhevsk did not get under way until October of that year, this target was missed by 66,000 units.[31] The modernization and expansion of Moskvitch production is being carried out by RENAULT of France, who agreed to furnish technical assistance.[32] The new Volga Automobile Plant, being constructed at Tolyatti under an agreement with FIAT, is expected to produce 660,000 small cars per year by the end of 1980.[33] Whether or not this goal will be achieved remains to be seen. Although A. Tarasov announced on 2 March 1969 that "... the construction plan is advancing on all fronts."[34] *Pravda* announced on 16 March 1969

Automobile	Factory and Location	Estimated 1968 Output
ZIL **	Plant Named Likhachev	
	Moscow	Unknown
Chaika	Gorki Automobile Plant	
	Gorki	Unknown *
Volga	Gorki Automobile Plant	
	Gorki	162,600 *
Moskvitch	Moscow Small Displacement Automobile Plant Named Lenin Comsomol	
	Moscow	100,000
	Izhevsk	None
ZAZ	Zaprozhe Automobile Plant	
	Zaprozhe	17,700
UAZ **	Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant	
	Ulyanovsk	Unknown
VAZ	Volga Automobile Plant	
	Tolyatti	None

* Chaika production included in Volga figures.
** Not officially classified as passenger cars.

[29] *Economicheskaia Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 34, 1966, p. 7.
[30] Michael Connock, "New Soviet Car Plant Runs into Teething Troubles," *Financial Times* (London), 16 May 1969.
[31] *Pravda* (Moscow), 9 October 1970, p. 1.
[32] A. Blokhin, "Zavodskoi Putz 'Moskvicha,'" (The Factory Path of the Moskvitch), *Izvestia* (Moscow), 16 July 1969, p. 3.
[33] Potapov. This estimate varies widely from the 500,000 figure quoted by *Time*. See "Fiat's New Wheeler," *Time* (Atlantic Edition), 6 May 1966.
[34] A. Tarasov, "Avtomobilizatsia" (Automobilization), *Nedelaia* (Moscow), No. 9, 1969, p 4.

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that problems were larger than expected and work will not be completed on time.[35] Delays in 1970 have delayed completion even more.[36]

In estimating production, Soviet imports were not considered, as they number less than 100 units per year, and are therefore statistically insignificant.[37]

SOVIET PRODUCTION MODELS

There are several striking features about Soviet passenger cars. Since demand far outstrips supply, there is a total lack of competitive marketing practices such as are used in the West. There is a paucity of "extra options" available on Western cars. Apparently the only real option is colour, and this may be a matter of chance rather than choice, at least for the buyer within the USSR.[38] It is well known that not all models are available to the Soviet consumer. The Chaika and ZIL sedans are not even listed in export sales catalogues. These automobiles are intended only for official government use, and the only discussions of them appear in maintenance manuals for vehicle drivers.

Judging from recent announcements in the Soviet press, 1969 was a year of change for the Soviet automobile industry. Zaprozhets, Moskvitch, and Volga all introduced new models. The major change in the Moskvitch and the Volga appears to involve engines; there are no apparent changes in body style or running gear. The Zaprozhets has been completely restyled. Technical data and references on current models are included in Appendix I.

VOLGA

The new Volga sedan, the GAZ 24, was put on the market early in 1969 to replace the older GAZ 21. It has a new body that provides more interior room on the old wheelbase. Mechanically, it has hydraulic drum brakes with separate systems for front and rear, to lessen the likelihood of both systems failing simultaneously. The four-speed manual transmission is mounted on the floor. Reflecting a current drive to simplify maintenance, the number of grease fittings has been reduced from 30 to 9.

ZAPROZHETS

The ZAZ 964 is a two-door sedan that could probably be compared with a Volkswagen in size and performance. Its similarity to Volkswagen is further reinforced by its power-plant, an air-cooled, four-cylinder V-type unit mounted in the rear of the vehicle. There has

[35] S. Bogatoako and E. Manko, "500 Gektarov Pog Kryshei" (500 Hectares Under a Roof), *Pravda* (Moscow), 16 March 1969, p. 2.

[36] "Fiat Plant in Russia is Plagued by Delays," *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 26 February 1970, p. 1.

[37] This data is brought out in Table XV, "Import SSSR Po Tovaram" (Imports of the USSR by Type of Goods), *Bneshnaig Torgovlia SSSR* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Mozhdunarodnie Otnoshenie, 1967, 1968, 1969). This is a sharp decrease from the approximately 1,500 units imported annually under the previous five-year plan.

[38] *Price List No. 2 p*, Vneshpolsyltorg (Moscow, 1965), pp. 5–6.

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been an announcement about a new model, the ZAZ 968, but there are no technical data available on this model as yet. Photographs show a rather stylish vehicle that brings to mind the Karmann Ghia.

MOSKVITCH

The favourite of the Soviet automobile industry and the most famous Soviet passenger car is the redoubtable Moskvitch. It is the only Soviet passenger car to appear in an international automobile rally, where it did rather well, finishing first in its class in the 1968 London to Sydney automobile race.[39] It is interesting to note that the Soviet team consisted of four Moskvitch 412 sedans; however, the first production model Moskvitch 412, SN000001, was produced on 8 December 1969.[40] The Moskvitch 412 was also exhibited at the International Automobile Salon in The Hague.[41] This passenger car represents the first serious Soviet effort to enter the international market and is exported to 70 countries.[42] The author examined it in a dealer's showroom on Vesterbrogade in Copenhagen in June 1969. The Moskvitch 412 apparently differs from the earlier Moskvitch 408 only in the power plant. Photographs show the same four-door sedan with a five-passenger seating capacity. Moskvitch also manufactures a model number 426, universal wagon, on the same chassis and having the same overall dimensions as the sedan.[43]

CHAIKA

The Chaika is not available to Soviet citizens for use as a private sedan. It, like the ZIL, is manufactured for official use. A modification of the Chaika is used as a taxi cab. This four-door, six-passenger sedan is the only Soviet passenger car equipped with a hydraulic clutch.

ZIL 111

The ZIL 111 is a luxury vehicle obviously intended for use as a government limousine. Visiting heads of state or other high-ranking dignitaries are invariably shown riding in ZIL sedans. Although some sources maintain that this vehicle is no longer manufactured, this author cannot accept that theory, even though the Likhachev Plant is no longer listed as a producer of automobiles.[44] There is some evidence that the Soviets may classify this vehicle as a bus or as a special vehicle, since it is carried in that section of the *Short Automobile Hand-*

[39] Ministerstvo Avtomobilnovo Transporta i Shosseinhy Dorog, RSFSR.
[40] "Moskvichi Na Dorogakh 11 Stran" (Moskvitches on the Roads of Eleven Countries), *Sputnik*, No. 8, August 1969, p. 34.
[41] *Pravda* (Moscow), 9 December 1969, p. 1.
[42] "Zaprozhets v Amsterdame" (Zaprozhets in Amsterdam), *TASS Dispatch*, The Hague, 13 February 1969.
[43] A. Blokhin, "Zavodskoi Putz Moskvitcha" (The Factory Journey of the Moskvitch), *Izvestia* (16 July 1969), p. 3.
[44] USSR, *Vneshexport*, Zakaz No. 27063/4.

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book.[45] Nor is it likely that Mr. Brezhnev will meet visiting heads of state at the Moscow Airport in a Moskvitch or a Volga. It may be that demand for this vehicle is sufficiently low that it is manufactured on the basis of individual orders. This four-door, all-metal, seven-passenger sedan has three rows of seats and two heaters for passenger comfort. There is also an open model often seen at ceremonies.

UAZ 469

The UAZ 469 is officially classified as a truck, but it can be considered as a passenger car because of its size. It is the only four-wheel-drive vehicle of this size in the Soviet inventory. Its principal use is as military equipment, but some are available for non-military governmental use in areas where this type of vehicle is required. It has only recently gone into production as a replacement for the VAZ 69, a vehicle having similar characteristics. Some models of the VAZ 69 have a designation "M" indicating that it is equipped with the M20 engine, the same as that in the VAZ 469, and also currently used in the older Volga sedan. This is the only known example of interchangeability of components in the Soviet passenger car industry.

VAZ 2101

The VAZ 2101 is the newest passenger car in the Soviet inventory, although it is not yet in full production. It is a Soviet version of the FIAT 124 sedan. It has a dual braking system with hydraulic drum brakes on the rear and disc brakes on the front wheels. To simplify maintenance, transmission oil changes will be required only every 30,000 miles. The four-cylinder, 60-horsepower engine is of an advanced design but requires 92 octane petrol, which is not yet available in quantity on the Soviet market.[46]

Growth of the Soviet Passenger Car Industry

A casual reading of the Soviet press over the past five years will impress the reader with the determination of the Soviet leadership to "automobilize" the nation. Production statistics support this: for example, in the period 1962–69, production of passenger cars has increased by 177 per cent (see Appendix 3). In 1969 over half of the appropriations for capital construction in the machine building industries for the entire Soviet Union were expended on the automobile industry.[47] To reach the five-year-plan goal of 1,360,000 motor vehicles per year, capital expenditures had to be at least tripled over the level of the previous plan.[48] In the first four years of the current plan, production has shown an average annual growth of about 5 per cent. Actual output

[45] Vvdensky, p. 33.
[46] *Kratkii Avtomobilnyi Spravochnik*, p. 77.
[47] Tarasov.
[48] "Novye Svershenia, Novye Plany" (New Heights, New Plans), *Voprosi Ekonomiki*, No. 11 (1967), p. 5.

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in 1969 was 844,300 motor vehicles, 62 per cent of the announced goal.[49] To achieve the 1970 goal, the USSR is counting on a production of 750,000 passenger cars, a 200 per cent increase in one year. This goal was predicated on the assumption that the new Moskvitch plant at Izhevsk and the new works at Tolyatti would be in production. Although there has been no officially announced change in the five-year-plan goals, achievement of these two important goals in time to meet production appears unlikely. In January 1969 problems at the Izhevsk plant were serious. An article in *Pravda* complained about failure of sub-contractors to deliver required equipment, shortage of skilled workers, and extreme absenteeism among workers.[50] Just how far behind this factory is, is not known, but its estimated production of 100,000 vehicles in 1970, was under-fulfilled by 80 per cent. The first vehicle from the Tolyatti factory was promised by 22 April 1970, the 100th birthday of Lenin, and this goal was reached by using sub-assemblies imported from Italy.[51]

Continued growth of the passenger car industry is forecast for the next five-year plan. On 25 February 1969, A. M. Tarasov told a TASS correspondent during an interview that " specialists estimate the capacity of this branch to be two million vehicles in 1975." (Although it will still greatly lag behind current US production of eight million units per year, and would still leave the USSR in a poor seventh place in world production, even if production in other nations remains static during this period.[52]) In the same article, Tarasov announced that he planned for an increase in truck manufacture of 200,000 units by 1975, indicating that passenger car production for that year is expected to approach 1,150,000 units. Since the planned production of Moskvitches and VAZ 2101s will total 860,000 units by 1975, normal productivity increases at the Volga and Zaprozhets plants added to our previously estimated figures make this assumption appear logical.[53] So, for the first time in Soviet history, some time in the period 1970–1975 the production of passenger cars is planned to surpass the production of commercial vehicles.

FROM the foregoing, it is logical to assume that this expanding production would mean attempting to put an automobile in every garage. In this matter it would be enlightening to see how production

49 " Ob Itogakh Vypolnenia Gosugarstvennogo Plana Razvitia Narognogo Khosaistvo SSSR v 1969 Godu " (About the Summaries of the Fulfilling of the State Plan for the Development of the Economy of the USSR in 1969), *Economikicheskaia Gazeta*, No. 5 (1970), p. 3. Compares actual output with figures announced by Tarasov in January 1969.

50 Connock, p. 4.

51 S. Bogatko and E. Manko, " Vhzitsia Pusk " (Getting Closer to Production), *Pravda* (Moscow), 25 February 1970, p. 1. See also, Min'ko' and Strazhev, *Pravda*, 9 September 1970, p. 2.

52 *The New York Times Encyclopedia Almanac 1970*, ed. Seymour Kurtz (New York: New York Times Book Division, 1969), p. 651.

53 TASS (Moscow), 25 February 1969.

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is distributed between the various consumers. Although detailed sales figures are not available, from official sources we can determine three basic consumers of the product:

(1) Official use, including support of government and party offices, state enterprises, the armed forces, etc.

(2) Exports to other nations both within and without the Soviet bloc. As has already been seen, the Moskvitch is exported to over 70 nations.

(3) Domestic sales, which include sales to the individual consumer and those cars given out as prizes by the State lottery.

Although there are no figures available showing consumption by the official sector, we may come to a close approximation of this figure by subtracting private consumption and exports from total production (see Appendix 4). During the first three years of the previous five-year plan, government consumption has taken approximately 41 per cent of production, while exports have absorbed 28 per cent of production, leaving 31 per cent to be distributed to the private sector of the economy. These figures compare closely with figures for 1971. However, while the rural population comprises 44 per cent of the population,[54] only 24 per cent of that portion of production directed towards the private sector of the economy is allocated for rural consumption. In 1971 this figure rose to 33 per cent. Thus it is obviously easier for an urban worker to purchase a car than it is for his country cousin. This fact is borne out by recent articles in the Soviet press criticizing the practice of agricultural workers buying cars of putting themselves on lists in cities, instead of on the lists of their local region. The practice is sufficiently widespread to merit the threat of severe punishment to violators.[55] This same source states that the order of priority in the RSFSR for authority to purchase automobiles and motor cycles in rural areas includes managers and technicians in that order, but does not even mention labourers or workers. It is obvious that the average Soviet farm labourer is not likely to become a car owner in the near future, even if he has the purchase price.

If anything keeps automobile ownership from becoming widespread in the USSR, it will be prices. Retail prices for the three automobiles currently available to the Soviet consumer range from 3,500 rubles for the inexpensive Zaprozhets, 4,936 rubles for the Moskvitch 412, to 5,602 rubles for the larger Volga.[56] Price lists for the VAZ 2101 have not been released; although by size and performance it should be priced between the Moskvitch and the Volga. If this in fact becomes the case, it is interesting to speculate on the attitude of Soviet citizens when they discover that they must pay over $5,400·00[57] at the official exchange

[54] *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR v 1968 Godu*, p. 11.
[55] A. Pyshov, "Tolko v Poriadke Ocheredi" (Only in One's Turn), *Sovietskaia Rossia* (Moscow), 3 August 1969, p. 2.
[56] *Selskaia Zhisn*, 5 February 1970, p. 4.
[57] Ibid.

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rate for a car that costs an Italian $1,600·00. If the Soviet government opts to reduce prices to a level equal to the world market, as had been indicated,[58] this will only exacerbate the already large imbalance between demand and supply.

Problems facing the Soviet Passenger Car Industry

In its growth, the Soviet automobile industry has followed a rather different course of development than its Western counterparts.[59] In the Soviet view, while the capitalist industry grew, it decentralized—supply industries grew up around basic industries. But the USSR continued on a course of centralization, every plant developing its own requirements and sources. This "narrowing specialization" has led to two basic flaws in the Soviet automotive industry, according to Soviet engineers. The first flaw is a lack of standardization that causes a requirement for a vast number of small parts in small quantities for the different models and types of vehicles produced by different plants. To satisfy requirements of repair parts is expensive in terms of manufacturing, stocking, and book-keeping.

The second flaw in Soviet eyes is that this system of creating vast independent enterprises has contributed directly to the backwardness of the industry as a whole. The creation of new enterprises has mostly been achieved by expanding old enterprises: the building of the Izhevsk combine out of the Moscow Small Displacement Automobile Plant Named Lenin Comsomol is an example. This practice, they claim, has brought about expansion at the expense of modernization. New plants manufacture the same models as the parent plant and such expenditures on an old model make significant modernization uneconomical.

Lack of change to meet new needs or take advantage of new processes is apparent. Khrushchev touched on this problem when he criticized the ZIL factory for manufacturing the same automobile for fourteen years, and the Cheluabinsk Tractor Factory for manufacturing the same tractor since 1939.[60] The 1966 agreement with FIAT was a further indication that the industry had been allowed to fall behind the times and needed extraordinary measures to be brought up to desired level of production.[61]

The suggested Soviet answer to these problems is to "diversify." In 1965 it was recommended that future expansion be based on creation of support industries to supply parts to basic industries, that is, as an example, to create factories that manufacture engines for several automobile factories.[62] It was suggested that this system might lead to

[58] TASS (Moscow), English language dispatch 0853 GIT, 19 March 1966.
[59] N. Kharatsiev and G. Bazylenko, "Kakie Avtomobili Nuzhny Narodnomu Khosiastvii?" (What Automobiles are Necessary to the Economy?), *Pravda* (Moscow), 18 May 1965, p. 2.
[60] A. Stefanov and V. Bakulin, "Chto Meshaet Cozdaniy Moshhnogo Sovershennogo Traktora" (What Is Interfering in the Creation of a Powerful Modern Tractor?), *Pravda* (Moscow), 25 January 1962.
[61] Potapov.
[62] Kharatsiev and Bazylenko.

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greater efficiency in incorporating improvements throughout the industry and lead to greater standardization of parts among the various manufacturers. The creation of the new plant at Tolyatti indicates that this concept has not met with official sanction. If anything, the concept of " narrowing specialization " appears to have been strengthened. It is possible to predict continuing resistance to change within the automotive industry.

THE value of any product depends on its reliability, and reliability depends on design and the quality of the materials and workmanship put into its manufacture. The recall campaigns waged in recent years by some Western companies to correct manufacturing defects attest to the serious results that poor quality control can have. The Soviet government recognizes this fact, and Soviet commentator H. M. Potapov stated: " In front of us are many difficult matters in the further development of our branch. Among them is not only quantitative but qualitative growth."[63] A casual inspection of new Moskvitch cars in the showroom in Copenhagen in 1969 showed that the foot brake on one model did not work, that all models were rusting in the showroom due to flaws in the finish, that the door on one model did not open, on another it did not close properly, that boot lids and hoods did not fasten properly on any model, to mention only a few of the faults. The external deficiencies indicated the possibility of even more serious internal flaws. Soviet writings support this assumption.

Since automobiles are scarce in the USSR, they tend to be kept in operation as long as is physically possible. Most vehicles require capital repairs, the replacing of major components such as the engine, etc., at 150 to 200 thousand kilometres. The cost of repairs at this point is 60 to 70 per cent of the original cost of the vehicle.[64] The general level of repair work is so great that the general cost of manufacturing repair parts for out-of-production vehicles equals 40 to 45 per cent of the cost of new vehicles.[65] The expenditure on manufacture of repair parts in 1968 was 750 million rubles, and in 1969 it was 850 million rubles.[66] An obvious conclusion from these facts is that the quality of workmanship and materials in sub-assemblies must be very low. This conclusion is supported by the chief construction engineer of the Gorki plant, Prosverin, who admits that due to poor quality, materials and workmanship, the valves on the Volga sedan wear out between 80,000 and 100,000 kilometres. He admits that long life and reliability are not considered as indicators when measuring fulfilment of the supplier's

[63] Potapov, 12 February 1969.
[64] A. Zarnbin, P. Chervonobrodov and A. Tarkov, " Spetzializnovats Remont Machin " (To Specialize in Repairs of Machines), *Pravda* (Moscow), 24 November 1965, p. 2.
[65] Ibid.
[66] A. Gudimov, " Avtomobile: Zavod-Magazin, Servio " (Automobile: Factory-Sales Service), *Ekonomicheskaia Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 7, February 1969, p. 20.

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plan. He further states that, in order to fulfil its plan, his plant must close its eyes to defects in sub-assemblies and materials ordered from other suppliers.[67]

EFFICIENT use of materials indicates the quality of workmanship and attention to details and also has a bearing on manufacturing costs. In this field the Soviet automotive industry is in a difficult position. As an example, the following quantities of basic materials are used in the manufacture of the Volga and are compared to the same materials used in the manufacture of a Plymouth.[68]

Basic Materials	*Volga*	*Plymouth*
Iron and Steel	1483·5 kg	1014·6 kg
Aluminum Rollings	7·6 kg	29·9 kg
Aluminum Alloy	55·4 kg	—
Plastic	—	4·7 kg
TOTAL	1545·5 kg	1049·2 kg

This difference in weight in iron and steel is explained by the facts that the lower quality steel available to Soviet plants requires larger cross sections to meet strength requirements and that plants must use standard sizes produced by rolling mills without regard to the needs of the automotive industry.[69]

Another interesting sidelight concerns the use of plastic in place of metals. The Moskvitch uses 49 plastic parts weighing 3·6 kilograms, while foreign cars use an average of 130 details weighing eight kilogrames.[70] In the machine building industry as a whole, the USSR uses twice as much steel for repair parts as the United States, in spite of the greater production of repair parts in the United States.[71]

In any structure, including the structure of an automobile, useful life is predicated on the soundness of the frame. If the frame does not support the structure of the car, all other major components will be forced to absorb structural stress and they will fail in a short period of time. The Likhachev factory has consistently had the problem of early failure of frame members on a truck model. Since failure was attributed to poor quality steel, this defect probably exists in other vehicles. The

[67] A. Prosvirin, L. Sokolov, and M. Korvgodskii, "Skolko Sluzhits Avtomobil?" (How Much to Serve an Automobile?), *Pravda* (Moscow), 20 August 1967, p. 2.

[68] M. Gorshunov and D. Popov, "Puti Ulucheniia Ispolzovaniia Chernykh Metalov" (Ways of Improving the Use of Ferrous Metals), *Voprosi Ekonomiki* (Moscow), No. 1, 1966, p. 71.

[69] S. Mateev, "Perspektivy Razvitiia Avtomobilnoi Promyshlennosti v Novom Piatiletim" (Prospects of Development of the Automobile Industry in the New 5-Year Plan), *Planovnoe Khoziastvo* (Moscow), No. 7, July 1966, p. 29. See also *Voprosii Ekonomiki*, July, 1970.

[70] Gorshunov and Popov, p. 72.

[71] Ibid. p. 74.

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fact that this defect has existed for fifteen years without correction is an indicator of the attention paid to qualitative improvements of products in the automotive industry.[72]

WHILE the rate of capital investment is not an open fact in the USSR, Mr Tarasov announced that the industry-wide capital investment for 1969 is 1,260,000 rubles.[73] As this amount is alleged to be twice the 1968 investment,[74] and the 1968 is one and one-half times the 1967 investment, it is obvious that the rate of capital investment is expanding. The investment in new branches of the passenger car industry alone is immense. The FIAT plant contract with Italy is estimated to cost 600 million dollars.[75] The French efforts at Izhevsk are estimated at 250 million francs, and 37 million dollars' worth of machine tools have been purchased from the United States.[76] Although these are long-term investments, they nonetheless attest to strong Soviet determination to modernize and expand their industry.

WHAT steps have been taken in the Soviet Union to solve the needs of an automobile culture?

An obvious requirement for full utilization of automobiles is an adequate road network. When the figures of Appendix 5 are compared with the nearly four million miles of public hard-top roads in the United States,[77] the lack of an adequate road network becomes readily apparent. It is obvious that large areas of the country have no hard surface road networks. Although progress is being made in expanding the hard top road network, this subject is not receiving the emphasis that the automobile industry is. The total extent of the highway network shank 11,200 kilometres in 1968, due to deterioration of unimproved roads.[78] Even though the hard-surfaced road network is slowly expanding, much of the network is too narrow to support the growing volume of traffic.[79] Some roads are being widened and about 16,000 kilometres of hard top road were scheduled for construction in 1969.[80] Even these figure do not tell the whole story. The average speed permitted by road conditions on hard top roads is 60 kilometres per hour. For other type roads, average speeds are limited to 10 kilometres per hour.[18]

[72] N. Tkachuk, "Chto Meshaet Nam Povysits Kachestvo Avtomobilia" (What Interferes in Our Raising the Quality of Automobiles), *Pravda* (Moscow), 24 December 1964, p. 2.
[73] TASS (Moscow), 25 February 1969.
[74] Ibid.
[75] "World Business," *Time*, 6 May 1966, p. 49.
[76] Hill, "US Sales for Soviet FIAT Plant," *RRE Special* (Washington), 13 January 1969.
[77] *New York Times Encyclopedia Almanac 1970*, p. 669.
[78] *Narodnoe Khoziastvo SSSR v 1968 Godu*, p. 489.
[79] Ray Vicker, "Caring for Ivan's Car," *Wall Street Journal* (New York), 15 January 1969, p. 1.
[80] Ibid.
[81] N. Khoroshilov and A. Nankratov, "Segognia i Zavtra Dorozhnogo Servisa" (Road Service Today and Tomorrow), *Turist* (Moscow), No. 8, August 1969, p. 10.

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THE weakness of "the rear," that is, of the support needed to distribute and maintain cars, is one of the greatest problems. With a relatively small output and a two- to three-year [82] waiting period before delivery, the problem has not been serious enough to warrant serious consideration by the government, but with the increase in production and increased consumer demands, some steps must be taken. Under the present system, automobile distribution in the private sector is established by plan and is included in the market fund. The plan allocates cars between the urban and rural population and between republics. Although it cannot be documented directly, it is apparent that cars are further allocated through this fund down to the lowest level.[83] The cars are actually sold to individuals through two outlets: state commission stores in urban areas and cooperative consumer stores in rural areas.[84] The names of individuals who may purchase cars when they become available are published by the Executive Committees of the Regional Councils of Workers Deputies.[85] This rather crude sales system does not meet the needs of the passenger car industry. Since sales outlets are not equipped to service the cars, the side streets around them are often lined with cars that will not run, being worked on by frustrated purchasers who cannot get needed parts and who are not qualified to make repairs. The outlet must only turn the car over to the purchaser and get the car off the premises, often by towing it out of the door with a piece of rope and a truck.[86]

This problem is recognised by the Trade Commission of the USSR and some halting steps are being taken towards solving the problem. The first automobile sales facility in the USSR is under construction and is a modern facility with sales, maintenance, repairs and storage in one five-storey building.[87]

On a wider scale, the Automobile Technical Service was organized in November 1968 to cope with the problems of automobile service throughout the USSR. It is planning a series of petrol stations, repair garages, parts stores, car washes, and other service centres scattered about the country.[88] In Moscow there are 13 petrol stations, and throughout the RSFSR there are 600 stations.[89] Two large service centres have been planned to handle Volga and Zaprozhets cars and are expected to cost about 50 million rubles. Unfortunately, the appropriation was later reduced to 50,000 rubles and work has ground to a halt.[90]

[82] Charlotte Saikowski, "Russians Await Auto Revolution," *The Christian Science Monitor* (London), 12 February 1969, p. 1.
[83] Pyshov.
[84] Iu. Mikhin, "Konsultatsia, Otvety Raziasneniia" (Consultations, Answers, and Explanations), *Izvestia* (Moscow), 5 October 1969, p. 5.
[85] Pyshov.
[86] Gudimov.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Pankratov.
[89] Vicker.
[90] Gudimov.

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In the matter of trained personnel for servicing, little appears to have been done. Competent repairmen are difficult to find in Moscow and, by inference, elsewhere.[91] The official attitude is that a trained production worker is *per se* a trained mechanic.[92] No apparent thought or effort being expended in the training of qualified mechanics.

In the field of repair parts, a rather ambivalent situation exists. Although expenditures approached 750 million rubles in 1968 and 850 million rubles in 1969, results seem to be lacking.[93] As an example, in Moscow one must wait three days for spark plugs for a Moskvitch.[94] The problem of repair parts and skilled mechanics is so acute that in many cities private automobile owners have started more or less spontaneous " rallies " on Sundays. Drivers will congregate in a given area to trade information, repair parts, and even expertise.[95]

Since there are approximately one million privately owned cars registered in the USSR,[96] we can estimate that there must be approximately three million government cars in operation. If this figure is roughly correct, we can estimate an expenditure of the order of 200 rubles per car per year for manufacture of repair parts. The fact that parts are scarce in spite of such a great expenditure of funds is explained by an inherent contradiction of the Soviet planned economy. Since fulfilment of the plan is measured by monetary value of repair parts, factories tend to manufacture the most expensive and complex items for which there is little demand, while ignoring the cheap simple parts that are in such short supply.[97] it does not appear that this problem will be solved in the near future.

The more sophisticated modern automobiles require more sophisticated and modern products to support them. This provides a further difficulty in the Soviet Union. As performance increases, the quality of lubricants must increase. As the compression ratio of engines increases, the quality and octane rating of fuel must increase. The current standard petrol in the USSR is 66 octane. If this were raised to 85 octane, there would be an eight to fifteen per cent improvement in engine performance, and the life of moving parts could be extended two to three times if quality of lubricants was improved.[98] The engine of the FIAT 124 is designed for standard grade Western European petrol, 92 octane. Just how they intend to solve this problem is not clear, but in testing their

[91] Vicker.
[92] Gudimov.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Vicker.
[95] A. Druzenko, " Avtoazbuka " (Autoalphabet), *Izvestia* (Moscow), 13 November 1969, p. 6.
[96] Ibid. Some reliable Western sources estimate the Soviet passenger car fleet to number 1·2 million rgistered vehicles of which approximately 500,000 are privately owned. Use of this estimate makes expenditures even more amazing.
[97] Gudimov.
[98] S. Matveev, " Perspektivi Razvitiia Avtomobilnoi Promyshlennosti v Novom Piatiletti " (Perspectives of the Development of the Automobile Industry in the New 5-Year Plan), *Planovoe Khoziastvo* (Moscow), No. 7, July 1966, p. 29.

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VAZ 2101 prototypes, they remark that the top speed of 140 kilometres per hour is too fast and that they may have to reduce this speed to meet Soviet conditions.[99]

Future Trends

A most interesting trend is the developing Soviet interest in the international automotive field. They have participated in the London-Sydney automobile race and the International Automobile Show in Holland. Soviet exports and attempts to market automobiles in the West further point to wider international participation. Soviet interest in more sophisticated competition is also evident. Students at the Kharkovsk Automobile Institute are working on two experimental cars, the HADI-7 and HADI-8. These gas turbine powered cars have already achieved speeds of 450 kilometres per hour, and they hope to reach speeds of 720 kilometres per hour and to seize the international land speed record.[104]

Recognizing the hazards of air pollution, Soviet engineers are working on an electric automobile. The Academy of Science of the USSR believes that a small vehicle of limited speed operated by storage batteries could be economically operated in the stop-and-go situations of city driving. They foresee use of improved carburation and anti-emission devices on internal combustion engines as another means of improving pollution control.[105]

Another possible future development is a diesel-powered passenger car. Although they have been manufacturing trucks and tanks with diesel engines for many years, there has never been any known attempt in the Soviet Union to manufacture a diesel-powered passenger car. In February 1969 the Ministry of Automobile Industry announced the creation of a new automobile factory in Eastern Siberia which will concentrate on production of diesel motors.[106] Although this dispatch did not mention production of such motors for passenger cars, it does mention small capacity engines and later mentions production of passenger cars at Tolyatti. A further and more direct indication of Soviet interest in this field was the display of a Moskvitch 408 sedan equipped with a diesel motor at The Hague Automobile Show in February 1969.[107]

In the service and repair field, there is a more indirect approach to meeting anticipated future requirements. Filling stations will be required to stock 25 to 40 of the most often demanded repair parts for privately-owned automobiles. To meet the need for repair facilities, the Ministry

[99] A. Klokhin, "Finis Pered Startom" (Finish Before the Start), *Izvestia* (Moscow), 30 May 1969, p. 4.
[104] O. Gysev, "Avtomobili Dlia Rekordov," (Automobile for Records), *Pravda*, 22 June 1969, p. 6.
[105] A. Frumkin, A. Gorinov and V. Balotskii, "Na Puti k Electromobiliam" (On the Way to Electrical Automobiles), *Pravda* (Moscow), 27 June 1969, p. 3.
[106] TASS Dispatch 5-26, Moscow, 28 February 1969.
[107] TASS Dispatch, No. 47, The Hague, 13 February 1969.

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of Autotransport has directed its subordinate installations having repair facilities to be ready to do maintenance on private cars.[108] However, spreading already scarce repair parts among 600 filling stations scattered throughout the USSR must only aggravate an already difficult situation. The capability of the Ministry of Autotransport to absorb the maintenance requirements for private vehicles in addition to maintaining its own fleet is an unknown factor. At present there is no evidence that this policy has been instituted.

GIVEN previous history, and the large capital outlays necessary to expand their passenger car industry, it appears likely that the industry will again technically fall behind the West. It is very possible that FIAT will cease manufacturing the FIAT 124 sedan and move on to an improved model before the Tolyatti works ever get into full production in 1975. Since Western products cannot compete on the Soviet market, there is not likely to be much stimulation for change.

Due to limited production, poor quality and lack of dealer and maintenance services, economic competition with Western producers for a share of the international market is highly unlikely. However, increased trade within COMECON and export of automobiles to under-developed nations as a form of economic aid will probably increase. Lack of repair parts will further reduce the competitive position of Soviet products against Western products.

Although production of passenger cars is increasing, there appears little likelihood of private ownership ever approaching that of the West, or of the passenger car ever having the social impact that it has had in the United States. Distribution of output between the government, exports and private consumers proves that the USSR is in no hurry to orient its industry towards the citizen consumer. The passenger car will continue to be an expensive and rare luxury for the average Russian city dweller, and an almost unattainable goal for the average agricultural worker.

APPENDIX 1

Technical Data, Soviet Passenger Cars

VOLGA [1]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 5–6
Cylinders	4 in line water-cooled
Horsepower	110
Compression	8·2 : 1
Acceleration	0–100 KM/hr: 22 seconds
Fuel Consumption	12 litres per 100 kilometres
Maximum Speed	145 kilometres per hour

[108] S. Raber, "Segodnia i Zavtra Dorozhnogo Servisa" (Road Service of Today and Tomorrow), *Turist*, No. 8, August 1969, p. 10.

[1] *Sputnik* No. 6, June 1969, *Novaia Volga*, pp. 72–5.

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VOLGA—*continued*

Specifications:	
Wheel Base	2·8 metres
Length	4·73 metres
Width	1·8 metres
Height	1·49 metres
Curb Weight	1300 kilograms

ZAPROZHETS [2]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 4
Cylinders	V-4 air-cooled
Horsepower	27
Compression	Unknown
Acceleration	Unknown
Fuel Consumption	5·5 litres per 100 kilometres
Maximum Speed	90 kilometres per hour
Specifications:	
Wheel Base	2·02 metres
Length	3·33 metres
Width	1·39 metres
Height	1·38 metres
Curb Weight	650 kilograms

MOSKVITCH 412 [3]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 4–5
Cylinders	4 in line water-cooled
Horsepower	60
Compression	Unknown
Acceleration	Unknown
Fuel Consumption	Unknown
Maximum Speed	140 kilometres per hour
Specifications:	
Wheel Base	2·4 metres
Length	4·09 metres
Width	1·55 metres
Height	1·48 metres
Curb Weight	990 kilograms

[2] Pamphlet *Zaprozhets 965*, Vneshtorg Izdat Zakaz No. 27001.
[3] Pamphlet *Moskvitch*, Vneshtorg Izdat Zakaz No. 27006/7.

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CHAIKA [4]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 6
Cylinders	6 in line water-cooled
Horsepower	90
Compression	Unknown
Acceleration	Unknown
Fuel Consumption	18·5 litres per 100 kilometres
Maximum Speed	120 kilometres per hour
Specifications:	
Wheel Base	3·2 metres
Length	5·53 metres
Width	1·90 metres
Height	1·66 metres
Curb Weight	1940 kilograms

ZIL 111 [5]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 7
Cylinders	V-8 water-cooled
Horsepower	220
Compression	Unknown
Acceleration	Unknown
Fuel Consumption	19 litres per 100 kilometres
Maximum Speed	170 kilometres per hour
Specifications:	
Wheel Base	3·76 metres
Length	6·03 metres
Width	2·03 metres
Height	1·64 metres
Curb Weight	2550 kilograms

UAZ 469 [6]

Engine:	*Passengers:* 4
Cylinders	4 in line water-cooled
Horsepower	70
Compression	Unknown
Acceleration	Unknown
Fuel Consumption	Unknown
Maximum Speed	100 kilometres per hour

[4] Ministry of Automobile Transport and Highways of the RSFSR, *Kratky Avtomobilny Spravochnik*, *Avtotransizdat*, Moscow 1963, pp. 42–4.
[5] Ibid. pp. 45–8.
[6] Headquarters, United States Army Europe, *USAREUR Pamphlet 30–60–1 Identification Handbook, Soviet and Satellite Ordnance Equipment, Part Two*, 30 June 1966 p. 007.

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UAZ 469—*continued*

Specifications:	
Wheel Base	2·38 metres
Length	4·04 metres
Width	1·78 metres
Height	2·02 metres
Curb Weight	1600 kilometres

VAZ 2101 [7]

(FIAT)

Engine:	*Passengers:* 5
Cylinders	4 in line liquid cooled sealed system
Horsepower	60–65
Compression	8·8 : 1
Acceleration	0–80 kilometres per hour in 12 seconds
Fuel Consumption	8–9 litres per 100 kilometres
Maximum Speed	140 kilometres per hour
Specifications:	
Wheel Base	2·42 metres
Length	4·03 metres
Width	1·62 metres
Height	1·44 metres
Curb Weight	860 kilograms

APPENDIX 2

World Passenger Car Production: 1968

Country	*Cars*
United States	8,848,620
Federal Republic of Germany	2,535,433
Japan	2,055,821
France	1,833,047
United Kingdom	1,699,300
Italy	1,544,933
Canada	899,943
Australia	314,000
Spain	310,000
USSR	280,000 *

Figures as furnished by the Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc. Published in *The New York Times Encyclopedic Almanac 1970*, Seymour Kurtz, editor. New York: New York Times Book Division, 1969, p. 651.

* This figure from *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR V 1968 godu*, p. 261. Figure quoted by the Automobile Association for this year was 300,000. In either event, the USSR is in tenth place.

[7] B. Solovev, "Novui Malolitrazhnui VAZ 2101," (New Small Displacement VAZ 2101), *Za Rulem*, No. 6, June 1968, pp. 6, 7.

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APPENDIX 3

Growth of the Passenger Car Industry

Soviet Production of Passenger Cars, 1962–69

Year	*Number*
1962	165,945
1963	173,122
1964	185,159
1965	201,175
1966	230,251
1967	251,441
1968	280,332
1969	293,600 *

SOURCE: *Narodnoe Khosaistvo, SSSR V 1968 Godu*, p. 261. Also see *United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1969, p. 291.
* *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 5, January 1970, p. 3.

APPENDIX 4

Distribution of Soviet Passenger Car Production 1962–68

Consumption, Thousands of Units

	Private Sector				
Year [1]	*Rural* [2]	*Urban* [3]	*Total* [4]	*Exports* [5]	*Official Use* [6]
1963	27	53	(80)	35·7	57·4
1964	18	52	(70)	44·5	70·7
1965	17·1	46·9	(64·0)	48·6	88·6
1966	19·4	54·2	(73·6)	66·5	90·1
1967	17·4	57·7	(75·7)	68·9	107·4
1968	25·0	61·3	(86·3)	82·3	111·7
1969	32·0	55	(87)	73·8	132·8
1970	49·0	74	(123)	84·8	136·8
1971	74·0	148	(222)	149·7	157·3

[1] Years 1963 and 1964 from *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1964. Years 1965 to 1968 from *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1968. Data on year 1969 not yet available.
[2] Data from table: *Production Assigned for Sale to Agricultural Population*, p. 632, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1964, and p. 623, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1968.
[3] This figure estimated by subtracting *Agricultural Sales* from *Sales to Population of Cities, Towns and Agricultural Areas.*
[4] Data from table: *Production Intended for Sale to Population of Cities, Towns and Agricultural Areas*, p. 632, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1964, and p. 623, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1968.
[5] Data from table: *Exports of the Most Important Goods from the USSR*, p. 661, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1964, and p. 657, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1968.
[6] Estimate reached by subtracting exports and sales to urban and rural population from total production (Appendix 2)

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APPENDIX 5

Extent of Hard Top Automobile Roads in the USSR

Thousands of Kilometres

Year	*All Hard Covered Roads*	*Cement or Asphalt* *	*All Roads*
1965	379·0	132·3	1363·5
1966	405·6	146·0	1363·6
1967	433·0	161·1	1368·4
1968	455·4	176·7	1357·2
1969**	483·2	—	—
1970**	511·6	—	—
1971**	540·4	—	—

REFERENCE: Pages 487 and 483, *Narodnoe Khosaistvo SSSR*, 1968.
* Included in the column " All Hard Covered Roads."
** Incomplete data for 1969–71. See *Narodnoe Khozunsto SSSR*, 1970.

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Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919 *

Gordon A. Craig

ON 9 December 1918, exactly one month after the outbreak of the revolution that toppled the Hohenzollerns from power in Germany, there was a meeting of the new cabinet, the Council of People's Representatives. As it assembled, Dr. Wilhelm Solf, a civil servant who had survived the recent upheaval and was continuing to serve in his old post as Under-Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, refused to shake hands with one of the six ministers, the Independent Socialist Hugo Haase, on the grounds that Haase had allegedly taken Russian gold for his party before the revolution. This was a significant gesture, not only because it illustrated the contempt with which the members of the pre-war political establishment regarded their new masters, but because, in the end, it was the Solfs rather than the Haases who determined the course of German politics after 1918. It was the disunity and lack of determination of the Independents and the insistence of the Majority Socialists, led by Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann, that the support of the old bureaucratic apparatus and, more important, the old military command were indispensable, that caused the German revolution of 1918 to fail. By the middle of 1920 society had returned to its traditional ways.

TO describe the process by which the initial successes of the revolution were negated is the principal objective of Francis Carsten's illuminating study, but he is not content to stop there. Was it not possible, he asks, that this reversal, so tragic in the end for Germany and all its neighbours, might have been avoided? Were there not alternative courses of action which, if taken boldly by the Socialist leaders, might have given strength and permanence to the parliamentary democracy that they established in 1918?

It is well known that Ebert, a man with a pronounced bureaucratic cast of mind and an admirer of the virtues of discipline and order, was appalled by the muddle and confusion of the first days of the revolution and afraid that it heralded a repetition of what had occurred in Petrograd in November 1917. He constantly warned his colleagues of the imminent threat of Bolshevism and saw its harbingers in the soldiers' and workers' councils, which sprang up like mushrooms after the Kiel days of November. He bent all his efforts, therefore, to reducing the authority of the councils and, wherever possible, to eliminating them entirely. In the end, thanks to the enthusiastic support given to him by the Army High Command and thanks, even more, to the political folly of the Spartacists, he succeeded.

Mr. Carsten suggests that this was a false reading of the situation, that there was no real red threat, and that the majority of the councils

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were composed of men of moderate views, with little sympathy for Bolshevism and no desire to imitate its excesses. This was made apparent as early as mid-December, when a congress of the councils meeting in Berlin refused to seat Spartacist delegates and supported Ebert's call for a speedy convocation of a National Constituent Assembly that would be representative of all classes of society. In view of this vote of confidence, Ebert might have been well advised to ask himself whether the councils might not represent a useful counterbalance to the rightist elements in the state, which were already showing alarming recuperative power. And it might have been well if he had attended to the one urgent set of demands that the councils had made at that meeting, the so-called Hamburg Points which recommended the immediate dissolution of the old military system and the establishment of a people's militia in its place.

Ebert, who had two sons who died while serving in the Prussian Army, was probably temperamentally incapable of thinking in those terms, and he was in any case preoccupied with Polish depredations along the eastern frontiers and with the threat of Spartacism at home. He needed troops, and he was persuaded by his minister of defence, Gustav Noske, who made some ineffective efforts to raise a republican militia, that it was sounder to rely on free corps made up of former officers and NCOs of the regular army.

This proved to be a fatal mistake, and it may not have been necessary. Mr. Carsten points out that in the neighbouring republic of Austria, the government had succeeded in raising a popular militia, the *Volkswehr*, under the leadership of Julius Deutsch, and that this force proved to be both politically reliable and militarily competent. It is true that the old imperial military establishment had collapsed utterly at the war's end and that the Austrian Social Democratic movement was considerably more united than its German counterpart, both circumstances that facilitated the creation of a new model army. Even so, the Austrian experience showed that it was not impossible to persuade the working class to defend a democratic government, despite Noske's doubts on that score.

Not that the Austrian revolution was any more successful than the German one. In this brilliant comparative study of the course of politics in Germany and Austria, Mr. Carsten shows that what success the Austrian Socialist government had with the *Volkswehr* was offset by other factors beyond its control—the seizure of power in Budapest by Bela Kun, the influx of refugees from eastern Europe, the loss of national territory in the South Tyrol, Carinthia, the Burgenland, and Bohemia and Moravia, which was imposed upon it by the Entente powers, the horrific food shortages—all of which helped alienate rural Austria from Vienna and created the tensions that were finally to lead to civil war in 1934. In some of his most effective pages, Mr. Carsten describes the role that anti-semitimism played in undermining the foundations of Austrian democracy and points out the irony in the fact that, while the disciples of Schönerer and the Christian Socials who revered the name of Lueger fulminated against Vienna as a New Palestine and against Socialist leaders as Bolshevist dupes, "the most eloquent defender of the national aspirations of the German Austrians

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was a Jewish intellectual of strong Marxist views." This was Otto Bauer, whose efforts to persuade the Allies to make concessions to Austria were little appreciated and who was hounded out of the country by the forces of reaction in 1934.

MR. CARSTEN has performed the notable service of providing his fellow historians with the first thorough and circumstantial account in English of the activities of the soldiers', workers', and peasants' councils in Germany and Austria and the way in which they were affected by the agitations of the extreme left, the resilience of the extreme right, the policies of the national governments, and the intrusion of external factors. His general conclusion is that "the working class alone was too weak enforce the 'democratization' of society." But he insists, nevertheless, that the tactics of the socialist leaders were inadequate and that, in Germany in particular, they underestimated their own strength and were excessively conscious of the necessity of uniting the nation, using methods for that end that defeated their purpose and alienated many of their followers.

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Letters to the Editor

Sir,

I am grateful to Professor Leonard Schapiro for his sympathetic assessment of my book *The Judge in a Communist State* in the Winter 1972 issue of *Survey*. However, the reviewer raised a critical point which I would like to clarify; it relates to the crucial issue of involvement of political authorities in the judicial process. The reviewer suspects me of "giving a somewhat over-coloured picture" and adds: "Even in a communist dictatorship cases must occur in the court in which neither the party nor other officials are likely to be in the slightest interested, and where even the most cautious judge can afford the luxury of applying the law without fear of causing offence in any influential quarter."

The answer to this question is in the very first paragraph of the chapter "The Judge and the Apparatchiki" (p. 61): "In about 90 per cent of our court agenda there was not the slightest sign of interference in our decision-making. This observation, however, does not warrant the conclusion that some sort of '90 per cent judicial independence and integrity' existed. Both the sorry experience with the remaining 10 per cent and the awareness that someone might at any time inflict his 'suggestion' upon us conditioned *all* our adjudication."

For the sake of further clarity let me respond to related questions:

Q.: "Aren't there any situations—e.g. torts, traffic accidents, inheritances—which are apolitical, beyond political considerations and involvement?"

A.: "No. Concept of class justice and class adjudication ('the brilliant discovery of legal science,' according to Viktor Knapp, Professor of Law at Charles University in Prague) rescued us from sterile idealistic illusions, implied in the above question. Even in a car accident, the class profile of parties must be analysed and put in proper context of the conflict situation. There is nothing on the court calendar which remains beyond the legitimate interest of the communist apparat."

Q.: "Does that then mean that the communist apparat interferes in all legal cases?"

A.: "Certainly not. The ruling Party in its politicized perception of everything, from a boot nail to the stars in the most distant galaxy, has to settle for priorities. The 24 hours' limit in each given day demand it. On the whole, the judiciary is not among the priorities of the overburdened apparatus."

Q.: "So why do you in the judiciary worry when they in the Party don't come to bother you?"

A.: "We worry because they can always come. Any case no matter how trivial and how definitely closed may be re-opened and the judge called to justify its proper class contents. In the book I put it this way (p. 69): It was not so much the order to do this or that that

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mattered, as the knowledge, feeling, or at least suspicion that our necks were at stake and that at any time someone might come and accuse us of 'violation of socialist legality and aiding the class enemy.' A few years of practice with totalitarianism taught us to react in the same way cows react towards an electrified fence. . . . Like a newsman who, living with censorship, becomes his own censor, the judge adjusted his reactions to the anticipated response of the Party. Here, totalitarianism appears at its best. The judge becomes his own apparatchik."

Q.: "Do you imply that there was absolutely no room left for non-political, just, objective adjudication?"

A.: "Certainly not. At least 90 per cent of civil cases (and less that this proportion with criminal cases) we decided would likely pass the test of judicial propriety in a non-communist setting. This so-called 'classness" was mainly a matter of form: a verbal ritual that polluted the proceedings but did not necessarily affect the substance, i.e. the decision itself. 'Classness' in all its vagueness is manipulative and can be utilized for justification of virtually anything (e.g. 'merciless class struggle' when advocating severe punishment, and 'well-known generosity of the victorious proletariat' when mild sentence appears desirable). Furthermore, we were aided by the system's high productivity of new and even newer legal norms, all in force and many of them mutually exclusive. In the book I give examples of how one selected the right rule and regulation to justify almost any decision. Hence, the judge could at least attempt to utilize both 'classness' and the deluge of legislative acts as his protective shield and in fact turn it against the system."

Q.: "But did the judges do it?"

A.: "Not many, I regret to say. The pursuit of judicial role with what approached integrity was too demanding, and the majority of the judges gave up or did not bother."

Q.: "Were all judges equally politically vulnerable?"

A.: "No. The most vulnerable were the pre-war judges who had to expiate for the stigma of association with past bourgeois order, with acts of exemplary militancy. The most trusted were the proletarian cadres turned lawyers but these were the least likely types to embark upon the path of independent judgeship in defiance of the political desiderata of the regime."

Q.: "Why did you omit in the book to tell more about 'the more humdrum and uneventful daily life of the Czech court,' as the reviewer put it?"

A.: "Because of necessity. More than 20 publishers rejected the manuscript in its present, somewhat frivolous form. With humdrums added the book would have been thoroughly unpublishable."

Sincerely,

OTTO ULČ

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Sir,

In connection with Dr Tibor Szamuely, whose obituary I contributed to your issue No. 86, may I draw to the attention of your readers the foundation of a Tibor Szamuely Memorial Prize, which is to be administered by his publishers, Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd.

In the 3 April edition of the London *Times* a letter appeared in the following terms, which explains the purpose and the nature of this prize—and, incidentally, shows by its signatories how widespread, and in what a variety of fields, was the respect and admiration felt for Dr. Szamuely:

> "We wish to announce the inauguration of a Tibor Szamuely Memorial Prize, in memory of our late friend and colleague, who contributed so much to public life. It will be awarded yearly to a book in the fields of modern history, politics or social science which seems to the judges to embody best the qualities of erudition and good sense for which Dr Szamuely stood.
>
> | | | |
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> | C. Brian Cox | John Mander | Frederic Warburg |
> | John Gross | Malcolm Muggeridge." | |

Subscriptions are now being solicited to the fund for establishing this prize, by a committee consisting of Robert Conquest, John Gross, and Professor Hugh Thomas. Readers of *Survey* who wish to subscribe may send cheques made out to Robert Conquest, and addressed to him care of Messrs. Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 14 Carlisle Street, Soho Square, London, W.1.

Yours faithfully,

ROBERT CONQUEST, JOHN GROSS, HUGH THOMAS.

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Our Contributors

RAYMOND ARON is a professor at the College de France and the author of *inter alia, Century of Total War* (1954), *Espoir et Peur du Siècle* (1957), *Opium of the Intellectuals* (1957), *Paix et Guerre entre les Nations* (1962), *Le grand Débat* (1963). His latest book is *La Republique Impériale* (1972).

THE HON. GEORGE BALL, former US Under-Secretary of State, is at present a senior managing director of Lehmann Brothers, New York.

WILLIAM P. BAXTER is in the United States Army, currently stationed in West Berlin.

ADAM BROMBERG was until 1965 Director of the State Scientific Publishing House in Poland. He emigrated to Sweden in 1968 and is now engaged in research at Uppsala University.

GORDEN A. CRAIG is J. E. Wallace Sterling Professor of Humanities at Stanford University. Among his books are *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945* and *War, Politics and Diplomacy*.

MELVIN CROAN is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of Russian Area Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

RICHARD B. DOBSON is a research associate of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and holds a Research Fellowship from the International Research and Exchanges Board.

ELLIOT R. GOODMAN, author of *Soviet Design for a World State,* is Professor of Political Science at Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

PAUL HOLLANDER is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst and an associate of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University.

WALTER LAQUEUR is Director of the Institute of Contemporary History, Professor of History at the University of Tel Aviv and an associate of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University and editor of the Center's series: *The Washington Papers.*

MAURICE LATEY, formerly head of the BBC's East European Service, is now Chief Commentator in the BBC's External Services.

WALTER J. LEVY is an oil advisor to industry and government.

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET is Professor of Government and Sociology at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. Among his books are: *Agrarian Socialism, Political Man, Revolution and Counter-revolution, The Politics of Unreason,* and *Rebellion in the University.*

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RICHARD PIPES is Professor of History and Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. His most recent book is *Struve, Liberal on the Left 1870–1905*.

ELIZABETH VALKENIER is a fellow at the Russian Institute, Columbia University. Her "Soviet Economic Relations with the Developing Nations" is to appear in *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (to be published by Johns Hopkins University Press later this year).

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